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Abstract	  	  	  This	  thesis	  examines	  Barhebraeus’	  contribution	  to	  the	  medieval	  Syrian	  Christian	  discourse	  on	   the	   concept	  of	  God,	   concerning	  his	  understanding	  of	   the	  ontology	  of	  God	   through	   the	  love	   of	   God.	   Barhebraeus’	   thinking	   can	   contribute	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   God	  presupposed	  in	  the	  contemporary	  western	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism.	  Both	  the	  medieval	  Syrian	   tradition	   and	   the	   modern	   study	   of	   mysticism	   reach	   an	   impasse	   in	   the	   discourse	  about	   God	   due	   to	   the	   conflict	   between	   two	   rival	   epistemologies.	   In	   response	   to	   the	  epistemological	   impasse,	   Barhebraeus	   turns	   to	   insights	   from	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	  understanding	  of	  God	  based	  on	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  to	  critique	  the	  metaphysical	  background	  of	  the	  thinking	  which	  Syrian	  hermeneutics	  inherited	  from	  the	  Greeks.	  The	  main	  texts	  used	  for	  the	   argument	   of	   this	   thesis	   are	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   and	   the	   Ethicon,	   which	   reveal	   the	  development	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  main	  theme	  and	  his	  resolution	  of	  the	   impasse	   in	  the	  Syrian	  tradition.	   The	   academic	   discipline	   of	   mysticism	   is	   brought	   into	   dialogue	   with	   this	  contribution	   to	  Syrian	  hermeneutics,	   so	   that	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	   is	   shown	   to	  make	  a	  methodological	  contribution	  in	  resolving	  the	  epistemological	  basis	  of	  the	  conflict	  over	  the	  intentionality	   of	   mystical	   consciousness	   in	   the	   contemporary	   study	   of	   mysticism.	   This	  conflict	  is	  between	  two	  main	  schools	  of	  thought,	  objectivist	  and	  relativist,	  which	  inform	  the	  metaphysical	   presuppositions	   of	   both	   approaches	   to	   the	   study	   of	  mysticism,	   based	   on	   a	  materialist	   and	   essentialist	   view	  of	   religion.	   Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	   is	   shown	   to	   resolve	  the	   substantive	  problem	  of	  making	  metaphysical	   assertions	   concerning	   transcendence	   in	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  through	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  which	  overcomes	  the	  concept	  of	  God	  derived	  from	  metaphysics.	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  thus	  goes	  beyond	  both	  the	   classical	   approach	   to	   the	   study	   of	  mysticism	   and	   the	   relativist	   critique,	   to	   provide	   a	  hermeneutical	  understanding	  of	  the	  claims	  of	  mystic	  discourse.	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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  	  The	  mysticism	  of	  Barhebraeus	  is	  brought	  into	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Western	  discipline	  of	  the	  study	   of	   mysticism	   in	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   his	   resolution	   of	   the	   epistemological	  impasse	  in	  Syrian	  hermeneutics	  over	  the	   ‘Concept	  of	  God’	  may	  be	  extended	  to	  that	  which	  divides	  the	  modern	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  and	  to	  further	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  epistemological	  inquiry	  within	  ontological	  hermeneutics.	  	  Thus	   the	   central	   argument	   of	   the	   thesis	   concerns	   three	   main	   areas	   that	   are	   developed	  through	  the	  chapters,	   in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  contribute	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  God.	  These	  areas	  consist	  of	  the	  following:	  1. Barhebraeus’	  understanding	  of	  the	  ontology	  of	  God	  through	  the	  love	  of	  God	  	  2. The	  mystical	  ‘experience’	  and	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  intentionality	  3. The	  role	  of	  dialogue	  for	  the	  hermeneutical	  study	  of	  mysticism	  The	   first	   area	   involves	   exploring	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God	   in	   Barhebraeus’	  mystical	   texts,	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   and	   the	   Ethicon,	   with	   a	   view	   to	   understanding	   the	  nature	  of	  the	  ontology	  of	  God	  in	  the	  mysticism	  of	  Barhebraeus	  (1226-­‐1286CE).	  The	  insights	  gained	   from	   these	   texts	   serve	   to	   substantially	   revise	   the	   onto-­‐theological	   discourse	   that	  arises	  from	  his	  other	  works	  of	  a	  theological	  or	  philosophical	  nature.	  Therefore,	  his	  mystical	  texts	   cannot	   be	   considered	   in	   isolation	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   his	   literary	   output,	   since	   they	  represent	  the	  conclusion	  of	  his	  thinking	  on	  divine	  metaphysics.	  This	  part	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  outlined	   in	   Chapter	   3	   and	   developed	   through	   Chapters	   4	   and	   5,	   but	   the	  methodological	  framework	  is	  set	  up	  in	  Chapter	  2	  and	  then	  reprised	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  This	  framework	  is	  based	  on	   the	  discourse	  about	  God	   in	   the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  particularly	   the	  mystical	  experience	  and	  the	  intentionality	  of	  this	  experience	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  subject-­‐object	  structure.	  The	   monistic	   and	   theistic	   positions	   adopted	   within	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism	   presuppose,	  either	   positively	   or	   negatively,	   an	   ontology	   of	   God,	   and	   thus	   the	   intentionality	   of	   the	  religious	   or	  mystical	   experience	   rests	   on	  metaphysical	   presuppositions.	   The	   second	   area	  then	   provides	   the	   connection	   between	   the	   concern	   of	   Barhebraeus	  with	   the	   ontology	   of	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God,	  and	  the	  arguments	  within	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  concerning	  the	  intentionality	  of	  the	  mystical	   consciousness.	   These	   arguments	   are	   resolved	   by	   turning	   to	   the	   mysticism	   of	  Barhebraeus,	  not	  as	  an	  object	  of	  academic	  study	  but	  as	  a	   tradition	  of	   thinking	  which	  can	  make	   a	   contribution	   to	   modern	   debates	   about	   the	   role	   of	   transcendence	   in	   religious	  experience.	  This	  dialogical	  aspect	  of	  the	  thesis	  constitutes	  the	  third	  area	  of	  argumentation,	  which	   is	   the	   methodological	   contribution	   of	   a	   hermeneutical	   approach	   to	   the	   academic	  study	  of	  mysticism.	  	  Barhebraeus’	   mysticism	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God	   is	   thus	   brought	   into	   dialogue	   with	   modern	  debates	   in	   order	   to	  make	   a	  methodological	   and	   substantive	   contribution	   to	   the	   study	   of	  mysticism.	   The	   methodological	   contribution	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   mysticism	   resolves	   the	  epistemological	   conflict	   over	   the	   intentionality	   of	   consciousness	   that	   exists	   between	   the	  rival	   approaches	   in	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism.	   The	   substantive	   contribution	   involves	   the	  problem	   of	   metaphysical	   assertions	   about	   transcendence,	   which	   forms	   a	   similar	  problematic	   for	   Syrian	  hermeneutics	   as	   it	   does	   in	   the	   contemporary	  debates	   of	   religious	  studies.	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  overcomes	  the	  concept	  of	  God	  derived	  from	   metaphysics,	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   essentialist	   and	   materialist	   presuppositions	   about	  transcendence	  in	  the	  classical	  and	  constructivist	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism.1	  	  
Overview of the Chapters 	  Chapter	  2	  begins	  with	   the	  premise	   that	  Barhebraeus’	  meditational	   thinking	   about	  God	   is	  contained	   in	   texts	   which	   have	   been	   categorised	   as	   ‘mystical’	   within	   Syriac	   studies.	   This	  categorisation	   locates	   these	   texts	  of	  Barhebraeus	  within	  another	  academic	  discourse,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	   thesis	   does	   not	   explore	   the	   substantial	   body	   of	   literature	   on	   the	   theology	   of	   mysticism	   in	   Eastern	  Christian	   traditions.	   This	   literature	   includes	   the	   classic	   collection,	  La	  Mystique	  et	   les	  Mystiques,	   (éd)	   Andre	  Ravier	   (Paris:	   Desclée	   de	   Brouwer,	   1965),	   and	   the	   works	   of	   those	   who	   engage	   directly	   with	   Eastern	  Christianity	   –	   Thomas	   T,	   Špidlík,	   “La	   Spiritualité	   de	   l’Orient	   Chrétien.	   Manuel	   systématique”,	   Orientalia	  
Christiana	  Analecta	   206	   (Roma,	   1978);	   Thomas	   Špidlík,	   “La	   Spiritualité	   de	   l’Orient	   Chrétien.	   II:	   La	   prière”,	  
Orientalia	   Christiana	   Analecta	   230	   (Roma,	   1988);	   Irénée	   Hausherr,	   “Études	   de	   spiritualité	   orientale”,	  
Orientalia	  Christiana	  Analecta	   183	   (Roma,	   1969);	   I.	  Hausherr,	   “La	  direction	   spirituelle	   en	  Orient	   autrefois”,	  
Orientalia	   Christiana	   Analecta	   	   144	   (Roma,	   1956).	   For	   my	   discussion	   of	   Hausherr’s	   estimation	   of	   the	  composition	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  see	  the	  section	  on	  The	  Syrian	  Dionysian	  Tradition	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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Western	   discipline	   of	   studying	  mysticism,	   and	   thus	   projects	   the	   theoretical	   assumptions	  from	   the	   modern	   study	   of	   mysticism	   onto	   Barhebraeus’	   texts.	   In	   order	   to	   study	   the	  ‘mystical’	   texts	   of	   Barhebraeus	   and	   assess	   the	   contribution	   of	   his	   ‘mystic’	   discourse	   to	  Syrian	   tradition,	   the	   presuppositions	   of	   the	   modern	   study	   of	   mysticism	   must	   first	   be	  considered	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  thinking	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  Therefore	  this	  thesis	  begins	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  problematic	  within	  the	  Western	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  a	  middle	  path	  between	  the	  rival	  methodological	  approaches	  in	  this	  discipline,	  characterised	  as	  that	  of	  Enlightenment	  Objectivism	  and	  Genealogical	  Critique.	  For	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  to	   progress	   beyond	   the	   impasse	   of	   relativism	   and	   essentialism,	   which	   represent	   rival	  epistemological	   approaches	   to	   the	   object	   of	   its	   study,	   a	  more	   hermeneutical	   approach	   is	  required.	   In	   taking	   this	   approach,	   the	   academic	   study	   of	  mysticism	   is	   understood	   as	   the	  study	   of	   traditions	   of	   inquiry	   about	   the	   relation	   of	  man	   to	   God,	   but	   these	   traditions	   are	  internally	  differentiated.	  The	  academic	  discipline	   is	  a	   tradition	  which	  can	  be	   informed	  by	  the	  other,	  through	  engagement	  with	  other	  mystical	  traditions,	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  revision	  of	  its	  own	  understanding	  of	  mysticism.	  This	  dialogue	  of	  traditions	  is	  instigated	  with	  an	  initial	  investigation	  into	  the	  approaches	  that	  have	  been	  taken	  within	  Syriac	  studies	  to	  the	  mystical	  texts	  of	  the	  Syrian	  monastics.	  	  	  Chapter	   3	   proceeds	  with	   a	   historical	   overview	   of	   Barhebraeus’	  main	   texts	   and	   the	  main	  themes	  which	   arise	   from	   them.	   The	   themes	   pursued	   in	   Barhebraeus’	   mysticism	   emerge	  from	  the	  mapping	  of	  his	  literary	  works,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  their	  central	  concerns.	  This	  survey	  of	  his	  main	  themes	  leads	  to	  the	  problematic	  that	  Barhebraeus	  identified	  within	  the	  traditions	  that	  he	  inherited.	  Barhebraeus	  engaged	  in	  the	  central	  epistemological	  debates	  of	  the	  Syrian	   tradition,	  and	  his	  writings	  present	  and	  reformulate	   the	   intellectual	   issues	   that	  had	   preoccupied	   his	   predecessors.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   chapter	   contains	   a	   Critical	  Biography	  of	  Barhebraeus	  in	  order	  to	  trace	  the	  traditions	  which	  informed	  his	  literary	  and	  ecclesiastical	  career.	  The	   internal	  evidence	  of	  his	  texts	   indicate	  how	  Barhebraeus	  saw	  his	  works	   as	   contributing	   to	  West	   Syrian	   literary	   culture,	   a	  world	  which	  was	   informed	  by	   a	  variety	   of	   intellectual	   traditions,	   including	   the	   Greek	   and	   the	   Islamic.	   These	   texts	   also	  reflect	  Barhebraeus’	   personal	   involvement	  with	  his	   cultural	   environment	   as	  Maphrian	  of	  the	   eastern	   provinces,	   and	   thus	   details	   of	   his	   interaction	   with	   the	   leading	   political	   and	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ecclesiastical	  figures	  of	  his	  day,	  are	  used	  to	  contextualise	  his	  literary	  works.	  The	  selective	  overview	  of	   the	  biographical	   sources	   for	  Barhebraeus’	   life,	   examines	  his	   interaction	  with	  the	  East	  Syrians	  on	  a	  number	  of	  different	  levels,	  especially	  inter-­‐confessional	  relations	  and	  use	   of	   philosophical	   materials.	   Barhebraeus’	   particular	   contribution	   to	   Syrian	  hermeneutics	   is	   located	   in	   terms	   of	   his	   engagement	   with	   the	   Peripatetic	   tradition	   of	  Aristotle,	   and	   similarly,	   in	   his	   immersion	   in	   Syrian	   monastic	   spirituality.	   The	  interconnection	   of	   these	   apparently	   antipathetic	   disciplines	   is	   explored	   in	   more	   detail	  through	   the	   perspective	   of	   understanding	   the	   Syrian	  monasteries	   as	   centres	   of	   learning,	  whose	  educative	  curricula	  defined	  both	  the	  scholastic	  and	  mystic	  orientations.	  The	  tension	  between	   the	   school	  and	   the	  monastery	  amongst	   the	  East	  Syrians	  provides	  a	  backdrop	   to	  the	  epistemological	  tensions	  evident	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  own	  texts.	  	  Chapter	  4	  explores	  the	  main	  theme	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism,	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  background	  in	  Syrian	  monastic	  spirituality.	  	  Alongside	  the	  key	  themes	  and	  influences	  on	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism,	   the	   academic	   scholarship	   on	   his	  mystical	   texts	   is	   considered	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  critical	  editions	  of	  the	  Syriac	  texts	  and	  translations	  that	  have	  been	  published	  in	  Syriac	   studies.	   The	   categorisation	   of	   these	   texts	   by	   scholars	   as	   mystical	   is	   elaborated	  according	  to	  Barhebraeus’	  stated	  intentions	  for	  these	  texts	  and	  the	  literary	  genres	  to	  which	  these	   writings	   make	   reference.	   The	   Syrian	   Dionysian	   tradition	   is	   identified	   as	   key	   to	  Barhebraeus’	  understanding	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God,	  with	   the	  West	  Syrian	   transmission	  of	   the	  writings	  of	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē	  and	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius.	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  is	  shown	  to	   mediate	   between	   the	   theological	   principles	   derived	   from	   Greek	   metaphysics,	   that	   of	  Aristotle’s	   Highest	   Being	   and	   Plato’s	   Highest	   Good.	   Barhebraeus’	   emphasis	   on	   the	   Spirit	  surpasses	   these	   polarised	   positions	   concerning	   the	   ontology	   of	   God,	   and	   revives	   the	  importance	  of	   revelation	   in	   Syrian	  hermeneutics.	  The	   ecumenical	   aspect	   to	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  is	  apparent	  with	  his	  incorporation	  of	  John	  Climacus’	  Scala	  Paradisi.	  	  	  Chapter	  5	  builds	  specifically	  on	  the	  conflict	  of	  thinking	  between	  scholastic	  learning	  and	  the	  contemplative	  disciplines	  of	  the	  mystics.	  This	  conflict	  was	  outlined	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Chapter	  3	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  historical	  formation	  and	  crystallisation	  in	  the	  educative	  curricula	  of	  the	  East	  and	  West	  Syrians.	  The	  characterisation	  of	  this	  conflict	  as	  an	  epistemological	  impasse,	  with	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its	  roots	  in	  the	  late	  antique	  philosophical	  tradition	  of	  Alexandria,	  is	  explored	  in	  more	  depth	  here.	   The	   substantive	   problem	   in	   this	   Syrian	   impasse	   is	   identified	   as	   that	   of	   forming	   an	  appropriate	   conceptual	   language	   for	   God.	   The	   Evagrian	   critique	   of	   onto-­‐theological	  discourse	   is	   shown	   to	   have	   a	   profound	   impact	   on	   the	   thinking	   of	   Barhebraeus,	   whose	  personal	  epistemological	  crisis	  mirrors	  that	  of	  the	  wider	  epistemological	  conflict	  between	  scholastics	  and	  mystics.	  The	  connection	  between	  epistemology	  and	  ontology	  is	  explored	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  epistemological	  frameworks	  inherited	  from	  Greek	  philosophy	  led	  to	  rival	  conceptions	  of	   the	  ontology	  of	  God.	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God	  overcame	  the	  epistemological	  debate	  by	  shifting	  the	  focus	  from	  knowledge	  to	  love,	  and	  the	  ontology	  established	  by	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  Barhebraeus	  borrowed	  from	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  through	  the	  five	  causes	  of	  love,	  in	  his	  resolution	  of	  the	  Syrian	  impasse.	  His	  dialogue	   with	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   is	   further	   considered	   according	   to	   his	   departure	   from	   the	  Avicennan	   tradition	   of	   metaphysics,	   in	   which	   the	   love	   of	   God	   remains	   within	   the	  delimitations	   of	   an	   onto-­‐theological	   discourse.	   This	   break	   with	   onto-­‐theology	   in	  Barhebraeus’	  mystical	  texts	  is	  epitomised	  by	  his	  concept	  of	  the	  Spirit	  as	  that	  which	  gives,	  and	  the	  model	  of	  the	  gift.	  	  Chapter	   6	   returns	   to	   the	   theoretical	   formulation	   of	   taking	   a	   hermeneutical	   approach	   to	  mysticism	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  This	  approach	  begins	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  academic	   inquiry,	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   any	   academic	   study	   is	   embedded	   in	   a	   tradition	  which	   contains	   its	   own	   epistemological	   and	   methodological	   presuppositions	   about	   the	  object	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  study.	  These	  presuppositions,	  understood	  as	  ‘fore-­‐projections’	  and	  as	  ‘prejudice’	  in	  the	  ontological	  tradition	  of	  philosophical	  hermeneutics,	  are	  formative	  for	   that	   inquiry	   and	   yet	   are	   open	   to	   reinterpretation	   and	   revision	   when	   they	   become	  inadequate	  to	  their	  object	  of	  study.	  The	  Western	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  can	  become	  a	  more	   reflective	   discipline	   that	   is	   able	   to	   incorporate	   the	   insights	   offered	   by	   mystical	  traditions	  in	  two	  inter-­‐related	  areas:	  	  i) the	  substantive	  issue	  of	  the	  relation	  of	  man	  to	  God	  ii) the	  methodological	   issue	   of	   how	   this	   relation	  may	   be	   studied,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  explanatory	  structures	  of	  interpretation	  that	  mystical	  traditions	  provide.	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Therefore	   Chapter	   6	   is	   divided	   two-­‐fold,	   with	   the	   first	   part	   concerned	   with	   the	  epistemological	  impasse	  in	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  and	  the	  possibilities	  for	  its	  resolution	  in	  the	   encounter	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   mysticism	   with	   a	   similar	   epistemological	   impasse	   in	   the	  Syrian	  tradition.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  deals	  with	  the	  methodological	  contribution	  that	   an	   understanding	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   mysticism	   can	   make	   to	   the	   dialogical	   method	  proposed	  for	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  derived	  from	  ontological	  hermeneutics.	   In	  this	   tradition	   of	   hermeneutics,	   academic	   inquiry	   that	   is	   truly	   dialogical	   should	   allow	   its	  ‘fore-­‐projections’	  to	  be	  revised	  by	  the	  encounter	  with	  the	  ‘other’,	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  ‘other’	  to	  speak.	  In	  this	  way,	  Western	  ontological	  hermeneutics	  can	  itself	  be	  enriched	  methodologically,	  through	  the	  dialogical	  encounter	  with	  mystic	  traditions,	  and	  particularly	  the	   contribution	   that	   they	   make	   to	   the	   epistemological	   problem	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   God.	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Chapter	  2:	  A	  Hermeneutical	  Approach	  for	  the	  Academic	  Study	  of	  Mysticism	  
Introduction 	  The	  Western	   discipline	   of	  mysticism	  within	  which	   Barhebraeus’	  mystical	   texts	   are	   to	   be	  considered,	  is	  a	  discipline	  problematized	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  very	  study	  of	  mysticism	  is	  being	   called	   into	   question,	   with	   the	   suggestion	   that	   the	   term	   ‘mysticism’	   should	   be	  abandoned	  altogether.	  Therefore,	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  different	  modes	  of	  inquiry	  within	  the	   study	   of	   mysticism	   is	   undertaken	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   delineating	   an	   approach	   that	  becomes	  central	  to	  this	  thesis.	  Mapping	  this	  academic	  literature	  on	  mysticism	  is	  thereby	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  conceptual	  methodology	  of	  a	  hermeneutical	  approach	  to	  mysticism.	  	  The	   two	   dominant	  ways	   of	   studying	  mysticism	   appear	   to	   be	   incommensurable,	   and	   any	  inquiry	   into	  mysticism	   today	   needs	   to	   engage	  with	   this	   debate	   in	   order	   to	   articulate	   an	  approach	   that	   will	   avoid	   the	   limitations	   of	   these	   two	   rival	  modes	   of	   inquiry.	   These	   two	  approaches	  may	  be	  identified	  broadly	  as	  follows,	  	  
• what	  may	  be	  considered	  Enlightenment	  objectivism	  in	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  
• Genealogical	   critique	   of	   these	   Enlightenment	   approaches	   to	   mysticism	   in	   the	  tradition	  of	  postmodern	  relativism.	  	  The	  formation	  of	  these	  categories	  draws	  on	  Richard	  J.	  Bernstein’s	  philosophical	  analysis	  of	  the	  academic	  sciences,	  in	  his	  book	  Beyond	  Objectivism	  and	  Relativism,	  and	  also	  on	  the	  more	  specific	   discussion	   of	   the	   discipline	   of	   religious	   studies	   by	   Gavin	   Flood,	  whose	   book	  The	  
Importance	  of	  Religion	  categorises	  the	  predominant	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  as	  universalism	  and	  relativism.2	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  the	  debate	  is	  mapped	  out	  so	  that	  this	  mapping	  becomes	  the	  evidence	  for	  the	  hermeneutical	  approach	  adopted	  in	  this	  thesis.	  This	  chapter	  is	  in	  four	  sections:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Richard	  J.	  Bernstein,	  Beyond	  Objectivism	  and	  Relativism	  :	  Science,	  Hermeneutics,	  and	  Praxis	  (Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  1983).	  Gavin	  D.	  Flood,	  The	  Importance	  of	  Religion	  :	  Meaning	  and	  Action	  in	  
Our	  Strange	  World	  (Chichester,	  West	  Sussex,	  UK	  ;	  Malden,	  MA:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2012),	  81.	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• It	   commences	   with	   the	   attempt	   to	   capture	   the	   current	   articulation	   of	   the	   debate	  between	  the	  approaches	  of	  Enlightenment	  objectivism	  and	  postmodern	  relativism.	  	  
• The	  second	  examines	  critically	  the	  various	  approaches	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  mode	  of	  inquiry,	  in	  order	  to	  reveal	  its	  limitations.	  	  
• The	   third	   part	   explores	   the	   various	   critiques	   offered	   by	   recent	   postmodern	  approaches	   within	   the	   Western	   academic	   study	   of	   mysticism,	   with	   a	   view	   to	  showing	  the	  limitations	  of	  a	  purely	  constructivist	  approach.	  
• The	   fourth	   part	   intends	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   conventional	   approaches	   of	   the	  Enlightenment	   study	   of	   mysticism	   and	   its	   genealogical	   critique,	   by	   exploring	   a	  middle	  path	  in	  philosophical	  hermeneutics	  that	  has	  developed	  post-­‐Heidegger	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  especially	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Hans-­‐Georg	  Gadamer	  and	  Paul	  Ricoeur.	  	  	  In	   reviewing	   the	   literature	   in	   the	   Western	   academic	   study	   of	   mysticism,	   philosophical	  hermeneutics	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   seriously	   engaged	   within	   this	   discipline,	   although	   Martin	  Heidegger’s	   thought	  has	  been	  used	   to	  a	  certain	  extent	  by	  Michel	  de	  Certeau.	  While	  Flood	  has	  used	  Ricoeur	  extensively,	  and	  Richard	  King	  has	  similarly	  used	  Gadamer,	  these	  scholars	  work	   within	   the	   overall,	   comprehensive	   field	   of	   religion,	   though	   they	   apply	   their	  approaches	  to	  mysticism	  as	  part	  of	  their	  wider	  work	  on	  the	  study	  of	  religion.3	  	  	  
Background	  to	  the	  Debate	  	  	  	  While	   the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  certainly	  has	   its	  adherents,	   there	   is	  also	  a	  certain	  reticence	   in	   contemporary	   scholarship	   to	   associate	   itself	   with	   the	   term,	   unless	   some	  understanding	  of	  mysticism	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  a	  well-­‐established	  position.	  In	  their	  preface	  to	   Mystics:	   Presence	   and	   Aporia	   published	   in	   2003,	   the	   editors	   Michael	   Kessler	   and	  Christine	   Sheppard	   give	   their	   reasons	   for	   a	   deliberate	   avoidance	   of	   the	   term	   ‘mysticism’	  due	   to	   ‘the	   totalizing	   connotations	   of	   the	   suffix	   “ism”,	   where	   “mysticism”	   would	   be	  understood	   as	   one	   among	   many	   rationally	   categorizable	   “isms”	   –	   atheism,	   polytheism,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Brainerd	  Prince’s	  PhD	  thesis	  on	  Sri	  Aurobindo	  follows	  the	  trajectory	  of	  King	  and	  Flood	  in	  the	  incorporation	  of	  dialogical	  hermeneutics	  in	  the	  study	  of	  religion,	  to	  outline	  the	  approach	  of	  ‘traditionary	  hermeneutics’	  and	  the	   Samvāda	   tradition	   of	   inquiry.	   Prince,	   Brainerd.	   "Aurobindo's	   Integralism	   :	   Study	   of	   Religion	   and	   the	  Hermeneutics	  of	  Tradition."	  (Thesis	  (Ph.D.),	  Middlesex	  University,	  2012),	  29-­‐34,	  356-­‐57.	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pantheism,	  mysticism’.4	  Instead	  they	  take	  up	  the	  alternative	  proposed	  by	  Michel	  de	  Certeau,	  whose	   ‘excavation’	  of	   le	  mystique	  provides	  the	  inspiration	  for	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  volume	  
Mystics,	   in	   recognising	   that	   the	   term	   itself	   has	   its	   own	   particular	   history	   in	   Christian	  tradition,	   but	   also	   that	   the	   language	   of	   le	  mystique	   extends	   to	   a	   plurality	   of	   phenomena.	  However,	   the	   editors	   recognise	   that	   to	   deploy	   for	   their	   varied	   subject	  matter,	   a	   term	   in	  translation	  from	  the	  French,	  born	  in	  the	  ecclesiastics	  of	  sixteenth	  and	  seventeenth	  century	  Europe,	  sets	  up	  for	  the	  volume	  itself	  a	   ‘self-­‐conscious	  anachronism	  and	  semantic	  oddity’.5	  The	   necessity	   for	   this	   semantic	   anachronism	   stems	   from	   the	   avoidance	   of	   the	   over-­‐used	  term	   ‘mysticism’	   and	   particularly	   its	   associations	   with	   the	   universalizing	   values	   of	   the	  phenomenology	  of	  religion,	  inheriting	  both	  the	  trans-­‐historical	  values	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  and	  the	  Romanticist	  reactionary	  perspective	  of	  the	  experiencing	  self.6	  	  	  Leigh	  Eric	  Schmidt	  identifies	  the	  lacunae	  between	  Certeau’s	  ‘genealogy’	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  mysticism	  as	  a	  phenomena	  in	  early	  modern	  Europe	  and	  the	  development	  of	  mysticism	  as	  the	  object	  of	  empirical	  study	  in	  the	  secular	  university	  with	  the	  psychology	  of	  William	  James.	  Schmidt	   provides	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	   ‘making’	   of	   modern	   mysticism	   in	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	  world,	  to	  develop	  the	  background	  to	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  preoccupation	  with	  mysticism,	  evidenced	  in	  James’s	  study,	  as	  a	  Romanticist	  response	  to	  a	  growing	  awareness	  of	   religious	   pluralism.7	  Bernard	   McGinn’s	   survey	   of	   approaches	   in	   Western	   mysticism	  complements	   Schmidt’s	   contextualisation,	   by	   highlighting	   how	   the	   theological	   interest	   in	  mysticism	  in	  the	  inter-­‐war	  years	  of	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  was	  particularly	  driven	  by	  French	   Jesuits	   such	   as	   Augustin-­‐Francois	   Poulain,	   J.	  Maréchal	   and	  Henri	   Bremond.	   Their	  interest,	  which	  was	  complemented	  by	  German	  Catholic	  writing	  on	  the	  subject,	  was	  driven	  by	  debates	  over	  the	  role	  of	  mysticism	  in	  the	  Christian	  life	  as	  well	  as	  its	  perceived	  relation	  to	  other	   religious	   traditions.8	  McGinn’s	   survey	  divides	   the	   field	  between	   the	   theological,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Michael	  Kessler	  and	  Christian	  Sheppard,	  Mystics	  :	  Presence	  and	  Aporia,	  Religion	  and	  Postmodernism	  (Chicago	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2003),	  viii.	  5	  Ibid.,	  viii-­‐ix.	  6	  Gavin	  D.	  Flood,	  Beyond	  Phenomenology	  :	  Rethinking	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion	  (London	  ;	  New	  York:	  Cassell,	  1999),	  104-­‐05.	  7	  Leigh	  Eric	  Schmidt,	  "The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Mysticism,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Religion	  71,	  no.	  2	  (2003).	  8	  Bernard	  McGinn,	  The	  Presence	  of	  God	  :	  A	  History	  of	  Western	  Christian	  Mysticism	  (New	  York:	  Crossroad,	  1991),	  280.	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philosophical,	   and	   the	   comparativist	   and	   psychological	   approaches.	   He	   states	   in	   his	  introduction	  that	  ‘we	  must	  still	  ask	  what	  mysticism	  is’,	  and	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  undermine	  the	  inquiry	  into	  mysticism	  per	  se.9	  This	  is	  perhaps	  to	  be	  expected	  from	  a	  survey	  that	  forms	  an	  appendix	  to	  a	  multi-­‐volume	  overview	  of	  Western	  Christian	  mysticism.	  Indeed	  the	  problems	  arise	  mainly	  when	  scholars	  seek	  to	  apply	  these	  Western	  categories,	  tied	  as	  they	  are	  to	  the	  history	  of	  Europe,	  to	  other	  cultures	  and	  religions.	  	  Genealogies	   of	   the	   European	   understanding	   of	   mysticism	   have	   thus	   been	   offered	   from	  various	  different	  perspectives,	  such	  as	  the	  feminist	  with	  Grace	  Jantzen,	  and	  the	  postcolonial	  critique	   of	   King. 10 	  The	   genealogical	   project	   as	   such	   evolved	   in	   other	   areas,	   and	   is	  epitomised	  by	  the	  analysis	  of	  knowledge	  as	  socially	  constructed	  discourse	  by,	  for	  example,	  Michel	   Foucault’s	   The	   Archaeology	   of	   Knowledge	   and	   Peter	   L.	   Berger	   and	   Thomas	  Luckmann’s	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Reality.11	  Jantzen	  has	  portrayed	  the	  privatisation	  of	  mysticism	   as	   a	   social	   construct	   of	   Western	   culture,	   exemplified	   by	   William	   James’s	  relegation	   of	   mysticism	   to	   the	   personal	   and	   individual	   realm	   of	   experience.12	  King	   has	  shown	   how	   the	   erosion	   of	   mystical	   aspects	   in	   Western	   culture	   has	   led	   to	   post-­‐Enlightenment	   thought	   projecting	   these	   characteristics	   onto	   the	   ‘mystic	   East’,	   a	   process	  which	   has	   contributed	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   Western	   cultural	   identity.13 	  	   Thus,	   these	  genealogies	  of	  mysticism	  have	  left	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  at	  an	  impasse,	  casting	  it	  as	   a	  mere	  by-­‐product	  of	  Eurocentric	   ‘historical	   and	   cultural	   situatedness’.14	  The	  question	  becomes	   how	   to	   read	   and	   how	   to	   represent	   the	   other,	   without	   continuing	   with	   the	  theological,	  patriarchal,	  rationalist	  and	  orientalist	  agendas.	  Indeed	  the	  paradox	  remains	  as	  to	   how	   this	   ‘other’	   can	   be	   identified	   or	   categorised	   as	   an	   ‘object’	   of	   study	   without	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ibid., xv. 10	  See	   the	   section	   ‘A	   genealogy	   of	   mysticism’	   in:	   Grace	   Jantzen,	   Power,	   Gender,	   and	   Christian	   Mysticism,	  Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  Ideology	  and	  Religion	  (Cambridge	  ;	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  12-­‐18.	   See	  King’s	  Chapter	  1:	   ‘The	  power	  of	  definitions:	   a	   genealogy	  of	   the	   idea	  of	   ‘the	  mystical’.	  Richard	  King,	  
Orientalism	  and	  Religion	  :	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Theory,	  India	  and	  the	  Mystic	  East	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1999),	  7-­‐34.	  11	  For	  Foucault’s	  discussion	  of	  genealogy	   following	  Nietzsche’s	  use	  of	   the	   term	  in	   the	  Genealogy	  of	  Morality,	  see:	  Gavin	  D.	  Flood,	  The	  Ascetic	  Self	  :	  Subjectivity,	  Memory,	  and	  Tradition	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  243.	  King	  discusses	   the	  significance	  of	  Berger	  and	  Luckmann	   for	  social	   constructivism	  within	  sociology.	  King,	  Orientalism	  and	  Religion	  :	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Theory,	  India	  and	  the	  Mystic	  East,	  170.	  12	  Jantzen,	  Power,	  Gender,	  and	  Christian	  Mysticism,	  18-­‐25.	  13	  King,	  Orientalism	  and	  Religion	  :	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Theory,	  India	  and	  the	  Mystic	  East,	  33.	  14	  Ibid.,	  73.	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criteria	  that	  was	  shaped	  by	  these	  agendas;	  so	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  mysticism	  does	  not	  become	  devoid	  of	  content	  and	  definition.	  	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  any	  mention	  of	  mysticism	  seems	  to	  require	  using	  the	  term	  in	  quotation	  marks.	  To	  talk	  of	  ‘mysticism’,	  is	  thus	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  this	  is	  a	  category	  problematized	  to	  such	  an	  extent,	  that	  it	  has	  even	  been	  designated	  as	  ‘an	  illusion,	  unreal,	  a	  false	  category’,	  by	  Hans	  H.	  Penner.15	  Schmidt	  comments	  that	  ‘Penner,	  in	  effect,	  set	  perpetual	   quotation	   marks	   around	   the	   term	   to	   signal	   the	   emptiness	   of	   its	   sui	   generis	  pretensions	   to	  universality	  and	   transcendence.’16	  For	  Penner	   the	  study	  of	   ‘mysticism’	  has	  itself	   distorted	   a	   set	   of	   ‘puzzling	   data’	   which	   has	   ‘led	   scholars	   to	   construct	   so-­‐called	  mystical	  systems	  and,	  in	  turn,	  to	  see	  ‘mysticism’	  as	  the	  essence	  of	  religion’.	  Penner	  is	  typical	  of	  the	  constructivist	  trend,	  articulated	  most	  vociferously	  by	  Steven	  T.	  Katz,	  which	  is	  highly	  dismissive	   of	   the	   legacy	   of	   the	   ‘classical	   approaches	   to	   mysticism’. 17 	  Indeed	   the	  constructivist	  position	  developed	  in	  reaction	  to	  these	  so-­‐called	  classical	  approaches,	  which	  encompass	   various	   forms	   of	   phenomenological	   inquiry	   into	   mysticism,	   including	   the	  perennialist	   philosophy,	   and	   deriving	   from	   an	   approach	   to	   religion	   inspired	   by	   the	  Enlightenment	  hermeneutics	  of	  Friedrich	  Schleiermacher.18	  	  The	   classical	   scholars	   of	   the	   academic	   study	   of	   mysticism	   sought	   to	   protect	   religious	  phenomena	  from	  the	  reductionist	  explanation	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences,	  by	  emphasising	  the	  subjective	   nature	   of	   mystics’	   claims	   to	   religious	   experience.	   Schmidt	   suggests	   that	   this	  approach	   was	   ‘designed	   to	   seal	   off	   a	   guarded	   domain	   for	   religious	   experience	   amid	  modernity	  –	  one	  in	  which	  religious	  feelings	  would	  be	  safe	  from	  reductionistic	  explanations	  and	   scientific	   incursions’.19	  Wayne	   Proudfoot	   sees	   the	   development	   of	   mysticism	   as	   a	  subject	   of	   academic	   study,	   as	   a	   ‘protective	   strategy’	   from	   the	   Romantic	   theology	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Hans	  H.	  Penner,	  "The	  Mystical	  Illusion,"	   in	  Mysticism	  and	  Religious	  Traditions,	  ed.	  Steven	  T.	  Katz	  (Oxford	  ;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1983),	  89.	  16	  Schmidt,	  "The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Mysticism,"	  274.	  17	  See	  Penner’s	  summary	  of	  these	  classical	  approaches.	  Penner,	  "The	  Mystical	  Illusion,"	  90-­‐94.	  18	  For	  the	  significance	  of	  Schleiermacher	  for	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  see	  discussion	  in:	  Jantzen,	  Power,	  Gender,	  
and	  Christian	  Mysticism,	  311-­‐20.	  19	  Schmidt,	  "The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Mysticism,"	  274.	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Schleiermacher	   onwards.20	  However,	   this	   strategy,	   typified	   by	   the	   classical	   scholars	   of	  mysticism,	   has	   been	   exposed	   to	   a	   Nietzschean	   perspectivism	   in	   the	   critical	   theory	   of	  religion	  and	  this	  critique	   is	  reflected	   in	   the	  constructivist	  approach	  to	  mysticism.	  Despite	  the	   often	   illusory	   nature	   of	   mysticism	   for	   the	   constructivist	   scholars,	   alternative	  approaches	   have	   accentuated	   the	   distinctiveness	   of	   the	   mystics’	   claims	   within	   their	  religious	   traditions.	   These	   approaches	   seek	   both	   a	   re-­‐envisioning	   of	   the	   linguistic	  operations	  of	  the	  mystics’	  text,	  as	  deployed	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  Michel	  de	  Certeau,21	  and	  the	  non-­‐linguistic	   nature	   of	   mystical	   experience,	   as	   suggested	   by	   Robert	   K.	   C.	   Forman’s	  exposition	   of	   pure	   consciousness	   and	   the	   apophatic	   tradition. 22 	  Certeau’s	   work	  demonstrates	   how	   a	   continued	   reflexivity	   of	   method	   within	   a	   highly	   problematized	  category	   of	   study,	   may	   yield	   further	   insights	   from	   within	   historically	   situated	   linguistic	  studies	   that	   reach	   beyond	   the	   social	   construction	   of	   reality.	   The	   approach	   of	   Certeau	  suggests	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  third	  method	  of	  enquiry,	  that	  offers	  a	  middle	  way	  between	  the	  polarised	   positions	   of	   phenomenology,	   which	   tends	   to	   blur	   the	   differences	   of	   religious	  plurality,	   and	   the	   cultural	   relativism	   that	   affirms	   the	   untranslatability	   of	   this	   plurality.	  While	  there	  is	  an	  on-­‐going	  debate	  concerning	  the	  need	  for	  a	  revision	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  cultural	  relativism	   that	   has	   sought	   to	   supplant	   the	   neutral	   objectivity	   of	   the	   scholar,	   there	   have	  been	  few	  voices	  offering	  a	  solution.	  	  	  
Enlightenment Objectivism 	  The	   approaches	   to	   mysticism	   in	   this	   section	   are	   grouped	   together	   in	   terms	   of	   their	  universalising	  view	  of	  the	  objectivist	  stance	  assumed	  by	  the	  neutral	  observer.	  Flood	  claims	  that	   the	   search	   for	   an	   objective	   reality	   beyond	   its	   representation	   in	   text	   and	   practice	   is	  shared	  by	  both	   the	  naturalist	   and	   the	  phenomenological	   approach,	   in	   that	  both	  pursue	  a	  ‘scientific’	  method	  variously	  conceived.	  In	  point	  of	  fact,	  ‘both	  the	  phenomenologist	  Edmund	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Wayne	  Proudfoot,	  Religious	  Experience	  (Berkeley	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1985),	  119-­‐54.	  21	  Michel	  de	  Certeau,	  The	  Mystic	  Fable	  [La	  fable	  mystique.],	  trans.	  Michael	  B.	  Smith.,	  Religion	  and	  Postmodernism,	  vol.	  1,	  Religion	  and	  Postmodernism	  (Chicago	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1992).	  22	  Robert	  K.	  C.	  Forman,	  Mysticism,	  Mind,	  Consciousness	  (Albany,	  NY:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1999),	  172.	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Husserl	  and	  the	  sociologist	  Max	  Weber	  regarded	  their	  methods	  as	  objectivist	  science’.23	  Of	  course	   their	   empirical	   objectives	   differed	   considerably,	   while	   Weber	   stated	   that	   the	  ‘essence’	  of	  religion	  was	  not	  his	  concern	  but	  the	  task	  of	  studying	  ‘the	  conditions	  and	  effects	  of	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  social	  action’,24	  Husserl’s	  methods	  sought	  the	  essential	  being	  behind	  these	   social	   forms.	   While	   the	   phenomenologies	   of	   religion	   that	   derived	   from	   Husserl’s	  philosophical	  phenomenology	  might	  not	  always	  recognise	  their	  own	  practices	  as	  scientific	  in	   the	   conventional	   sense,	   they	   share	   the	   attempt	   to	  produce	  accurate	  description	   in	   the	  creating	  of	  typologies	  for	  their	  phenomena	  in	  order	  to	  suggest	  the	  essence,	  be	  it	  mystical	  or	  otherwise,	  of	  these	  religious	  forms.	  This	  is	  as	  appropriate	  to	  the	  psychology	  of	  James	  who	  sought	  materialist	  explanations	  for	  mystical	  phenomena,	  as	  it	  is	  for	  the	  sociology	  of	  Weber	  and	  his	  model	  of	  ‘ideal	  types’	  which	  classes	  mystics	  and	  ascetics	  along	  with	  the	  ‘charisma’	  of	  the	  prophet	  and	  saint.	  	  
Sociology	  and	  Explanation	  While	  Weber	   is	  an	  unlikely	   representative	  of	  Romanticism,	  Sven	  Eliaeson	  shows	  how	  his	  concept	   of	   ‘understanding’	   or	   Verstehen	   had	   its	   history	   in	   this	   reaction	   to	   the	  Enlightenment,	  and	  thus	  his	  methodology	  ‘shared	  the	  language	  of	  romanticism	  and	  indeed	  grew	   out	   of	   it’.	   Weber	   clearly	   rejected	   the	   association	   of	   Verstehen	   with	   the	   notion	   of	  ‘empathetic	  understanding’	  or	  Einfühlung	  and	  insisted	  that	  understanding	  had	  to	  be	  met	  by	  
rationale	  Evidenz.25	  Instead	  of	  pursuing	  an	  empathetic	  awareness	  of	   the	  religious	  subject,	  particularly	   inspired	  by	   the	  Romantic	   tradition	  coming	   from	  Schleiermacher	  and	  Dilthey,	  Weber’s	   science	   was	   concerned	   with	   the	   evidence	   of	   reality.	   In	   the	  Methodology	   of	   the	  
Social	  Sciences,	  he	  declared	  that	  ‘The	  type	  of	  social	  science	  in	  which	  we	  are	  interested	  is	  an	  empirical	   science	   of	   concrete	   reality’.26	  Flood	   argues	   that	   for	   Weber,	   Verstehen	   is	   the	  empirical	   method	   that	   penetrates	   the	   reality	   surrounding	   our	   lives	   and	   ‘arrives	   at	   an	  objective	   account	   of	   social	   history,	   albeit	   an	   objectivity	   constrained	   by	   culture	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Flood,	  Beyond	  Phenomenology	  :	  Rethinking	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion,	  28-­‐29.	  24	  Max	  Weber,	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Religion	  (Boston,	  Mass.:	  Beacon,	  1993),	  1.	  25	  Sven	  Eliaeson,	  "Max	  Weber's	  Methodology:	  An	  Ideal‐Type,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Behavioral	  
Sciences	  36,	  no.	  3	  (2000):	  242-­‐43.	  26	  Weber’s	  comment	  is	  quoted	  by	  Flood,	  Beyond	  Phenomenology	  :	  Rethinking	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion,	  29.	  See	  further:	  Max	  Weber,	  The	  Methodology	  of	  the	  Social	  Sciences,	  trans.	  Henry	  A.	  Finch	  and	  Edward	  A.	  Shils	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1949),	  72.	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conditions	  of	  production’.27	  Weber	  applied	  his	  objective	  methods	  to	  depict	   the	  role	  of	   the	  ascetic	  and	  the	  mystic	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  ‘charisma’	  functioned	  in	  society.	  	  The	  Weberian	  distinction	  of	  the	  ‘rejection	  of	  the	  world’	  by	  the	  ascetic,	  who	  retains	  ‘at	  least	  the	   negative	   inner	   relationship	   with	   it’,	   from	   the	   ‘flight	   from	   the	   world’	   by	   the	  contemplative	   mystic,	   places	   these	   charismatic	   types	   in	   a	   somewhat	   antagonistic	  relationship	  to	  each	  other.28	  However,	  Weber’s	  model	  of	  the	  routinization	  of	  charisma	  has	  formed	  an	  illuminating	  vision	  of	  capitalism	  and	  the	  Protestant	  work	  ethic.	  Flood	  considers	  this	   ‘dialectic’	   of	   routinization	   and	   charisma	   to	   be	   Weber’s	   most	   lasting	   insight,	   in	   the	  instrumental	  role	  of	  Protestant	  religion	  on	  economics,	  when	   ‘the	  otherworldly	  asceticism	  of	   the	  monasteries	  became	  a	   this-­‐worldly	  asceticism	  as	  part	  of	   everyday	   life.’29	  However,	  even	  Weber	  maintains	  only	  a	  marginalised	  role	  for	  religion	  in	  society,	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  secularist	   project	   of	   sociology	   that	   emphasises	   the	   ‘unfolding	   of	   rationalisation’	   as	   the	  driving	   force	  of	  history.30	  Weber	  understood	  his	   contemporary	  world	  as	   suffering	   from	  a	  condition	   of	   disenchantment	  with	   the	   retreat	   of	   religion,	   and	   it	   is	   in	   this	   atmosphere	   of	  retreat	  that	  Weber	  views	  the	  role	  of	  the	  religious	  in	  society.	  	  Weber’s	  neo-­‐Kantian	  notion	  of	  relativism	  meant	  that	  he	  accepted	  that	  ‘Reality	  can	  never	  be	  apprehended	  fully	   in	  any	  set	  of	  concepts’	  and	  his	  construction	  of	   the	   ‘ideal	   types’	  reflects	  the	  inevitable	  distance	  between	  concepts	  and	  reality.31	  Nevertheless	  the	  drive	  of	  the	  social	  sciences	   to	   measure	   this	   concrete	   reality	   made	   recourse	   to	   the	   methods	   of	   the	   natural	  sciences.	  In	  keeping	  with	  this	  trend,	  Weber	  conceived	  ideal	  systems	  of	  historical	  causality	  that	  drew	  on	  jurisprudence,	  i.e.	  the	  law	  is	  governed	  by	  its	  own	  rules	  of	  abstraction.32	  Peter	  Winch	  in	  his	  assessment	  of	  social	  science,	  around	  fifty	  years	  later,	  criticised	  this	  tendency	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  more	  specifically	  Weber’s	  methods	  which	  relied	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Flood,	  Beyond	  Phenomenology	  :	  Rethinking	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion,	  29.	  28	  Max	  Weber,	  Economy	  and	  Society	  :	  An	  Outline	  of	  Interpretive	  Sociology	  [Wirtschaft	  und	  Gesellschaft.],	  trans.	  Ephraim	  Fischoff	  (New	  York:	  Bedminster	  Press,	  1968),	  545.	  29	  Flood,	  The	  Importance	  of	  Religion	  :	  Meaning	  and	  Action	  in	  Our	  Strange	  World,	  45.	  30	  Ibid.,	  46.	  31	  Eliaeson,	  "Max	  Weber's	  Methodology:	  An	  Ideal‐Type,"	  261.	  	  32	  Ibid.,	  255.	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‘statistical	   laws	   based	   on	   observations	   of	   what	   happens’.33	  Winch	   continued	   that,	   ‘if	   a	  proffered	  interpretation	  is	  wrong,	  statistics,	  though	  they	  may	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  so,	  are	  not	  the	  decisive	  and	  ultimate	   court	  of	   appeal	   for	   the	  validity	  of	   sociological	   interpretation	   in	  the	   way	   Weber	   suggests’.34	  Bernstein	   comments	   that	   Winch’s	   attack	   extended	   to	   the	  ‘positivist	  models	  of	  knowledge	  and	  rationality’	  as	  they	  are	  evidenced	  in	  Weber’s	  sociology,	  and	  that	  such	  an	  attack	   formed	  a	  parallel	   to	  Thomas	  Kuhn’s	   incommensurability	   thesis.35	  Bernstein	   argues	   that	   Winch	   despite	   his	   focus	   on	   the	   social	   disciplines	   rather	   than	   the	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  	  	   Like	  Kuhn,	  he	   [Winch]	  was	  protesting	  against	   the	  pervasive	  ethnocentricism	  whereby	  we	  measure	  and	  judge	  what	   is	   initially	   strange	   and	   alien	   to	   us	   by	   “our”	   present	   standards,	   as	   if	   they	  were	   the	   sole	   and	  exclusive	  measure	  of	  rationality.	  36	  	  	  The	  charge	  of	  ethnocentricism	  made	  by	  Winch,	   recurred	   frequently	   in	   the	  critique	  of	   the	  standards	   of	   neutral	   objectivity	   in	   both	   sociology	   and	   the	   phenomenology	   of	   religion,	   in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  tradition-­‐specific	  nature	  of	  their	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  	  
Mysticism	  and	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Religion	  The	   reductive	   explanation	   of	  mysticism,	   so	   apparent	   in	   the	   sociology	   of	   religion,	   is	   also	  characteristic	   of	   the	  psychology	  of	   religion;	   both	  disciplines	   are	   very	  much	   implicated	   in	  the	   Enlightenment	   project	   of	   offering	   empirical	   explanations	   from	   supposedly	   neutral	  objective	   standpoints.	   Frits	   Staal	   argues	   that	   while	   Sigmund	   Freud’s	   theories	   could	   be	  appropriated	   for	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism,	   his	   more	   explicit	   statements	   are	   overly	  determined	  by	  his	  conviction	  that	   ‘all	   religion	   is	  an	   illusion’.	  Carl	   Jung	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  takes	   us	   to	   the	   opposite	   extreme,	   in	   which	   his	   metaphysical	   realm	   of	   ‘archetypes’	   only	  provides	  ‘an	  ever-­‐elusive	  framework’,	  which	  fares	  no	  better	  when	  used	  in	  the	  explanation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Bernstein,	  Beyond	  Objectivism	  and	  Relativism	  :	  Science,	  Hermeneutics,	  and	  Praxis,	  27.	  This	  is	  Bernstein’s	  presentation	  of	  Winch’s	  argument,	  see	  further:	  Peter	  Winch,	  The	  Idea	  of	  a	  Social	  Science,	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  
Philosophy,	  2nd	  ed.	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1990),	  113.	  34	  The	  Idea	  of	  a	  Social	  Science,	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Philosophy,	  113.	  35	  Bernstein,	  Beyond	  Objectivism	  and	  Relativism	  :	  Science,	  Hermeneutics,	  and	  Praxis,	  28.	  36	  Ibid.	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of	  mysticism	  by	  Jungian	  disciples	  such	  as	  E.	  Neumann.37	  However,	  well	  before	  the	  Freudian	  method	   of	   psychoanalysis	   and	   Jung’s	   recourse	   to	   the	   sublime,	   came	   the	   schema	   of	  philosopher	   and	   psychologist,	  William	   James,	  who	   gave	   us	   an	   initial	   classification	   of	   the	  four	   types	   of	  mystical	   experience.	  With	   James’s	   approach,	  mysticism	   became	   a	   category	  capable	  of	  rational	  enquiry,	  but	  he	  seems	  to	  have	  restrained	  from	  reaching	  the	  naturalist	  conclusions	  more	  typical	  of	  later	  Freudian	  psychoanalysis.	  	  	  James’s	   approach,	   while	   he	   located	   the	   causes	   of	   mysticism	   within	   altered	   states	   of	  consciousness,	   is	   better	   understood	   within	   the	   wider	   framework	   of	   nineteenth	   century	  liberal	  Protestantism,	  than	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  later	  developments	  in	  the	  psychology	  of	  religion.	  Indeed	  Leigh	  Schmidt’s	  article	  traces	  the	  multiple	  strands	  that	  constituted	  this	  world,	  from	  ‘the	  Romantic	  construct	  of	  mysticism’	  to	  the	  popular	   interest	   in	  the	  other	  religions	  of	   the	  East	   and	   the	   academic	   interest	   in	   comparative	   religion	   at	   the	  Harvard	  Divinity	   School.38	  That	  James	  saw	  mysticism	  exclusively	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  mystical	  experience	  was	  in	  keeping	  with	  what	  Schmidt	  calls	  ‘the	  innovations	  of	  the	  era’.39	  	  However,	  the	  particular	  contribution	  of	   James	   was	   the	   application	   of	   his	   medical	   training	   in	   psychology	   to	   his	   analysis	   of	  religious	  experience,	  and	  mysticism	  as	  a	  particular	  ‘variety’	  of	  this	  experience.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  lectures	  given	  at	  Edinburgh	  University	  at	   the	  turn	  of	   the	  twentieth	  century,	  subsequently	  published	  as	  The	  Varieties	  of	  Religious	  Experience,	  James	  established	  the	  realm	  of	  religious	  experience	   as	   distinguished	   by	   the	   mystical.	   His	   fourfold	   categorisation	   of	   mystical	  experience	  –	  ineffable,	  noetic,	  transient,	  and	  passive	  -­‐	  became	  foundational	  for	  subsequent	  studies	  on	  mysticism.	  For	  James,	  it	  was	  his	  empirical	  study	  of	  human	  nature	  that	  provided	  him	  with	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  his	  only	  access	   to	   these	   ‘mystical	   states’,	  which	  he	  admitted	  he	  could	  appreciate	  ‘only	  at	  second	  hand’,	  since	  ‘my	  own	  constitution	  shuts	  me	  out	  from	  their	  enjoyment	   almost	   entirely’. 40 	  The	   components	   of	   his	   empirical	   study	   of	   mysticism	  consisted	   of	   his	   interaction	   with	   literary	   texts	   and	   his	   personal	   experimentation	   with	  nitrous	  oxide	  intoxication.	  The	  latter	  served	  to	  replicate	  the	  mystical	  experience,	  breaking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Frits	  Staal,	  Exploring	  Mysticism	  :	  A	  Methodological	  Essay	  (Berkeley	  Calif.	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1975),	  112-­‐13.	  38	  Schmidt,	  "The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Mysticism,"	  287.	  39	  Ibid.,	  294.	  40	  William	  James,	  The	  Varieties	  of	  Religious	  Experience	  :	  A	  Study	  in	  Human	  Nature,	  Penguin	  Classics	  (New	  York	  ;	  London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1985),	  379.	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down	   the	   ‘rational	   consciousness’	   to	   which	   he	   felt	   subject,	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   an	   intuitive	  feeling	   for	  mystical	   states.41	  James’s	   statement	   ‘that	   personal	   religious	   experience	  has	   its	  root	   and	   centre	   in	   mystical	   states	   of	   consciousness’,42	  suggests	   that	   the	   mystical	   states	  provided	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  the	  more	  everyday	  type	  of	  individual	  religious	  experience.	  	  	  This	  view	  may	  be	  contextualised	  within	  Schmidt’s	  New	  England	  circles	  whose	  views	  had	  already	   been	   expressed	   in	   publications	   like	   the	   Christian	  Examiner	   in	   1844,	   ‘as	   a	   higher	  stage	   in	   spiritual	   life	   has	   been	   reached,	  we	   find	   the	  mysticism	  of	   religious	   experience’.43	  Schmidt’s	   comment	   that	   this	   is	   ‘a	   phrase	   reminiscent	   of	   Schleiermacher	   and	   worthy	   of	  James’,	  might	   indicate	   that	   there	   is	   a	   further	   aspect	   to	   James’s	   psychology	   of	  mysticism.	  This	   aspect	   appears	   in	   its	   possible	   alignment	  with	  Protestant	   theological	   attempts,	   often	  identified	   with	   Schleiermacher,	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   criticisms	   characteristic	   of	   the	  Enlightenment.	   Although	   James	   may	   be	   credited	   with	   the	   first	   sustained	   application	   of	  psychology	  to	  mysticism,	  his	  personal	  philosophy	  was	  also	  more	  deeply	  enmeshed	  within	  the	  intellectual	  currents	  of	  Romanticism	  and	  liberal	  Protestantism	  than	  his	  ‘psychology’	  of	  religious	   experience	   would	   seem	   to	   suggest.	   James	   seems	   almost	   to	   avoid	   drawing	  conclusions	  about	   the	  object	  of	   the	   religious	  experiences	   that	  he	  analysed.	   In	   contrast	   to	  James’s	   focus	   on	   the	   varieties	   of	   religious	   experience,	   was	   Rudolf	   Otto’s	   interest	   in	  interpreting	   experience	   as	   experience	   of	   otherness,	   and,	   as	   it	   disclosed,	   the	   infinite	  otherness	  of	  the	  holy.	  	  	  
Experience	  of	  the	  Sacred	  	  In	   The	   Idea	   of	   the	   Holy,	   originally	   published	   in	   German	   as	   Das	   Heilege	   in	   1917,44	  Otto	  emphasised	  the	  numinous	  object	  of	  man’s	  religious	  nature,	  the	  holy	  or	  the	  sacred,	  which	  he	  took	   as	   an	   a	   priori	   category.	   For	   this	   notion	   of	   the	   a	   priori	   category,	   Otto	   made	   direct	  reference	   to	   Kant’s	   Critique	   of	   Pure	   Reason	   (first	   published	   in	   1781),	   ‘though	   all	   our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Ibid.,	  387-­‐88.	  42	  Ibid.,	  379. 43	  Henry	  Ware	  Jr	  writing	  for	  the	  Christian	  Encounter,	  1944,	  is	  quoted	  in:	  Schmidt,	  "The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Mysticism,"	  286.	  44	  Huyo	  Ishida,	  "Otto's	  Theory	  of	  Religious	  Experience	  as	  Encounter	  with	  the	  Numinous	  and	  Its	  Application	  to	  Buddhism,"	  Japanese	  Religions	  XVI,	  no.	  4	  (1989):	  17.	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knowledge	   begins	   with	   experience,	   it	   by	   no	   means	   follows	   that	   all	   arises	   out	   of	  experience’. 45 	  Otto	   defined	   religious	   experience	   more	   precisely	   as	   an	   experience	   of	  otherness,	   an	   otherness	   identified	   as	   ‘the	   numinous’.	   The	   numinous	   object	   of	   man’s	  religious	  nature	  is	  thereby	  a	  universal	  one	  applicable	  to	  all	  religious	  systems.	  Indeed	  Otto’s	  idea	   of	   the	   numinous	   experience	   is	   emphatically	   non-­‐rational	   and	   very	   much	   in	   the	  tradition	  of	  Schleiermacher’s	  description	  of	  personal	   intuition	  and	   feeling	   for	   the	   infinite.	  Jacques	  Waardenberg	  placed	  Otto	  in	  the	  line	  of	  German	  theologians	  such	  as	  Schleiermacher,	  in	  that	  he	  used	  ‘a	  normative	  concept	  of	  religion	  which	  ultimately	  goes	  back	  to	  a	  theological	  tradition’.46	  For	  Otto,	  personal	  religious	  experience	  of	  the	  ‘wholly	  other’47	  was	  foundational	  to	  his	  conception	  of	  ‘the	  religious	  life’.48	  Huyo	  Ishida	  states	  that	  Schleiermacher’s	  ‘analysis	  of	   the	   religious	   feeling	  as	   such	  was	   in	  many	  ways	  a	   forerunner	  of	  Otto’s	  own	  analysis’.49	  Wayne	  Proudfoot	  locates	  the	  provenance	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  religious	  experience	  within	  Western	  tradition,	  particularly	  identifying	  Schleiermacher,	  who	  claimed	  that	  fundamentally	  religion	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  ‘sense	  of	  the	  infinite’	  or	  ‘the	  feeling	  of	  absolute	  dependence’.50	  Robert	  H.	  Sharf	   comments	   that	   Schleiermacher’s	   whole	   emphasis	   on	   feeling	   was	   driven	   by	   his	  ‘interest	   in	   freeing	   religious	   doctrine	   and	   practice	   from	   dependence	   on	   metaphysical	  beliefs	  and	  ecclesiastical	  institutions’.51	  It	  is	  then	  to	  Schleiermacher	  that	  Otto’s	  philosophy	  of	  religion	  is	  indebted,	  in	  seeking	  to	  universalise	  an	  idea	  of	  religious	  essentialism	  that	  was	  in	  turn	  indebted	  to	  Western	  theological	   thinking	  and	  developed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  rational	  empiricism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Rudolf	  Otto,	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Non-­‐Rational	  Factor	  in	  the	  Idea	  of	  the	  Divine	  and	  Its	  
Relation	  to	  the	  Rational,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Oxford	  U.P,	  1950),	  113.	  	  46	  Jacques	  Waardenburg,	  Classical	  Approaches	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion	  :	  Aims,	  Methods,	  and	  Theories	  of	  
Research	  (New	  York:	  Walter	  de	  Gruyter,	  1999),	  60.	  47	  Otto,	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Non-­‐Rational	  Factor	  in	  the	  Idea	  of	  the	  Divine	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  
the	  Rational,	  28.	  48	  Ibid.,	  4.	  49	  Ishida,	  "Otto's	  Theory	  of	  Religious	  Experience	  as	  Encounter	  with	  the	  Numinous	  and	  Its	  Application	  to	  Buddhism,"	  17.	  50	  Proudfoot,	  Religious	  Experience,	  xii-­‐xv.	  Friedrich	  Schleiermacher,	  On	  Religion	  :	  Speeches	  to	  Its	  Cultured	  
Despisers	  [Über	  die	  Religion.],	  trans.	  Richard	  Crouter,	  Texts	  in	  German	  Philosophy	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1988).	  The	  Christian	  Faith	  (Edinburgh:	  T	  &	  T	  Clark,	  1928).	  51	  Robert	  H.	  Sharf,	  "Experience,"	  in	  Critical	  Terms	  for	  Religious	  Studies,	  ed.	  Mark	  C.	  Taylor	  (Chicago	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1998),	  98.	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Otto	  advanced	  the	  proposition	  that	  mysticism	  is	  the	  apex	  of	  religious	  experience,	  but	  it	   is	  also	  representative	  of	  the	  thinking	  of	   James	  and	  Evelyn	  Underhill.	   In	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy,	  Otto	   states	   that	   ‘essentially	  mysticism	   is	   the	   stressing	   to	   a	   very	   high	   degree,	   indeed	   the	  overstressing,	   of	   the	   non-­‐rational	   or	   supra-­‐rational	   elements	   in	   religion;	   and	   it	   is	   only	  intelligible	  when	  so	  understood.’52	  This	  emphatic	  connection	   to	  religious	  experience	  does	  seem	   suggestive	   of	   the	   thought	   of	   Schleiermacher	   and	   his	   representation	   of	   religious	  feeling	   as	   prefiguring	   the	   dogmatic	   and	   institutionalised	   forms	   of	   religious	   expression.	  Otto’s	   understanding	   of	   mysticism,	   which	   he	   outlined	   in	   a	   subsequent	   publication	  
Mysticism	  East	  and	  West,	  is	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  his	  theory	  of	  religious	  experience.	  Ishida	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘the	  underlying	  theme	  is	  always	  the	  numinous	  experience,	  which	  had	  been	  already	  developed	  and	  discussed	  in	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy’.53	  Otto’s	  Mysticism	  East	  and	  
West	   dealt	   specifically	   with	   the	   parallels	   between	   the	   thinking	   of	   the	   eighth	   century	  Shankara	  and	  Meister	  Eckhart	  (1260-­‐1328CE);	  Otto	  derived	  the	  framework	  for	  his	  analysis	  from	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy.	   In	  examining	  Otto’s	   theory	  of	   encounter	  with	   the	  numinous	   in	  terms	  of	   its	   application	   to	  Buddhism,	   Ishida	  questioned	   ‘the	  presuppositional	   idea	  of	   the	  subject-­‐object	  distinction’.	  He	  concluded	  that	  Otto’s	  assumption	  of	  an	  ‘ontological	  structure’	  was	  quite	  unsuitable	   to	  Buddhism,	  but	  allowed	   for	   its	  potential	  use	   in	  other	   traditions.54	  The	  basis	  for	  any	  such	  a	  priori	  categories	  in	  the	  approach	  to	  mysticism	  has	  been	  questioned	  considerably	   in	   recent	   scholarship,	  a	  point	   that	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	   further	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  constructivist	  position.	  	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy	  was	  the	  first	  major	  comparative	  study	  of	  its	  time	  on	  mysticism,	  55	  and	  proposed	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  mystics	  was	  synonymous	  with	  his	  a	  priori	  category	  of	  the	  numinous,	   the	  universal	   religious	   experience.	   This	   connection	  became	   so	   intrinsic	   to	  the	  classical	  approaches	  to	  mysticism	  that	  this	  scholarship	  tended	  to	  see	  the	  mystical	  as	  a	  category	  of	  religious	  experience.	  The	  stance	  has	  led	  Sharf,	  in	  his	  article	  on	  “Experience”,	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Otto,	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Non-­‐Rational	  Factor	  in	  the	  Idea	  of	  the	  Divine	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  
the	  Rational,	  22.	   53	  Ishida,	  "Otto's	  Theory	  of	  Religious	  Experience	  as	  Encounter	  with	  the	  Numinous	  and	  Its	  Application	  to	  Buddhism,"	  23.	  54	  Ibid.,	  25.	  55	  Peter	  Moore,	  "Recent	  Studies	  of	  Mysticism:	  A	  Critical	  Survey,"	  Religion	  :	  a	  Journal	  of	  Religion	  and	  Religions	  3	  (1973):	  146.	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note	   that	   ‘the	   academic	   literature	   does	   not	   clearly	   delineate	   the	   relationship	   between	  religious	   experience	   and	   mystical	   experience’.56 	  Indeed	   this	   lack	   of	   differentiation	   is	  indicative	  of	  the	  role	  that	  the	  mystical	  has	  played	  in	  attempts	  to	  define	  what	  is	  fundamental	  to	  religious	  experience;	  a	  point	  which	  is	  developed	  further	  by	  Richard	  King,	  and	  discussed	  in	  the	  later	  section	  on	  the	  hermeneutical	  approach	  to	  mysticism.	  	  
Perennialism	  and	  the	  Spiritual	  Consciousness	  James’s	  analyses	  were	  subject	  to	  modifications,	  but	  his	   identification	  of	  experience	  as	  the	  empirical	   data	   for	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism	   continued	   to	   be	   normative	   in	   discussions	   of	  spiritual	   consciousness.	   The	   shift	   from	   philosophies	   of	   consciousness	   to	   philosophies	   of	  language	  and	  semiotics	  seems	  to	  have	  coincided	  with	  the	  domination	  of	  ‘constructivism’	  in	  the	   1970s	   and	   80s.57 	  However	   the	   constructivist	   model	   should	   be	   seen	   against	   the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  ‘perennialists’	  as	  Forman	  points	  out,58	  if	  such	  a	  general	  term	  can	  really	  be	  used	  for	  all	  of	   James’s	  more	  immediate	  successors.	  Broadly,	   these	  scholars	  attempted	  not	  only	  to	  classify	  common	  cross-­‐cultural	  mystical	  experiences	  but	  also	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  from	  them	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  mystical	  consciousness.	  59	  James	  had	  concentrated	  on	  the	  noetic	  quality	  of	  mystical	  experience,	  the	  providing	  of	  noēsis	  in	  states	  of	  knowledge	  or	  ‘insight	  into	  depths	  of	   truth’.60	  Underhill,	  whose	  study	  of	  mysticism	  was	  published	  within	  a	  decade	  of	  James’s	  lectures,	  is	  paradigmatic	  of	  the	  renewed	  interest	  in	  spiritual	  consciousness.61	  	  Underhill	   took	  issue	  with	  the	  categories	  of	  mystical	  experience	  put	   forward	  by	  James	  but	  maintained	   in	   her	   seminal	   studies,	   his	   focus	   on	   the	   psychological	   experience	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Sharf,	  "Experience,"	  94.	  57	  Forman,	  Mysticism,	  Mind,	  Consciousness,	  31.	  58	  Ibid.	  59	  In	  his	  Introduction,	  Otto	  maintains	  that	  alongside	  the	  ‘many	  varieties	  of	  expression’	  in	  mysticism,	  there	  is	  ‘an	  inner	  relationship	  of	  types	  of	  human	  experience	  and	  spiritual	  life’,	  and	  thus	  makes	  general	  conclusions	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  mystical	  consciousness,	  without	  identifying	  himself	  as	  a	  perennialist.	  Rudolf	  Otto,	  Mysticism	  East	  
and	  West	  :	  A	  Comparative	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Nature	  of	  Mysticism,	   trans.	  Bertha	  L.	  Bracey	  and	  Richenda	  C.	  Payne	  (Macmillan,	  1932),	  xvi.	  60	  James,	  The	  Varieties	  of	  Religious	  Experience	  :	  A	  Study	  in	  Human	  Nature,	  380.	  61	  Underhill	  argues	  in	  her	  opening	  essay	  for	  three	  phases	  to	  the	  mystical	  consciousness	  which	  claims	  ‘to	  an	  apprehension	  of	  the	  divine	  unifying	  principle	  behind	  appearance’.	  Evelyn	  Underhill,	  The	  Essentials	  of	  
Mysticism	  :	  And	  Other	  Essays	  (London:	  Dent,	  1920),	  14-­‐15.	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mysticism.62	  However,	  she	  rejected	  the	  idea	  that	  mystical	  states	  were	  merely	  transient	  or	  that	  the	  experiencing	  subject	  was	  passive	  throughout;	  instead	  she	  believed	  that	  mysticism	  was	  practical,	   an	  entirely	   spiritual	   activity	   that	  did	  not	  depend	  on	   the	   theoretical.	   In	   this	  way,	   Underhill	   directed	   her	   attention	   to	   that	   perception	   of	   the	   numinous	   in	   ‘the	   self-­‐conscious	  subject’,	  or	  ‘the	  I’	  of	  that	  experience;63	  the	  particular	  self-­‐knowing	  subject	  of	  the	  mystics	  was	  the	   ‘transcendental	  self’.	  For	  her,	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  revealed,	   ‘a	  genuine	  two-­‐foldness	  in	  human	  nature—the	  difference	  in	  kind	  between	  Animus	  the	  surface-­‐self	  and	  
Anima	  the	  transcendental	  self,	  in	  touch	  with	  supernatural	  realities’.64	  This	  concern	  with	  the	  ‘transcendental	   self’,	   which	   Walter	   Stace	   seems	   to	   reflect	   in	   his	   own	   references	   to	   the	  ‘infinite	   and	   universal	   self’,65	  has	   proved	   a	   popular	   theme	   for	   perennialist	   writers	   on	  mysticism.	  Robert	  C.	  Zaehner	  argues	  however	  that	  the	  perennialists	  neither	  defined	  ‘what	  precisely	  constitutes	  a	  mystical	  experience’,	  nor	  could	  their	  claim	  that	  all	  mystics	  speak	  the	  same	  language	  be	  justified.66	  Penner	  reiterates	  this	  kind	  of	  argument	  when	  he	  stated	  that	  perennialist	  scholars	  of	  mysticism	  did	  not	  provide	  a	  system	  of	  rules	   to	   justify	   their	  belief	  that	  ‘mystical	  languages,	  or	  types	  of	  languages,	  express	  an	  identical	  experience’.67	  	  Admittedly,	   perennialism	   is	   difficult	   to	   define	   precisely;	   its	   application	   to	   the	   classical	  approaches	   to	   mysticism	   is	   necessarily	   vague.	   Forman	   describes	   the	   perennialists	   as	  believing	   ‘that	   all	   religious	   experiences	   are	   similar	   and,	   further,	   that	   those	   experiences	  represent	  a	  direct	  contact	  with	  a	  (variously	  defined)	  absolute	  principle’.68	  Perennialism	  is	  also	  suggestive	  of	  those	  scholars	  who	  invested	  themselves	  personally	  in	  the	  universalizing	  tendencies	   of	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism	   that	   characterized	   at	   least	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	  twentieth	  century.	  This	  personal	  investment	  took	  various	  forms;	  Underhill’s	  book	  adopted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  For	  example,	  amongst	  her	  more	  general	  works	  on	  mysticism	  are	  the	  following:	  The	  Spiritual	  Life	  :	  Four	  
Broadcast	  Talks	  by	  Evelyn	  Underhill	  (London:	  Hodder	  &	  Stoughton,	  1937);	  Practical	  Mysticism	  :	  A	  Little	  Book	  
for	  Normal	  People	  (Guildford:	  Eagle,	  1991);	  The	  Mystics	  of	  the	  Church	  (Cambridge:	  James	  Clarke,	  1975);	  The	  
Mystic	  Way	  :	  A	  Psychological	  Study	  in	  Christian	  Origins	  (London:	  Dent,	  1913);	  The	  Essentials	  of	  Mysticism	  :	  And	  
Other	  Essays.	  63	  Mysticism	  :	  A	  Study	  in	  the	  Nature	  and	  Development	  of	  Man's	  Spiritual	  Consciousness,	  2nd	  ed.	  (London:	  Methuen,	  1911),	  9.	  64	  Ibid.,	  3.	  65	  W.	  T.	  Stace,	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  1960),	  147.	  66	  R.	  C.	  Zaehner,	  Mysticism,	  Sacred	  and	  Profane	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  Some	  Varieties	  of	  Praeter-­‐Natural	  Experience	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1957),	  27.	  67	  Penner,	  "The	  Mystical	  Illusion,"	  90.	  68	  Forman,	  Mysticism,	  Mind,	  Consciousness,	  31.	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a	  romantically	  engaged	  approach	  to	  her	  subjects,	  others	  sought	  a	  more	  clinical	  access	  to	  the	  spiritual	   consciousness.	   James	  was	   far	   from	   alone	   in	   his	   enthusiasm	   to	   experiment	  with	  nitrous	  oxide	   in	  order	   to	   imitate	   the	  mystical	   states	  of	   such	   fascination	   to	  him;	  narcotics	  also	   feature	   heavily	   in	   Aldous	   Huxley’s	   encounter	  with	  mystical	   experience.69	  These	   two	  scholars	  prompted	  different	  responses	  from	  Zaehner;	  whilst	  he	  praised	  James’s	  analysis	  of	  mystical	   experience	   for	   its	   detachment,	   he	   was	   scathing	   of	   the	   partiality	   of	   Huxley’s	  conclusions70	  and	  his	  self-­‐professed	  purpose	  in	  writing	  Mysticism:	  Sacred	  and	  Profane,	  was	  to	   counter	   the	   religious	   ‘indifferentism’	   conveyed	   by	   Huxley’s	  The	  Doors	   of	   Perception.71	  That	  Huxley	  had	  been	  an	  ardent	  defender	  of	   the	   ‘perennial	  philosophy’,	   a	   term	  which	  he	  can	   be	   credited	  with	   popularizing,72	  was	   clear	   in	   his	   1944	   book	   bearing	   this	   very	   title.73	  However,	   Huxley	   was	   hardly	   the	   originator	   of	   the	   philosophy	   or	   a	   particularly	   lucid	  exponent;	   Zaehner	   has	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   leading	   advocates	   of	   his	   time	  were	   Ananda	  Coomaraswamy,74	  René	  Guénon75	  and	  Frithjof	  Schuon.76	  Whilst	  these	  perennialist	  thinkers	  continue	  to	  have	  their	  modern	  exponents,	  such	  as	  Huston	  Smith	  and	  James	  S.	  Cutsinger,77	  most	  contemporary	  scholars	  of	  mysticism	  have	  been	  condemning	  of	  their	  central	  claims.	  	  
Descriptive	  Phenomenologies	  The	   ‘essentialist	   reductionism’	   characteristic	   of	   the	   scholars	   that	   have	   been	   discussed	   in	  the	   previous	   section,	   tended	   to	   reduce	   all	   mystical	   accounts	   to	   an	   essential	   mystical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Zaehner,	  Mysticism,	  Sacred	  and	  Profane	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  Some	  Varieties	  of	  Praeter-­‐Natural	  Experience,	  xiv.	  70	  Ibid.	  Zaehner’s	  critique	  of	  Huxley	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  first	  two	  chapters.	  71	  Ibid.,	  xiv.	  See	  further:	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  The	  Doors	  of	  Perception	  (London:	  Chatto	  &	  Windus,	  1954).	  72	  Sharf,	  "Experience,"	  96.	  73	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  The	  Perennial	  Philosophy	  (London:	  Triad	  Grafton,	  1985).	  74	  Ananda	  Kentish	  Coomaraswamy,	  Roger	  Lipsey,	  and	  Bollingen	  Foundation	  Collection	  (Library	  of	  Congress),	  
Coomaraswamy,	  3	  vols.,	  Bollingen	  Series	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1977).	  	  	  75	  	  Christophe	  Andruzac,	  René	  Guénon:	  La	  Contemplation	  Métaphysique	  et	  L’expérience	  Mystique	  	  (Paris:	  Dervy-­‐Livres,	  1980).	  	  76	  Frithjof	   Schuon,	   The	   Transcendent	   Unity	   of	   Religions	   (London:	   Faber	   and	   Faber,	   1953).	   Islam	   and	   the	  
Perennial	  Philosophy	   (London:	  World	  of	   Islam	  Festival	  Publishing,	  1976).	   Zaehner	   criticises	   the	  philosophia	  
perennis	   ‘which	  would	  set	  itself	  above	  creed	  and	  which	  therefore	  interprets	  all	  creeds	  from	  its	  own	  a	  priori	  notions’.	  Zaehner,	  Mysticism,	  Sacred	  and	  Profane	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  Some	  Varieties	  of	  Praeter-­‐Natural	  Experience,	  30.	  	  	  77	  James	   S.	   Cutsinger,	   Paths	   to	   the	   Heart	   :	   Sufism	   and	   the	   Christian	   East,	   The	   Perennial	   Philosophy	   Series	  (Bloomington,	   Ind.:	  World	  Wisdom,	   2002).	   This	   volume	   of	   essays	   from	   the	   2001	   international	   conference	  
Paths	  to	  the	  Heart	  is	  dedicated	  to	  Frithjof	  Schuon	  by	  the	  editor	  James	  S.	  Cutsinger,	  with	  some	  Conclusions	  from	  Huston	  Smith.	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experience	  common	  to	  all	   traditions.78	  In	  response,	  a	  more	  descriptive	  phenomenological	  trend	   emerged	   in	   the	   academic	   study	   of	  mysticism	   of	   Zaehner,	  Walter	   Stace	   and	  Ninian	  Smart,	  that	  was	  to	  differentiate	  certain	  typologies	  of	  mystical	  experience	  according	  to	  the	  diverse	   descriptions	   of	  mystical	   reports.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	  philosophia	  perennis,	   Zaehner	  stated	   his	   own	   aim	   to	   be	   ‘an	   unbiased	   approach	   to	   the	   phenomenology	   of	  mysticism’.79	  Zaehner	   has	   been	   roundly	   criticised	   for	   avowedly	   personal	   theological	   judgements,80	  but	  he	   offered	   a	   distinction	   between	   the	   ‘praeternatural’	   mystical	   experience	   (in	   which	   he	  included	   Huxley’s	   experiences),	   and	   other	   religious	   types.	   In	   doing	   so,	   he	   makes	   a	  fundamental	   distinction	   between	   the	   theistic,	   evidenced	   most	   profoundly	   in	   Christian	  mysticism,	  and	  the	  monistic,	  where	  he	  places	  Buddhism	  and	  some	  characteristics	  of	  Hindu,	  Christian	   and	   Sufi	  mysticism.81	  In	   his	   third	   praeternatural	   category,	  which	   appears	   to	   be	  the	   lowest	   in	   Zaehner’s	   system,	   are	   placed	   all	   other	   religious	   experiences,	   including	   the	  Romantic	  poets	  such	  as	  Wordsworth	  and	  Keats.	  These	  he	  considers	  to	  be	  of	  the	  natural	  or	  panenhenic	   type,	   ‘the	  experience	  of	   all	   as	  one	  or	  one	  as	   all’,	   as	   in	   the	  Upanishads.82	  Frits	  Staal’s	  response	  to	  such	  a	  hierarchical	  scheme	  is	  to	  place	  Zaehner	  within	  his	  section	  on	  the	  ‘dogmatic	   approaches’	   of	   his	   methodological	   essay	   on	   how	   mysticism	   should	   not	   be	  studied.83	  Irrespective,	   Zaehner’s	   contribution	   marks	   a	   significant	   shift	   away	   from	   the	  homogenising	  vision	  of	  perennialism,	   that	   the	  same	  core	  experience	  may	  be	  described	   in	  various	   ways,	   towards	   the	   idea	   of	   these	   various	   descriptions	   pointing	   to	   inherently	  different	   experiences	   of	   mysticism. 84 	  What	   is	   required	   and	   what	   the	   perennialists	  essentially	   overlooked	   for	   Zaehner	   is	   to	   ‘define	   what	   precisely	   constitutes	   a	   mystical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Katz’s	  accusation:	  Steven	  T.	  Katz,	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  in	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophical	  
Analysis,	  ed.	  Steven	  T.	  Katz,	  Studies	  in	  Philosophy	  and	  Religion	  (London:	  Sheldon	  Press,	  1978),	  24.	  79	  Zaehner,	  Mysticism,	  Sacred	  and	  Profane	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  Some	  Varieties	  of	  Praeter-­‐Natural	  Experience,	  30.	  80	  See	   for	   example	   the	   critique	  made	  by	   Stace,	   Smart	   and	  Katz:	   Stace,	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	   36.	  Ninian	  Smart,	  "Understanding	  Religious	  Experience,"	  in	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophical	  Analysis,	  ed.	  Steven	  T.	  Katz	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  13.	  Katz,	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  31.	  81	  For	  this	  fundamental	  division	  of	  mysticism,	  see	  the	  Conclusion.	  Zaehner,	  Mysticism,	  Sacred	  and	  Profane	  :	  An	  
Inquiry	   into	   Some	   Varieties	   of	   Praeter-­‐Natural	   Experience,	   204.	   ‘Here,	   then,	   are	   two	   distinct	   and	   mutually	  opposed	  types	  of	  mysticism,	  -­‐	  the	  monist	  and	  the	  theistic…	  it	  is	  an	  unbridgeable	  gulf	  between	  all	  those	  who	  see	  God	  as	   incomparably	  greater	  than	  oneself,	   though	  He	  is,	  at	   the	  same	  time,	   the	  root	  and	  ground	  of	  one’s	  being,	  and	  those	  who	  maintain	  that	  soul	  and	  God	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  and	  that	  all	  else	  is	  pure	  illusion.’	  82	  Ibid.,	  28.	  83	  Staal,	  Exploring	  Mysticism	   :	  A	  Methodological	  Essay,	   67-­‐69.	   Staal’s	   criticism	   is	  mainly	   aimed	   at	   Zaehner’s	  1960	  book	  on	  Hindu	  and	  Muslim	  Mysticism,	  in	  that	  it	  contributes	  little	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  mysticism.	  84	  McGinn,	  The	  Presence	  of	  God	  :	  A	  History	  of	  Western	  Christian	  Mysticism,	  339.	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experience’.85	  In	   this	   endeavour,	   Stace	   and	   Smart	   sought	   to	   refine	   what	   defines	   this	  phenomenon	   in	   its	   many	   varieties;	   implicit	   in	   their	   understanding	   is	   that	   mystical	  experience	   is	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   descriptive	   interpretation	   in	   the	   mystic’s	   account.	   The	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  explore	  the	  interpretative	  nature	  of	  this	  description	  is	  precisely	  what	  distinguishes	  Smart’s	  more	  finely	  nuanced	  approach	  to	  Stace’s.	  While	  recognising	  that	  the	  path	   to	   understanding	   is	   ‘phenomenological’,	   Smart	   also	   stresses	   the	   necessity	   of	  disentanglement,	   in	  order	  to	  perceive	  the	   ‘degrees	  of	   interpretation	  in	  their	  descriptions’,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ‘performative’	  and	  ‘existential’	  aspects.86	  	  Stace’s	  philosophy	  of	  mysticism	   in	  his	  work	  published	   in	  1960,	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	  became	  a	  well-­‐known	  position	  and	  the	  cause	  of	  much	  academic	  debate.	  In	  his	  1973	  survey	  of	   studies	   on	   mysticism,	   Peter	   Moore	   declared	   that	   Stace’s	   ‘philosophical	   study	   of	  mysticism	   has	   probably	   been	   the	   most	   influential	   work	   on	   the	   subject	   since	   William	  James’.87	  Stace	  categorised	  what	  he	  saw	  as	   the	  universality	  of	  mystical	  experience	   in	   two	  ways,	  ‘introvertive’	  and	  ‘extrovertive’,	  a	  distinction	  that	  he	  apparently	  derived	  from	  Otto.88	  Stace	  distinguishes	  these	  two	  main	  types	  as	  follows,	  ‘that	  the	  extrovertive	  experience	  looks	  outward	   through	   the	   senses,	   while	   the	   introvertive	   looks	   inward	   into	   the	   mind’.89	  The	  extrovertive	   mystic	   perceives	   through	   his	   physical	   senses,	   the	   One	   who	   mystically	  transfigures	   ‘the	   multiplicity	   of	   external	   material	   objects’.90	  The	   introvertive	   mystic	   also	  perceives	   the	  One	   but	   in	   his	   own	   ego,	   ‘by	   deliberately	   shutting	   off	   the	   senses’	   from	   this	  multiplicity. 91 	  Moore	   suggested	   that	   Stace’s	   introvertive	   mysticism	   is	   comparable	   to	  Zaehner’s	  monistic	  and	  theistic	  categories,	  while	  the	  extrovertive	  to	  Zaehner’s	  ‘panenhenic’	  or	   naturalist	   mysticism.92	  He	   cast	   doubt	   on	   the	   efficacy	   of	   Stace’s	   phenomenology	   of	  mystical	  experience,	  since	  the	  evidence	  provided	  from	  various	  mystical	  texts	  is	  quotations	  ‘mostly	   brief,	   often	   second-­‐hand	   and	   generally	   given	   without	   reference	   to	   their	   original	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Zaehner,	  Mysticism,	  Sacred	  and	  Profane	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  Some	  Varieties	  of	  Praeter-­‐Natural	  Experience,	  27.	  86	  Smart,	  "Understanding	  Religious	  Experience,"	  20.	  87	  Moore,	  "Recent	  Studies	  of	  Mysticism:	  A	  Critical	  Survey,"	  149.	  88	  The	  connection	  of	  Stace	  and	  Otto	  is	  suggested	  by	  Moore.	  Ibid.	  Stace	  himself	  refers	  to	  the	  terminology	  of	  both	  Otto	  and	  Underhill,	  in	  defining	  the	  introvertive	  experience.	  Stace,	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	  61.	  89	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	  61.	  90	  Ibid.	  91	  Ibid.,	  62.	  92	  Moore,	  "Recent	  Studies	  of	  Mysticism:	  A	  Critical	  Survey,"	  149.	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contexts’.93	  This	  criticism	  could	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  many	  of	  the	  ‘classic’	  works	  on	  mysticism	  considered	  so	  far.	  Similar	  objections	  have	  been	  made	  to	  the	  misrepresentations	  of	  mystical	  texts	   in	   Aldous	   Huxley’s	   The	   Perennial	   Philosophy	   and	   Rudolf	   Otto’s	  Mysticism	   East	   and	  
West.94	  Moore	  also	  suggested	  that	  Stace	  ‘underestimates	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  experience-­‐interpretation	  relationship’,	   imagining	  a	  straightforward	  and	   linear	  relationship	   ‘between	  the	  contents	  of	  a	  mystical	  experience	  and	  the	  language	  or	  symbols	  of	  its	  interpretation’.95	  Stace	   had	   attempted	   a	   distinction	   between	   the	   ‘sense	   experience’	   and	   ‘conceptual	  interpretation’	   in	   responding	   to	   Zaehner,	   but	   he	   persisted	   in	   trying	   to	   isolate	   the	   ‘pure’	  experience. 96 	  However	   the	   alternative	   classifications	   which	   Stace	   developed	   did	   not	  sufficiently	  take	  into	  account	  the	  complexities	  of	  contextuality.97	  	  	  Smart’s	  approach	  returned	  to	  the	  phenomenologies	  provided	  by	  Otto,	  Zaehner	  and	  Stace,	  in	  offering	  a	   simplified	   schema,	  bringing	  out	   the	   interplay	  of	   experience	  and	   interpretation.	  Experience	   is	   presented	   as	   a	   more	   unified	   category,	   its	   varieties	   suggest	   ‘ascribing	  difference	   of	   description	   to	   doctrinal	   interpretation’.98	  Smart	   suggested	   that	   the	   interior	  types	  of	  religious	  experience	  that	  Zaehner	  had	  differentiated	  into	  theistic	  and	  monistic	  are	  essentially	  within	  the	  same	  category	  of	  interior	  mysticism;	  his	  point	  being	  that,	   ‘The	  gaps	  within	  the	  monistic	  category	  are	  big	  enough	  for	  it	  not	  to	  seem	  implausible	  to	  count	  the	  gap	  between	   monism	   and	   theism	   as	   no	   wider’.99	  Drawing	   on	   Otto,	   Smart	   contended	   that	  religious	  experience	   is	  more	  appropriately	  divided	   into	  the	   ‘numinous’	  and	  the	   ‘mystical’,	  but	  this	  is	  only	  defended	  as	  ‘a	  rough	  distinction’.	  He	  reclassified	  the	  more	  romantic	  forms	  of	  naturalist	   or	   Zaehner’s	   ‘panenhenic’	   mysticism	   into	   the	   ‘numinous’,	   along	   with	   the	  prophetic	   religions	  of	   Judaism,	  Christianity	   and	   Islam,	   and	  Buddhist	   experiences	   into	   the	  ‘mystical’. 100 	  If	   Stace	   veered	   towards	   perennialism,	   Smart	   came	   much	   closer	   to	  constructivism.	  While	  Smart	  raised	  issues	  of	  contextuality	  and	  suggested	  a	  more	  reflexive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Ibid.	  94	  Forman,	  Mysticism,	  Mind,	  Consciousness,	  32.	  95	  Moore,	  "Recent	  Studies	  of	  Mysticism:	  A	  Critical	  Survey,"	  151.	  96	  Stace,	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	  31.	  97	  Katz,	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  27-­‐29.	  98	  Smart,	  "Understanding	  Religious	  Experience,"	  14.	  99	  "Interpretation	  and	  Mystical	  Experience,"	  Rel.	  Stud.	  1,	  no.	  1	  (1965):	  83.	  Smart’s	  article	  is	  essentially	  devoted	  to	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  Zaehner’s	  distinction	  of	  the	  theistic	  category	  from	  the	  monistic	  form	  of	  mysticism.	  100	  "Understanding	  Religious	  Experience,"	  13.	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model	   of	   experience	   and	   interpretation,	   he	   did	   not	   attempt	   to	   defend	   his	   position	  philosophically	   in	   the	   manner	   more	   typical	   of	   the	   scholarship	   that	   has	   critiqued	   the	  phenomenological	  approaches	  to	  mysticism.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  mediation	  of	  mystical	   experience	   illustrates	   the	   current	   incommensurability	   between	   these	   rival	  approaches,	  phenomenological	  and	  constructivist,	  in	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism.	  	  	  
Genealogical Critique of Objectivist Approaches 	  Contextuality	  has	  come	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  the	  constructivist	  approach,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  has	  become	   almost	   impossible	   to	   talk	   of	   mystical	   experience	   without	   subscribing	   to	   a	  particular	  philosophy	  of	  language.	  Typically,	  this	  trend	  has	  objected	  to	  the	  presupposition	  of	   mystical	   experience	   as	   a	   cross-­‐cultural	   phenomenon,	   maintaining	   that	   mystical	  experience	   in	   itself	   could	   not	   form	   the	   sole	   preoccupation	   of	   scholars.	   The	   descriptive	  phenomenological	  content	  of	  the	  mystics’	  experience	  has	  lost	  its	  primacy	  in	  discussion	  and	  focus	  has	  shifted	  to	  its	  representation	  in	  the	  text.	  Constructivism	  thus	  views	  the	  account	  of	  the	  mystical	  experience	  as	  formed	  within	  a	  cultural-­‐linguistic	  framework	  that	  provides	  the	  means	   of	   construction	   of	   that	   experience.	   However,	   this	   emphasis	   of	   the	   constructivists	  makes	  it	  problematic	  to	  generalise	  about	  mystical	  phenomena	  in	  any	  way	  and	  the	  extreme	  relativist	   approach	   would	   lead	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   even	   the	   term	   mysticism	   is	   only	  applicable	   to	   the	   study	   of	  Western	   Christian	   tradition.	   Indeed,	   Penner	   is	   aware	   that	   the	  linguistic	  turn	  in	  academic	  scholarship	  has	  led	  to	  a	  ‘mystical	  relativism’,	  which	  has	  rejected	  the	   neutral	   explanation	   of	   any	   conceptual	   system,	   postulating	   that	   the	   typologies	   of	  mystical	  experience	  do	  not	  recognise	  the	   incommensurability	  of	  mystical	  systems,	   in	  that	  different	   mystical	   languages	   represent	   the	   ‘Reality’	   of	   different	   mystical	   worlds.101	  This	  perspective	   represents	   the	   classical	   study	   of	   mysticism	   as	   the	   mere	   ‘reification	   of	  abstractions’,	  an	  accusation	  which	  neither	  Penner	  nor	  other	  constructivists	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  resolve	  except	  by	  turning	  to	  the	  semantic	  field	  of	  the	  tradition,	  without	  providing	  a	  de-­‐reified	   criteria	   to	   their	   enquiry,	   and	   as	   if	   the	   neutrality	   of	   the	   observer	   can	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   be	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  Penner,	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maintained.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  abstract	  focus	  in	  philosophical	  analyses	  of	  mysticism	  on	  the	  experience-­‐interpretation	  distinction	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  circumvent	  (rather	  than	  resolve)	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  mystical	  or	  cultural	  relativism.	  
Constructivism	  and	  the	  Mediation	  of	  Experience	  A	   variety	   of	   arguments	   surround	   the	   constructivist	   position,	   but	   Katz’s	   ideas	   still	  predominate.	   In	   a	   series	   of	   articles,	   he	   proposed	   the	   argument	   that	   was	   to	   become	  definitive	  of	   the	  constructivist	   stance	  on	  mysticism.	  His	  premise	  was	   that	   the	   language	  of	  the	  mystics	  is	  determined	  by	  their	  cultural	  environment	  and	  therefore	  any	  analysis	  of	  this	  language	   is	   unable	   to	   give	  us	   ‘unmediated’	   access	   to	   the	   ‘event’	   of	   their	   experience.	  Katz	  argued	  ‘that	  the	  experience	  itself,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  form	  in	  which	  it	  is	  reported,	  is	  shaped	  by	  concepts	  which	  the	  mystic	  brings	  to,	  and	  which	  shape	  his	  experience’.102	  Indeed	  Katz	  states	  even	  more	  forcefully	  elsewhere	  that	  ‘Neither	  mystical	  experience	  nor	  more	  ordinary	  forms	  of	   experience	   give	   any	   indication,	   or	   any	   grounds	   for	   believing	   that	   they	   are	  unmediated.’103	  This	   seems	   somewhat	   in	   contradiction	   to	   the	   mystics’	   claim	   to	   the	   self-­‐authenticating	   nature	   of	   the	   experience.	   Katz	   concludes	   his	   ‘deconstruction’	   of	   the	  ‘conservative’	   nature	   of	  mystical	   experience	   in	   suggesting	   that	   tradition,	   reconceived	   by	  him	  as	  ‘models’,	  contributes	  to	  the	  very	  ‘creation	  of	  experience’	  (italics	  his).104	  	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  term	  ‘mediation’	  is	  according	  to	  Forman,	  a	  neo-­‐Kantian	  term	  which	  informs	  the	  constructivist	  traditions	  of	  Western	  analytical	  philosophy.105	  Forman	  questions	  the	   assumptions	   of	   constructivism	  and	   the	   implications	   of	   the	  philosophy	  of	   language	   to	  which	   they	   adhere,	   for	   the	   study	   of	  mysticism.	   In	   the	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	   Immanuel	  Kant	  (1724-­‐1804CE)	  famously	  argued	  that	  the	  ‘noumenon’,	  rather	  than	  being	  experienced	  directly,	   is	   encountered	   through	   human	   categories	   which	   thus	   ‘mediate’	   all	   human	  experience. 106 	  Katz	   himself	   refers	   to	   the	   Kantian	   description	   of	   epistemic	   activity	  concerning	   transcendental	   knowledge,	   from	  which	   he	   concludes,	   ‘the	  mystic	   even	   in	   his	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  Steven	  T.	  Katz,	  "The	  'Conservative'	  Character	  of	  Mystical	  Experience,"	  in	  Mysticism	  and	  Religious	  Traditions,	  ed.	  Steven	  T.	  Katz	  (Oxford	  ;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1983),	  4. 103	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  26.	  104	  "The	  'Conservative'	  Character	  of	  Mystical	  Experience,"	  51.	  105	  Forman,	  Mysticism,	  Mind,	  Consciousness,	  2.	  106	  Ibid.,	  3.	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state	   of	   reconditioned	   consciousness	   is	   also	   a	   shaper	   of	   his	   experience’.107	  The	   extreme	  constructivist	  position	  would	  therefore	  seem	  to	  argue	  without	  qualification	  that	  religious	  experience	  is	  ‘mediated’	  by	  doctrinal	  and	  cultural	  elements;	  these	  construct	  the	  conceptual	  world	  of	  both	  the	  mystic	  and	  his	  experiences.	  From	  this	  position,	  a	  mystical	  experience	  of	  so-­‐called	  ‘pure	  consciousness’	  becomes	  logically	  impossible,	  since	  consciousness	  is	  always	  ‘consciousness	   of	   something’	   and	   that	   object	   of	   consciousness	   is	   culturally	   mediated.	  Penner	  suggests	  that	  rather	  than	  speaking	  of	  pure	  consciousness,	   the	  significance	  of	  such	  mystical	  experience	  is	  only	  to	  be	  explained	  if	  one	  is	  prepared	  ‘to	  locate	  and	  explain	  the	  set	  of	  relations	  which	  mediate	  them’.108	  	  	  Criticisms	   of	   ‘hard’	   constructivism	   by	   philosophers	   such	   as	   Robert	   Forman	   and	  William	  Wainwright	  have	  focussed	  on	  alternative	  theories	  of	  human	  consciousness.109	  Forman,	  who	  defends	   the	   state	   of	   pure	   consciousness,	   has	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   constructivist	  philosophers	   of	   mysticism	   rely	   on	   theories	   of	   language	   formation	   that	   depend	   on	   the	  conditionality	   and	   intentionality	   of	   experience,	   and	   thus	   reflect	   the	   philosophy	   of	   Kant,	  Husserl	   and	   Frans	   Brentano.110	  Instead	   Forman	   has	   chosen	   to	   co-­‐opt	   the	   insights	   of	   the	  Chinese	  Buddhist	  philosopher	  Paramaartha,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  the	  German	  Catholic	  mystic	  Meister	   Eckhart,	   to	   outline	   a	   new	   philosophical	   model	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   pure	  conscious	   event.	  He	   acknowledges	   the	   efficacy	  of	   the	   criticism	  of	  his	   own	  work	   that	   it	   is	  perhaps	  ‘too	  highly	  influenced	  by	  the	  linguistic	  philosophy	  that	  I	  have	  criticised’.111	  Indeed,	  the	   debate	   over	   pure	   consciousness	   has	   continued	   to	   be	   governed	   by	   the	   boundaries	   of	  constructivism,	  rather	  than	  by	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  teachings	  of	  mystics	  such	  as	  Eckhart	  on	   the	   emptying	   of	   the	   mind.	  112	  Wainwright’s	   1981	   book	  Mysticism,	   advanced	   another	  partial	  criticism	  of	  Forman	  by	  suggesting	  that	  even	  reports	  of	  a	  pure	  conscious	  event	  (PCE)	  could	   in	   fact	   be	   conceptual	   events	   remembered	   incorrectly.113	  He	   argued	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   for	   the	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  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  59.	  108	  Penner,	  "The	  Mystical	  Illusion,"	  89. 109	  For	  the	  distinction	  of	  ‘hard’	  from	  ‘soft’	  constructivism,	  see	  Section	  6	  on	  Constructivism	  in:	  Jerome	  Gellman,	  "Mysticism,"	  	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (2014).	  110	  Forman,	  Mysticism,	  Mind,	  Consciousness,	  78-­‐79.	  111	  Ibid.,	  170.	  112	  For	  this	  debate,	  see	  Section	  5.2:	  Criticism	  of	  the	  Defense	  of	  Pure	  Conscious	  Events.	  Gellman,	  "Mysticism".	  113	  William	  J.	  Wainwright,	  Mysticism	  :	  A	  Study	  of	  Its	  Nature,	  Cognitive	  Value	  and	  Moral	  Implications	  (Brighton:	  Wayland,	  1981),	  117-­‐19.	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cognitive	  nature	  of	  mystical	   claims	   that	   imply	   ‘realms	  of	  being	  or	   types	  of	   reality	  hidden	  from	   the	   ordinary	   consciousness’. 114 	  Wainwright’s	   arguments	   typify	   epistemological	  discussions	  of	  the	  cognitive	  aspect	  to	  mystical	  experience	  in	  Anglo-­‐American	  philosophy.	  	  
Epistemologies	  of	  Experience	  in	  Anglo-­‐American	  Philosophy	  Katz’s	   articles	   established	   the	   mediation	   of	   mystical	   experience	   through	   what	   has	   been	  called	   the	   ‘cultural-­‐linguistic’	   framework.115	  The	   epistemology	   of	   mystical	   experience	   is	  concerned	   with	   philosophical	   questions	   concerning	   the	   very	   cognitive	   and	   perceptual	  nature	   of	   that	   experience.	   Alongside	   the	   linguistic	   turn	   that	   informs	   the	   constructivist	  emphasis	  on	   the	  mediation	  process,	   is	   the	  perceptual	  nature	  of	   that	  process	  provided	  by	  analytical	  philosophy.	  The	  principle	  debates	  in	  Anglo-­‐American	  philosophy	  stem	  from	  the	  distinctions	   made	   by	   the	   descriptive	   phenomenologists	   between	   experience	   and	   its	  interpretation.	   The	  nuancing	   of	   this	   relationship	   has	   been	  particularly	   highlighted	   in	   the	  phenomenology	  of	  Smart,	  who	  has	  emphasised	  the	  ‘ramifications’	  of	  the	  doctrinal	  system	  in	  the	   mystic’s	   interpretation	   of	   their	   experience.	   However,	   within	   the	   phenomenological	  approach,	  experience	  has	  remained	  an	  essential	   category	  requiring	  adequate	  description,	  while	   the	   epistemological	   has	   questioned	   the	   processes	   of	   knowing	   and	   perceiving	   that	  experience	  without	  assuming	  that	  experience	  is	  a	  priori	  to	  the	  descriptive	  interpretation	  in	  the	  mystic’s	  account.	  	  	  Smart’s	   exposition	   of	   doctrinal	   ‘ramifications’	   accommodated	   the	   mystics’	   experience	  within	   the	   process	   of	   interpretation,	   suggesting	   only	   that	   ‘the	   higher	   the	   degree	   of	  ramification,	  the	  less	  is	  the	  description	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  experience	  itself’.116	  By	  contrast,	  Moore	   is	   decidedly	   more	   emphatic	   concerning	   the	   role	   of	   doctrinal	   elements	   in	   the	  interpretative	   account,	   proposing	   that	   these	   ‘may	   themselves	  mediate	   information	   about	  the	   phenomenological	   character	   of	   the	   experience	   and	   cannot	   therefore	   be	   discounted	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  115 	  George	   A.	   Lindbeck,	   The	   Nature	   of	   Doctrine	   :	   Religion	   and	   Theology	   in	   a	   Postliberal	   Age,	   1st	   ed.	  (Philadelphia:	  Westminster	  Press,	  1984),	  21.	  Lindbeck	  argues	  concerning	   the	  cultural-­‐linguistic	  alternative,	  that	   ‘its	   roots	   go	   back	   on	   the	   cultural	   side	   to	   Marx,	   Weber,	   and	   Durkheim,	   and	   on	   the	   linguistic	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   to	  Wittgenstein’.	  116	  Smart,	  "Interpretation	  and	  Mystical	  Experience,"	  80.	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either	  as	  superfluous	  additions	  or	  as	  problematic	  obscurations’.117	  For	  Moore,	  the	  doctrinal	  background	   of	   the	   mystic	   is	   ‘a	   key	   to	   his	   experience’	   and	   not	   an	   obstacle	   either	   to	   the	  mystic	  understanding	  his	  own	  experience,	  or	   to	   the	   investigator	   in	  his	  phenomenological	  analysis.118	  However,	  the	  claims	  of	  mystics	  present	  a	  challenge	  to	  analytical	  philosophy	  in	  going	  beyond	  ‘the	  limit	  of	  rational	  inquiry’,	  particularly	  in	  the	  assertion	  of	  the	  ineffability	  of	  mystical	  experience.119	  	  	  Stace	   provided	   an	   initial	   solution	   to	   the	   philosophical	   problem	  of	   ineffability,	  which	  was	  that	  since	  there	  are	  logical	  difficulties	  with	  doctrines	  of	   ‘absolute’	   ineffability	  (such	  as	  the	  Dionysian	   theory),	   the	   laws	   of	   logical	   understanding	   are	   inapplicable	   to	   mystical	  experience	  and	  thus	  what	  the	  mystic	  asserts	  is	  the	  paradoxicality,	  not	  the	  ineffability,	  of	  the	  experience.120	  Smart	   insists	   that	   the	   ‘inexpressible’,	   ‘indefinable’,	   and	   ‘incomprehensible’	  should	   not	   be	   taken	   to	   exclude	   describability	   and	   that	   there	   is	   an	   inherent	   ambiguity	   to	  such	   expressions,	   which	   assert	   instead	   that	   their	   experience	   is	   ‘not	   totally	  comprehensible’.121	  The	   issue	   of	   the	   ineffability	   of	   mystical	   experience	   (the	   Jamesian	  insight),	  thus	  becomes	  of	  critical	  importance	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  mystics’	  interpretations	  of	  their	   experiences,	   since	   the	   very	   interpretation	   of	   something	   as	   ineffable	   presents	   an	  immediate	   paradox	   in	   logic.	   McGinn	   concludes	   that	   the	   contribution	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	  philosophical	  studies	  of	  mysticism	  has	  often	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  ‘critical	  studies	  of	  the	  inner	  consistency	   of	   theories	   of	   mysticism’	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   attention	   to	   the	   context	   and	  language	  of	  the	  mystical	  texts	  themselves.122	  Smart	  argues	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  ‘a	  reasonable	  knowledge	   of	   the	   empirical	   facts	   concerning	   religion	   and	   religions’	   against	   the	   over-­‐philosophizing	  of	  mystical	  experience.	  In	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  mediation	  of	  that	  experience,	  Smart	   has	   emphasised	   the	   ‘severe	   limitations	   upon	   the	   philosophical	   discussion	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Peter	  Moore,	  "Mystical	  Experience,	  Mystical	  Doctrine,	  Mystical	  Technique,"	  in	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophical	  
Analysis,	  ed.	  Steven	  T.	  Katz	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  110.	  118	  Ibid.,	  111.	  119	  Ibid.,	  101.	  120	  Stace,	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	  288-­‐306.	  The	  philosopher	  Richard	  Gale	  is	  highly	  critical	  of	  Stace’s	  theories	  and	  argues	  instead	  for	  the	  subjectivity	  over	  the	  alleged	  ineffability	  of	  the	  mystical	  experience.	  Richard	  M.	  Gale,	  "Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,"	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  57,	  no.	  14	  (1960).	  121	  Smart,	  "Understanding	  Religious	  Experience,"	  17.	  122	  McGinn,	  The	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  of	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  Mysticism,	  319.	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mysticism	   in	   the	   abstract’.123 	  Indeed,	   rather	   than	   focussing	   on	   forming	   an	   adequate	  epistemology	   of	   mystical	   experience,	   the	   hermeneutical	   approach	   to	   the	   subject	   of	  mysticism	   must	   explore	   both	   the	   substantive	   and	   the	   methodological,	   i.e.	   the	   claims	   of	  mystic	  traditions	  and	  the	  role	  of	  academic	  inquiry	  into	  them.	  	  
A Hermeneutical Approach for the Study of Mysticism 	  From	  the	  predominant	  modern	  view	  of	  reading	  the	  mystics	  as	  operating	  within	  a	  common	  core	  of	  mystical	  experience,	  cultural	  relativists	   like	  Katz	  disrupted	  this	  naïve	  essentialism	  with	  assertions	  of	  social	  construction	  and	  untranslatability.	  The	  problem	  of	  reading	   texts	  through	   the	   reduction	   to	   phenomenological	   essences	   is	   not	   solely	   a	   tendency	   to	   derive	  universalising	   philosophies	   of	   the	   mystical	   consciousness	   from	   them,	   but	   also	   a	   certain	  temptation	   to	   use	   a	   cross-­‐section	   of	   mystical	   texts	   without	   sufficient	   reference	   to	   the	  linguistic	  contingency	  of	  their	  socio-­‐historical	  context.	  However,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  talk	  about	   what	   constitutes	   the	   phenomenological	   content	   of	  mystical	   language	   continues	   to	  raise	   ontological	   and	   epistemological	   issues	   beyond	   a	   constructivist	   philosophy.	  Philosophical	   hermeneutics	   provides	   a	   way	   forward	   for	   reconsidering	   these	   issues,	   in	  avoiding	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  rival	  approaches	  delineated	  in	  the	  first	  two	  parts	  of	  this	  chapter.	   This	   section	   forms	   a	   preliminary	   enquiry	   into	   how	   philosophical	   hermeneutics	  would	  interface	  with	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  by	  exploring	  some	  of	  the	  key	  themes	  highlighted	  in	  the	  approaches	  of	  King,	  Flood	  and	  Certeau	  to	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism.	  Indeed	  these	  scholars	  have	   identified	  the	  current	   impasse	   in	   the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  as	  indicative	  of	  the	  binaries	  of	  Western	  culture.	  	  The	   eclipse	   or	   ‘retreat’	   of	   the	   mystics,	   identified	   by	   Certeau	   at	   the	   dawn	   of	   the	  Enlightenment,	  signifies	  for	  King	  a	  deepening	  marginalisation	  and	  suppression	  of	  ‘mystical’	  elements	  within	  Western	  intellectual	  culture.124	  King	  has	  suggested	  that	  Romanticism	  and	  New	  Age	  spiritualities	  have	  merely	  been	  attempts	  to	  invert	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  rationalist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Smart,	  "Understanding	  Religious	  Experience,"	  15.	  124	  King,	  Orientalism	  and	  Religion	  :	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Theory,	  India	  and	  the	  Mystic	  East,	  27.	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post-­‐Kantian	  epistemology,	  but	  these	  have	  not	  sought	  to	  undermine	  the	  imposed	  polarities	  of	  the	  rational	  and	  the	  non-­‐rational	  or	  irrational	  whereby	  mysticism	  tends	  to	  be	  positioned	  in	   the	   latter.125	  The	  Romanticist	   emphasis	   on	   feeling	   and	   the	   poetic,	   has	   not	  managed	   to	  safeguard	   either	   religion	   or	   mysticism	   from	   the	   opposing	   camp,	   in	   fact	   it	   has	   merely	  conceded	   to	   its	   categories.	   Whilst	   the	   psychological	   philosophy	   of	   James	   confirmed	   the	  established	   position	   of	   the	  mystical	  within	   the	   private	   realm	   of	   religious	   experience,	   for	  King	   this	   privatisation	   was	   also	   a	   marginalisation	   of	   religion	   and	   the	   mystical	   from	   the	  sphere	  of	  power	  and	  authority	  in	  the	  West,	  which	  had	  become	  monopolised	  by	  modernist	  philosophy	   and	   science	   in	   the	   post-­‐Enlightenment.126	  The	   question	   posed	   now	   is	   how	   to	  move	  beyond	  the	  privatisation	  of	   the	  mystical,	  which	  has	  been	  definitive	  of	   the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  as	  surveyed	  in	  the	  first	  two	  parts	  of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  work	  of	  Certeau	  and	   Flood	   has	   promoted	   a	   fundamental	   shift	   from	   categorising	   mystical	   experience	   as	  subjective	  and	  as	  the	  embodiment	  of	  spirituality	  in	  tradition.	  	  
The	  Linguistic	  Genealogy	  of	  la	  mystique	  Certeau’s	  work	  originally	  published	  in	  1982	  as	  La	  Fable	  Mystique	  marks	  a	  departure	  from	  the	   established	   boundaries	   of	   the	   conventional	   approaches	   to	  mysticism.	   As	  McGinn	   has	  shown,	   his	   approach	   can	   not	   be	   placed	   within	   the	   tradition	   of	   French	   theological	  scholarship	   on	   mysticism,	   which	   was	   so	   intense	   in	   the	   early	   twentieth	   century.	   Jeremy	  Ahearne’s	   book,	   Michel	   de	   Certeau,	   Interpretation	   and	   its	   Other,	   has	   suggested	   that	   for	  Certeau	  the	  ‘mystic	  science’	  of	  interpreting	  the	  ‘mystics’	  formed	  around	  the	  early	  modern	  reflection	  on	  mystic	  writings.127	  Certeau’s	  study	  was	  not	  a	  general	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  nor	  did	  his	  isolation	  of	  la	  mystique	  attempt	  to	  replace	  the	  term	  mysticism	  or	  le	  mysticisme	  with	  another	  essentialising	  phenomenological	  category,	  that	  seemed	  to	  constitute	  the	  particular	  fixation	   of	   pre-­‐constructivist	   scholars.	   For	   Ahearne,	   the	   project	   of	   Certeau’s	   The	   Mystic	  
Fable	   was	   ‘to	   trace	   how	   a	   sociohistorically	   situated	   ‘discipline’,	   ‘la	   mystique’,	   was	  constituted	  over	  the	  early	  modern	  period,	  and	  how	  it	  subsequently	  broke	  apart’.128	  In	  his	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  Ibid.,	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  Jeremy	  Ahearne,	  Michel	  de	  Certeau	  :	  Interpretation	  and	  Its	  Other,	  Key	  Contemporary	  Thinkers	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  1995),	  96.	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  Ibid.,	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analysis,	  Certeau	  saw	  the	  crisis	  of	  modernity	  as	  refracted	  into	  the	  fragmented	  language	  of	  the	   early-­‐modern	   ‘mystics’	   who	   sought	   to	   operate	   at	   its	   boundaries.129	  From	   Ahearne’s	  overview	   of	   The	   Mystic	   Fable,	   it	   is	   apparent	   that	   while	   Certeau	   provides	   a	   linguistic	  genealogy	  of	  mystique,	   it	   is	  not	   strictly	  part	  of	   the	  genealogical	  project,	   and	  his	  approach	  can	   not	   be	   considered	   a	   Nietzschean	   or	   Freudian	   ‘hermeneutics	   of	   suspicion’.130	  Indeed,	  Certeau	   does	   not	   reduce	   the	   mystic	   tradition	   to	   contemporary	   methods	   of	   explanation	  concerning	  psychic	  states	  or	  acts,	  and	  he	  has	  resisted	  unduly	  privileging	   the	  discipline	  of	  psychoanalysis	  which	  has	  its	  own	  historical	  formation	  from	  Freud	  to	  Lacan.131	  	  	  	  Certeau	  delineated	  the	  specific	  development	  of	  the	  term	  mystique,	  which	  he	  traced	  from	  its	  foundations	  in	  the	  thirteenth	  century	  with	  Meister	  Eckhart,	  to	  ‘its	  greatest	  formalization’	  in	  the	  sixteenth	  century	  with	  the	  Spanish	  mystics	  Teresa	  of	  Avila	  and	  John	  of	  the	  Cross,	  and	  finally	   to	   its	   end,	   with	   the	   seventeenth	   century	   Angelus	   Silesius.132 	  The	   purpose	   of	  Certeau’s	   historical	   genealogy	   of	   mystique,	   the	   significance	   of	   its	   semantic	   shift	   from	  adjective	  to	  noun,	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  historical	  circumstances	  of	  that	  beginning	  and	  end	  of	  mystique,	  which	  does	  not	  preclude	  however	  ‘a	  regressive	  history	  of	  its	  formation	  and	  a	  study	  of	  its	  later	  embodiments’.133	  Certeau	  was	  thus	  interested	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  mystic	  discourse,	   ‘to	   determine	   what	   occurs	   in	   a	   field	   delimited	   by	   a	   name	   (“mystics”)	   [noun	  
mystique]	  and	  within	  which	  work	  is	  being	  done	  in	  obedience	  to	  a	  relevant	  set	  of	  rules’.134	  What	   remains	   of	   the	   procedures	   of	   the	   mystics	   are	   only	   traces	   of	   this	   discourse,	   since	  mystic	   science,	   in	   being	   pledged	   to	   the	   impossible	   and	   the	   inaccessible,	  was	   destined	   to	  vanish.135	  Indeed	  Certeau’s	  position	  argued	  directly	  against	  the	  reduction	  of	  mystique	  to	  the	  common	  core	  of	  mystical	  experience,	  and	  he	  dismissed	  the	  pursuit	  of	  ‘a	  malleable	  ineffable	  that	  could	  be	  fashioned	  to	  fit	  any	  end’.136	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  trans.	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  While	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  is	  very	  much	  a	  construction	  of	  modernity,	  Certeau	  has	   shown	   that	   the	   early	   modern	   mystic	   tradition	   provided	   the	   elements	   for	   its	   own	  fabrication.	   	   It	  may	  be	  said	  therefore	  that	  within	  the	  currents	  of	  modern	  liberalism	  in	  the	  nineteenth	   and	   early	   twentieth	   centuries,	   there	   was	   fabricated	   another	   tradition	   of	  mysticism,	   a	   new	   academic	   science	   of	  mysticism	   in	  world	   religions,	   in	   place	   of	   the	   early	  modern	   ‘mystic	   science’,	   which	   had	   been	   concerned	   with	   a	   mystic	   tradition	   and	   its	  interpretation.	  The	  critique	  of	  the	  modern	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  may	  be	  considered	  according	  to	  the	  intellectual	  traditions	  that	  inform	  it,	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  discourses	  that	  form	  the	  substantive	  object	  of	   its	   inquiry.137	  The	  modern	  discipline	  of	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  can	  be	  re-­‐invigorated	  by	  Certeau’s	  identification	  of	  mystic	  discourse,	  and	  thus	  the	  discourse	  of	  mystic	  traditions	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  impasse	  in	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism.	  	  	  
From	  Mystical	  Experience	  to	  Mystic	  Tradition	  	  King	   has	   highlighted	   ‘the	   post-­‐experiential	   emphasis	   in	   most	   contemporary	   accounts	   of	  mysticism’,	   which	   reflects	   both	   the	   ‘the	   influence	   of	   post-­‐Kantian	   epistemology’	   and	   the	  Jamesian	   philosophical	   psychology. 138 	  However,	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   the	   term	  ‘experience’	   as	   the	   foundation	   for	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   ‘mystical’	   has	   not	   itself	   been	  sufficiently	   questioned	  by	   either	   of	   the	   rival	   groups	   of	   enquiry	   that	   have	  been	  discussed	  above.139	  Flood	  has	  pointed	  out	  two	  difficulties,	  first	  that	  it	  is	  doubtful	  that	  the	  term	  has	  the	  same	  connotations	  for	  everyone,	  especially	  if	  mystical	  experience	  is	  meant	  to	  imply	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐the-­‐ordinary	  state	  of	  consciousness.	  The	  second	  difficulty	   is	  that	  the	  term	  also	   ‘implies	  an	   encounter	   with	   the	   world	   through	   the	   senses’,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   ‘many	   mystical	  experiences	   are	   regarded	   as	   being	   outside	   of	   the	   body	   (and	   therefore	   beyond	   the	  senses)’.140	  Instead	  of	  any	  core	  mystical	  experience,	  Flood	  has	  suggested	  that	  what	  emerges	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  Gavin	  D.	  Flood,	  "Reflections	  on	  Tradition	  and	  Inquiry	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Religions,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  
Academy	  of	  Religion	  74,	  no.	  1	  (2006):	  55.	  Flood’s	  development	  of	  the	  three	  levels	  of	  discourse	  in	  religious	  studies	  is	  considered	  further	  for	  its	  application	  to	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  138	  King,	  Orientalism	  and	  Religion	  :	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Theory,	  India	  and	  the	  Mystic	  East,	  8.	  139	  See	  the	  two	  main	  sections	  above,	  ‘Enlightenment	  Objectivism’	  and	  ‘Genealogical	  Critique’.	  140	  Flood,	  The	  Importance	  of	  Religion	  :	  Meaning	  and	  Action	  in	  Our	  Strange	  World,	  82.	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are	   ‘analogues’	   of	   the	  mystical,	  which	   involve	   language	   and	   practices	   of	   the	   body	   across	  spiritual	  traditions.	  	   This	  is	  to	  move	  away	  from	  an	  essentialist	  understanding	  of	  experience	  to	  locate	  a	  diversity	  of	  human	  experience	   in	   time	  and	   therefore	   in	   the	  way	   that	   experience	   is	  narrated.	   Indeed	   if	  we	   substitute	   the	  term	   “experience”	   with	   “narrative”	   or	   even	   “subjectivity”,	   we	   can	   offer	   an	   account	   of	   spiritual	  experience	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  our	  continued	  existence	  through	  time	  and	  a	  shared	  structure	  which	  is	  filled	  out	  with	  tradition-­‐specific	  contents	  at	  different	  historical	  times.141	  	  Flood’s	  alternatives	  of	  ‘narrative’	  and	  ‘subjectivity’	  move	  beyond	  naïve	  essentialism,	  to	  talk	  about	   human	   existence,	   bodily	   and	   temporal.	   The	   existential	   condition	   of	   human	  subjectivity	   and	   its	   means	   of	   narrativizing,	   inform	   the	   account	   of	   a	   shared	   structure	   of	  spiritual	  traditions.	  Again,	  it	  is	  Certeau	  who	  suggests	  that	  with	  mystic	  writing	  there	  is	  ‘the	  narrativization	  of	  one’s	  life’,	  in	  which	  the	  autobiography	  of	  mystics	  such	  as	  Teresa	  of	  Avila	  (1515-­‐1582CE)	  is	  thus	  ‘a	  way	  of	  “ordering	  one’s	  soul”	  and	  one’s	  “spirit”’.142	  	  	  In	  Flood’s	  use	  of	  terminology	  there	  is	  a	  noticeable	  preference	  for	  the	  terms	  spirituality	  and	  the	  spiritual,	  over	  mysticism	  and	  the	  mystical.	  This	  seems	  to	  stem	  from	  a	  desire	  to	  distance	  himself	   from	   the	   narrow	   focus	   of	   academic	   scholars	   of	  mysticism	  on	   issues	   surrounding	  human	   consciousness	   and	   experience.	   However,	   Flood	   has	   also	   acknowledged	   that	  mysticism,	  like	  the	  term	  spirituality,	  has	  its	  own	  genealogy,	  and	  thus	  ‘What	  is	  now	  referred	  to	  as	  “spirituality”	  fell	  within	  the	  semantic	  range	  of	  the	  category	  “mysticism”.’143	  The	  term	  ‘mysticism’	   has	   of	   course	   its	   own	   academic	   history,	  mainly	   dating	   to	   the	   last	   century,	   as	  well	  as	   its	  particular	  Christian	  history	   in	  the	  West	  that	  developed	  from	  mystical	   theology	  and	  deriving	   from	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius’s	   short	   treatise	   that	  was	   translated	   into	  Latin	   in	   the	  ninth	  century	  as	  De	  Mystica	  Theologica.144	  Flood	  has	  recognised	  that	  mystical	   theology,	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘knowledge	  of	  God	  through	  experience’,	  did	  become	  distinct	  from	  dogmatic	  or	  natural	  theology,	  and	  knowledge	  through	  revelation	  or	  ‘reasoning	  about	  the	  universe’.145	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Ibid.,	  82-­‐83. 142	  Certeau,	  The	  Mystic	  Fable,	  120.	  143	  Flood,	  The	  Importance	  of	  Religion	  :	  Meaning	  and	  Action	  in	  Our	  Strange	  World,	  81.	  144	  Certeau,	  The	  Mystic	  Fable,	  101-­‐3.	  145	  Flood,	  The	  Importance	  of	  Religion	  :	  Meaning	  and	  Action	  in	  Our	  Strange	  World,	  81.	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Certeau’s	  account,	  the	  emergence	  of	  mystique	  as	  ‘mystical	  science’	  occurred	  in	  the	  sixteenth	  century	   and	   coincided	   with	   the	   deployment	   of	   the	   Dionysian	   corpus	   in	   the	   language	   of	  theologians	   such	   as	   Nicholas	   of	   Cusa	   (1401-­‐1464CE),	   and	   when	   Teresa	   of	   Avila	   was	  canonized	  in	  1615	  her	  writings	  were	  recommended	  as	  ‘books	  of	  mystical	  theology’.146	  	  	  Certeau’s	  project	  has	  located	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Western	  tradition	  of	  mystics	  at	  the	  cusp	  of	  modernity,	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  abstract	  field	  of	  phenomenological	  typologies,	  to	  which	  he	  alludes	   as	   ‘the	   seduction	   of	   partial	   resemblances’.147	  There	   has	   been	   much	   criticism	   of	  Certeau’s	  narrow	   focus,	   in	   that	   it	   seems	   to	  undermine	   the	   two	   rival	   approaches	  outlined	  above	   and	   to	   withdraw	   from	   the	   possibility	   of	   other	   forms	   of	   mysticism	   beyond	   his	  genealogy	  of	  Western	  mysticism.	  However,	   the	  methods	  of	   Certeau’s	   analysis,	   can,	   it	   has	  been	  argued	  by	  McGinn,	  be	  appropriated	  in	  the	  study	  of	  mystics	  not	  encompassed	  by	  the	  confines	   that	   he	   established.148	  	   Flood	   argues	   that	   accepting	   the	   validity	   of	   tradition-­‐specific	   values	   goes	   against	   ‘a	   Nietzschean/Foucaultian	   evaluation	   that	   is	   fundamentally	  materialist	   and	   cannot	   allow	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   transcendence’.149 	  Tradition-­‐based	  discourse	   opens	   up	   the	   linguistic	   processes	   of	   the	   mystics	   in	   their	   orientation	   towards	  transcendence,	  in	  that	  the	  mystical	  text	  attempts	  to	  speak	  of	  something	  other	  than	  itself.	  
Mysticism	  in	  Syriac	  Studies	  Since	   the	   term	   ‘mysticism’	   is	   located	  within	   a	  modern	   European	   discipline	   of	   study,	   this	  raises	   inherent	   and	   critical	   problems	   for	   its	   application	   to	   non-­‐Western	   phenomena.	  Certeau’s	   retrieval	  of	   the	   formation	  of	  mystique	   in	  Western	   tradition	  has	   implications	   for	  Syriac	  studies,	  both	  linguistic	  and	  conceptual,	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  ‘mysticism’	  in	  Syriac.	  The	   contribution	   of	   Certeau	   to	   this	   question	   has	   similarly	   been	   appreciated	   by	   Sabino	  Chialà	   in	  his	  article	   for	   the	   recent	  volume,	  Les	  Mystiques	  Syriaques.150	  The	   terminology	  of	  mystics	  and	  the	  mystical	  is	  represented	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  terms	  in	  the	  Syriac	  tradition	  and	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  Certeau,	  The	  Mystic	  Fable,	  102. 147	  Ibid.,	  9.	  148	  McGinn,	  The	  Presence	  of	  God	  :	  A	  History	  of	  Western	  Christian	  Mysticism,	  312-­‐13.	  149	  Flood,	  The	  Ascetic	  Self	  :	  Subjectivity,	  Memory,	  and	  Tradition,	  247.	  150	  Sabino	  	  Chialà,	  "Les	  Mystiques	  Syro-­‐Orientaux,	  une	  École	  ou	  une	  Époque?,"	  in	  Les	  Mystiques	  Syriaques,	  ed.	  Alain	  Desreumaux,	  Études	  Syriaques	   (Paris:	  Geuthner,	  2011),	  63.	  Chialà	   refers	   to	   the	  debate	  over	   the	   term	  ‘mystic’	   (mystique)	   and	   the	   contribution	   of	   Certeau,	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   his	   article	   on	   the	   West	   Syrian	  mystics;	  ‘Nous	  savons	  tous	  combien	  la	  définition	  de	  «mystique»	  a	  retenu	  l'attention	  des	  éminents	  savants	  et	  que	  la	  question	  est	  loin	  d'être	  réglée’.	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not	   centred	   on	   a	   single	   concept	   equivalent	   to	   the	   articulation	   of	   mysticism	   in	   Western	  European	  tradition.	  While	  the	  connotations	  of	  the	  Greek	  noun,	  mystērion,	  similarly	  belong	  to	   the	   etymology	   of	   the	   Syriac	   rāzā,151	  	   this	   term	   is	   not	   deployed	   as	   an	   adjective	   for	   the	  monks	   who	   follow	   in	   the	   Syrian	   Dionysian	   tradition;	   in	   Barhebraeus’	   writings	   they	   are	  referred	   to	   as	   the	   holy	   ones	   (qadīšē),	   engaged	   in	   spiritual	   practice	   (rūḥānāyā).	   Indeed,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  tendency	  for	  scholars	  to	  speak	  of	  Syriac	   ‘spirituality’,	  rather	  than	  Syrian	  ‘mysticism’.152	  However	  this	  attention	  to	  terminology	  has	  not	  prevented	  the	  incorporation	  of	  conceptual	  categories	  from	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  into	  Syriac	  studies.	  	  	  While	  the	  term	  ‘spiritual’	  has	  slightly	  different	  connotations	  to	  the	  ‘mystical’	  in	  English,	  it	  is	  still	  bound	  up	  with	   the	  Western	  history	  of	  mysticism,	   including	   the	  modern	  emphasis	  on	  the	   category	   of	   personal	   religious	   experience.	   Flood	   argues	   that	   the	   term	   ‘spirituality’	  comes	   from	   the	   Ignatian	   ‘spiritual	   exercises’	   (exercita	   spiritualia),	   with	   the	   genealogy	   of	  these	   terms	   found	  within	   a	  Western	   Christian	   history,	   as	   outlined	   in	   the	  Dictionnaire	  de	  
Spiritualité.153	  Within	   this	   history,	   spirituality	   is	   ‘the	   cultivation	   of	   the	   inner	   life	   of	   a	  religious	   community,	   particularly	   a	   monastic	   community’,	   although	   in	   modern	   Western	  culture	  Flood	  recognises	   that	   the	   term	  denotes	   ‘an	   individual,	  private	  experience’.154	  This	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Sebastian	  Brock	  describes	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  Syriac	  word	  rāzā	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Syrian	  hymnographer	  St	  Ephrem	  (d.	  373	  CE),	  which	  is	  best	  translated	  as	  ‘mystery’	  or	  ‘symbol’,	  with	  the	  plural	  rāzē,	   like	  the	  Greek	  
mystēria,	   referring	   to	   the	   liturgical	  Mysteries.	   ‘The	  word	  of	  Persian	  origin,	   first	  appears	   in	  Daniel	  where	   its	  primary	  meaning	   is	   that	  of	   “secret”;	   subsequently	   it	  occurs	   in	   the	   text	  of	   the	  Qumran	  community,	  and	  very	  probably	   it	   is	   the	  Semitic	   term	  lying	  behind	  St	  Paul’s	  use	  of	   the	  word	  mysterion.’	  Syrus	  Ephraem,	  Hymns	  on	  
Paradise,	  trans.	  Sebastian	  P.	  Brock	  (Crestwood,	  N.Y.:	  St	  Vladimir's	  Seminary,	  1990),	  42.	  	  152	  Brock	  argues	  for	  the	  distinctness	  of	   ‘Syriac	  spirituality’	   from	  the	  Greek	  and	  Latin	  traditions.	  Sebastian	  P.	  Brock,	   Spirituality	   in	   the	   Syriac	   Tradition,	   2nd	   ed.	   (Kottayam:	   St.	   Ephrem	   Ecumenical	   Research	   Institute,	  2005),	   2.	   Seely	  Beggiani’s	   book	  depends	  heavily	   on	   the	   contributors	   to	   the	  Dictionnaire	  de	  Spiritualité	  (see	  below).	   Seely	   J.	   Beggiani,	   Introduction	   to	  Eastern	  Christian	  Spirituality	   :	  The	  Syriac	  Tradition	   (Cranbury,	   NJ:	  Associated	  University	  Presses,	  1991),	  7.	  	  	  153 	  Flood,	   The	   Importance	   of	   Religion	   :	   Meaning	   and	   Action	   in	   Our	   Strange	   World,	   80.	   Michel	   Dupuy,	  "Spiritualité,"	   in	   Dictionnaire	   de	   Spiritualité	   Ascétique	   et	   Mystique	   :	   Doctrine	   et	   Histoire,	   ed.	   Marcel	   Viller,	  Charles	  Baumgartner,	  and	  André	  Rayez	  (Paris:	  G.	  Beauchesne	  et	  ses	  fils,	  1937),	  1142-­‐46.	  Michel	  Dupuy	  begins	  with	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Latin	  substantive	  spiritualitas,	  used	  to	  translate	  the	  Greek	  pneumatikos	  in	  the	  Pauline	  epistles.	   The	   substantive	   is	   found	   frequently	   in	   Tertullian	   (166-­‐225CE),	   and	   in	   both	   the	   philosophical	   and	  religious	  senses	  in	  thirteenth	  century	  authors	  such	  as	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  and	  Albert	  Magnus	  (1200-­‐1280CE).	  154	  Flood,	  The	   Importance	  of	  Religion	   :	  Meaning	  and	  Action	   in	  Our	  Strange	  World,	   80.	   These	   perspectives	   on	  spirituality	   are	   reflected	   in	   G.	  Widengren’s	   article,	   in	  which	   he	   compares	   Isaac	   of	   Nineveh’s	   directions	   for	  prayer	   with	   the	   Spiritual	   Exercises	   of	   Ignatius	   Loyola	   (1491-­‐1556CE),	   and	   then	   proceeds	   to	   argue	   that	  Stephen	   bar	   Ṣūdhailē’s	   writings	   testify	   to	   his	   inner	   mystical	   experiences	   rather	   than	   to	   ‘only	   literary	  reminiscences	  of	   inherited	  traditions’.	  G.	  Widengren,	  "Researches	  in	  Syrian	  Mysticism:	  Mystical	  Experiences	  and	  Spiritual	  Exercises,"	  Numen	  8,	  no.	  3	  (1961):	  177-­‐83.	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  155	  For	  the	  discussion	  of	  Barhebraeus	  as	  a	  mystic,	  see	  the	  Introduction	  to	  Chapter	  4.	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Chapter	  3:	  Locating	  Barhebraeus	  Historically	  –	  Traditions,	  Texts	  and	  Themes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Introduction: A Critical Biography 	  Barhebraeus	   is	   a	   sufficiently	   celebrated	   figure	   to	   be	   given	   a	   biographical	   entry	   across	   a	  broad	   range	   of	   modern	   encyclopaedias,	   a	   diversity	   that	   reflects	   his	   own	   career	   as	   a	  polymath	  who	  specialised	  in	  so	  many	  different	  disciplines.	  That	  Barhebraeus	  excelled	  in	  so	  many	   literary	   fields,	  makes	   it	  difficult	   to	   locate	  him	  in	  a	  single	  discipline.	  Well-­‐known	  for	  his	  ecumenical	  views	  towards	  the	  other	  Christian	  confessions	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  openness	  towards	  Islam,	  this	  outlook	  led	  to	  a	  tendency	  to	  turn	  to	  authorities	  that	  were	  less	  standardly	  read,	  in	  the	  monastic	  circles	  of	  the	  West	  Syrians.	  However,	  these	  distinctive	  characteristics	  by	  no	  means	  placed	  him	  outside	  of	  his	  tradition,	  indeed	  Barhebraeus’	  more	  innovative	   aspects	   are	   also	   highly	   synthetic	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   he	   borrows	   from	   other	  traditions	   that	  were	   closely	   related	   to	  his	  own.	   In	   considering	  Barhebraeus’	  place	  within	  Syrian	   tradition,	   it	   seems	   pertinent	   to	   consult	   the	   entry	   on	   Barhebraeus	   within	   the	  encyclopaedic	   history	   of	   Syriac	   literature	   and	   the	   sciences,	   written	   by	   the	   late	   Syrian	  Orthodox	   Patriarch,	   Mor	   Ignatius	   Aphram	   I	   Barsoum	   (1887-­‐1957CE).	   This	   Arabic	   work,	  published	  in	  1956,	  was	   later	  translated	   into	  English	  by	  Matti	  Moosa,	   for	  the	  2003	  edition	  entitled:	   The	   scattered	   pearls:	   a	   history	   of	   Syriac	   literature	   and	   sciences. 156 	  Barsoum	  introduces	  Barhebraeus	  as	  ‘one	  of	  the	  great	  philosophers	  and	  theologians	  of	  the	  Orient	  as	  well	   as	   the	   world’.157	  Barhebraeus	   has	   also	   been	   compared	   to	   the	   great	   scholars	   of	  medieval	  Europe,	  such	  as	  Thomas	  Aquinas.158	  However,	  as	  Hidemi	  Takahashi	  states,	  ‘there	  are	  no	  positive	  indications	  in	  Barhebraeus'	  works	  (philosophical-­‐theological	  and	  historical)	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  Ignatius	   Aphram	   Barsoum	   and	   Matti	   Moosa,	   The	   Scattered	   Pearls	   :	   A	   History	   of	   Syriac	   Literature	   and	  
Sciences,	  2nd	  rev.	  ed.	  (Piscataway,	  N.J.:	  Gorgias	  Press,	  2003).	  	  157	  Ibid.,	  463.	  158	  Hidemi	   Takahashi,	   "The	   Reception	   of	   Ibn	   Sīnā	   in	   Syriac	  the	   Case	   of	   Gregory	   Barhebraeus"	   (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Before	  and	  after	  Avicenna	  :	  proceedings	  of	  the	  First	  Conference	  of	  the	  Avicenna	  Study	  Group,	  Yale	  University,	  2001),	  274,	  n.	  73.	  Takahashi	  points	  out	   that,	   ‘Thomas	  Aquinas	   (1225-­‐74)	  and	  Barhebraeus	  (1225/6-­‐1286)	  are	  almost	  exact	  contemporaries	  and	  the	  date	  of	  composition	  of	  the	  Summa	  -­‐1267-­‐73-­‐	  too,	  is	  very	  close	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Candelabrum’.	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that	  he	  had	  any	  awareness	  of	   the	  developments	  of	  Latin	  Scholastic	  philosophy’.159	  This	   is	  despite	   the	   possibility	   of	   interaction	   with	   Latin	   Scholasticism	   during	   the	   period	   of	   his	  studies	  in	  the	  Crusader	  States	  of	  the	  Franks,	  in	  Tripoli,	  Antioch	  and	  Cilicia.160	  	  That	  Barhebraeus	  distinguished	  himself	  as	  an	  Aristotelian	  philosopher	  and	  as	  a	  theologian	  was	   hardly	   without	   precedent	   amongst	   Syrian	   church	   leaders;	   other	   notable	   examples	  include	  Timothy	  I	  (780-­‐823CE)	  Patriarch	  of	  the	  Church	  of	  the	  East,	  whose	  dialogues	  display	  his	  Aristotelian	  training.161	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  tradition,	  philosophical	  learning	  was	   located	   in	   the	   monastic	   centres	   and	   it	   was	   usual	   for	   Syrian	   church	   leaders	   like	  Barhebraeus	   to	   have	   a	  monastic	   background.162	  Athanasius	   of	  Balad	   (d.	   686CE)	   similarly	  deserves	  to	  be	  mentioned	  here,	  a	  scholar	  of	  the	  monastery	  of	  Qennešre,	  Athanasius	  became	  Patriarch	   of	   Antioch	   and	   thus	   head	   of	   the	   Syrian	   Orthodox	   Church	   from	   683	   to	   686.163	  Although	   Athanasius’	   translations	   do	   not	   survive,	   his	   translation	   of	   books	   of	   Aristotle’s	  
Organon	  were	  sought	  after	  by	  the	  Patriarch	  Timothy,	  when	  the	  latter	  was	  commissioned	  to	  provide	  an	  Arabic	  translation	  of	  the	  Topics	  (the	  book	  of	  dialectics)	  for	  the	  Caliph	  al-­‐Mahdī	  (775-­‐785CE).164	  The	  monastic	  context	  for	  Barhebraeus’	  philosophy	  will	  be	  explored	  further	  in	  the	  section	  on	  the	  West	  Syrian	  Monastic	  Curriculum.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  Ibid.,	  274.	  Janssens	  also	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  evidence	  for	  Barhebraeus’	  awareness	  of	  Byzantine	  scholasticism	  either.	  Herman	  F.	  Janssens,	  L'Entretien	  de	  la	  Sagesse	  :	  Introduction	  aux	  Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  
Bar	  Hebraeus	  (Paris:	  Les	  Belles	  Lettres,	  1937),	  34.	  160	  Takahashi,	   "The	   Reception	   of	   Ibn	   Sīnā	   in	   Syriac	  the	   Case	   of	   Gregory	   Barhebraeus,"	   274.	   The	   textual	  connection	  is	  made	  by	  Zonta,	  who	  notes	  that	  13th	  century	  Aristotelianism	  spread	  amongst	  Latin	  scholastics,	  Hebrew	  philosophers	  and	  amongst	  the	  Syriac	  thinkers	  in	  Mesopotamia,	  though	  he	  admits	  that	  this	  process	  ‘is	  still	   in	  need	  of	   a	   reasonable	  explication’.	  Mauro	  Zonta,	   "Syriac,	  Hebrew	  and	  Latin	  Encyclopedia	   in	   the	  13th	  Century:	  A	  Comparative	  Approach	  to	  "Medieval	  Philosophies""	  (paper	  presented	  at	   the	  Was	   ist	  Philosophie	  im	  Mittelalter?	  =	  Qu'est-­‐ce	  que	  la	  philosophie	  au	  Moyen	  Âge?	  =	  What	  is	  Philosophy	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages?,	  Erfurt,	  25-­‐30	  August	  1997),	  928.	  	  161	  Daniel	  King,	   "Why	  Were	   the	  Syrians	   Interested	   in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	   in	  History	  and	  Identity	  in	  the	  Late	  
Antique	  near	  East,	   ed.	  Philip	  Wood,	  Oxford	  Studies	   in	  Late	  Antiquity	   (Oxford	   ;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  69.	  162	  For	   example,	   in	   his	   biographical	   chapter	   on	   Barhebraeus,	   Nöldeke	   comments	   regarding	   Barhebraeus’	  ordination	  as	  a	  monk	  that	   ‘this	  was	  doubtless	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  episcopal	  dignity,	   the	  higher	  ecclesiastical	  charges	   being	   in	   the	   Oriental	   Churches	   accessible	   only	   to	   monks’.	   Theodor	   Nöldeke	   and	   John	   Sutherland	  Black,	  Sketches	  from	  Eastern	  History	  (London:	  Adam	  and	  Charles	  Black,	  1892),	  238.	  163	  Barsoum	  and	  Moosa,	  The	  Scattered	  Pearls	  :	  A	  History	  of	  Syriac	  Literature	  and	  Sciences,	  331-­‐32.	  164	  John	  W.	  Watt,	  "Commentary	  and	  Translation	  in	  Syriac	  Aristotelian	  Scholarship:	  Sergius	  to	  Baghdad,"	  
Journal	  for	  Late	  Antique	  Religion	  and	  Culture	  4	  (2010):	  39.	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Biographical	  Sources	  for	  Barhebraeus	  Of	  Barhebraeus’	  early	  life,	  not	  much	  is	  known	  in	  any	  detail,	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  extant	  sources.	   Scholars	   usually	   construct	   a	   biography	   for	   Barhebraeus	   according	   to	   his	   own	  writings,	   principally	   the	   chronicle	   of	   church	   history,	   the	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum,	   which	  forms	  the	  second	  part	  of	  his	  Chronography	  (Maktbānūt	  Zabnē).165	  However,	  in	  keeping	  with	  an	  ecclesiastical	  history,	  this	  concentrates	  on	  the	  details	  of	  his	  career	  as	  bishop	  (of	  Gubbos,	  Laḳabhīn	  and	  then	  Aleppo)166	  and	  his	  subsequent	  appointment	  as	  Maphrian	  of	  the	  Eastern	  provinces.	  In	  addition,	  the	  prelude	  to	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  (Ktābā	  d-­‐yawnā)	  provides	  a	  short	  account	  of	  his	  career	  according	  to	  the	  development	  of	  his	  internal	  spiritual	  life.	  There	  are	  also	  a	  number	  of	  Letters	  and	  Poems	  written	  by	  Barhebraeus,	  which	  may	  be	  used	  to	  supplement	  the	  accounts	  provided	  in	  the	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  
the	  Dove.	   Since	   these	   accounts	   are	   quite	   different	   in	   style	   and	   length,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	  consider	  alongside	  each	  other	  the	  narration	  of	  the	  events	  of	  his	  ecclesiastical	  career	  as	  they	  appear	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  and	  the	  Chronicon.	  	  The	  details	  of	  the	  earliest	  part	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  life	  come	  in	  his	  Arabic	  chronicle,	  the	  History	  
of	  the	  Dynasties	  (Mukhtaṣar	  tā’rīkh	  al-­‐duwal),167	  	  and	  it	  is	  recorded	  there	  that	  Barhebraeus	  was	  born	  in	  Melitene	  (also	  known	  as	  Malatya),	  where	  he	  lived	  until	  the	  Mongol	  invasions	  caused	   his	   father	   Aaron	   to	   remove	   the	   family	   to	   Antioch,	   then	   under	   the	   control	   of	   the	  Franks.168	  In	  Antioch,	  Barhebraeus	  trained	  at	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  Patriarchate	  and	  entered	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  These	  are	  translated	  by	  Budge	  in	  his	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Chronography,	  which	  he	  devotes	  to	  the	  Life	  and	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  E.	  A.	  Wallis	  Budge,	  The	  Chronography,	  2	  vols.	  (Amsterdam:	  Philo	  Press,	  1976),	  xv-­‐xxvi.	  The	   main	   body	   of	   Budge’s	   translation	   the	   Chronography	   is	   actually	   drawn	   from	   Bedjan’s	   edition	   of	  Barhebraeus’	  Chronicon	  Syriacum,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  his	  secular	  history	  as	  against	  his	  ecclesiastical	  history.	  Paul	  Bedjan,	  Gregorii	  Barhebraei	  Chronicon	  Syriacum	  (Parisiis:	  Maisonneuve,	  1890).	  166	  Budge,	   The	   Chronography,	   xvii-­‐xviii.	   Budge	   cites	   Chron.	   Eccl.	   Section	   1,	   for	   Barhebraeus’	   transfer	   to	  Laḳabhīn	  and	  then	  to	  Aleppo	  in	  1253.	  J.	  B.	  Abbeloos	  and	  Thomas	  Joseph	  Lamy,	  Gregorii	  Barhebraei	  Chronicon	  
Ecclesiasticum,	  Quod	  e	  Codice	  Musei	  Britannici	  Descriptum	  Conjuncta	  Opera	  ed,	   2	  vols.	   (Lovanii	   (Belgium):	  C.	  Peeters,	  1872),	  I:685,	  721.	  167	  Gregory	   John	   Bar	   Hebraeus,	   Historia	   Compendiosa	   Dynastiarum,	   Arab.	   ed.	   &	   Lat.	   Versa	   ab	   E.	   Pocockio	  (Oxon.1663),	   487*,	   319.	   The	   Arabic	   text	  was	   first	   edited	   and	   translated	   into	   Latin	   by	   Edward	   Pococke,	   in	  which	  Volume	  1	  contains	  the	  Arabic	  text,	  and	  Volume	  2	  the	  Latin	  translation.	  168	  Weltecke’s	  article	  places	  this	  move	  in	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  the	  Syriac	  Orthodox	  patriarchate	  in	  Antioch.	  Dorothea	   Weltecke,	   "On	   the	   Syriac	   Orthodox	   in	   the	   Principality	   of	   Antioch	   During	   the	   Crusader	   Period"	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  East	  and	  West	  in	  the	  Medieval	  Eastern	  Mediterranean	  I	  :	  Antioch	  from	  the	  Byzantine	  Reconquest	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Crusader	  Principality,	  Leuven,	  2003),	  120.	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the	   monastic	   vocation	   aged	   seventeen,	   in	   order	   to	   live	   the	   hermetic	   life.169	  Along	   with	  another	   student,	   Barhebraeus	   records	   in	   the	   Chronicon	   Ecclesiasticum	   that	   he	   studied	  rhetoric	   and	   medicine	   in	   Tripoli	   with	   a	   rhetor	   or	  mlīlō	   from	   the	   Church	   of	   the	   East.170	  Theodor	  Nöldeke	  suggested	  that	  this	  training	  under	  a	  Nestorian	  ‘may	  have	  had	  something	  to	  do	  with	   the	   tolerance	  which	  he	   afterwards	   showed	   to	  different	   creed’,	   though	  he	   also	  admitted	   that	   it	   was	   not	   unusual	   for	   Syrians	   to	   attend	   lectures	   of	   someone	   whom	   they	  considered	  to	  be	  ‘heretical’.171	  However,	  in	  terms	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  own	  stated	  views,	  he	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  Christology	  of	  the	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  to	  be	  heretical,	  though	  he	  held	  it	  to	  be	   inferior	   to	   the	  position	  maintained	  by	   the	  Syrian	  Orthodox.	  While	  Barhebraeus’	  views	  certainly	   became	   increasingly	   ecumenical	   in	   the	   later	   stages	   of	   his	   life,	   even	   in	   his	  more	  apologetical	  works,	  he	  never	  states	   that	  he	  considered	   the	  other	  confessions	   to	  entertain	  heretical	   beliefs,	   despite	   their	   deep	   Christological	   divisions.	   His	   stance	   comes	   in	  marked	  contrast	  to	  the	  views	  held	  by	  his	  predecessors,	  such	  as	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  monk	  Severus	  Jacob	  Bar	  Šakko	  (d.	  1240-­‐1CE),	  who	  also,	  it	  might	  be	  added,	  began	  his	  philosophical	  studies	  under	  a	   ‘Nestorian’	  teacher,	  John	  bar	  Zōʿbī,	  then	  continued	  under	  the	  Muslim	  philosopher	  Kamāl	  al-­‐Din	  Mūsa	  ibn	  Yūnus	  (1156-­‐1242CE).172	  	  	  The	   phenomenon	   of	   Syrian	   Orthodox	   monks	   training	   under	   East	   Syrian	   rhetors,	   would	  testify	  to	  the	  Graeco-­‐Syriac	  philosophical	  tradition	  shared	  by	  West	  and	  East	  Syrians	  alike.	  It	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned,	  how	  in	  a	  much	  earlier	  period,	  Patriarch	  Timothy	  I	  was	  obliged	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  monasteries	  of	  the	  West	  Syrians	  to	  obtain	  Syriac	  translations	  from	  the	  Greek	  books	  of	  the	  Organon	  that	  he	  required.173	  This	  would	  indicate	  the	  shared	  basis	  of	  the	  East	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Budge	  cites	  the	  source	  of	  this	  information	  as	  one	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  poems:	  Codex	  Vat.	  No.	  CLXXIV	  (Catal.	  iii.	  p.	  356),	  No.	  29.	  Budge,	  The	  Chronography,	  xvii.	  170 	  Abbeloos	   and	   Lamy,	   Gregorii	   Barhebraei	   Chronicon	   Ecclesiasticum,	   Quod	   e	   Codice	   Musei	   Britannici	  
Descriptum	  Conjuncta	  Opera	  ed,	   I:667-­‐68.	  Weltecke	   suggests	   that	  Antioch	  was	   too	  provincial	   and	  hence	   the	  departure	   of	   Barhebraeus	   to	   continue	   his	   studies	   at	   Tripoli.	   Weltecke,	   "On	   the	   Syriac	   Orthodox	   in	   the	  Principality	  of	  Antioch	  During	  the	  Crusader	  Period,"	  120-­‐21.	  171	  Nöldeke	  and	  Black,	  Sketches	  from	  Eastern	  History,	  238.	  	  	  172	  Takahashi,	  "The	  Reception	  of	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  in	  Syriac	  the	  Case	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus,"	  280.	  This	  information	  is	  given	   by	   Barhebraeus	   in	   the	   Chronicon.	   Abbeloos	   and	   Lamy,	  Gregorii	   Barhebraei	   Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum,	  
Quod	  e	  Codice	  Musei	  Britannici	  Descriptum	  Conjuncta	  Opera	  ed,	  II:409-­‐12.	  173	  Sebastian	  P.	  Brock,	  From	  Antagonism	  to	  Assimilation	  :	  Syriac	  Attitudes	  to	  Greek	  Learning	  (Washington,	  D.	  C.:	  Dumbarton	  Oaks,	  1980),	  23.	  ‘It	  was	  no	  doubt	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  decline	  of	  interest	  among	  his	  fellow	  churchmen	  in	  Aristotelian	   studies	   in	   the	   late	   eighth	   century	   that	   Timothy	   I	   had	   to	   suggest	   that	   inquiries	   about	  commentaries	   on	   the	   Topics	   and	   later	   books	   of	   the	   Organon	   should	   covertly	   be	   directed	   to	   the	   Syrian	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and	  West	   Syrian	   interest	   in	   Aristotelian	   logic,	   even	   if	   relations	   between	   these	   scholastic	  traditions	   of	   Graeco-­‐Syriac	   philosophy	   were	   not	   actively	   maintained.	   Daniel	   King	   has	  suggested	   that	   while	   there	   was	   little	   common	   ground	   in	   their	   reading	   of	   the	   Church	  Fathers,	   the	   notable	   exception	   being	   Basil	   of	   Caesarea,	   the	   works	   of	   Aristotle	   were	   a	  significant	  shared	  authority.174	  	  	  Barhebraeus’	   autobiographical	   introduction	   to	   the	   fourth	   part	   of	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	  begins	   by	   recounting	   how	  he	   spent	   his	   early	   years	   studying	   the	  Holy	   Scriptures	   and	   the	  church	   fathers	   under	   an	   excellent	   teacher.175	  Later,	   he	   was	   pressed	   into	   a	   position	   of	  responsibility	  in	  the	  church,	  apparently	  with	  some	  reluctance	  for	  he	  states	  that	  at	  the	  age	  of	  twenty,	  he	  was	  ‘compelled’	  by	  the	  Patriarch	  ‘to	  receive	  the	  dignity	  of	  bishop’.176	  It	  may	  be	  surmised	  that	  his	  early	  vocation	  of	  the	  hermetic	  life,	  devoted	  to	  the	  monastic	  prayers	  and	  vigils	  of	   the	  cell,	  would	  have	  been	  quite	  different	   to	   the	  duties	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  his	  ecclesiastical	   office.	   George	   Lane	   has	   suggested	   that	   this	   ascetic	   life	   of	   meditations	   and	  mysticism	  is	  precisely	  what	  had	  to	  be	  relinquished	  on	  Barhebraeus’	  appointment	  as	  bishop	  of	   Gubbos	   and	   his	   entering	   into	   ‘the	   worldly	   affairs	   of	   the	   Syrian	   Orthodox	   Church’.177	  While	   this	   might	   be	   implied	   retrospectively	   from	   his	   attitude	   to	   the	   solitary	   life	   in	   the	  
Ethicon	  (Ktābā	  d-­‐īthīqōn)	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  himself	  supplies	  no	  further	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  Orthodox	  monastery	  of	  Mar	  Mattai	  (near	  Mosul).’	  Brock	  provides	  a	  translation	  of	  these	  enquiries	  of	  Timothy’s,	  directed	  to	  Mar	  Pethion,	  from	  Letter	  43:	  ‘Enquiries	  on	  this	  should	  be	  directed	  to	  the	  monastery	  of	  Mar	  Mattai	  –	  but	  they	  should	  not	  be	  made	  too	  eagerly,	  lest	  the	  information,	  (the	  purpose	  of	  the	  enquiry)	  being	  perceived,	  be	  kept	  hidden.’	   "Two	  Letters	  of	   the	  Patriarch	  Timothy	   from	  the	  Late	  Eighth	  Century	  on	  Translations	   from	  Greek,"	  Arabic	  Sciences	  and	  Philosophy	  9,	  no.	  2	  (1999):	  236.	  	  174	  Daniel	   King	   responds	   to	   Tannous’s	   chapter	   of	   the	   same	   volume,	   in	   his	   Postscript:	   ‘he	   makes	   the	   point	  effectively	  that	  while	  Bar	  ʿIdta	  read	  Nestorius	  and	  Jacob	  read	  Philoxenus,	  both	  read	  Basil.	  But	  we	  could	  easily	  replace	   Basil	   with	   Aristotle.’	   King,	   "Why	   Were	   the	   Syrians	   Interested	   in	   Greek	   Philosophy?,"	   81.	   For	   the	  designation	  of	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  pagan	  philosophers	  as	   ‘outsiders’	  by	  Barhebraeus	   in	  the	  Book	  of	  Directions,	  see	  Jack	  Tannous’	  comments	  in	  the	  later	  section,	  The	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  Monastery	  of	  Qennešre.	  175	  For	  the	  classification	  of	  this	  passage	  as	  autobiographical,	  see	  for	  example	  Samir	  Khalil’s	  analysis	  the	  passage	  accordingly	  in	  Part	  2:	  ‘Le	  récit	  autobiographique	  d’Ibn	  al-­‐‘Ibri’.	  Samir	  Khalil	  Samir,	  S.J.,	  "Cheminement	  Mystique	  d'Ibn	  al-­‐'Ibri	  (1226-­‐1286),"	  Proche-­‐Orient	  Chretien	  37	  (1987):	  75.	  See	  also	  his	  subsequent	  article	  in	  this	  vein:	  "Un	  Récit	  Autobiographique	  d'Ibn	  al-­‐'Ibri,"	  Dirāsāt	  15	  (1988).	  176	  A.	  J.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon	  (Leyden:	  E.	  J.	  Brill,	  1919),	  60,	  577*.	  177	  George	  Lane,	  "An	  Account	  of	  Gregory	  Bar	  Hebraeus	  Abu	  Al-­‐Faraj	  and	  His	  Relations	  with	  the	  Mongols	  of	  Persia,"	  Hugoye:	  Journal	  of	  Syriac	  Studies	  2,	  no.	  2	  (1999	  [2010]):	  216.	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information	  on	  the	  apparently	  sudden	  transition	  to	  his	  role	  as	  bishop.178	  In	  the	  Chronicon	  
Ecclesiasticum,	   he	   records	   simply	   that	   he	   was	   ordained	   bishop	   by	   Patriarch	   Ignatius	   II,	  along	  with	  his	  fellow	  student	  of	  rhetoric	  Ṣalībhā	  Bar	  Yaʿkūb	  Wagīh	  (who	  became	  bishop	  of	  Akko),	   and	   that	   on	   the	   14th	   September	   1246,	   he	   became	   bishop	   of	   Gubbos.179	  In	   the	  corresponding	  section	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  states	  that	  his	  appointment	  as	  bishop	  forced	  him	  to	  become	  engaged	  in	  ‘disquisitions	  and	  disputations	  with	  the	  heads	  of	  other	   confessions,	   interior	   and	   exterior’.180	  However	   the	   experience	   of	   being	   involved	   in	  inter-­‐confessional	  disputations,	  led	  him	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  all	  such	  differences	  between	  the	  Christian	  confessions	  on	  matters	  of	  Christology	  were	  of	  no	  real	  substance,	  and	  that	  he	  forsook	   such	   practices,	   though	   this	   clearly	   did	   not	   result	   in	   the	   resignation	   of	   his	  ecclesiastical	  career.181	  	  	  The	  story	  of	  Barhebraeus’	   spiritual	   life	  does	  not	   figure	   in	   the	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum	   at	  all,	  as	  might	  be	  expected	  of	  a	  historical	  compendium	  where	  he	  supplies	  ample	  details	  of	  his	  attempt	  and	  apparent	  success	  in	  maintaining	  good	  relations	  with	  the	  leading	  figures	  of	  the	  Church	   of	   the	   East.182 	  In	   terms	   of	   his	   relations	   with	   Muslims,	   Barhebraeus’	   brother	  Barṣawmā	   tells	   how	   he	   produced	   an	   Arabic	   version	   of	   his	   Syriac	   chronicle	   of	   secular	  history	  (i.e.	  not	  including	  his	  volumes	  of	  church	  history),	  entitled	  the	  Mukhtaṣar	  tā’rīkh	  al-­‐
duwal,	   on	   the	   request	   of	   Muslim	   scholars	   in	   the	   circle	   of	   al-­‐Ṭūsī	   at	   Marāgha.183	  While	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  Lane	  referes	  to	  the	  Introduction	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  in	  this	  context,	  though	  it	  was	  written	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  ecclesiastical	  career	  and	  long	  after	  the	  initial	  three-­‐year	  period	  of	  his	  monastic	  life.	  Ibid.	  179 	  Abbeloos	   and	   Lamy,	   Gregorii	   Barhebraei	   Chronicon	   Ecclesiasticum,	   Quod	   e	   Codice	   Musei	   Britannici	  
Descriptum	  Conjuncta	  Opera	  ed,	  I:667-­‐70.	  The	  date	  of	  1246	  coincided	  precisely	  with	  the	  day	  of	  the	  Festival	  of	  the	  Redeeming	  Cross.	  This	   is	  also	  narrated	  by	  Budge	   in	  his	   Introduction	   to	   the	  Chronicon	  Syriacum.	  Budge,	  
The	  Chronography,	  xvii.	  180	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  60,	  577*.	  181	  Ibid.,	  60,	  577-­‐78*.	  182	  Budge	   translates	   a	   long	   section	   from	   Barhebraeus’	   appointment	   as	  Maphrian	   to	   his	   final	   illness,	   in	   the	  
Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum	  Section	   II,	   proceeding	   from	   column	   432.	   Abbeloos	   and	   Lamy,	  Gregorii	  Barhebraei	  
Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum,	  Quod	  e	  Codice	  Musei	  Britannici	  Descriptum	  Conjuncta	  Opera	   ed,	   II:432f.	   There	   are	  many	  such	  episodes	  in	  this	  section,	  but	  here	  is	  one	  example	  of	  the	  good	  relations	  between	  the	  Maphrian	  and	  the	   Church	   of	   the	   East,	   recorded	   as	   the	   summer	   of	   1588	   (1277CE):	   ‘Now	   before	   the	  Maphrian	   went	   into	  BAGHDÂD	  he	  sent	  and	  informed	  Archdeacon	  THOMAS	  [of	  his	  coming],	  and	  he	  informed	  the	  Catholicos	  MÂR	  DENḤÂ,	  and	  he	  sent	  bishops	  and	  many	  BAGHDÂD	  noblemen	  to	  meet	  the	  Maphrian,	  and	  when	  he	  went	   into	  him	   he	   honoured	   him	   greatly	   on	   the	   roadside.	   And	   he	   turned	   to	   the	   great	   crowd	   of	   JACOBITES	   and	  NESTORIANS	  and	  said	  unto	  them,	  ‘Blessed	  are	  the	  people	  whom	  he	  thus	  hath.’	  Budge,	  The	  Chronography,	  xxiv.	  183	  Hidemi	  Takahashi,	  "The	  Mathematical	  Sciences	  in	  Syriac:	  From	  Sergius	  of	  Resh-­‐‘Aina	  and	  Severus	  Sebokht	  to	  Barhebraeus	  and	  Patriarch	  Ni‘matallah,"	  Annals	  of	  Science	  68,	  no.	  4	  (2011):	  486.	  In	  his	  introduction	  to	  the	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Barhebraeus	  moved	   around	   considerably	   in	   his	   role	   as	  Maphrian	   of	   the	   East,	   his	   official	  residence	  was	  at	  the	  Monastery	  of	  Mar	  Mattai,	  near	  to	  Mosul,	   in	  the	  region	  of	  Nineveh.184	  He	   also	   sojourned	   in	   Tabrīz	   and	   Marāgha	   in	   Persian	   Azerbaijan;	   Marāgha	   had	   an	  observatory	  and	  extensive	  library	  that	  had	  been	  established	  by	  the	  Persian	  Islamic	  scholar	  al-­‐Ṭūsī.185	  In	  the	  preface	  to	  the	  Chronography,	  Barhebraeus	  mentions	  his	  recourse	  to	  the	  Il-­‐Khans’	   library	   of	   Marāgha,	   where	   he	   had	   ‘loaded	   up	   this	  my	   little	   book	  with	   narratives	  which	  are	  worthy	  of	  remembrance’	  from	  the	  volumes	  of	  the	  Syrians,	  Arabs	  and	  Persians.186	  Takahashi	  suggests	  that	  Barhebraeus	  made	  at	  least	  four	  prolonged	  visits	  to	  Marāgha	  during	  the	  period	  of	  his	  maphrianate.187	  According	  to	  the	  dating	  of	  the	  works	  completed	  there	  by	  Barhebraeus,	  these	  visits	  would	  correspond	  with	  his	  ‘lecture’	  in	  1268	  on	  Euclid’s	  Elements	  and	  then	  again	  in	  1272	  on	  Ptolemy’s	  Almagest.	  A	  more	  extended	  period	  might	  be	  placed	  in	  1279	  when	  he	  completed	  the	  Ethicon,	  until	  he	  moved	  to	  Tabrīz	  in	  1282,	  and	  his	  final	  stay	  in	  Marāgha	   was	   in	   1286,	   when	   his	   death	   prevented	   him	   from	   completing	   the	   Arabic	  history.188	  	  
Ecumenical	  Relations	  with	  the	  East	  Syrians	  During	  his	  temporary	  residency	  in	  Marāgha,189	  Barhebraeus	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  on	  cordial	  terms	   with	   the	   East	   Syrian	   Patriarch,	   who	   also	   resided	   in	   Marāgha	   during	   the	   same	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Chronography,	  Budge	  provides	  a	   translation	  of	  Barṣawmā’s	  version	  of	  events	  concerning	  Barhebraeus’	   final	  departure	  to	  Marāgha.	   ‘And	  when	  he	  was	  living	  there,	  honoured	  by	  both	  great	  and	  small,	  the	  foremost	  men	  among	  the	  ARABS	  asked	  him	  to	  turn	  the	  Chronography	  which	  he	  had	  composed	  in	  Syriac	  into	  the	  Saracenic	  language	  so	  that	  they	  also	  might	  read	  and	  enjoy	  it.	  To	  this	  the	  Maphrian	  agreed,	  and	  straightaway	  he	  began	  to	  turn	   the	   [book	   into	  Arabic]	   in	  noble	   and	  exceedingly	   eloquent	   language.	   [He	  worked]	   for	   a	  month	  of	  days,	  until	  he	  had	  very	  nearly	  finished	  it,	  and	  there	  remained	  of	  it	  [untranslated]	  perhaps	  three	  folios.’	  Budge,	  The	  
Chronography,	  xxviii-­‐xxix.	  184	  Hidemi	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  1st	  Gorgias	  Press	  ed.	  (Piscataway,	  N.J.:	  Gorgias	  Press,	  2005),	  25.	  185	  "Simeon	  of	  Qal'a	  Rumaita,	  Patriarch	  Philoxenus	  Nemrod	  and	  Bar	  'Ebroyo,"	  Hugoye:	  Journal	  of	  Syriac	  
Studies	  4,	  no.	  1	  (2001	  [2010]):	  73,	  n.	  89	  and	  90.	  186	  Budge,	  The	  Chronography,	  2.	  	  187	  Takahashi,	  "Simeon	  of	  Qal'a	  Rumaita,	  Patriarch	  Philoxenus	  Nemrod	  and	  Bar	  'Ebroyo,"	  81,	  n.	  104.	  188	  Ibid.	  The	  dating	  of	  these	  works	  are	  from	  Takahashi’s	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  and	  are	  given	  in	  the	  chronology	  of	  Barhebraeus’	   main	   works	   in	   Appendix	   1.	   They	   also	   correspond	   with	   the	   details	   that	   Takahashi	   gives	   of	  Barhebraeus’	   four	   trips	   to	   Tabrīz	   and	  Marāgha	   (see	   n.	   104	   of	   his	   article),	   from	   Section	   II	   of	   the	  Chronicon	  
Ecclesiasticum	  covering	  the	  period	  from	  1262	  to	  his	  death	  in	  1286.	  Abbeloos	  and	  Lamy,	  Gregorii	  Barhebraei	  
Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum,	  Quod	  e	  Codice	  Musei	  Britannici	  Descriptum	  Conjuncta	  Opera	  ed,	  II:441-­‐74.	  189	  Takahashi,	   "The	   Mathematical	   Sciences	   in	   Syriac:	   From	   Sergius	   of	   Resh-­‐‘Aina	   and	   Severus	   Sebokht	   to	  Barhebraeus	  and	  Patriarch	  Ni‘matallah,"	  485.	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period.190	  In	  this	  climate	  of	  mutual	  respect,	  the	  various	  Christian	  communities	  of	  that	  city,	  including	  the	  Greeks	  and	  Armenians,	  assembled	  together	  for	  the	  funeral	  of	  Barhebraeus	  in	  1286.	  The	  ordinances	  given	  by	   the	  East	  Syrian	  Patriarch	  Yahballaha	   for	   the	   funeral	  were	  appended	  by	  Barhebraeus’	  brother	  Barṣawmā	  to	  the	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum:191	  	   And	  because	  MÂR	  YABH	  ’ALLÂHÂ,	  the	  praiseworthy	  Catholicus,	  was	  at	  that	  time	  in	  the	  city	  of	  MARÂGHÂ,	  he	  commanded	  that	  no	  man	  should	  go	  to	  business	  in	  the	  bazar,	  and	  that	  no	  man	  should	  open	  [his]	  shop.	  And	  he	  sent	  out	  a	  beater	  of	  a	  board	  (i.e.	  bell-­‐ringer),	  and	  all	  the	  people	  gathered	  together	  at	  the	  cell	  of	  the	  Maphrian.	  And	  the	  Catholicus	  sent	  the	  bishops	  who	  were	  with	  him,	  and	  many	  large	  candles,	  and	  a	  whole	  crowd	  of	  ARMENIANS	  and	  GREEKS	  were	  there,	  but	  of	  our	  own	  community	  only	  four	  Elders	  were	  present.	  	  The	  manner	   in	  which	   Barhebraeus	  was	   celebrated	   at	   his	   funeral,	   points	   to	   the	   special	  nature	   of	   his	   relation	   as	   Maphrian	   with	   the	   East	   Syrians.	   As	   Maphrian	   of	   the	   Eastern	  provinces	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  church,	  Barhebraeus	  made	  many	  visits	  to	  cities	  such	  as	  Baghdad	   in	   order	   to	   sustain	   the	   priesthood	   with	   further	   ordinations.192	  However	   the	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  had	  a	  much	  more	  sizeable	  presence	  amongst	  the	  Christian	  populations	  distributed	   across	   Persia	   and	   Azerbaijan.193 	  It	   would	   therefore	   have	   been	   of	   some	  strategic	  importance	  that	  in	  his	  role	  as	  Maphrian	  he	  sought	  to	  nurture	  good	  relations	  with	  leading	   ecclesiastical	   figures	   of	   the	   Church	   of	   the	   East.	   Takahashi	   suggests	   that	  Barhebraeus	  saw	  unity	  amongst	  Syrian	  Christians	  as	   ‘indispensable’	  to	  making	  the	  most	  of	  the	  ‘pro-­‐Christian	  attitude’	  of	  the	  Mongols	  .194	  	  	  
Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum	   records	  Barhebraeus’	   interaction	  with	  Patriarchs	  Mar	  Denḥā	   I	  (1265-­‐1281CE)	  and	  Mar	  Yahballaha	  III	  (1281-­‐1317CE).195	  Florence	  Jullien	  has	  argued	  for	  the	  apologetic	  approach	  of	  Barhebraeus	  in	  his	  correspondence	  with	  Mar	  Denḥā,	  in	  which	  Barhebraeus	  upheld	  an	  anti-­‐diophysite	  position	  against	  that	  of	  the	  Patriarch,	  defending	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  26.	  191	  Budge,	  The	  Chronography,	  xxx.	  192	  Ibid.,	  xxi-­‐xxii.	  193	  This	  point	  is	  made	  by	  Nöldeke.	  See	  Nöldeke	  and	  Black,	  Sketches	  from	  Eastern	  History,	  244.	  Nöldeke	  also	  explains	  that	  the	  title	  maphrian,	  or	  ‘mafriyiáná’	  in	  Syriac,	  means	  “the	  fructifier”,	  that	  is	  ‘the	  one	  who	  spreads	  the	  Church	  by	  instituting	  priests	  and	  bishops’.	  	  194	  	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  52.	  195	  See	  the	  examples	  already	  listed,	  as	  cited	  by	  Budge	  in	  his	  Introduction.	  Budge,	  The	  Chronography,	  xxiv,	  xxx.	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through	   the	   deployment	   of	   traditional	   Christological	   arguments	   based	   on	   the	   Greek	  Patristics.196	  However,	   Barhebraeus	   also	   invited	   Mar	   Denḥā	   to	   overcome	   the	   historic	  Christological	  differences	  between	  Cyril	  and	  Nestorius	   that	  continued	   to	  divide	   the	   two	  churches.197	  He	  also	  demonstrated	  a	  great	  respect	  for	  the	  apostolicity	  of	  the	  East	  Syrian	  tradition,	   in	   his	   reference	   to	   the	   history	   of	   the	   East	   Syrian	   patriarchs	   in	   this	  correspondence.	   Jullien	   has	   surmised	   that	   in	   the	   second	   part	   of	   his	   Letter,	   he	   uses	   the	  section	   of	   the	   Chronicon	   Ecclesiasticum	   dedicated	   to	   the	   primates	   of	   the	   Orient	   as	   his	  model.198	  The	  scope	  of	  the	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum	  shows	  a	  more	  ecumenical	  attitude,	  in	  covering	  the	  history	  of	   the	  West	  Syrian	  Patriarchs	   in	  the	  first	  part,	  and	  the	  West	  Syrian	  Maphrians	   and	   the	   East	   Syrian	   Patriarchs	   in	   the	   second	   part.199	  Sebastian	   Brock	   has	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  inclusion	  of	  East	  Syrian	  ecclesiastical	  history	  is	  unique	  in	  the	  genre	  of	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  chronicles,	  and	  thus	  Barhebraeus	  had	  to	  draw	  much	  of	  his	  material	  on	  the	  East	  Syrian	  Patriarchs	  from	  the	  chronicle	  tradition	  of	  the	  Church	  of	  the	  East,	  notably	  the	  twelfth-­‐century	  source	  of	  Mari	  ibn	  Suleiman.200	  	  	  That	  Barhebraeus’	  attitude	  to	  the	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  is	  not	  without	  precedent	  may	  be	  seen	  by	   comparison	   with	   other	   figures	   in	   his	   tradition.	   Herman	   Teule	   has	   compared	   the	  attitudes	   of	   four	   figures	   of	   the	   Syrian	   Orthodox	   Church	   from	   the	   twelfth	   and	   thirteenth	  centuries,	  beginning	  with	  Al-­‐Arfādī.	  Teule	  has	  adopted	  the	  latter’s	  surprisingly	  ecumenical	  statement	  as	  the	  title	  of	  his	  article	  ‘It	  is	  not	  right	  to	  call	  ourselves	  Orthodox	  and	  the	  others	  heretics’.201	  Teule	   suggests	   that	  Al-­‐Arfādī’s	   remarkable	  openness	   ‘may	  have	  prepared	   the	  way	   for	   later	   Jacobite	  believers	   to	  adopt	  a	   likewise	  open	  attitude	   to	  heterodox	  believers,	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  Florence	  Jullien,	  "Une	  Question	  de	  Controverse	  Religieuse:	  la	  Lettre	  au	  Catholicos	  Nestorien	  Mār	  Denḥā	  I"	  
Parole	  de	  l’Orient	  33	  (2008),	  100-­‐03.	  197	  Ibid.,	  97-­‐98.	  198	  Ibid.,	  104-­‐05.	  199	  The	   Letter	   to	   Catholicus	   Denḥā	   I	   must	   therefore	   post-­‐date	   the	   Chronicon	   Ecclesiasticum,	   but	   Takahashi	  suggests	  that	  the	  dating	  of	  the	  Letter	  to	  1593	  (1281/2CE)	  is	  problematic	  since	  the	  Catholicos	  died	  on	  the	  24th	  February	   1592.	   Takahashi,	   Barhebraeus	   :	   A	   Bio-­‐Bibliography,	   52,	   n.	   231.	   Abbeloos	   and	   Lamy,	   Gregorii	  
Barhebraei	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum,	  Quod	  e	  Codice	  Musei	  Britannici	  Descriptum	  Conjuncta	  Opera	  ed,	  II:451-­‐52.	  200	  Sebastian	  P.	   Brock,	   "Syriac	   Sources	   for	   Seventh-­‐Century	  History,"	  Byzantine	  and	  Modern	  Greek	  Studies	   2	  (1976):	  23.	  201	  In	  terms	  of	  dating,	  Teule	  suggests	  that	  he	  probably	  lived	  in	  the	  eleventh	  or	  twelfth	  century.	  Herman	  Teule,	  "It	  Is	  Not	  Right	  to	  Call	  Ourselves	  Orthodox	  and	  the	  Others	  Heretics:	  Ecumenical	  Attitudes	  in	  the	  Jacobite	  Church	  in	  the	  Time	  of	  the	  Crusades"	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  East	  and	  West	  in	  the	  Crusader	  States	  :	  Context	  -­‐	  Contacts	  -­‐	  Confrontations	  II,	  Hernen	  Castle,	  Netherlands,	  1997),	  14.	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including	   the	   Franks’.202	  However,	   unlike	   his	   near	   Syrian	  Orthodox	   contemporaries,	   only	  Barhebraeus	  follows	  a	  similar	  line	  of	  thinking,	  whilst	  both	  Bar	  Ṣalībī	  and	  Bar	  Šakko	  proffer	  very	  pointed	  criticisms	  of	  such	  ecumenical	  statements.	  Bar	  Ṣalībī	  discussed	  the	  four	  main	  Christological	  traditions	  in	  his	  book	  of	  disputation,	  dismissing	  all	  but	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  position	   as	   heretical.203	  This	   work	   directs	   polemic	   not	   only	   against	   non-­‐Christians	   i.e.	  Muslims	  and	  Jews,	  but	  also	  other	  Christians,	   including	  the	  Nestorians,	  the	  Byzantines	  and	  even	   the	   Armenians,	   though	   Teule	   comments	   that	   surprisingly	   this	   does	   not	   include	   the	  Franks.204	  Teule	   suggests	   that	   for	   Barhebraeus	   the	   Chalcedonians	   and	   the	   other	   non-­‐Chalcedonian	  churches	  escape	  the	  judgment	  of	  heresy,	  ‘since	  their	  Christology	  only	  differs	  from	  the	  Jacobites’	  in	  terminology,	  not	  in	  substance’.205	  	  	  Barhebraeus’	   attitude,	   reiterated	   in	   the	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove,	   would	   thus	   seem	   to	   reflect	   his	  ‘Jacobite’	   forebear,	   Al-­‐Arfādī.	   In	   this	   short	   Arabic	   treatise	   on	   ‘the	   concordance	   in	   faith	  among	   the	   Christians	   and	   the	   essence	   of	   religions	   (kitāb	   ijtimā‘	   al-­‐amānā	  wa-­‐‘unsūr	   ad-­‐
diyāna)’,	   he	   states	   that	   in	   their	   ‘underlying	   meaning	   (ma‘na)’	   the	   main	   Christian	  communities	   are	   in	   fact	   in	   agreement	   concerning	   the	   christologies	  which	  divide	   them.206	  These	   statements	   of	   Al-­‐Arfādī	   correspond	   closely	   to	   the	   conclusions	   reached	   by	  Barhebraeus,	   that	   the	   quarrels	   between	   the	   confessions	   concern	   terminology	   (kūnnāyē)	  over	   and	   above	   substance.	   Barhebraeus	   concluded	   in	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove,	   that	   ‘these	  quarrels	   of	   Christians	   among	   themselves	   are	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   facts	   but	   of	   words	   and	  denominations’	   -­‐	   that	   is,	   a	   quarrel	   over	   mellē	   w-­‐kūnnāyē.207	  This	   attitude	   is	   similarly	  displayed	   in	   Barhebraeus’	   chapter	   On	   Incarnation,	   which	   forms	   the	   fourth	   ‘base’	   or	  ‘foundation’	   of	   his	   theological	   summa	   the	   Candelabrum.	   Wolfgang	   Hage’s	   article	  ‘Ecumenical	   Aspects	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   Christology’,	   shows	   how	   Barhebraeus	   deliberately	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	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  16-­‐17.	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	  21.	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  Ibid.,	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  Al-­‐Arfādī	  also	  refers	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  agreement	  of	  meaning	  in	  Christology	  in	  this	  treatise.	  207	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  60,	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refrained	  from	  including	  the	  Chalcedonian	  and	  non-­‐Chalcedonian	  confessions	  in	  his	  ‘Index	  of	  Heresies’,	  which	  comes	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  Christological	  chapter.208	  	   The	   other	   groups	   flourishing	   nowadays	   in	   the	  world	   only	   dispute	   over	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   union	   (in	  Christ),	  because	  all	  of	  them	  agree	  in	  the	  doctrines	  of	  Trinity	  and	  of	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  natures	  out	  of	  which	  Christ	  (was	  made),	  without	  change	  and	  mixture.209	  	  Barhebraeus	   continues	   by	   outlining	   the	   three	   main	   Christological	   positions	   for	   these	  groups,	   represented	   by	   the	   Jacobites	   (along	   with	   the	   other	   Oriental	   Orthodox),	   the	  Nestorians,	   and	   ‘the	   middle	   course’	   taken	   by	   the	   Chalcedonians,	   which	   included	   the	  Greeks,	  the	  Franks	  and	  the	  Maronites.210	  Whilst	  Hage	  emphasised	  the	  ecumenical	  tone	  of	  these	  statements,	  which	  he	  proposed	  ‘is	  a	  quite	  new	  one	  in	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  tradition’,	  Teule	   has	   shown	   the	   possible	   background	   to	   this	   ecumenism	   within	   Barhebraeus’	  tradition.	  	  Takahashi	   has	   suggested	   that	   there	   may	   well	   have	   been	   a	   pragmatic	   element	   to	  Barhebraeus’	   ecumenism,	   in	   that	   ‘Nestorian’	   Christians	   occupied	   the	   more	   influential	  positions	  in	  the	  court	  of	  the	  Mongols,	  rather	  than	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox.211	  However,	  he	  sees	  no	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  ecumenical	  convictions	  of	  Barhebraeus	  as	  they	  are	  expressed	  at	  the	  end	   of	   his	   life	   in	   the	   Dove. 212 	  It	   seems	   that	   Barhebraeus’	   ecumenism,	   while	   it	   was	  formulated	  within	   the	  religious	  and	  political	  environment	  of	  his	  day,	  descended	   from	  his	  attitude	   to	   the	   influence	   of	   Greek	   epistemological	   reasoning	   on	   the	   conduct	   of	   inter-­‐
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  Barhebraeus'	  Christology,"	  108.	  	  Hage	  translates	  this	  passage	  from	  the	  conclusion	  to	  Barhebraeus’	  Index	  of	  Heresies	  in	  Nau’s	  Syriac	  edition.	  Nau,	  Documents	  Pour	  Servir	  a	  L'histoire	  
de	  l'Église	  Nestorienne,	  263-­‐65.	  210	  Hage,	  "Ecumenical	  Aspects	  of	  Barhebraeus'	  Christology,"	  108.	  211	  Takahashi	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  Doquz	  Khatun,	  consort	  to	  Hulagu,	  whom	  Barhebraeus	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘believing	  Christian	  Queen’,	  in	  the	  Chronography.	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  52,	  n.	  232.	  Bedjan,	  Gregorii	  Barhebraei	  Chronicon	  Syriacum,	  491.15f,	  509.21f,	  21.16.	  212	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  52.	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confessional	   relations	   in	   the	   Syrian	   Orient. 213 	  Barhebraeus’	   understanding	   of	   the	  epistemological	  problem	  of	  the	  incorporation	  of	  Greek	  logic	  into	  religious	  disputation	  (Syr.	  
durrāšā)	   was	   an	   attitude	   that	   developed	   over	   the	   course	   of	   his	   career	   and	   this	   will	   be	  explored	  further	  in	  a	  subsequent	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.214	  	  
Barhebraeus’ Contribution to a Syriac Revival 	  Barhebraeus	   produced	   works	   ranging	   from	   grammar	   to	   humorous	   anecdotes,	   but	   his	  underlying	  methods	  of	  systematisation	  were	  highly	  philosophical.	  Takahashi	  has	  advocated	  a	   strong	   case	   for	   Barhebraeus’	   philosophical	   credentials,	   pointing	   out	   that	   despite	  comments	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  where	  he	  would	  seem	  to	  renounce	  Greek	  philosophy	  in	  fact	   he	   never	   gave	   up	   the	   writing	   of	   philosophy.	   Indeed	   it	   was	   a	   compendium	   of	  Aristotelian	   philosophy,	   the	   Cream	   of	   Wisdom	   (Ḥêwat	   Ḥekmtā),	   which	   formed	   his	   last	  completed	  work	  in	  February	  1286,	  only	  six	  months	  before	  his	  death.215	  Barhebraeus	  made	  some	  of	  his	  most	  significant	  contributions	  to	  the	  Syrian	  Renaissance	  period	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  philosophy,	  particularly	  in	  his	  translation	  and	  appropriation	  of	  Islamic	  philosophical	  texts.	  In	  this	  he	  did	  not	  simply	  perform	  the	  role	  of	  a	  translator	  of	  Islamic	  philosophy,	  but	  drew	  on	  Aristotelian	   philosophy	   throughout	  many	   of	   his	   other	  writings,	   including	   the	   theological	  and	   mystical.	   Thus,	   a	   theological	   work	   like	   his	   Candelabrum	   of	   the	   Sanctuary	   (Mnārat	  
qudshē)	   contains	   brief	   expositions	   of	   Aristotelian	   philosophy;	   its	   section	   on	   the	  
Hexaemaron	  draws	  on	  the	  zoology	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  books	  of	  natural	  science.216	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Takahashi	  also	  argues	  for	  the	  development	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  ecumenism,	  but	  points	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  dating	  all	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  ecumenical	  ‘gestures’,	  particularly	  the	  letter	  to	  Mar	  Denḥā,	  	  in	  order	  to	  accurately	  chart	  this	  development	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  thought.	  Ibid.	  214	  See	  the	  sub-­‐section	  on	  The	  Centrality	  of	  Aristotelian	  Logic	  within	  the	  final	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  215	  Hidemi	  Takahashi,	  "Edition	  of	  the	  Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	  on	  the	  Edition	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Heaven	  and	  the	  World	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  Generation	  and	  Corruption	  of	  the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	   in	  The	  Letter	  before	  the	  Spirit	  :	  The	  Importance	  of	  Text	  Editions	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Reception	  of	  
Aristotle,	   ed.	   Aafke	   M.	   I.	   van	   Oppenraaij	   and	   Resianne	   Fontaine,	   Aristoteles	   Semitico-­‐Latinus,	   0927-­‐4103	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2012),	  114.	  216	  H.	  J.	  Drossaart	  Lulofs,	  On	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Aristotle,	  Philosophia	  Antiqua	  (Leiden:	  E.	  J.	  Brill,	  1965),	  x.	  Lulofs	  suggests	   that	  Barhebraeus’	   source	  here	  was	   the	  Syriac	  version	  of	  Nicolaus	  Damascenus	  on	  Aristotle	   rather	  than	  Aristotle’s	  Historia	  animalium	  itself,	  cf.	  J.	  Bakoš,	  "Le	  Candélabre	  des	  Sanctuaires	  de	  Grégoire	  Aboulfaradj	  dit	  Barhebraeus,"	  Patrologia	  Orientalis	  XXII	  (1933).	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One	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  most	  notable	  achievements	  was	  his	  reappropriation	  of	  the	  full	  corpus	  of	  Aristotelian	  philosophy	   for	   the	   Syrians,	  which	  was	   realised	   through	  his	   reading	  of	   the	  Avicennan	  and	  post-­‐Avicennan	  philosophical	   tradition	   in	  Arabic.	   In	  Ernest	  Wallis	  Budge’s	  translation	  of	  Bedjan’s	  Syriac	  text	  of	  the	  Chronicon	  Syriacum,	  Barhebraeus	  stated:	  	   And	   there	   arose	   among	   them	   philosophers,	   and	   mathematicians,	   and	   physicians,	   who	   surpassed	   the	  ancient	   [sages]	   in	   the	   exactness	   of	   their	   knowledge.	   The	   only	   foundations	   on	   which	   they	   set	   up	   their	  buildings	  were	  Greek	  houses;	  the	  wisdom-­‐buidlings	  (or,	  science-­‐buildings)	  which	  they	  erected	  were	  great	  by	  reason	  of	  their	  highly	  polished	  diction,	  and	  their	  greatly	  skilled	  researches	  (or	  investigations).	  Thus	  it	  hath	   happened	   that	   we	   from	   they	   (ie.	   the	   GREEKS)	   have	   acquired	   wisdom	   through	   translators,	   all	   of	  whom	  are	  SYRIANS,	  have	  been	  compelled	  to	  ask	  for	  wisdom	  from	  them.217	  	  	  This	  passage	  occurs	  near	  the	  beginning	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  tenth	  section	  that	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  history	  of	  the	  ‘Kings	  of	  the	  Arabs’.	  Here,	  Barhebraeus	  admires	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  Arab	  sciences,	   in	  that	  they	  have	  been	  built	  solely	  through	  the	  investigation	  into	  Greek	  wisdom,	  and	  thus	  suggests	  that	  his	  own	  interest	  in	  the	  Arab	  sciences	  is	  due	  entirely	  to	  their	  Greek	  ‘foundations’.	   Barhebraeus	   and	   his	   near-­‐contemporaries,	   felt	   compelled	   to	   revive	   this	  aspect	   that	  appears	   to	  have	   fallen	   into	  neglect	   in	   the	  Syrian	   tradition.	  Takahashi	  has	  also	  suggested	   that	   Barhebraeus’	   revival	   of	   the	   Greek	   disciplines	   of	   learning	   through	   his	  extensive	   translation	   and	   composition	   of	   scientific	   literature	   was	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  promoting	   cultural	   ‘prestige’	   in	   this	   new	   situation	   of	   religious	   favour	   for	   the	   Syriac-­‐speaking	  Christians	  under	  Ilkhanid	  rule.	  He	  maintains	  that	  Barhebraeus	  and	  other	  religious	  leaders	  would	   have	   perceived	   the	   fall	   of	   Baghdad	   in	   1258	   to	   the	  Mongols	   as	   instigating	  something	  of	  a	  new	  religious	  and	  political	  order,	  one	   ‘which	  was	  not	  dominated	  by	  Islam	  and	   in	  which	   the	   Syriac-­‐speaking	  Christians	   too	  were	   given	   the	  opportunity,	   for	   the	   first	  time	   in	   centuries,	   to	   compete	   with	   the	   other	   races	   for	   positions	   of	   prominence.’.218	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  ‘new	  world	  order’	  for	  the	  Syrians	  in	  Takahashi’s	  opinion	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	   structure	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   Chronicon	   Syriacum,	   in	   which	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   ʿAbbāsid	  caliphate	  forms	  the	  final	  event	  in	  his	  section	  on	  the	  kings	  of	  the	  Arabs	  and	  thus	  heralds	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217	  Budge,	  The	  Chronography,	  92,	  98*.	  The	  second	  page	  reference	   [*]	   is	   to	  Bedjan’s	  Syriac	   text	  which	  Budge	  reproduces	  in	  Volume	  II,	  while	  providing	  his	  own	  translation	  into	  English	  in	  Volume	  I.	  218	  Takahashi,	  "Simeon	  of	  Qal'a	  Rumaita,	  Patriarch	  Philoxenus	  Nemrod	  and	  Bar	  'Ebroyo,"	  79-­‐80.	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new	  order	  of	  the	  Mongol	  Khans.219	  The	  intellectual	  revival	  of	  the	  Syrian	  tradition	  served	  a	  political	   purpose,	   in	   which	   Barhebraeus	   played	   such	   an	   instrumental	   part	   through	   his	  literary,	  political	  and	  ecumenical	  activities.	  However,	  irrespective	  of	  any	  potential	  political	  motivations,	  Barhebraeus	  made	  a	  significant	  and	  profound	  contribution	  to	  this	  intellectual	  revival.	  	  
The	  Revival	  of	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Notion	  of	  a	  ‘Renaissance’	  The	   literary	   achievements	   of	   Barhebraeus	   have	   often	   been	   evaluated	   according	   to	   the	  notion	  that	  the	  Syrians	  were	  undergoing	  a	  ‘Renaissance’	  in	  the	  thirteenth	  century.	  Thus,	  the	  literary	  endeavours	  of	  Barhebraeus	  have	  usually	  been	  seen	  as	  marking	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	   achievements	   of	   the	   Syrian	   Renaissance,	   followed	   by	   a	   cultural	   decline.	   The	   Syrian	  Orthodox	   Patriarch	   Barsoum	   placed	   Barhebraeus	   at	   the	   very	   end	   of	   what	   he	   calls	   the	  ‘Second	  Period’	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  Church,	  extending	  from	  around	  660	  to	  1290.220	  However,	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   Syrian	   or	   Syriac	   ‘Renaissance’	   promulgated	   in	   Syriac	  studies,	   brings	   with	   it	   a	   model	   of	   revival	   that	   appears	   inappropriate	   for	   an	   intellectual	  culture	   that	   remained	   very	   much	   centred	   on	   the	   monasteries.	   Instead	   of	   being	   a	  renaissance	  period,	  Syrian	  intellectual	  culture	  may	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  ‘scholastic’	  one,	  with	  distinct	  parallels,	   and	  even	  some	  direct	   links	   through	   the	  Frankish	  city	  of	  Antioch,	   to	   the	  development	  of	  scholasticism	  in	  the	  Latin	  West.221	  In	  the	  Syrian	  medieval	  period,	  a	  similar	  interaction	  occurred	  with	  the	  Islamic	  sciences,	  with	  the	  translation	  or	  incorporation	  of	  the	  Arabic	  Aristotelian	  tradition	  into	  Syriac	  by	  Barhebraeus	  and	  his	  immediate	  predecessors.	  	  Dorothea	  Weltecke	  in	  her	  chapter	  for	  the	  volume	  The	  Syriac	  Renaissance,	  ‘A	  Renaissance	  in	  Historiography?’,	   frames	   her	   article	   by	   questioning	   the	   application	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   a	  
renaissance	   to	  Syriac	  culture.222	  She	  argues	   that	   following	  Baumstark,	  scholars	  were	  keen	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  219	  Ibid.,	  78-­‐79.	  220	  Barsoum	  and	  Moosa,	  The	  Scattered	  Pearls	  :	  A	  History	  of	  Syriac	  Literature	  and	  Sciences,	  463-­‐81.	  	  221	  See	   further	   the	   article	   by	   Charles	   Burnett	   propounding	   the	   central	   role	   of	   Antioch.	   Charles	   Burnett,	  "Antioch	  as	  a	  Link	  between	  Arabic	  and	  Latin	  Culture	   in	   the	  Twelfth	  and	  Thirteenth	  Century,"	   in	  Arabic	  into	  
Latin	   in	   the	   Middle	   Ages	   :	   The	   Translators	   and	   Their	   Intellectual	   and	   Social	   Context,	   ed.	   Charles	   Burnett,	  Collected	  Studies	  (Farnham:	  Ashgate,	  2010).	  222	  Dorothea	  Weltecke,	  "A	  Renaissance	  in	  Historiography?	  Patriarch	  Michael,	  the	  Anonymous	  Chronicle	  Ad	  A.	  1234,	  and	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  in	  The	  Syriac	  Renaissance,	  ed.	  Herman	  G.	  B	  Teule,	  et	  al.,	  Eastern	  Christian	  Studies	  (Leuven:	  Peeters,	  2010).	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to	  emphasise	  the	  achievements	  of	  this	  period	  by	  using	  the	  term	  ‘Syrian	  Renaissance’,	  rather	  than	  degrading	   these	   twelfth	   and	   thirteenth	   century	  authors	   ‘as	  mere	  epigones	   in	   a	   long	  period	   of	   decay	   since	   the	   6th	   century’.223	  However	   the	   very	   European	   conception	   of	   a	  ‘Renaissance’	  inherits	  the	  assumptions	  of	  its	  renaissance	  scholars,	  specifically	  the	  myth	  of	  an	   oppressive	   Church,	   which	   prevented	   the	   progress	   of	   science	   and	   rationality.224	  As	  Weltecke	   points	   out,	   this	   ‘myth’	   was	   entirely	   absent	   from	   the	   Syriac	   orthodox	  chronographers,	  who	  were	  engaged	   in	  the	  medieval	  monastic	  genre	  of	  writing	  chronicles	  that	   the	   humanist	   scholars	   of	   the	   European	   Renaissance	   despised	   so	   completely. 225	  Moreover,	  Weltecke	  argues	  that	  there	  was	  no	  comparable	  attempt	  to	  return	  to	  the	  classical	  texts	  without	   the	   ‘scholastic’	  distortion,	  nor	  was	   there	  such	  an	   idealisation	  of	  a	   ‘classical’	  period	   that	   could	   then	   serve	   Michael	   the	   Syrian	   or	   Barhebraeus	   with	   an	   authoritative	  model	  for	  restoration.226	  	  	  Weltecke’s	   comments	   have	   been	  made	   in	   the	   context	   of	   historiography,	   but	   are	   equally	  pertinent	   to	  other	   fields,	  as	  are	   the	  modern	  presuppositions	   that	  have	  been	  projected	  by	  European	   scholars	   onto	   the	   very	   different	   cultural	   world	   of	   the	   Syrians.	   In	   the	   same	  volume,	  N.	  Peter	  Joosse	  states	  in	  his	  chapter	  on	  the	  ‘Structure	  and	  Sources	  of	  Bar	  Hebraeus’	  
‘Practical	   Philosophy’	   in	   The	   Cream	   of	   Wisdom’,	   that	   Barhebraeus	   must	   have	   used	   only	  Arabic	   sources	   for	  his	   section	  on	  practical	  philosophy	  since	   the	  Syriac	  versions	  were	   too	  deficient	  and	  traditional	  in	  content;	  stating	  that,	  	   They	   stood	   in	   the	   way	   of	   progress	   and	   would	   have	   caused	   a	   standstill,	   which	   in	   its	   turn	   would	   have	  introduced	   a	   period	   of	   decline,	   where	   a	   period	   of	   revival	   and	   Renaissance	   of	   Syrian	   arts,	   culture,	   and	  sciences	  was	  hoped	  and	  wished	  for.227	  	  The	   underlying	   reason	   for	   Joosse’s	   position	   would	   seem	   to	   lie	   in	   his	   strong	   belief	   in	   a	  notion	  of	  renaissance,	  whereby	  the	  Syrian	  tradition	  had	  become	  the	  distortive	  lens	  which	  needed	  to	  be	  cleared	  aside	  in	  order	  to	  return	  to	  the	  more	  classical	  Aristotle,	  preserved	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  223	  Ibid.,	  108.	  224	  Ibid.,	  109.	  225	  Ibid.,	  110.	  226	  Ibid.	  227	  N.	  Peter	  Joosse,	  "Expounding	  on	  a	  Theme:	  Structure	  and	  Sources	  of	  Barhebraeus,"	  in	  The	  Syriac	  
Renaissance,	  ed.	  Herman	  G.	  B.	  Teule,	  Eastern	  Christian	  Studies	  (Leuven:	  Peeters,	  2010),	  141.	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the	  Arabic.	   Joosse	   states	   that	  Barhebraeus	   seldom	  quoted	  directly	   from	  his	  main	  Persian	  source	   for	   the	   summary	  of	  Aristotelian	  practical	   philosophy,	   despite	  his	   extensive	  use	  of	  Nasīr	   al-­‐dīn	   al-­‐Ṭūsī’s	   (b.	   1201CE)	   Nasirean	   Ethics.	   	  228	  He	   maintains	   that	   Barhebraeus’	  summary	  also	  draws	  on	  other	  works	  in	  Arabic,	  but	  that	  he	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	  Syriac	  versions	   of	   Aristotle’s	   Nicomachean	   Ethics,	   such	   as	   the	   Summa	   Alexandrinorum	   or	   De	  
virtutibus. 229 	  By	   contrast,	   Takahashi	   has	   drawn	   attention	   to	   the	   clear	   philological	  connections	  specifically	  between	  Barhebraeus’	  Ethics	  and	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  Syriac	  version	  of	  the	  Pseudo-­‐Aristotelian	  text,	  De	  virtutibus.230	  Therefore,	  rather	  than	  being	  dismissive	  of	  the	   Syriac	   tradition	   of	   Aristotle,	   Barhebraeus	   used	   it	   to	   supplement	   the	   Avicennan	  tradition.	  	  Barhebraeus’	   extensive	   use	   of	   Islamic	   philosophy	   was	   remarkable	   but	   not	   without	  precedent.	  Already	  in	  the	  medieval	  period,	  Bar	  Šakko	  had	  made	  considerable	  use	  of	  Islamic	  philosophical	   learning	   in	   his	   Syriac	  works.231	  The	   inter-­‐relation	   of	   the	   Syriac	   and	   Arabic	  traditions	  of	  philosophy	  had	  been	  established	  with	  the	  translation	  movements	  of	  the	  ninth	  and	   tenth	   centuries,	   when	   Syrian	   Christian	   scholars	   used	   the	   Syriac	   translations	   as	   a	  medium	   through	   which	   to	   transmit	   Greek	   philosophy	   into	   Arabic	   during	   the	   ʿAbbāsid	  era.232	  From	   the	   tenth	   century	   the	   Islamic	   philosophical	   tradition	   came	   to	   predominate,	  with	  Arabic	  displacing	  Syriac	   ‘as	   the	   language	  of	   science’.233	  In	   the	   twelfth	  and	   thirteenth	  centuries	  there	  was	  a	  revival	  of	  interest	  amongst	  Syrian	  scholastics	  such	  as	  Barhebraeus	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  228	  A	   Syriac	   Encyclopaedia	   of	   Aristolelian	   Philosophy	   :	   Barhebraeus	   (13th	   c.),	   Butyrum	   Sapientiae,	   Books	   of	  
Ethics,	  Economy,	  and	  Politics	   :	  A	  Critical	  Edition,	  with	   Introduction,	  Translation,	  Commentary,	   and	  Glossaries,	  Aristoteles	  Semitico-­‐Latinus	  (Leiden	  ;	  Boston:	  Brill,	  2004),	  3.	  	  229	  Ibid.,	  207-­‐15.	  Joose	  maintains	  that	  Zonta	  was	  wrong	  to	  assume	  that	  Barhebraeus	  made	  use	  of	  the	  Syriac	  version	  of	  the	  Pseudo-­‐Aristotelian	  De	  virtutibus,	  but	  rather	  relied	  on	  the	  Arabic	  version	  of	  Abū	  Qurra.	  Cf.	  Mauro	  Zonta,	  "Structure	  and	  Sources	  of	  Bar-­‐Hebraeus'	  "Practical	  Philosophy"	  in	  the	  Cream	  of	  Science"	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Symposium	  Syriacum	  VII,	  Uppsala,	  1996),	  285-­‐92.	  230	  Takahashi	   argues	   for	   ‘the	   almost	   exact	   agreement’	   between	   a	   sentence	   in	   Barhebraeus’	   book	   of	   Ethics	  (III.iv.4),	   and	   in	   the	  abridged	  Syriac	  version	  of	  De	  virtutibus	   in	  Ms.	   Sinai	   Syr.	  14.	  Takahashi,	   "Edition	  of	   the	  Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	  on	  the	  Edition	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Heaven	  and	   the	  World	  and	   the	  Book	  of	  Generation	  and	  Corruption	  of	   the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	  117	  n.	  22.	  Takahashi	  suggests	  Barhebraeus	  may	  well	  have	  used	  the	  Syriac	  Summa	  Alexandrinorum,	  but	  as	  Joosse	  points	  out,	  both	  the	  Syriac	  version	  and	  the	  Greek	  original	  are	  lost.	  231	  Takahashi	  calls	  Bar	  Šakko	  a	  ‘precursor’	  to	  Barhebraeus,	  but	  affirms	  the	  extensive	  usage	  of	  Islamic	  sources	  by	  Barhebraeus	  was	  ‘exceptional’.	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  98.	  232	  John	  W.	  Watt,	   "Greek	  Philosophy	  and	  Syriac	  Culture	   in	   ‘Abbasid	   Iraq,"	   in	  The	  Christian	  Heritage	  of	  Iraq	  :	  
Collected	   Papers	   from	   the	   Christianity	   of	   Iraq	   I-­‐V	   Seminar	   Days,	   ed.	   Erica	   C.	   D.	   Hunter,	   Gorgias	   Eastern	  Christian	  Studies	  (Piscataway,	  NJ:	  Gorgias	  Press,	  2009),	  10-­‐11.	  233	  Ibid.,	  13.	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the	   Greek	   sciences.	   While	   the	   Syriac	   revival	   of	   this	   tradition	   of	   philosophy	   was	  characteristic	  of	  this	  period,	  it	  also	  defined	  Barhebraeus’	  own	  particular	  achievements.	  For	  Teule,	   this	   period	   of	   intellectual	   revival	   had	   two	   principal	   foundations,	   which	   were,	  openness	  to	  the	  Islamic	  sciences	  and	  a	  spirit	  of	  ecumenism	  between	  the	  different	  Christian	  confessions	   of	   the	   Syrians.234	  He	   has	   proposed	   that	   these	   two	   orientations	   of	   the	   ‘Syriac	  Renaissance’	  contribute	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  thought.235	  	  	  
Rationale	  to	  Barhebraeus’	  Literary	  Activities	  In	   the	  debate	   surrounding	  Barhebraeus’	   contribution	   to	  Syrian	   intellectual	   culture,	  Teule	  has	  advocated	   that	  Barhebraeus	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  scholarly	   ‘compiler’	  and	   transmitter	  of	  other	  works,	  but	  also	  made	   ‘original’	  contributions.236	  He	  characterizes	  this	  originality	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  ‘extensive	  use’	  of	  Islamic	  religious	  thought	  and	  his	  ability	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  his	  own	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  community.	  He	  maintains	  that	  this	  can	  only	  be	   truly	   established	   with	   regard	   to	   his	   sources	   by	   investigating	   ‘whether	   he	   follows	  classical	   patterns	   or	   selects,	   discovers	   –	   or	   rediscovers	   –	   writings,	   ignored	   by	   his	  contemporaries	  or	  immediate	  predecessors’.237	  Barhebraeus	  certainly	  displayed	  significant	  originality	   in	  his	  use	  of	   sources;	   it	  has	  not	   so	   far	  been	  suggested	   that	  Barhebraeus	  made	  original	   contributions	   to	   philosophical	   thought.	  Moreover	   scholars	   have	   commented	   that	  the	   Syrian	   tradition	   did	   not	   excel	   in	   this	   regard,	   especially	   when	   compared	   to	   Arabic	  philosophy.238	  The	  appraisal	  offered	  by	  Joosse	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  Barhebraeus’	  books	  of	  practical	   philosophy	   from	   the	   Cream	  of	  Wisdom	   is	   that,	   ‘Although	   Barhebraeus	  may	   not	  have	  been	  an	  original	  thinker,	  he	  is	  without	  doubt	  one	  of	  the	  most	  excellent	  compilers	  of	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  Herman	  Teule,	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo"	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Actes	  du	  Colloque	  VIII	  Patrimoine	  syriaque,	  Antélias-­‐Beyrouth,	  2002),	  260-­‐1.	  235	  Ibid.,	  261.	  236	  This	  perspective	  on	  Barhebraeus	  was	  held	  by	  ‘older	  scholars’	  such	  as	  Nau,	  Rubens	  Duval	  and	  Jean	  Baptiste	  Chabot.	  "Christian	  Spiritual	  Sources	  in	  the	  Ethicon	  of	  Barhebraeus,"	  The	  Journal	  of	  Eastern	  Christian	  Studies	  60	  (2008):	  333	  n.	  2.	  237	  Ibid.,	  334.	  238	  Brock	  comments	  ‘that	  although	  Greek	  influence	  on	  Syriac	  culture	  was	  far	  greater	  than	  it	  ever	  was	  to	  be	  on	  Arabic,	   the	  conjunction	  of	  Greek	  and	  Semitic	   failed	   to	   spark	  any	  creative	  genius	  among	  Syriac	  writers	  as	   it	  undoubtedly	   did	   among	   later	   Arab	   thinkers’.	   Brock,	   From	   Antagonism	   to	   Assimilation	   :	   Syriac	   Attitudes	   to	  
Greek	  Learning,	  30.	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times.’239	  In	   doing	   so,	   Joosse	   takes	   an	   alternative	   view	   to	   that	   of	   Teule	   on	   the	   extent	   of	  Barhebraeus’	  originality.	  This	  may	  be	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  works	  on	  which	  they	  have	  directed	  their	  scholarship;	  Joosse	  has	  focussed	  on	  Barhebraeus’	  philosophical	  works,	  which	  collate	  and	  summarise	  materials	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  sources.	  Teule	  has	  written	  most	  extensively	  on	  the	  writings	   concerned	  with	  monastic	   spirituality,	   the	  Ethicon	   and	   the	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove,	  which	   are	  much	   less	   encyclopaedic	   in	  nature	   than	   the	   various	   compendia	  of	  Aristotelian	  philosophy.	  	  Takahashi	  has	  devoted	  a	  section	  of	  the	  Bio-­‐Bibliography	  (I.2.6)	  to	  considering	  the	  purpose	  behind	  Barhebraeus’	  literary	  activity,	  maintaining	  that	  Barhebraeus	  was	  clearly	  motivated	  by	  his	  role	  as	  a	  pastor	  in	  his	  theological,	  liturgical	  and	  jurisprudential	  works,	  whereas	  in	  his	  historical	   tomes	   he	   followed	   the	   tradition	   of	   historiography	   that	   was	   particularly	  distinguished	  by	  the	  chronicles	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  Patriarchs,	  Dionysius	  of	  Tell-­‐Mahre	  (818-­‐845CE)	   and	   Michael	   I	   (1166-­‐1199CE).240	  Several	   of	   his	   other	   works,	   such	   as	   his	  Arabic	  History	  of	   the	  Dynasties,	  were	   composed	   in	   response	   to	   a	   particular	   request	   from	  some	   quarter. 241 	  Takahashi	   cites	   the	   well-­‐known	   comment	   of	   Barhebraeus	   in	   the	  
Candelabrum	  of	  the	  Sanctuary,	  concerning	  the	  lack	  of	  Syrian	  interest	  in	  intellectual	  activity,	  for	  ‘…the	  field	  of	  wisdom	  has	  grown	  waste,	  the	  love	  of	  wisdom	  has	  become	  cold;	  its	  fire	  has	  been	   extinguished	   and	   its	   light	   has	   grown	   dark’.242	  However,	   Takahashi	   considers	   this	   a	  literary	  topos,	  since	  it	  is	  similarly	  deployed	  in	  the	  Chronicon	  as	  the	  reason	  for	  undertaking	  its	  composition.	   Indeed,	  Barhebraeus	  complains	   in	   the	  Preface	   to	   the	  Chronicon	  Syriacum	  that	   the	   tradition	   of	   historiography	  had	  been	  neglected	   since	  Michael	   I.243	  Takahashi	   has	  found	  unsatisfactory	  the	  idea	  that	  Barhebraeus’	  choice	  of	  subjects	  was	  merely	  haphazard,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  Joosse,	  A	  Syriac	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Aristolelian	  Philosophy	  :	  Barhebraeus	  (13th	  c.),	  Butyrum	  Sapientiae,	  Books	  
of	  Ethics,	  Economy,	  and	  Politics	  :	  A	  Critical	  Edition,	  with	  Introduction,	  Translation,	  Commentary,	  and	  Glossaries,	  3.	  240	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  99.	  241	  Takahashi	  shows	  that	  at	   least	  two	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  Syriac	  works	  were	  commissioned	  by	  Rabban	  Simeon,	  the	   Ascent	   of	   the	   mind	   and	   the	   translation	   of	   Ibn	   Sīnā’s	   Kitāb	   al-­‐ishārāt	   wa-­‐l-­‐tanbīhāt.	   "Simeon	   of	   Qal'a	  Rumaita,	  Patriarch	  Philoxenus	  Nemrod	  and	  Bar	  'Ebroyo,"	  68.	  242	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  100.	  Takahashi	  cites	  Barhebraeus’	  Candelabrum,	  Base	  I,	  24.11f	  from	  the	  Syriac	   text	   edited	   by	   Ján	   Bakoš.	   Bakoš,	   "Le	   Candélabre	   des	   Sanctuaires	   de	   Grégoire	   Aboulfaradj	   dit	  Barhebraeus,"	  510.	  243	  Takahashi,	   Barhebraeus	   :	   A	   Bio-­‐Bibliography,	   100,	   n.382.	   For	   Barhebraeus’	   Preface,	   see:	   Budge,	   The	  
Chronography,	  1-­‐2.	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and	  suggests	  that	  he	  made	  a	  more	  systematic	  attempt	  to	  make	  all	  branches	  of	  knowledge,	  especially	   Arabic	   scholarship,	   available	   in	   Syriac.244	  Furthermore,	   Barhebraeus	   points	   to	  the	   literary	   patronage	   especially	   of	   his	   Syriac	   works,	   by	   Rabban	   Simeon,	   the	   Syrian	  Orthodox	   physician	   to	   the	   Ilkhanid	   court	   (1260-­‐1289CE). 245 	  He	   is	   described	   by	  Barhebraeus,	   in	   his	   Preface	   to	   the	   astronomical	   treatise,	   the	  Ascent	   of	   the	  mind	   (Sullāqā	  
hawnānāyā),	  as	  ‘one	  who,	  in	  our	  palaces,	  rebuilds	  on	  the	  ruins	  of	  the	  sciences	  and	  one	  who	  renews	   the	   ancient	   disciplines	   in	   our	   age’.246	  Takahashi	   has	   speculated	   that	  Barhebraeus	  saw	   Rabban	   Simeon	   as	   ‘a	   renewer	   of	   those	   ancient	   disciplines’	   that	   he	   considered	   so	  shamefully	   neglected	   in	   Syriac	   scientific	   literature. 247 	  This	   would	   give	   an	   additional	  political	  dimension	   to	   the	  composition	  of	  Barhebraeus’	   scientific	  works,	   in	   furthering	   the	  literary	  prestige	  of	  the	  Syriac	  language	  over	  Arabic.	  	  
Barhebraeus’ Engagement with Greek Philosophy  	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   own	   testimony,	   scholars	   have	   emphasised	   his	   interest	   in	  Greek	  learning	  which	  led	  him	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  achievements	  of	  the	  Islamic	  sciences.	  However,	  this	  general	  explanation	  does	  not	  do	  sufficient	  justice	  to	  the	  transitions	  which	  seem	  to	  have	  occurred	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  intellectual	  life,	  or	  at	  least	  according	  to	  his	  own	  account	  of	  it,	  in	  the	   fourth	   part	   of	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove.	   Here	   Barhebraeus	   recounts	   how	   he	   made	   a	  thorough	   study	   of	   all	   that	  was	   necessary	   for	   him	   to	  master	   the	   disciplines	   of	   the	   Greek	  sciences,248	  an	  endeavour	  which	  is	  reflected	  in	  his	  substantial	  philosophical	  literary	  output.	  His	  disillusionment	  with	  this	  study	  to	  the	  point	  of	  a	  crisis	  in	  faith,	  would	  indicate	  that	  Greek	  philosophy	   posed	   a	   particular	   problematic	   for	  Barhebraeus	   in	   his	   understanding	   of	   God,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  244	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  100.	  245	  "Simeon	  of	  Qal'a	  Rumaita,	  Patriarch	  Philoxenus	  Nemrod	  and	  Bar	  'Ebroyo,"	  68-­‐81.	  246	  Ibid.,	  80.	  This	  translation	  into	  English	  is	  given	  by	  Takahashi	  from	  Nau’s	  Syriac	  text.	  François	  Nau,	  Le	  Livre	  
de	  L'ascension	  de	  L'esprit	  sur	  la	  Forme	  du	  Ciel	  et	  de	  la	  Terre	  :	  Cours	  D'astronomie	  Rédigé	  en	  1279	  par	  Grégoire	  
Aboulfarag,	   dit	   Bar	   Hebræus,	   2	   vols.,	   Bibliothèque	   de	   L'école	   des	   Hautes	   Études	   Sciences	   Philologiques	   et	  Historiques	  (Paris:	  É.	  Bouillon,	  1899),	  24f.	  	  247	  Takahashi,	  "Simeon	  of	  Qal'a	  Rumaita,	  Patriarch	  Philoxenus	  Nemrod	  and	  Bar	  'Ebroyo,"	  80-­‐81.	  248	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  60-­‐61,	  578*.	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which	   he	   was	   only	   able	   to	   resolve	   in	   his	   reading	   of	   the	   mystics.	   The	   sources	   for	   this	  problematic	  are	  further	  explored,	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  engagement	  with	  Greek	  philosophy.	  	  	  
Barhebraeus’	  Philosophical	  Works	  Barhebraeus	  sought	  to	  provide	  the	  Syrian	  Christian	  community	  with	  knowledge,	  especially	  where	  he	  perceived	   it	   to	  be	  deficient	   in	  regards	  to	   Islamic	  achievements.	  He	  did	  not	  only	  use	   materials	   written	   in	   Arabic,	   but	   also	   drew	   from	   the	   Syriac	   commentaries	   and	  translations	   of	   Aristotelian	   philosophy.	   In	   returning	   to	   Syriac	   philosophical	   works	   that	  belonged	  to	  a	  much	  earlier	  period,	  he	  attempted	  to	  extend	  the	  Syrian	  interest	  in	  Aristotle	  beyond	   that	   of	   the	   Organon,	   to	   the	   wider	   curriculum	   of	   the	   Aristotelian	   sciences.	   This	  process	   becomes	   clearer	   when	   the	   philosophical	   endeavours	   of	   Barhebraeus	   are	   placed	  within	  the	  history	  of	  the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  Neoplatonic	  Alexandrian	  tradition	  of	  Aristotle	  into	  Syriac.	  	  	  Takahashi	  has	   categorised	   the	  history	  of	   the	  Syriac	   tradition	  of	  Aristotle	   into	   three	  main	  periods.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  ‘purely	  Syriac’	  period,	  beginning	  with	  the	  earliest	  translations	  in	  the	  sixth	  century,	  extending	  to	  the	  revised	  translations	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  seventh	  century.	  The	  second	  main	  period	  is	  the	  ʿAbbāsid	  translation	  movement,	  when	  Greek	  scientific	  works	  were	   translated	   into	   Arabic	   (often	   via	   Syriac	   intermediaries)	   at	   the	   Beit	   al-­‐Ḥikma;	   the	  greatest	  exponent	  being	  the	  East	  Syrian	  scholar	  Ḥunayn	  ibn	  Isḥaq	  (809-­‐873CE).249	  Despite	  the	   prodigious	   translation	   activities	   in	   the	   ʿAbbāsid	   period,	   very	   little	  material	   survives.	  	  The	  third	  and	  final	  period	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘Syriac	  Renaissance’	  period,	  in	  which	  the	  authors	  may	  well	  have	  had	  access	  to	  the	  Syriac	  materials	  produced	  with	  the	  translation	  movement	  in	   the	   ʿAbbāsid	   period. 250 	  The	   principle	   representatives	   of	   this	   final	   period	   include	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  249	  For	  the	  development	  of	  Graeco-­‐Arabic	  translation	  techniques	  by	  such	  as	  Ḥunayn	  ibn	  Isḥaq	  under	  the	  patronage	  of	  the	  ʿAbbāsid	  Caliphs:	  Dimitri	  Gutas,	  Greek	  Thought,	  Arab	  Culture	  :	  The	  Graeco-­‐Arabic	  Translation	  
Movement	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  Early	  Abbasid	  Society	  (2nd-­‐4th/8th-­‐10th	  c.)	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1998),	  136-­‐41.	  250	  Takahashi,	  "Edition	  of	  the	  Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	  on	  the	  Edition	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Heaven	  and	  the	  World	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  Generation	  and	  Corruption	  of	  the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	  111.	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Dionysius	  Bar	   Ṣalībī	   (d.	   1171CE),	  who	  wrote	   ‘an	   extensive	   commentary’	   on	   the	  Organon	  that	  survives	  in	  an	  unpublished	  manuscript,251	  and	  of	  course,	  Barhebraeus.252	  	  If	  Barhebraeus’	  organising	  principles	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  foundationally	  philosophical,	  that	  is	  Aristotelian,	   then	   these	  may	   be	   understood	   better	   by	   attending	   to	   his	  works	   devoted	   to	  specifically	   Aristotelian	   subjects.	   Takahashi	   has	   listed	   eight	   philosophical	   works,	   from	  amongst	   Barhebraeus’	   total	   literary	   oeuvre	   that	   number	  more	   than	   forty	  main	  works.253	  These	  include:254	  	  
• Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye	  (Ktābā	  d-­‐bābātā)255	  
• Conversation	  of	  Wisdom	  (Swād	  sōpiya)256	  
• Treatise	  of	  Treatises	  (Têgrat	  têgrātā	  ):	  unpublished	  
• Cream	  of	  Wisdom	  (Ḥêwat	  Ḥekmtā)	  
• Concise	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Human	  Soul	  -­‐	  Maqāla	  mukhtaṣara	  fī	  al-­‐nafs	  al-­‐basharīya	  
• Treatise	  on	  the	  Science	  of	  the	  Human	  Soul	  -­‐	  Mukhtaṣar	  fī	  ‘ilm	  al-­‐nafs	  al-­‐insānīya257	  
• Translation	  of	  Ibn	  Sīnā’s	  Kitāb	  al-­‐Ishārāt	  wa-­‐l-­‐tanbīhāt	  (Book	  of	  Remarks	  and	  
Admonitions)	  -­‐	  Ktābā	  d-­‐remzē	  wa-­‐m‘īrānwātā	  d-­‐Abū	  ‘Alī	  bar	  Sīnā:	  unpublished	  
• Translation	  of	  Athīr	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐Abharī’s	  (d.	  1264)	  Zubdat	  al-­‐Asrār	  (Essence	  of	  Secrets)	  –	  K.	  d-­‐zubdat	  al-­‐asrār258	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  251	  Sebastian	   P.	   Brock,	   "Syriac	   Commentary	   Tradition,"	   in	   From	  Ephrem	   to	  Romanos	   :	   Interactions	   between	  
Syriac	  and	  Greek	  in	  Late	  Antiquity,	  Variorum	  Collected	  Studies	  Series	   (Aldershot	   ;	  Brookfield,	  USA:	  Ashgate,	  1999),	   13-­‐14.	   Brock	   notes	   two	   unpublished	   commentaries	   of	   Dionysius	   Bar	   Ṣalībī	   devoted	   to	   De	  
interpretatione	  and	  Prior	  Analytics:	  MS	  Cambridge,	  University	  Library,	  Gg.2.14.	  252	  Takahashi,	   "Edition	  of	   the	  Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	  on	  the	  Edition	   of	   the	  Book	  of	  Heaven	   and	   the	  World	   and	   the	  Book	   of	  Generation	   and	  Corruption	   of	   the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	  112-­‐13.	  253	  Ibid.,	  113.	  254	  The	  transliteration	  of	  the	  titles	  follows	  the	  Appendices	  (1	  &	  2),	  rather	  than	  Takahashi’s	  1999	  article.	  255	  Janssens	  has	  published	  the	  Syriac	  text	  over	  two	  journal	  articles.	  Herman	  F.	  Janssens,	  "Bar	  Hebraeus;	  Book	  of	   the	   Pupils	   of	   the	   Eye	   (Concluded),"	  The	  American	   Journal	  of	  Semitic	  Languages	  and	  Literatures	   47,	   no.	   2	  (1931).	  "Bar	  Hebraeus;	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye	  (Continued),"	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  Semitic	  Languages	  
and	  Literatures	  48,	  no.	  4	  (1932).	  256	  The	   full	   Syriac	   text	   is	   published	   by	   Janssens	  with	   French	   translation	   and	   commentary.	  L'Entretien	  de	   la	  
Sagesse	  :	  Introduction	  aux	  Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  Bar	  Hebraeus.	  257	  These	  Arabic	  works	   are	   both	   treatises	   on	   the	   soul,	   since	   they	   have	   not	   been	   translated	   into	   English	   an	  attempt	  has	  been	  made	  here	  to	  differentiate	  their	  titles	  in	  translation.	  	  258	  The	  Arabic	  original	  of	  this	  work	  survives,	  but	  not	  Barhebraeus’	  Syriac	  translation.	  Takahashi,	  "Edition	  of	  the	   Syriac	   Philosophical	  Works	   of	   Barhebraeus.	  With	   a	   Preliminary	   Report	   on	   the	   Edition	   of	   the	   Book	   of	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  Of	  the	  first	  four	  works	  listed	  above,	  the	  first	  is	  concerned	  only	  with	  logic	  (the	  short	  treatise	  called	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Pupils	   of	   the	   Eye),	   while	   the	   others	   are	   more	   comprehensive	  philosophical	  compendia	  of	  Aristotle.259	  These	  other	  treatises,	  Swād	  sōpiya,	  Têgrat	  têgrātā,	  and	  Ḥêwat	  Ḥekmtā,	   cover	   the	   three	   areas	   of	   logic,	   natural	   philosophy	   and	  metaphysics.	  Teule	   states	   that	   the	   intention	   behind	   these	   works	   was	   to	   provide	   ‘textbooks	   for	   a	  progressive	  course	  in	  philosophy’,	  with	  their	  alliterating	  titles	  indicating	  that	  Barhebraeus	  saw	  them	  as	  ‘forming	  a	  kind	  of	  trilogy	  despite	  the	  variance	  in	  the	  dates	  at	  which	  they	  were	  composed’.260	  The	   longest	   and	   most	   comprehensive	   of	   these	   three	   works,	   the	   Cream	   of	  
Wisdom	   (composed	   1285-­‐6CE)	   includes	   twenty-­‐two	   books	   and	   has	   an	   additional	   fourth	  part	  on	  practical	  philosophy.261	  A	  number	  of	  these	  books	  have	  been	  published	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ‘Aristoteles	   Semitico-­‐Latinus’	   project,	   but	   the	   third	   part	   on	  metaphysics	   and	   comprising	  two	  books,	  has	  to	  date	  not	  been	  published.262	  The	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom	   is	  Barhebraeus’	  most	  comprehensive	   philosophical	   work,	   and	   covers	   the	   entire	   system	   of	   Aristotle,	   drawing	  heavily	  on	  Avicenna	  or	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  (c.980-­‐1037CE).	  	  Both	  Takahashi	  and	  Brock	  have	  surmised	  that	  Barhebraeus’	  corpus	  of	  philosophical	  texts,	  were	   designed	   for	   the	   systematised	   training	   of	   students	   in	   Aristotelian	   philosophy.	  Takahashi	  argues	  that	  Barhebraeus’	   trilogy	  of	  philosophical	  compendia,	  were	   intended	  to	  provide	  a	  progressive	  course	  of	  philosophical	  training.263	  Brock	  develops	  this	  point	  further,	  with	   reference	   to	   the	   Syrian	   emphasis	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   logic	   and	   the	   books	   of	   the	  
Organon.	   He	   maintains	   that	   these	   ‘highly	   schematized	   works’	   would	   have	   provided	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  Heaven	  and	   the	  World	  and	   the	  Book	  of	  Generation	  and	  Corruption	  of	   the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	  133	  n.	  10.	   cf.	  
Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  70.	  259	  "Edition	  of	  the	  Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	  on	  the	  Edition	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Heaven	  and	  the	  World	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  Generation	  and	  Corruption	  of	  the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	  114.	  260	  "The	  Reception	  of	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  in	  Syriac	  the	  Case	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus,"	  252.	  261	  Ibid.,	  252-­‐3.	  262	  "Edition	  of	  the	  Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	  on	  the	  Edition	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Heaven	  and	  the	  World	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  Generation	  and	  Corruption	  of	  the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	  114-­‐15.	  Takahashi	  has	  published	  an	  article	  dealing	  with	   the	   contents	  of	   these	  books,	  but	   it	   is	   in	   Japanese	  and	   thus	  inaccessible	   for	   this	   study.	   See	   “The	   Reception	   of	   Kitab	   al-­‐Shifā’	   in	   Syriac:	   An	   Overview	   of	   the	   Books	   on	  Metaphysics	   in	  Barhebraeus’	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom”,	   in	  H.	  Kobayashi	  et	  al.(ed.),	  Structure	  and	  Transformation	  of	  
Knowledge	  in	  Islam:	  Thought,	  Science,	  Society	  and	  Their	  Interactions,	   Joint	  Usage/Research	  Center	  for	  Islamic	  Area	  Studies,	  Organization	  for	  Islamic	  Area	  Studies,	  Waseda	  University,	  2011,	  113–133	  (in	  Japanese).	  263	  "The	  Reception	  of	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  in	  Syriac	  the	  Case	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus,"	  252.	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‘introductions	   and	   summaries	   covering	   the	   complete	   Organon	   on	   several	   different	  levels’.264	  Thus,	  the	  Ktābā	  d-­‐bābātā	  was	  ‘designed	  as	  an	  elementary	  introduction’,	  the	  Swād	  
sōpiya	  and	  the	  Têgrat	  têgrātā	   ‘serving	  as	  intermediary	  handbooks’	  and	  the	  Ḥêwat	  Ḥekmtā	  ‘designed	  as	  an	  advanced	  compendium’.265	  In	  this	  way,	  Barhebraeus	  not	  only	  reinvigorated	  the	   traditional	   training	   in	   the	   Organon	   in	   the	   monastic	   school-­‐system	   by	   producing	  textbooks	   of	   ascending	   complexity,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   widened	   the	   philosophical	  curriculum,	   so	   that	   logic	   was	   read	   alongside	   the	   other	   books	   of	   natural	   philosophy	   and	  metaphysics,	   thereby	   restoring	   the	   role	   of	   logic	   to	   its	   proper	   place	   as	   the	   ‘tool’	   of	   these	  sciences.	  	  
The	  Problem	  with	  the	  Aristotelian	  Physics	  and	  the	  Metaphysics	  	  In	   the	   composition	   of	   his	   philosophical	   works,	   it	   has	   been	   well	   documented	   that	  Barhebraeus	  made	   substantial	   use	   of	   the	   Arabic	   Aristotelian	   tradition.	   However,	   he	   also	  retrieved	   many	   of	   the	   older	   Syriac	   materials	   on	   Aristotle,	   particularly	   on	   natural	  philosophy	   and	   metaphysics.	   Thus,	   he	   made	   use	   of	   the	   Syriac	   translation	   of	   Nicolaus	  Damascenus’	   Compendium	   of	   Aristotelian	   Philosophy,	   which	   summarised	   the	   physical	  treatises.	  Barhebraeus	  mentions	  this	  philosopher	  in	  his	  Arabic	  History	  of	  the	  Dynasties	  and	  that	  he	  was	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  Syriac	  copy	  of	  the	  Damascene’s	  Aristotelian	  compendium,	  which	  was	  a	  translation	  made	  by	  Ḥunayn	  ibn	  Isḥāq.266	  Moreover,	  the	  Syriac	  compendium	  of	  Nicolaus	   Damascenus	   would	   have	   possessed	   particular	   interest	   for	   Barhebraeus,	   in	   his	  endeavour	  to	  summarise	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  sciences	  in	  Syriac.267	  Drossart	  Lulofs	  has	   pointed	   out	   that	   for	   several	   centuries,	   only	   the	   Organon	   had	   been	   studied	   by	   the	  Syrians,	  while	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  Aristotelian	   corpus	  was	   ‘almost	  unknown’.268	  He	   comments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  264	  Brock,	  "Syriac	  Commentary	  Tradition,"	  6.	  265	  Ibid.	  266	  Drossaart	   Lulofs,	   On	   the	   Philosophy	   of	   Aristotle,	   10.	   Lulofs	   lists	   the	   following	   entry	   from	   Barhebraeus’	  
Mukhtaṣar	  tā’rīkh	  al-­‐duwal,	  in	  his	  Testimonia	  (5.6):	   ‘Amongst	  the	  learned	  men	  who	  lived	  near	  this	  time	  (the	  age	  of	  Julian	  the	  Apostate)	  was	  Nicolaus	  who	  was	  preeminent	  in	  the	  study	  of	  philosophy.	  His	  works	  comprise	  (a)	  a	  Compendium	  of	  Aristotelian	  Philosophy,	  of	  which	  we	  have	  a	  Syriac	  copy,	  the	  translator	  being	  Ḥunayn	  ibn	  Isḥāq,	   (b)	   a	   tract	   On	   plants,	   and	   (c)	   a	   Refutation	   of	   those	   who	   claim	   the	   intellect	   to	   be	   identical	   with	   the	  
intelligibles.	  According	  to	  Ibn	  Buṭlān	  he	  came	  originally	  from	  Laodicea’.	  	  267	  Ibid.,	   36.	   Drossart	   Lulofs	   notes	   with	   regret	   that	   there	   is	   no	   information	   in	   the	   Syriac	   copy	   of	   the	  Compendium	  as	  to	  when	  and	  where	  it	  was	  translated.	  According	  to	  Lulofs,	  Barhebraeus’	  information	  that	  his	  copy	  was	  translated	  by	  Ḥunayn	  ibn	  Isḥāq	  does	  not	  match	  with	  the	  ‘perfectionist’	  style	  of	  this	  translator	  and	  the	  ‘rather	  superficial	  translation’	  which	  is	  extant;	  the	  attribution	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  made	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  268	  Ibid.,	  7.	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further	   that	   for	   the	   Syrians	   Aristotle	  was	   ‘the	   logician’,	   and	   so	   ‘in	   the	   library	   of	  many	   a	  monastery	   the	   physical,	   metaphysical,	   rhetorical,	   political	   and	   ethical	   writings	   were	  completely	  lacking’.269	  	  	  The	   Syriac	   versions	   of	   Nicolaus	   Damascenus’	   compendium	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   included	  both	   summary	   and	   commentary	   on	   the	   Aristotelian	   physics	   and	   metaphysics,	   which	  Barhebraeus	  incorporated	  into	  the	  composition	  of	  two	  of	  his	  major	  works	  on	  theology	  and	  philosophy,	   in	  the	  hexaemaral	  section	  of	  the	  Candelabrum	  and	  in	  the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom.270	  Takahashi	  has	  drawn	  attention	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  Lulofs’	  discovery	  that	  Barhebraeus	  had	  used	  the	  Syriac	  versions	  of	  both	  Nicolaus	  Damascenus’	  De	  plantis	  and	  On	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  
Aristotle	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  works	  on	  Aristotelian	  natural	  philosophy.271	  He	  also	  drew	  on	  Sergius’	   translation	   of	   the	   Pseudo-­‐Aristotelian	  De	  mundo	   in	   those	   sections	   of	   his	   works	  dealing	  with	  natural	  science	  and	  Aristotle’s	  Metereologica,	  in	  both	  the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom	  and	  the	  theological	  compendium,	  the	  Candelabrum.272	  Moreover,	  Barhebraeus’	  predecessor	  Bar	  Šakko	  had	  also	  made	  use	  of	  this	  Syriac	  translation	  of	  De	  mundo,	  in	  his	  own	  compendium	  of	  Aristotelian	  philosophy,	  the	  Book	  of	  Dialogues.273	  	  	  Precisely	  why	  Barhebraeus	  was	  so	  concerned	  to	  broaden	  the	  monastic	  curriculum	  from	  the	  concentrated	  study	  of	  the	  logic	  in	  the	  early	  books	  of	  the	  Organon	  remains	  to	  be	  considered.	  Perhaps	   he	   considered	   that	   this	   narrow	   scope	   was	   detrimental	   to	   the	   development	   of	  Syrian	  philosophical	  thinking,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  he	  warned	  of	  the	  inherent	  dangers	  of	  monks	   reading	   certain	   books	   of	   Aristotle,	   particularly	   the	   books	   of	   the	   Physics	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  269	  Ibid.,	  36.	  270	  See	  also	  E.	  L.	  J.	  Poortman	  and	  H.	  J.	  Drossaart	  Lulofs,	  Nicolaus	  Damascenus	  De	  Plantis	  :	  Five	  Translations,	  Verhandelingen	  Der	  Koninklijke	  Nederlandse	  Akademie	  Van	  Wetenschappen	  Afd	  Letterkunde	  Nieuwe	  Reeks	  (Amsterdam:	  North-­‐Holland	  Pub.	  Co.,	  1989),	  68-­‐113.	  	  271	  Takahashi,	  "Edition	  of	  the	  Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	  on	  the	  Edition	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Heaven	  and	  the	  World	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  Generation	  and	  Corruption	  of	  the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	  116.	  272	  "Between	  Greek	  and	  Arabic:	  The	  Sciences	  in	  Syriac	  from	  Severus	  Sebokht	  to	  Barhebraeus,"	  in	  Transmission	  
of	  Sciences	  :	  Greek,	  Syriac,	  Arabic	  and	  Latin,	  ed.	  Haruo	  Kobayashi	  and	  Mizue	  Kato	  (Tokyo:	  Joint	  Usage/Research	  Center	  for	  Islamic	  Area	  Studies,	  Organization	  for	  Islamic	  Area	  Studies,	  Waseda	  University	  (WIAS),	  2010),	  25.	  273	  "Edition	  of	  the	  Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	  on	  the	  Edition	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Heaven	  and	   the	  World	  and	   the	  Book	  of	  Generation	  and	  Corruption	  of	   the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	  112.	  Takahashi	  mentions	  that	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  Dialogues,	  ‘his	  major	  work	  on	  the	  secular	  sciences’,	  Bar	  Šakko	  drew	  on	  some	  Syriac	  sources	  of	  Aristotle,	  such	  as	  Sergius’	  translation	  of	  the	  pseudonymous	  work,	  De	  mundo.	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Metaphysics,	   proclaiming	   that	   only	   limited	   use	   should	   be	  made	   of	   them.	   To	   endorse	   his	  point,	  Barhebraeus	  provides	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  Directions	  (Ktābā	  d-­‐Huddāyē),	  commonly	  known	  as	  the	  Nomocanon,	  a	  list	  of	  books	  as	  a	  curriculum	  of	  study	  for	  the	  ecclesiastical	  schools.274	  	   Out	   of	   the	  disciplines	   of	   the	   outsiders,	   the	  book	  of	  Anthony	  of	  Tagrit,	   the	   logical	   [books]	   of	  Aristotle	   –	  
Categoriae,	  Peri	  hermeneias,	  Analytica,	  Apodeictica,	  Topica	   [in]	  eight	   treatises,	  Refutation	  of	  the	  Sophists,	  
On	  the	  Poets,	  and	  On	  Rhetoric	  [in]	  three	  treatises	  –	  and	  the	  four	  mathematical	  [books/disciplines]	  provide	  beauty	  for	  the	  tongue	  and	  training	  for	  the	  mind.	  From	  the	  Physical	  Hearing	  and	  After-­‐the-­‐Physics,	  one	  is	  to	  take	  only	  as	  much	  as	  we	  have	  taken	  in	  our	  book	  the	  Candelabrum	  of	  the	  Sanctuary	  and	  the	  smaller	  [Book]	  
of	  Rays	  for	  refutation	  and	  disputation	  against	  those	  who	  knew	  God	  but	  did	  not	  glorify	  Him	  as	  God.	  275	  	  The	  reference	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  ninth-­‐century	  West	  Syrian	  Anthony	  of	  Tagrit	  would	  have	  been	  his	  book	  of	  rhetoric,	  the	  books	  of	  Aristotle’s	  logic	  listed	  here	  comprise	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	   Organon,	   and	   the	   four	   mathematical	   books	   were	   those	   of	   the	   quadrivium,	   i.e.	  arithmetic,	   geometry,	  music	   and	   astronomy.276	  The	   usage	   of	   the	   Aristotelian	   book	   of	   the	  
Physics	   (‘Physical	  Hearing’	   reflects	   the	   actual	  wording	  of	   the	  Aristotelian	   title)277	  and	   the	  
Metaphysics	  (‘After-­‐the-­‐Physics’	  is	  a	  more	  literal	  translation	  of	  the	  Syriac	  bātar	  kyānāyātā)	  is	   confined	   to	   refutation	   and	  disputation,	  with	   the	   specific	   qualification	  of	   against	  whom	  the	  works	  were	  to	  be	  employed.	  Takahashi	  has	  demonstrated	  that	   the	  reference	  to	   those	  ‘who	  knew	  God	  but	  did	  not	  glorify	  Him	  as	  God’,	  belongs	  to	  Paul’s	  Letter	  to	  the	  Romans	  1:21,	  which	  along	  with	  Barhebraeus’	  subsequent	  references	  to	  Paul	  (in	  the	  following	  part	  of	  the	  passage	   not	   quoted	   here),	   has	   been	   taken	   from	   the	  Historia	   Ecclesiastica	   of	   Socrates	   of	  Constantinople,	  also	  known	  as	  Socrates	  Scholasticus	  (b.	  380	  CE).278	  Therefore,	  the	  need	  for	  refutation	   and	   disputation	   would	   seem	   to	   refer	   to	   those	   teachings	   of	   the	   Greek	  philosophers	  that	  conflicted	  with	  Christian	  doctrines,	  rather	  than	  a	  contemporary	  context	  of	  inter-­‐confessional	  or	  inter-­‐religious	  disputation.	  In	  the	  Preface	  to	  the	  Second	  Foundation	  of	   the	   Candelabrum,	   Barhebraeus	   gives	   an	   outline	   of	   the	   opinions	   of	   the	   ancient	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  274	  "Between	  Greek	  and	  Arabic:	  The	  Sciences	  in	  Syriac	  from	  Severus	  Sebokht	  to	  Barhebraeus,"	  29.	  275	  Ibid.,	  28.	  Takahashi’s	  translation	  is	  made	  from	  an	  extensive	  passage	  in	  Bedjan’s	  Syriac	  edition.	  Paul	  Bedjan,	  
Nomocanon	  Gregorii	  Barhebraei	  (Parisiis	  ;	  Lipsiae:	  Harrassowitz,	  1898),	  106.3-­‐07.1.	  276	  Takahashi,	  "Between	  Greek	  and	  Arabic:	  The	  Sciences	  in	  Syriac	  from	  Severus	  Sebokht	  to	  Barhebraeus,"	  29.	  277	  "Simeon	  of	  Qal'a	  Rumaita,	  Patriarch	  Philoxenus	  Nemrod	  and	  Bar	  'Ebroyo,"	  69	  n.	  77.	  278	  "Between	  Greek	  and	  Arabic:	  The	  Sciences	  in	  Syriac	  from	  Severus	  Sebokht	  to	  Barhebraeus,"	  30.	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philosophers	  on	  the	  nature	  of	   the	  universe,	  and	  then	  concludes	  that	  all	  of	   their	  doctrines	  must	  be	  refuted	  as	  ‘heresies’.279	  	  	  The	   specifications	   given	   in	   the	  Book	  of	  Directions	   indicate	   that	   Barhebraeus	   perceived	   a	  need	  to	  protect	  theological	  discourse	  from	  the	  abstraction	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  Thus,	  he	  explicitly	   argued	   against	   the	   Aristotelian	   doctrine	   of	   the	   eternity	   of	   the	   world	   in	   the	  
Candelabrum. 280 	  However,	   as	   Takahashi	   has	   pointed	   out,	   Barhebraeus	   reaffirms	   the	  Aristotelian	  teaching	  on	  the	  eternity	  of	  the	  world	  without	  offering	  a	  corrective,	  in	  both	  the	  
Cream	  of	  Wisdom	  and	  the	  Conversation	  of	  Wisdom.281	  Giuseppe	  Furlani	  has	  maintained	  that	  the	   philosophical	   and	   theological	   works	   were	   written	   for	   different	   audiences,	   but	  Takahashi	  argues	  that	  the	  question	  remains	  to	  be	  resolved	  ‘as	  to	  what	  views	  Barhebraeus	  himself	   held	   on	   such	  matters	   and	   on	   philosophy	   in	   general’.282	  Janssens’	   suggestion	   that	  these	   inconsistencies	   indicate	  Barhebraeus’	   own	  uncertainties,	  which	   are	   reflected	   in	  his	  biographical	   account	  of	   a	   spiritual	   crisis	   in	   the	  Dove,	   does	  not	   resolve	   the	   issue,	   since	   as	  Takahashi	  has	  pointed	  out,	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Dove	  predates	  the	  Cream.283	  Therefore,	  it	  remains	   a	   pertinent	   question,	   why	   Barhebraeus	   should	   provide	   so	   many	   compendia	  including	   the	   more	   problematic	   books	   of	   Aristotle,	   without	   attempting	   to	   reconcile	   the	  Aristotelian	  doctrines	  that	  ran	  counter	  to	  the	  theology	  of	  his	  church.	  	  	  	  
Neoplatonic	  and	  Aristotelian	  Cosmology	  With	  the	  reception	  of	  Aristotelian	  and	  Neoplatonic	  cosmology,	   the	  Syrians	  similarly	  drew	  on	   the	   syntheses	   formulated	   by	   the	   Christian	   philosophers	   of	   Late	   Antiquity	   who	   had	  attempted	   to	   reconcile	   the	   doctrinal	   conflicts	   concerning	   creationism.	   The	   ‘pagan’	  Neoplatonists	   had	   been	   subject	   to	   substantial	   critique	   by	   the	   fifth	   and	   sixth	   century	  Christian	  Neoplatonists,	   associated	  with	   the	   school	   of	  Alexandria.	   These	   figures	   included	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  279	  Richard	  J.	  H.	  Gottheil,	  "A	  Synopsis	  of	  Greek	  Philosophy	  by	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  Hebraica	  3.4	  (1887):	  252,	  54.	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  this	  conflict,	  see	  the	  later	  section	  on	  Cosmology.	  280	  Takahashi,	  "The	  Reception	  of	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  in	  Syriac	  the	  Case	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus,"	  272.	  See	  also	  Janssens,	  
L'Entretien	  de	  la	  Sagesse	  :	  Introduction	  aux	  Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	  9f.	  281	  Takahashi,	  "The	  Reception	  of	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  in	  Syriac	  the	  Case	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus,"	  272.	  For	  the	  Cream	  of	  
Wisdom,	  see	  book	  V	  Meteorologica	  1.3	  and	  3.1-­‐2.	  282	  Ibid.	  Takahashi	  quotes:	  Giuseppe	  Furlani,	  "Di	  Tre	  Scritti	  in	  Lingua	  Siriaca	  Di	  Barhebreo	  Sull'	  Anima,"	  
Rivista	  degli	  Studi	  Orientali	  14	  (1934):	  307.	  283	  Takahashi,	  "The	  Reception	  of	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  in	  Syriac	  the	  Case	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus,"	  252.	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Aeneas	   of	   Gaza	   (d.	   c.	   518CE),	   Zacharias	   Scholasticus	   (c.	   465	   -­‐	   post	   536CE),	   and	   John	  Philoponus	   (490-­‐570CE),	   the	   latter	   proving	   particularly	   influential	   in	   the	   reception	   of	  Greek	  cosmology.284	  Sebastian	  Brock,	  commenting	  on	  the	  Christian	  Neoplatonist	  circles	  of	  sixth	  century	  Syria	  and	  Palestine,	  writes	  that	  	   there	  was	  a	  continuity	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Christian	  Neoplatonists,	  such	  as	  John	  Philoponus,	  and	  in	  certain	  Christian	  neoplatonizing	  texts	  of	  the	  sixth	  century,	  notably	  the	  Dionysian	  Corpus	  and	  writings	  of	  Evagrius,	  right	  through	  to	  the	  ninth	  century.	  	  He	  points	  out	  that	  this	  continuity	  of	  interest	  in	  Greek	  learning	  was	  maintained	  through	  the	  seventh	   century	   in	   Syria	   and	  Palestine	   (but	  not	  Constantinople),	   and	  as	   late	   as	   the	  ninth	  century	   the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  Patriarch	  Theodosius	  wrote	  his	  Commentary	  on	   the	  Book	  of	  
the	  Holy	  Hierotheos.285	  Indeed	   it	   can	  be	   seen	   that	   there	  were	  direct	   connections	  between	  Barhebraeus	  and	  these	  Christian	  Neoplatonist	  circles	  from	  the	  sixth	  to	  the	  ninth	  centuries,	  since	  he	  was	  at	  least	  familiar	  with	  the	  texts	  of	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	  Evagrius	  Ponticus	  (346-­‐399CE),	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos	  and	  the	  Commentary	  by	  Theodosius,	  if	  not	  directly	  with	   the	  work	   of	   John	   Philoponus.	  286	  Furthermore	   Brock	   states	   that	   these	   sixth	   century	  writers	  all	  seem	  to	  have	  had	  some	  connection	  with	  the	  controversy	  over	  ‘Origenism’,287	  and	  thus	   it	  would	  not	  be	  surprising	   for	  Barhebraeus’	  mystical	   texts	   to	   reflect	   the	  response	  of	  these	   Christian	   Neoplatonists	   to	   the	   Origenist	   controversy,	   particularly	   in	   regards	   to	  Origen’s	  cosmology.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina	  (d.	  536)	  is	  an	  important	  addition	  to	  the	  list	  of	  sixth	  century	  Neoplatonic	  writers	  supplied	  by	  Brock,	  for	  Sergius	  was	  educated	  in	  Alexandria	  and	  apparently	  by	  his	  association	  with	  the	  Evagrian	  corpus,	  was	  later	  accused	  of	  Origenism.288	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  284	  Daniel	  King,	  "Alexander	  of	  Aphrodisias'	  On	  the	  Principles	  of	  the	  Universe	  in	  a	  Syriac	  Adaptation,"	  Le	  Muséon	  123,	  no.	  1	  (2010):	  173-­‐78.	  For	  the	  Platonic	  philosophical	  background	  to	  the	  Christian	  apologists	  of	  the	  Gazan	  and	   Alexandrian	   schools:	   Sarah	   Klitenic	   Wear,	   "Another	   Link	   in	   the	   Golden	   Chain:	   Aeneas	   of	   Gaza	   and	  Zacharias	  Scholasticus	  on	  Plotinus	  Enn.	  4.3,"	  Greek,	  Roman	  and	  Byzantine	  Studies	  53	  (2013):	  145-­‐53.	  285	  Sebastian	  P.	  Brock,	  "A	  Syriac	  Intermediary	  for	  the	  Arabic	  Theology	  of	  Aristotle?	  In	  Search	  of	  a	  Chimera?,"	  in	  The	  Libraries	  of	  the	  Neoplatonists,	  ed.	  Cristina	  D'Ancona	  Costa	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2007),	  305-­‐6.	  286	  John	  Philoponus	  was	  known	  to	  Barhebraeus	  as	  a	  philosopher,	  and	  is	  included	  in	  the	  Chronicon	  Syriacum,	  where	  it	  is	  mentioned	  that	  he	  flourished	  in	  Alexandria.	  Budge,	  The	  Chronography,	  76.	  	  287	  Brock,	  "A	  Syriac	  Intermediary	  for	  the	  Arabic	  Theology	  of	  Aristotle?	  In	  Search	  of	  a	  Chimera?,"	  305.	  288	  King,	  "Alexander	  of	  Aphrodisias'	  On	  the	  Principles	  of	  the	  Universe	  in	  a	  Syriac	  Adaptation,"	  172-­‐73.	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John	   Philoponus	   produced	  many	   commentaries	   on	   Aristotle	   including	   the	   books	   of	   logic	  and	  the	  Physics,	  as	  well	  as	  Refutations	  of	  Proclus	  and	  Aristotle	  on	  the	  eternity	  of	  the	  world,	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  the	  Christian	  doctrine	  of	  creation.289	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina	  also	  made	  use	  of	   John	  Philoponus’s	  philosophical	  demonstration	  against	  the	  eternity	  of	  the	  world,	   in	  his	  modification	   of	   the	   comological	   treatise	   of	   Alexander	   of	   Aphrodisias.290 	  Barhebraeus’	  Preface	   to	   the	   Second	   Foundation	   of	   the	   Candelabrum,	   ‘On	   the	   Nature	   of	   the	   Universe’,	  upholds	  the	  ‘generation’	  over	  the	  eternity	  of	  the	  world,	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  ‘heresy’	  held	  by	  all	  of	  the	  ‘pagan	  philosophers’.291	  In	  the	  Sentences	  of	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  affirms	  that	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	  mind	   is	   true	  when	   it	   affirms	   ‘that	   God	   is	   one,	   and	  necessarily	  being	  and	  the	  eternal	  creator’.292	  In	  these	  two	  assertions,	  Barhebraeus	  is	  entering	  into	  the	  debate	   over	   the	   eternity	   of	   the	  world,	   the	   outlines	   of	  which	   had	   been	   established	   in	   the	  Alexandrian	   schools	   of	   Late	   Antiquity	   between	   the	   Christian	   and	   pagan	   Neoplatonic	  philosophers.	  	  	  While	  accepting	  the	  association	  of	  the	  Christian	  God	  with	  the	  Prime	  Mover	  of	  all,	  as	  the	  first	  principle	   of	   movement	   in	   the	   book	   of	   Physics,	   the	   subsequent	   principle	   of	   the	   eternal	  movement	  of	  the	  heavenly	  bodies	  by	  the	  Prime	  Mover	  and	  through	  which	  the	  sub-­‐lunar	  or	  natural	   bodies	   came	   to	   be	   moved,	   presented	   an	   immediate	   problem	   to	   the	   Christian	  Neoplatonists.	   If	   the	   eternal	   movement	   of	   the	   celestial	   bodies	   was	   accepted	   then	   the	  cosmos	   became	   eternal,	  which	   conflicted	  with	   the	   Christian	   understanding	   of	   the	   divine	  creative	  act,	   separating	   the	   infinite	  God	   from	  the	   finite	  creation.	   In	  order	   to	  maintain	   the	  Aristotelian	  principle	  of	  God	  as	  both	  the	  First	  Mover	  and	  First	  Cause	  of	  existence,	  there	  had	  to	  be	  a	  distinction	  between	   the	   creative	  activity	  of	  God,	  which	  was	  eternal,	   and	  what	  He	  created,	  which	  was	  not.	  This	  was	  a	  line	  of	  thinking	  proposed	  by	  the	  later	  Neoplatonists,	  and	  thus	   a	   Christian	   philosopher	   like	   Sergius	   operating	  within	   this	  Neoplatonic	  milieu,	   could	  co-­‐opt	  such	  arguments	  in	  order	  to	  align	  Aristotle	  with	  Christian	  doctrine.	  In	  this	  way,	  King	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  289	  King	  notes	  that	  Philoponus’	  Against	  Proclus	  on	  the	  Eternity	  of	  the	  World	  was	  published	  in	  529,	  seven	  years	  before	  the	  death	  of	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina.	  Ibid.,	  177.	  290	  "Why	  Were	  the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	  70,	  n.	  43.	  291	  Gottheil,	  "A	  Synopsis	  of	  Greek	  Philosophy	  by	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  254.	  Gottheil’s	  article	  includes	  the	  Syriac	  text	  and	  English	  translation	  of	  the	  Preface	  to	  the	  Second	  Base.	  292	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  Sentence	  88,	  77,	  595*.	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has	  suggested	  that	  Sergius	  was	  specifically	  concerned	  with	  building	  a	  Christian	  cosmology	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  Peripatetic	  tradition	  of	  Aristotle.293	  	  	  An	  Aristotelian	  such	  as	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina	  recognised	  that	  one	  could	  not	  begin	  and	  end	  with	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  Peripatetics,	  especially	  when	   it	  came	  to	  metaphysics	  and	  theology.	  These	  areas	  had	  therefore	  to	  be	  supplemented	  by	  the	  Christian	  Neoplatonic	  tradition.	  This	  is	  evident	   in	  his	  translation	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  commentator	  Alexander	  of	  Aphrodisias	  (fl.	  200CE),	  whose	  treatise	  attempts	  to	  harmonise	  passages	  from	  the	  Physics,	  Metaphysics	  and	  
De	  Anima,	   concerning	   the	   cause	   of	   the	  motion	   of	   the	   heavenly	   spheres	   with	   that	   of	   the	  sublunary	   bodies. 294 	  Sergius	   concludes	   the	   treatise	   with	   his	   own	   addition	   to	   the	  commentary,	  that	  to	  gain	  the	  highest	  knowledge	  of	  God,	  the	  mind	  must	  go	  beyond	  ordinary	  perception,	   and	   this	   higher	   state	   of	   knowledge	   Sergius	   describes	   using	   the	   Neoplatonic	  notion	   of	   ‘contemplation’	   or	   theōria,	   for	   ‘the	   head	   of	   all	   knowledge	   is	   theoria	   of	   Him’.295	  King	  has	  proposed	  that	  this	  language	  clearly	  comes	  from	  Evagrius	  and	  that	  the	  importance	  of	   theōria	   here	   is	   ‘a	   sign	   of	   the	   Christian	   vision	   of	   the	   ascetical	   life	   leading	   towards	   the	  contemplation	   of	   the	   supranatural’.296	  However,	   it	   also	   served	   the	   purpose	   of	   allowing	  Sergius	  to	  modify	  the	  problematic	  aspects	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  cosmology	  as	  they	  appeared	  in	  Alexander	  of	  Aphrodisias’	  text,	  according	  to	  the	  Neoplatonic	  cosmology	  of	  Evagrius.	  King	  argues	  that	  when	  Alexander	  came	  to	  the	  eternity	  of	  movement	  in	  the	  sublunar	  regions,	  that	  Sergius	   replaced	   this	   conclusion	  with	   the	   contemplation	   of	   the	   fixed	   outer	   sphere	   of	   the	  cosmos,	   while	   ‘at	   the	   same	   time	   looking	   back	   at	   our	   world	   and	   thereby	   gaining	   a	  profounder	  understanding	  of	  the	  radical	  distinction	  between	  creature	  and	  creator’.297	  This	  adaptation	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  inspired	  by	  the	  earlier	  stage	  of	  contemplation	  in	  the	  
theōria	   physikē	   of	   Evagrius,	   whose	   goal	   is	   described	   by	   Becker,	   as	   that	   of	   grasping	   ‘the	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  King,	  "Alexander	  of	  Aphrodisias'	  On	  the	  Principles	  of	  the	  Universe	  in	  a	  Syriac	  Adaptation,"	  178.	  294	  Ibid.,	  161.	  295	  Ibid.	  296	  Ibid.,	  185.	  King	  also	  suggests	   that	  Sergius	  was	  the	   likely	   translator	  of	   the	  complete	  Evagrian	  corpus	   into	  Syriac.	  The	  argument	  for	  Sergius’	  authorship	  of	  this	  corpus	  is	  made	  by	  Guillaumont.	  Antoine	  Guillaumont,	  Les	  
'Képhalaia	   Gnostica'	   d'Évagre	   le	   Pontique	   et	   L'histoire	   de	   L'origénisme	   chez	   les	   Grecs	   et	   chez	   les	   Syriens,	  Patristica	  Sorbonensia	  (Paris:	  Eds.	  du	  Seuil,	  1962),	  215-­‐27.	  297	  King,	  "Alexander	  of	  Aphrodisias'	  On	  the	  Principles	  of	  the	  Universe	  in	  a	  Syriac	  Adaptation,"	  184.	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underlying	   principles	   or	   lógoi	   of	   visible	   creation’	   through	   the	   contemplation	   of	   both	  scripture	  and	  the	  physical	  universe.298	  	  
Eternity	  of	  the	  Cosmos	  and	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Creation	  Alongside	  this	  Evagrian	  adaptation,	  Sergius	  also	  sought	  to	  meet	  the	  challenge	  of	  Alexander	  of	  Aphrodisias’	  demonstration	  of	  the	  eternal	  movement	  of	  the	  sublunar	  bodies,	  and	  thereby	  the	  eternity	  of	  the	  world.	  As	  King	  has	  written,	  this	  argument	  clearly	  presented	  a	  problem	  for	  Sergius,	  ‘for	  whom	  the	  world	  had	  a	  clear	  beginning	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  creator’.	  Sergius	  affirmed	  Alexander’s	  argument	   that	   the	  First	  Mover	  must	  be	   the	  cause	  of	  eternal	  motion,	  and	  then	  in	  an	  added	  gloss	  equated	  this	  First	  Mover,	  or	  the	  First	  Cause,	  with	  the	  Creator.	  The	  act	  of	  moving	  and	  creating	  are	  thus	  equated	  by	  Sergius,	  who	  also	  added	  that	  since	  the	  Creator	  is	  Himself	  a	  Being,	  there	  must	  have	  been	  an	  eternity	  of	  being.299	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  treatise,	  King	  states	  that	  Sergius’	  approach	  was	  that	   ‘God	  must	  always	  have	  been	  creating	  but	  does	  not	  explicitly	  draw	  from	  this	  the	  implication	  that	  the	  creation	  itself	  is	  eternal’,	  the	  latter	   being	   the	   conclusion	   of	   Alexander	   of	   Aphrodisias.300	  Sergius’	   views	   are	   located	   by	  King	  within	   that	  of	   the	   later	  Neoplatonists	  who	   interpreted	  Aristotle	  as	   teaching	   that	   the	  universe	  was	   created	   but	   that	   this	   creation	   did	   not	   have	   a	   beginning	   in	   time.	   Therefore,	  Sergius	   could	   argue	   for	   God’s	   creative	   activity	   being	   eternal,	   without	   coming	   to	   the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  universe	  was	  thereby	  coeternal	  with	  God.	  301	  	  In	   the	   Sentences	   of	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove,	   Barhebraeus	   makes	   implicit	   reference	   to	   the	  arguments	  which	  were	  presented	  by	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Christian	  dogma	  of	   creation.	   For	  Barhebraeus,	   the	   first	   essence,	   as	   the	   essential	   cause	   of	   creation,	  continually	   renews	   the	   essences	   of	   all	   creatures.	   For,	  while	   God	  works	   in	   all	   beings,	   the	  essence	   of	   beings	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   First	   Cause,	   who	   is	   not	   subject	   to	   causality.	  Barhebraeus	   argues	   that	   if	   God’s	   essence	   were	   not	   derived	   from	   himself,	   ‘but	   from	   his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  298	  Adam	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cause’,	  then	  he	  could	  not	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  another,	  and	  thus	  could	  not	  fulfil	  the	  creative	  potential	  of	   the	  First	  Cause	  of	  creation.	  He	  concludes	   therefore,	   that	  since	   this	   is	  the	  case,	  ‘So	  God	  alone	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  all	  and	  He	  worketh	  all	  in	  all’.	  302	  However,	  the	  divine	  creative	   activity	   being	   eternal,	   must	   continually	   be	   generating	   and	   annihilating	   the	  essences,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   something	   that	   can	   be	   appreciated	   by	   the	   philosophers.	   Indeed,	  Barhebraeus	  states	  that	  it	  is	  only	  the	  Initiated	  who	  are	  able	  to	  perceive	  this	  activity	  through	  their	  spiritual	  sight:	  	  	   It	   is	   one	   God,	  which	  works	   all	   in	   all.	   And	   in	   Him	  we	   live,	   and	  move,	   and	   have	   our	   being.	   In	   Him	   and	  through	  Him	  are	  all	  standing	  still	  and	  motion,	  all	  life	  of	  mind	  and	  soul	  and	  that	  of	  all	  beings.303	  	  	  Barhebraeus	   presents	   this	   statement	   in	   Sentence	   49	   as	   the	   utterance	   of	   the	   spiritual	  insight	  of	  the	  Initiated.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  passage	  represents	  a	  number	  of	  principles	  from	  Peripatetic	  philosophy	  also	  brought	  together	  by	  Sergius:	  a	  God	  who	  is	  single	  and	  not	  composite,	   the	   First	   or	   Prime	   Mover	   from	   whom	   all	   movement	   is	   generated,	   and	   the	  highest	  being	  who	  maintains	  the	  universe	  in	  its	  being.	  Barhebraeus	  maintained	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  natural	  bodies	  (‘all	  beings’)	  in	  God	  as	  the	  single	  source	  of	  all	  life,	  movement	  and	  being,	  but	  not	  of	  God	  as	  the	  Aristotelian	  principle	  of	  the	  Prime	  Mover	  of	  all	  that	   is	   moved	   in	   the	   Physics.	   The	   Initiated	   thus	   reaffirm	   these	   principles,	   not	   through	  philosophical	  study,	  but	  by	  ‘glorious	  revelations’,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  see	  clearly	  that	  ‘at	  every	  moment	   the	  creator	   is	   creating	  a	  new	  essence	   for	  all	   creatures’.304	  Indeed,	  Barhebraeus	  contrasts	   their	  understanding	   (or	   rather,	   an	  understanding	   that	   is	   a	  manner	  of	   seeing),	  with	   the	   difficulty	   of	   the	   mind	   conceiving	   of	   the	   ‘annihilation	   and	   renovation	   of	   the	  essences’.	   That	   the	   mind	   is	   not	   capable	   of	   attaining	   such	   insights	   on	   its	   own	   accord	  despite	   all	   its	   mental	   exertions	   is	   maintained	   by	   Barhebraeus	   accordingly,	   ‘And	   after	  frequent	   exercise	   and	   steady	   study,	   it	   is	   scarcely	   able	   to	   attain	   these	   things,	   but	   only	  dimly.’305	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Barhebraeus’	   conclusions	   on	   the	   eternity	   of	   divine	   creative	   activity,	   are	   thus	  not	   given	   a	  systematic	   treatment	   in	   the	   Dove,	   but	   are	   to	   be	   understood	   by	   his	   comments	   in	   the	  Sentences.	  This	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  deliberate	  strategy,	  since	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  eternity	  of	  movement	  of	  the	  cosmos	  and	  the	  world	  created	  in	  time	  by	  an	  intentional	  creative	  act	  of	  the	  divine,	  is	  not	  one	  that	  Barhebraeus	  wished	  to	  resolve	  within	  the	  language	  of	  scholastic	  philosophy.	  However,	  in	  entering	  into	  the	  Syrian	  tradition	  of	  adapting	  Greek	  cosmology	  to	  Christian	  doctrine,	  he	  hints	  at	  a	  Neoplatonic	  model	   for	   the	  generation	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  essences	  and	  the	  eventual	  return	  to	  unification	  in	  their	  source.	  This	  discussion	  of	  essences	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  cosmology	  of	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē,	  particularly	  in	  the	  First	  Discourse	  of	   the	  Book	   of	   the	  Holy	  Hierotheos.306	  Indeed,	   it	   could	   be	   especially	   Stephen’s	   cosmology	  (developed	   from	   Evagrius),	   that	   attracted	   such	   interest	   by	   Barhebraeus	   in	   the	   text,	   and	  contributed	   to	   his	   insights	   on	   the	   love	   of	   God	  which	   overcame	   the	   ontological	   problems	  presented	  to	  the	  Syrians	  by	  the	  Aristotelian	  Metaphysics	  and	  Physics.	  
	  
The Conflict of Thinking in Syrian Hermeneutics 	  The	  doctrine	  of	  the	  eternity	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  cosmos	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  behind	  Barhebraeus’	  warning	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  Directions	  against	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  Physics.	  And	  yet,	  paradoxically,	   he	   affirmed	   the	   eternity	   of	   the	   cosmos	   in	   two	   of	   the	   works	   forming	   his	  trilogy	  of	  philosophical	  compendia.	  If	  Barhebraeus	  did	  not	  conceive	  of	  the	  same	  readership	  for	  all	  of	  these	  writings,	  as	  Furlani	  suggests,	  then	  Barhebraeus’	  philosophical	  works	  would	  have	   been	   directed	   specifically	   to	   students	   of	   philosophy.	   Therefore,	   when	   Barhebraeus	  outlines	  the	  reading	  curriculum	  for	  the	  monks	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  Directions,	  this	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  conceived	  as	  a	  parallel	  system	  of	  education.	  Adam	  Becker	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  texts	  of	  the	  East	  Syrian	  monks	  indicate	  such	  a	  familiarity	  with	  the	  vocabulary	  of	  the	  schoolmen,	  the	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   the	  content	  of	  the	  Hierotheos	  into	  twenty-­‐two	  sections.	  Section	  20	  is	  entitled,	  ‘Of	  the	  Universal	  Essence;	  and	  that	  All	  came	  forth	  thence,	  and	  thither	  all	  returns;	  and	  of	  Quiet	  and	  Rest,	  and	  what	  will	  become	  of	  the	  Universe’.	  Fred	   Shipley	   Marsh,	   The	   Book	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   Extracts	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Gregory	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eskōlāyē,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	  he	  believes	   they	  must	   themselves	  had	  undergone	   this	   formal	  education	  in	  the	  schools	  of	  learning.307	  While	  for	  the	  West	  Syrians,	  there	  was	  not	  the	  same	  division	   of	   school	   and	  monastery	   as	   for	   the	   East	   Syrians,	   there	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   a	  similar	   divide	   between	   scholastic	   and	   ascetic	   theology.	   Many	   of	   the	   prominent	  ecclesiastical	   leaders	   amongst	   the	   West	   Syrians	   clearly	   had	   a	   background	   in	   Greek	  philosophy,	  which	  would	  have	  involved	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Organon.	  This	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  the	  trajectory	  followed	  by	  Barhebraeus.	  	  	  
The	  Centrality	  of	  Aristotelian	  logic	  Barhebraeus	  produced	   texts	   for	   the	  monastic	   context	  of	   scholastic	  education,	  but	  he	  was	  also	   aware	   of	   the	   inherent	   problematic	   with	   the	   Syriac	   study	   of	   Greek	   philosophy.	   This	  concerned	  the	  Aristotelian	  tradition,	  but	  over	  and	  above	  the	  Physics	  and	  the	  Metaphysics,	  it	  was	   primarily	   the	   Organon,	   the	   tool	   of	   philosophy,	   which	   presented	   the	   fundamental	  challenge	  to	  theological	  discourse.	  By	  his	  own	  account,	  his	  position	  as	  bishop	  brought	  him	  into	  the	  arena	  of	  religious	  disputation	  with	  the	  leaders	  of	  other	  confessions.	  In	  the	  Ethicon,	  he	  specifically	  forbade	  the	  monks	  from	  engaging	  in	  disputation.	  Barhebraeus’	  instruction	  of	  monastic	   practices	   makes	   it	   clear	   that	   he	   came	   to	   view	   the	   engagement	   in	   religious	  disputation	   as	   running	   contrary	   to	   the	   meditative	   focus	   of	   the	   monastic	   solitary.	   The	  conflict	   between	   disputation	   and	   contemplation	   did	   not	   belong	   only	   to	   the	   realm	   of	  practice,	   but	   also	   had	   a	   theoretical	   underpinning;	   for	   Barhebraeus	   it	   was	   a	   conflict	   of	  thinking	   within	   the	   Syrian	   monastic	   tradition,	   and	   one	   which	   was	   inherited	   from	   the	  Greeks.	  In	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  mediates	  between	  the	  view	  of	  Aristotelian	  logic	  as	  central	  to	  the	  Christian	  way	  of	  life,	  and	  the	  complete	  disparagement	  of	  logic	  by	  East	  Syrian	  ascetics	  like	  Dadīšō	  Qaṭrāyē,	   for	  whom	  the	   focus	  on	  Aristotle’s	  Organon	   in	   the	  schools,	  was	  but	  a	  demonic	  invention	  used	  to	  distract	  monks	  from	  their	  monastic	  practice.308	  	  By	   the	   seventh	   century,	   the	   study	   of	   logic	   had	   fully	   established	   itself	   in	   the	  West	   Syrian	  monastic	   curriculum	  with	   the	   consequence	   that	   logic	  had	   come	   to	  profoundly	  determine	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  Fear	  of	  God	  and	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  Beginning	  of	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  School	  of	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the	  ontology	  of	  Christian	  dogma.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  logic	  had	  led	  to	  a	  reaction	  amongst	  the	  East	   Syrian	  monastics	  who	   felt	   that	   the	  Graeco-­‐Syriac	   scholastic	   tradition	   ran	   counter	   to	  the	  teachings	  foundational	  for	  the	  monastic	  movement.	  Similar	  sentiments	  towards	  Greek	  learning	   also	   seem	   to	   occur	   in	  West	   Syrian	  monasteries	   in	   the	   seventh	   century,	   though	  without	   the	   details	   of	   precisely	   what	   was	   the	   cause	   of	   this	   opposition,309	  it	   can	   only	   be	  surmised	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  such	  objections	  were	  similar	  to	  those	  made	  by	  the	  East	  Syrian	  monastics.	  Indeed,	  if	  the	  study	  of	  logic	  met	  with	  serious	  objections	  from	  some	  quarters,	  in	  others,	   it	  was	  understood	   to	  be	  a	   fundamental	   component	  of	   instruction,	   since	   logic	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  tool	  for	  the	  study	  of	  Greek	  philosophy,	  but	  a	  system	  of	  reasoning	  essential	  to	  all	  intellectual	  endeavours	  including	  the	  study	  of	  Scripture.	  George	  of	  the	  Arabs	  (d.	  724CE),	  for	  example,	  saw	  the	  Christian	  path	  as	  beginning	  with	  the	  study	  of	  logic.310	  The	  East	  Syrian	  scholastic	   tradition	   shared	   this	   view	   of	   the	   centrality	   of	   logic,	   which	   allowed	   for	   some	  cross-­‐over	   of	   texts	   and	   authorities	   on	   Aristotle.311	  Patriarch	   Timothy’s	   recourse	   to	   the	  monastic	  libraries	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned,	  although	  this	  was	  in	  response	  to	  the	  specific	  request	  of	  the	  Caliph,	  rather	  than	  of	  his	  own	  volition.312	  However,	  at	  least	  one	  eminent	  East	  Syrian	  figure,	  Severus	  Sebokht	  (c.575-­‐666/7CE),	  departed	  for	  the	  West	  Syrian	  monastery	  of	  Qennešre.	  Severus	  Sebokht	  had	  been	  a	  teacher	  at	  the	  East	  Syrian	  school	  of	  Nisibis	  until	  a	  doctrinal	  dispute	  caused	  him	  to	  leave	  his	  position	  in	  612.	  As	  bishop	  of	   Qennešre,	   he	   became	   a	   leading	   exponent	   of	   the	   commentary	   tradition	   of	   Aristotle,	  particularly	   logic	  and	  syllogisms,	  producing	  a	  Discourse	  on	  Syllogisms	  in	  Prior	  Analytics	   in	  665.313	  He	   was	   also	   the	   Syriac	   translator	   of	   Paul	   the	   Persian’s	   Exposition	   of	   the	   Logic	   of	  
Aristotle,	  a	  sixth-­‐century	  work	  originally	  written	   in	  Pahlavi	  by	   this	  Aristotelian	  scholar	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  309	  The	   change	   of	   heart	   by	   the	  West	   Syrian	  monks	   of	   Eusabona	   towards	   the	   instruction	   in	   Greek	   learning	  given	  by	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa,	  has	  been	  mentioned	  already.	  310	  King,	  "Why	  Were	  the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	  79.	  	  311	  Ibid.,	  80.	  King	  states	  in	  this	  regard,	  ‘that	  many	  of	  our	  manuscripts	  of	  Syriac	  philosophical	  texts	  are	  of	  Eastern	  origin,	  that	  Easterners	  read	  the	  same	  seventh-­‐	  and	  eighth-­‐century	  translations	  of	  Aristotle	  as	  did	  the	  Westerners’.	  312	  Erica	  C.	  D.	  Hunter,	  "Interfaith	  Dialogues:	  The	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  and	  the	  Abbasids,"	  in	  Der	  Christliche	  Orient	  
Und	  Seines	  Umwelt.	  	  Gesammelte	  Studien	  Zu	  Ehren	  Jurgen	  Tubach,	  ed.	  Sophia	  G.	  Vashalomidze	  and	  Lutz	  Greisiger	  (Wiesbaden	  Harrassowitz:	  2007),	  291.	  313	  John	   M	   McMahon,	   "Severus	   Sebokht	   [Sebokt,	   Sebukht,	   Seboht],"	   in	   The	   Biographical	   Encyclopedia	   of	  
Astronomers,	   ed.	   Thomas	   Hockey,	   et	   al.	   (Springer	   New	   York,	   2007),	   1044-­‐45.	   McMahon	   emphasises	   the	  importance	  of	  Severus	  in	  transmitting	  the	  Greek	  astronomical	  knowledge	  to	  Syrian	  scholars.	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the	  Church	  of	  the	  East.	  314	  	  King	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘ecumenical’	  side	  of	  Syriac	  logical	  studies,	  and	  that	   conversely,	   the	  West	   Syrian	   texts	   such	  as	   those	  of	   Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina	  and	   Jacob	  of	  Edessa,	  were	  accepted	  as	  teaching	  materials	  in	  the	  East	  Syrian	  schools	  of	  learning.315	  	  This	  aspect	   to	   the	  Syriac	  study	  of	   logic	  can	  similarly	  be	  seen	   in	   the	   texts	  of	  Barhebraeus,	  whose	  short	  introductory	  treatise	  on	  logic	  alludes	  directly	  to	  Paul	  the	  Persian’s	  Exposition	  
of	  the	  Logic	  of	  Aristotle,	  through	  the	  very	  wording	  of	  his	  title	  -­‐	  The	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  
Eye.	  In	  Paul	  the	  Persian’s	  introduction	  to	  his	  treatise	  on	  logic,	  the	  faculty	  of	  logical	  thinking	  is	   likened	   to	   the	  eye	  of	   the	   soul	  which	   is	  enlightened	  by	  wisdom,	   rather	   than	   the	  merely	  visual	  perception	  of	  material	  things.	  Thus	  he	  states	  that	  ‘It	  is,	  indeed,	  the	  only	  true	  eye	  that	  sees	  everything,	  because	  of	  its	  affinity	  with	  the	  truth	  that	  is	  in	  everything’.316	  Therefore	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  this	  understanding	  of	   logic	  which	   is	  as	   fundamental	   to	  the	  mind	  as	  the	  ‘pupil’	   is	   to	   the	  eye	   that	  Barhebraeus	   refers	   to	   in	   the	   title	  of	  his	   treatise.317	  Alongside	  his	  summaries	  of	  logic	  for	  the	  study	  of	  Aristotelian	  philosophy,	  of	  which	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  
of	  the	  Eye	  forms	  a	  preparatory	  work,	  Barhebraeus	  also	  includes	  a	  summary	  of	  logic	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	   the	   first	  base	  on	  knowledge	   in	  his	   theological	   summa	   the	  Candelabrum.318	  However,	   in	   the	   Dove,	   his	   later	   work	   on	   monastic	   instruction	   of	   the	   spiritual	   life,	   he	  presents	  a	  different	  view	  of	   the	  study	  of	   logic,	   acknowledging	   the	  problematic	  aspects	   to	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  Organon	  in	  the	  scholastic	  education	  of	  leading	  ecclesiastical	  figures.	  	  Syriac	  religious	  disputation	  or	  durrāšā	  rested	  in	  various	  ways	  upon	  Aristotelian	  principles	  of	   logic	  and	  dialectic,	  derived	  from	  the	  Organon.319	  This	   is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  314	  Severus	  Sebokht	  is	  thought	  to	  have	  translated	  Paul’s	  Introduction	  to	  Aristotle’s	  Logic	  from	  Middle	  Persian	  into	  Syriac,	  as	  listed	  in	  Brock’s	  Appendix.	  Brock,	  "Syriac	  Commentary	  Tradition,"	  11.	  315	  Daniel	   King,	  The	  Earliest	   Syriac	  Translation	  of	  Aristotle's	  Categories	   :	  Text,	  Translation,	   and	  Commentary,	  Aristoteles	   Semitico-­‐Latinus	   (Leiden:	   Brill,	   2010),	   9-­‐10.	   King	   gives	   the	   example	   of	   an	   East	   Syrian	   Codex	   of	  1260,	  which	  includes	  Sergius’	  commentary	  and	  Jacob’s	  version	  of	  the	  Categories,	  alongside	  the	  grammar	  of	  an	  East	  Syrian	  Catholicos,	  Elias	  of	  Tirḥan.	  316	  Citation	  from	  Paul	  the	  Persian’s	  text	  is	  given	  in	  Janssens’	  introduction:	  Herman	  F.	  Janssens,	  "Bar	  Hebraeus;	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye,"	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  Semitic	  Languages	  and	  Literatures	  47,	  no.	  1	  (1930):	  26.	  	  317	  Ibid.,	  26-­‐27.	  Janssens	  argues	  that	  logic	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  pupil	  of	  the	  eye,	  just	  as	  sight	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  sensations,	  and	  so	  the	  pupil	  of	  the	  eye	  is	  ‘instrumental	  to	  systematic	  logical	  thinking’.	  Further	  that	  the	  Syriac	  word	  for	  ‘eye’	  (ʾaynā)	  is	  a	  frequent	  metaphorical	  reference	  for	  the	  faculties	  of	  the	  mind.	  318	  Ibid.,	  27-­‐28.	  319	  The	   same	   could	   be	   said	   of	   Arabic	   religious	   disputation	   in	   Christian-­‐Muslim	   dialogues	   dating	   from	   the	  beginning	   of	   the	   ʿAbbāsid	   period	   in	   the	   eighth	   century.	   On	   the	   significance	   of	   Aristotle’s	   Topics	   for	   inter-­‐religious	  disputation	  and	  especially	  the	  dialogue	  of	  Patriarch	  Timothy	  I	  with	  the	  Caliph	  al-­‐Mahdī,	  see	  Gutas,	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Barhebraeus’	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,	  which	  contains	  a	  section	  on	  disputation	  within	  the	  book	  of	  
Topics,	   the	  book	   from	  Aristotle’s	  Organon	   concerned	  with	   ‘dialectical	  deduction’.320	  Teule	  has	  suggested	  that	  when	  in	  the	  Ethicon	  Barhebraeus	  warns	  against	  the	  love	  of	  durrāšā,	  this	  refers	   to	   those	   who	   engaged	   in	   the	   methods	   of	   disputation	   and	   that	   the	   setting	   would	  usually	   be	   a	   religious	   disputation.321	  The	   Ethicon	   also	   instructs	   monks	   to	   refrain	   from	  engaging	  in	  disputations	  about	  the	  ‘natures	  and	  hypostases’	  (kyānē	  w-­‐qnomē)	  of	  Christ.322	  Barhebraeus	  further	  states	  in	  his	  chapter	  on	  the	  Incarnation	  in	  the	  Candelabrum,	  that	  while	  the	   different	   confessions	   (tawdyātā)	   may	   prefer	   ‘various	   terms	   kunnōyē	   to	   express	   the	  mystery	  of	   the	  union	  of	  Christ’s	  humanity	  and	  divinity’,	  none	  of	   them	  represent	  heretical	  Christological	   views. 323 	  Teule	   has	   stated	   that	   such	   an	   attitude	   was	   not	   unique	   to	  Barhebraeus,	  but	  was	  characteristic	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Renaissance.324	  However,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	   Barhebraeus’	   views	   on	   Christology	   were	   not	   simply	   what	   Teule	   describes	   as	   an	  ‘ecumenical	   intuition’,325	  but	  rather	  an	  outcome	  of	  deep	  reflection	  on	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  those	  practising	  durrāšā,	  since	  the	  different	  terms	  used	  by	  the	  main	  confessions	  are	  only	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  union	  in	  Christ	  of	  the	  divine	  and	  human,	  and	  indeed	  can	  do	  no	  more	  than	  provide	   a	   representation	   of	   this	   mystery.	   Barhebraeus	   professes	   in	   the	   Dove	   that	   ‘I	  absolutely	   forsook	   disputation	   with	   anyone	   concerning	   confession’,	   since	   all	   Christians	  possess	  ‘one	  unvarying	  equality’.326	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Greek	  Thought,	  Arab	  Culture	  :	  The	  Graeco-­‐Arabic	  Translation	  Movement	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  Early	  Abbasid	  Society	  
(2nd-­‐4th/8th-­‐10th	  c.),	  61-­‐69.	  320	  N.	  Peter	  Joosse,	  "Bar	  Hebraeus’	  Ktaba	  Da-­‐Hewath	  Hekhmtha	  (Butyrum	  Sapientiae):	  A	  Description	  of	  the	  Extant	  Manuscripts,"	  Le	  Muséon	  112,	  no.	  3-­‐4	  (1999):	  422-­‐23.	  (VI)	  The	  Topics,	  C.8:	  ‘About	  the	  order	  (or:	  arrangement)	  that	  is	  suitable	  in	  a	  disputation’.	  321	  Herman	  Teule,	  "Gregory	  Barhebraeus	  and	  His	  Time:	  The	  Syrian	  Renaissance,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  Canadian	  
Society	  for	  Syriac	  Studies	  3	  (2003):	  33.	  322	  Paul	  Bedjan,	  Ethicon	  :	  Seu,	  Moralia	  Gregorii	  Barhebræi	   (Parisiis	   ;	   Lipsiae:	  Otto	  Harrassowitz,	   1898),	   221.	  This	  citation	  from	  Bedjan’s	  edition	  of	  the	  Syriac	  text	  is	  given	  in	  Teule’s	  article:	  Teule,	  "Gregory	  Barhebraeus	  and	  His	  Time:	  The	  Syrian	  Renaissance,"	  33.	  323	  Bedjan,	  Ethicon	  :	  Seu,	  Moralia	  Gregorii	  Barhebræi,	  230.	  See	  also:	  F.	  Nau,	  “Textes	  monopysites,”	  Patrologia	  
orientalis	  XIII,	  2	  (1919),	  pp.	  248-­‐269;	  see	  esp.	  p.	  264.	  	  324	  Teule,	  "Gregory	  Barhebraeus	  and	  His	  Time:	  The	  Syrian	  Renaissance,"	  34.	  325	  Ibid.,	  36.	  326	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  60,	  578*.	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His	   collection	   of	   poems	   also	   contain	   a	   collection	   concerning	   durrāšā,327	  in	   which	   can	   be	  found	  a	  poem	  entitled,	   ‘Question	  of	  Ḵamīs	  bar	  Qardāḥē	  and	  Answers	  of	  Daniel	  bar	  Ḥaṭṭāb	  and	   Barhebraeus	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   Our	   Lord	   does	   not	   fall	   under	   the	   ten	   [Aristotelian]	  categories’. 328 	  This	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   discussion	   in	   three	   parts,	   beginning	   with	   the	  interrogation	  by	  the	  East	  Syrian	  Kamīs	  bar	  Qardāḥē,	  followed	  by	  the	  response	  of	  Daniel	  bar	  Ḥaṭṭāb,	  and	  finally	  another	  response	  from	  Barhebraeus.329	  In	  considering	  this	  discussion	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Organon,	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  debate	  revolves	  around	  the	  first	  book	  of	   the	  Categories,	   concerning	   the	  predicates	  or	  names	   (Syr.	  kūnnāyē)	  and	   their	  application	   to	  God.330	  The	   thematic	  of	   this	  poem	  corresponds	   to	  Barhebraeus’	   attitude	   to	  Christology	   when	   he	   states	   that	   the	   different	   terms	   used	   by	   the	   confessions	   do	   not	  represent	  a	  real	  difference.	  When	  Barhebraeus	  objects	  to	  disputation	  and	  its	  divisive	  use	  of	  terminology	   (kūnnāyē)	   in	   the	   rationalisation	   of	   God	   according	   to	   the	   Aristotelian	  
Categories,	   he	   is	   equally	   making	   a	   direct	   critique	   of	   the	   primacy	   of	   logic	   in	   religious	  discourse.	  For	  Barhebraeus,	  the	  reliance	  on	  the	  definitions	  of	  substance,	  argument	  through	  syllogisms,	  and	  the	  rules	  of	  dialectical	  reasoning,	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  reasoning	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  concept	   of	   God	   derived	   from	   the	   epistemology	   of	   logic,	   but	   not	   God	   Himself.	   Of	   course,	  Barhebraeus	   himself	   summarised	   the	   Organon	   in	   several	   treatises,	   including	   his	   final	  compendium	   of	   philosophy,	   the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,	   which	   customarily	   begins	  with	   a	   first	  part	  on	  logic	  (mlīlūtā).	  Therefore	  he	  clearly	  continued	  to	  recognise	  the	  importance	  of	  logic	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  study	  of	  Aristotelian	  philosophy,	  until	  the	  end	  of	  his	  life.	  	  In	   the	  aforementioned	  Book	  of	  Directions,	  Barhebraeus	  aligns	   the	  practices	  of	  disputation	  and	  refutation	  along	  with	  the	  books	  of	  the	  Physics	  and	  Metaphysics,	  all	  of	  which	  belong	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  327	  Hidemi	  Takahashi,	  "The	  Poems	  of	  Barhebraeus:	  A	  Preliminary	  Concordance,"	  Христианский	  Восток	  NS	  6	  [12]	  (2013):	  83.	  Dolabani	  divides	  the	  poems	  into	  twelve	  sections	  according	  to	  topics,	  of	  which	  the	  eleventh	  is	  on	  disputation.	  328	  Augustinus	  Scebabi,	  Gregorii	  Bar-­‐Hebraei	  Carmina	  (Romae:	  ex	  Typographia	  Polyglotta	  S.	  C.	  De	  Propaganda	  Fide,	  1877),	  153-­‐56.	  Yuhanna	  Dolabani,	  Mus̆ḥātā	  (Glane/Losser	  Holand:	  Monastery	  of	  St.	  Ephrem	  the	  Syrian,	  1983),	  157-­‐59,	  no.	  11.2.	  This	  English	  title	  of	  the	  Syriac	  disputation	  poem	  listed	  in	  the	  editions	  of	  Scebabi	  and	  Dolabani	   is	   given	   by	   Takahashi.	   Takahashi,	   "The	   Reception	   of	   Ibn	   Sīnā	   in	   Syriac	  the	   Case	   of	   Gregory	  Barhebraeus,"	  252	  n.	  10.	  	  329	  "The	  Poems	  of	  Barhebraeus:	  A	  Preliminary	  Concordance,"	  108.	  Takahashi	  provides	  a	   concordance	  of	   all	  the	  poems	  in	  these	  collections,	  and	  lists	  this	  disputation	  poem	  (no.	  11.2)	  as	  having	  three	  parts	  according	  to	  their	   Latin	   titles:	   CCLX.	   Chamisii	   Nestoriani	   interrogation	   ad	   Bar-­‐Chettab.	   CCLXI.	   Danielis	   Bar-­‐Chettab	  
responsio.	  CCLXXII.	  Barebrei	  Maphriani	  ad	  utrumque	  Responsio.	  330	  Watt,	  "Commentary	  and	  Translation	  in	  Syriac	  Aristotelian	  Scholarship:	  Sergius	  to	  Baghdad,"	  35.	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Aristotelian	   disciplines.	   In	   this	  manner,	   Barhebraeus’	   directives	   allow	   for	   the	   reading	   of	  these	  more	  problematic	  books	  of	  Aristotle	  solely	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  engaging	   in	  religious	  disputation,	   which	   would	   appear	   to	   be	   a	   necessary	   pursuit	   for	   some	   members	   of	   his	  Church,	  but	  it	  was	  a	  practice	  not	  recommended	  for	  those	  devoted	  to	  the	  internal	  life	  of	  the	  monastery.	   The	   epistemological	   association	   of	   the	   genre	   of	   disputation	   with	   the	  Aristotelian	   disciplines	   in	   general,	   can	   also	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   writings	   of	   Barhebraeus’	  predecessor	  Dionysius	  Bar	  Ṣalībī,	  whose	  works	  include	  a	  polemical	  book	  on	  disputation	  or	  
durrāšā,331	  as	  well	  as	  a	  series	  of	  commentaries	  including	  Porphyry’s	  Isagoge	  and	  the	  books	  of	  the	  Organon	  up	  to	  the	  Posterior	  Analytics.332	  	  	  	  Barhebraeus	   certainly	   revived	   the	  Aristotelian	   sciences	  within	   the	  Syrian	   cultural	  milieu,	  but	  he	  also	  admits	  in	  the	  Dove	  to	  the	  state	  of	  despair	  which	  the	  study	  of	  Greek	  philosophy	  had	  brought	  him.	  He	  declares	  that	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  Lord	  led	  him	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  ‘the	  Initiated’,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘Aba	  Euagrius	  and	  others,	  occidental	  and	  oriental’,	  that	  he	  was	  restored	   from	   the	  despair	   ‘of	  psychical,	   if	  not	  of	  bodily	   life’.333	  The	   teachings	  of	  Evagrius,	  which	  Barhebraeus	   identifies	   specifically	  as	   the	   source	  of	  his	   salvation,	  would	  have	  been	  accessible	   through	   a	   number	   of	   different	   avenues,	   since	   the	   translation	   of	   Evagrius	   into	  Syriac	   had	   influenced	   various	   streams	   of	   thought	   amongst	   the	   Syrians.	   The	   Evagrian	  tradition	  was	  influential	  for	  early	  West	  Syrian	  translators	  of	  Greek	  texts	  such	  as	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina,	   and	   was	   similarly	   in	   evidence	   amongst	   the	   seventh	   and	   eighth	   century	   East	  Syrian	  monastic	  writers	  such	  as	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh.	  Indeed	  it	  was	  the	  Syrian	  form	  of	  Evagrian	  monasticism,	   which	   was	   to	   prove	   so	   influential	   for	   Barhebraeus	   in	   his	   contribution	   to	  mystical	  thought.	  The	  tradition	  of	  monastic	  spirituality	  provided	  the	  solution,	  proffering	  to	  Barhebraeus	   a	   means	   of	   overcoming	   the	   impasse	   that	   he	   had	   encountered	   within	   the	  Syrian	  tradition.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  331	  Teule,	   "It	   Is	   Not	   Right	   to	   Call	   Ourselves	   Orthodox	   and	   the	   Others	   Heretics:	   Ecumenical	   Attitudes	   in	   the	  Jacobite	  Church	   in	   the	  Time	  of	   the	  Crusades,"	  16-­‐17.	  Teule	  notes	   that	   this	  work,	  now	   lost	  apart	   from	  a	   few	  chapters,	   is	   recorded	   by	   Dionysius’	   contemporary	   Michael	   the	   Syrian	   in	   his	   Chronicle,	   who	   provides	   a	  biographical	  entry	  for	  his	  friend;	  the	  Syriac	  text	  is	  edited	  by	  Chabot.	  Jean	  Baptiste	  Chabot,	  Chronique	  de	  Michel	  
le	  Syrien,	  Patriarche	  Jacobite	  d'Antioche	  (1166-­‐1199),	  4	  vols.	  (Bruxelles:	  Culture	  et	  Civilisation,	  1963),	  XIX.699.	  332	  Teule,	  "Gregory	  Barhebraeus	  and	  His	  Time:	  The	  Syrian	  Renaissance,"	  34.	  333	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  61,	  578*.	  
	   84	  
The	  West	  Syrian	  Monastic	  Curriculum	  Some	  precedent	   for	   the	  attempt	   to	   synthesise	   the	  Aristotelian	   sciences	  with	   the	   spiritual	  path	   coming	   from	   Neoplatonic	   thinkers	   such	   as	   Plotinus,	   is	   found	   already	   amongst	   the	  earliest	  of	  the	  Syrian	  philosophers	  who	  provided	  the	  first	  Syriac	  translations	  of	  Aristotle	  in	  the	   fifth	   and	   sixth	   centuries.	   King	   and	   John	  Watt	   have	   emphasised	   the	   role	   of	   Sergius	   of	  Reshʿaina	   (d.	   536)	   in	   formulating	   a	   synthesis	   of	  Aristotelian	  philosophy	   and	  Neoplatonic	  mysticism	   into	   a	  monastic	   curriculum	   of	   learning	   for	   the	  West	   Syrians.	   This	   curriculum	  pursued	  a	  religious	  goal	   in	  the	  study	  of	  philosophy.	   Indeed	  Watt	  has	   identified	  the	  Syriac	  transmission	  of	  Aristotle	  as	  beginning	  with	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina,	  a	  student	  in	  the	  school	  of	  Ammonius	   at	   Alexandria,	   who	   produced	   a	   Syriac	   commentary	   on	   the	   Categories.334	  He	  nominates	   this	   Sergius’	   most	   important	   treatise,	   since	   ‘it	   was	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   the	  embedding	  of	  Aristotle’s	  thought,	  especially	  his	  logic,	  in	  the	  intellectual	  culture	  of	  the	  Near	  East’.335	  In	  his	   commentary,	   Sergius	  gives	  an	   introduction	  on	   the	  aims	  of	   studying	  all	   the	  writings	  of	  Aristotelian	  philosophy,	  which	   should	  begin	  with	   the	  Categories,	   and	  proceed	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Organon,	  as	  a	  prolegomenon	  to	  the	  Aristotelian	  sciences	  as	  a	  whole:	  	  	   the	  aim	  of	  each	  one	  of	   the	   [logical]	   treatises,	  beginning	   the	  chain	  with	   that	  On	  Categories	  and	  similarly	  treating	  each	  one	  of	   them	   in	   the	   same	  way…	   then	   to	  go	  on	   to	  his	  other	   treatises,	   those	  on	   the	  parts	  of	  practical	  (philosophy),	  then	  physics	  and	  mathematics,	  and	  finally	  those	  called	  theological.336	  	  	  In	   this	   programme,	   Sergius	   follows	   the	   Alexandrian	   tradition	   of	   philosophy,	   which	  proceeded	   through	   the	   Aristotelian	   sciences	   from	   logic	   to	   physics,	   mathematics	   and	  metaphysics.337	  The	  end	  goal	  of	  studying	  Aristotelian	  logic	  and	  philosophy	  for	  Sergius	  was	  to	   reach	   theology,	   categorised	   by	   King	   as	   the	   ‘contemplative	   theology’	   of	   theōria.338	  For	  Sergius	  though,	   logic	  remained	  essential	   for	  the	  very	  interpretation	  of	  scripture,	  although	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  334	  The	  earliest	   translator	  of	   the	  Categories	   is	  however	  not	  known,	   though	   this	  was	  attributed	   to	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina	  until	  Henri	  Huggonnard-­‐Roche	  demonstrated	  otherwise.	  Henri	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche,	  "Sur	  les	  Versions	  Syriaques	  des	  "Catégories"	  d'Aristote,"	  Journal	  Asiatique	  275,	  no.	  3-­‐4.	  335	  Watt,	  "Commentary	  and	  Translation	  in	  Syriac	  Aristotelian	  Scholarship:	  Sergius	  to	  Baghdad,"	  28.	  336	  Ibid.,	  29.	  Watt’s	  translation	  of	  Sergius’	  commentary	  on	  the	  Categories	  is	  from	  the	  British	  Library	  manuscript:	  Add.	  14,658,	  fol.	  3rb.	  337	  Ibid.,	  36.	  338	  King,	  "Why	  Were	  the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	  62.	  King	  states	  that	  rather	  than	  articulate	  a	  particular	   Christological	   position,	   such	   an	   approach	   aspires	   to	   ‘the	   ascent	   of	   the	   individual	   soul	   towards	   a	  higher	  union	  with	  the	  godhead’.	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he	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  are	  those	  for	  whom	  logic	  is	  unnecessary,	  and	  who	  receive	  such	  knowledge	   directly	   by	   illumination	   and	   thus	   have	   no	   need	   of	   this	   instrument	   of	  discernment:	  	   …without	   these	  writings	   (sc.	   Aristotle’s	   logical	  works)	   neither	   can	   the	  meaning	   of	  medical	  writings	   be	  attained,	   nor	   can	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	   philosophers	   be	   understood,	   nor	   indeed	   can	   the	   true	   sense	   be	  uncovered	  of	  the	  divine	  Scriptures,	  wherein	  lies	  our	  help	  of	  salvation	  –	  unless	  it	  should	  be	  that	  someone	  receives	   the	  divine	  ability	   thanks	   to	   the	  exalted	  nature	  of	  his	  way	  of	   life,	  with	   the	  result	   that	  he	  has	  no	  need	  for	  human	  instruction.	  But	  education	  and	  advancement	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  all	  the	  human	  sciences,	  as	  far	  as	  human	  ability	  is	  concerned,	  cannot	  take	  place	  without	  the	  exercise	  of	  logic.339	  	  In	  this	  statement,	  Sergius	  makes	  no	  hint	  of	  a	  possible	  conflict	  between	  the	  methods	  of	  logic	  and	  the	  divinely-­‐inspired	  abilities	  of	  the	  monks.	  They	  are	  it	  seems,	  attaining	  the	  same	  goal.	  Through	   their	  divinely-­‐inspired	  ability,	   the	  mystics	  overcome	   the	  dependency	  on	   logic	   in	  the	  methods	   of	   the	   human	   sciences.	   To	   what	   extent	   Barhebraeus	   was	   familiar	   with	   the	  philosophical	   system	   of	   Sergius	   is	   not	   clear,	   but	   he	   certainly	   considered	   him	   a	   West	  Syrian,340	  and	   the	   Cream	   of	   Wisdom	   draws	   on	   Sergius’	   translation	   of	   the	   Aristotelian	  commentary	  De	  mundo.	  While	   Barhebraeus	  would	   appear	   to	   share	   Segius’	   views	   on	   the	  centrality	   of	   logic	   for	   all	   the	   human	   sciences,	   in	   his	   mystical	   texts	   he	   does	   hint	   at	   a	  fundamental	  tension	  between	  the	  methods	  of	  logic	  and	  the	  divine	  gift	  of	  revelation.	  	  Alongside	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  Organon	  as	  the	  instrument	  of	  logic,	  training	  in	  the	  Neoplatonic	  tradition	  rested	  on	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  and	  Evagrius	  Ponticus.	  Sergius’	  appended	  treatise	  to	  his	   translation	  of	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	  which	  has	  become	  known	  as	   the	  Mēmrā	  on	  Spiritual	  
Life,	   outlines	   his	   vision	   for	   a	   Christian	   philosophical	   curriculum.341	  King	   has	   argued	   that	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina	  in	  his	  treatise	  on	  the	  spiritual	  life,	  sought	  ‘to	  establish	  parallel	  courses	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  339	  Sebastian	  P.	  Brock,	  "Monasticism	  in	  Iraq	  :	  The	  Cultural	  Contribution,"	  in	  The	  Christian	  Heritage	  of	  Iraq	  :	  
Collected	  Papers	  from	  the	  Christianity	  of	  Iraq	  I-­‐V	  Seminar	  Days,	  ed.	  Erica	  C.	  D.	  Hunter,	  Gorgias	  Eastern	  Christian	  Studies	  (Piscataway,	  NJ:	  Gorgias	  Press,	  2009),	  70-­‐71.	  340	  King,	   "Alexander	  of	  Aphrodisias'	  On	  the	  Principles	  of	  the	  Universe	  in	  a	  Syriac	  Adaptation,"	  180-­‐81.	  Daniel	  King	  comments	  that	  a	  certain	  ambiguity	  in	  Sergius’	  position	  led	  to	  ‘both	  West	  and	  East	  Syrians	  of	  a	  later	  age	  claiming	   him	   as	   one	   of	   their	   own’,	   and	   thus	   Barhebraeus	   claims	   him	   as	   a	   follower	   of	   Severan	  Miaphysite	  theology	  while	  ʿAbdīshōʿ	  of	  Nisibis	  includes	  Sergius	  amongst	  the	  East	  Syrian	  writers.	  341	  The	  Syriac	  text	  of	  the	  Mēmrā	  has	  been	  edited	  and	  translated	  into	  French	  by	  Dom.	  Polycarpe	  Sherwood,	  and	  published	  	  over	  two	  volumes	  by	  the	  journal	  L’Orient	  syrien.	  P.	  Sherwood,	  "Mimro	  de	  Serge	  de	  Rešayna	  sur	  la	  Vie	  Spirituelle,"	  L'Orient	  syrien	  5,	  6.(1960):	  433-­‐457;	  (1961):	  95-­‐115,	  121-­‐156.	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of	   spiritual	   education	   which	   complemented	   one	   another’,	   combining	   the	   Alexandrian	  system	   of	   the	   Greek	   sciences	   beginning	   with	   Aristotle	   and	   the	   books	   of	   logic,	   with	   the	  Neoplatonic	   systems	   of	   Evagrius	   and	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	   which	   dealt	   with	   the	   levels	   of	  mystical	   experience.342	  He	   states	   that	   in	   the	  model	   propounded	  by	   Sergius,	   Evagrius	   and	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  displaced	  the	  reading	  of	  Plato	  in	  the	  Alexandrian	  curriculum,	  and	  that	  it	  was	   through	   these	   writings	   that	   the	   subject	   of	   metaphysics	   and	   theology	   were	   to	   be	  reached.343	  Therefore,	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   Aristotelian	   metaphysics	   was	   not	   considered	  sufficient	  to	  this	  end	  goal	  of	  theology,	  and	  that	  the	  Syrian-­‐Dionysian	  tradition	  was	  required	  to	  supplement	  the	  Aristotelian	  sciences.	  King	  comments	  that	  the	  ‘serious’	  study	  of	  Aristotle	  in	   Syriac	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   conducted	   mostly	   by	   those	   who	   were	   also	   followers	   of	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius.344	  There	   appears	   therefore	   to	   be	   a	   close	   association	   of	   the	   reading	   of	  Aristotle	   and	   of	   Pseudo-­‐Dionyius	   in	   Syriac,	   the	   latter	   providing	   a	   development	   of	   the	  connection	  between	  metaphysics	   and	   theology	   that	   is	   implicit	   in	  Aristotle’s	  metaphysics,	  but	  given	  its	  definitive	  Christian	  Neoplatonic	  form	  by	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  in	  the	  Hierarchies	  and	  Mystical	  Theology.	  	  
The	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  Monastery	  of	  Qennešre	  Barhebraeus’	   literary	   output	   demonstrates	   his	   study	   of	   both	   Aristotle	   and	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	  the	  former	  for	  his	  philosophical	  compendia	  and	  the	  latter	  for	  his	  mystical	  texts.	  Thus	   it	  would	   seem	   that	  Barhebraeus	   followed	   a	   line	   of	   thinking	   in	   the	   Syrian	  Orthodox	  tradition,	   in	   which	   the	   reading	   of	   both	   Aristotle	   and	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	   were	  complementary	   aspects	   to	   a	   systematised	   curriculum	  of	   study	   in	   the	  monasteries,	  which	  likely	   followed	   in	  outline	   that	  which	  was	  envisioned	  by	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina.345	  Watt	  has	  mooted	  the	  reading	  of	  both	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  and	  Aristotle	  at	  the	  monastery	  of	  Qennešre,	  a	  centre	   of	   Greek	   learning	   for	   the	   Syrian	   Orthodox.346	  At	   Qennešre,	   Athanasius	   of	   Balad	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  342	  King,	  "Why	  Were	  the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	  79.	  343	  Ibid.	  344	  Ibid.	  345	  Watt’s	  article	  develops	  the	  association	  of	  Aristotle	  with	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  in	  tenth-­‐century	  Baghdad.	  John	  W.	  Watt,	  "From	  Sergius	  to	  Mattā:	  Aristotle	  and	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  in	  Syriac	  Tradition	  "	  in	  Interpreting	  the	  Bible	  
and	  Aristotle	  in	  Late	  Antiquity	  :	  The	  Alexandrian	  Commentary	  Tradition	  between	  Rome	  and	  Baghdad,	  ed.	   Josef	  Lössl	  and	  J.	  W.	  Watt	  (Farnham,	  Surrey,	  England	  ;	  Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate,	  2011).	  346	  "Commentary	  and	  Translation	  in	  Syriac	  Aristotelian	  Scholarship:	  Sergius	  to	  Baghdad,"	  38.	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translated	  Aristotle’s	  Posterior	  Analytics	  and	  Topics,	  alongside	  the	  works	  of	  both	  Gregory	  of	  Nazianzus	   and	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius.347	  However,	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   study	   of	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  with	  Aristotle	  in	  the	  sixth	  and	  seventh	  centuries	  by	  the	  West	  Syrian	  scholastics	  does	   not	   seem	   to	   have	   recognised	   the	   difference	   of	   epistemology	   existing	   between	  Aristotelian	  logic	  and	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysian	  mystical	  theology.	  	  The	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  monastery	  of	  Qennešre	  was	  well	  known	  in	  its	  day	  both	  as	  a	  centre	  of	  Greek	   learning	   and	   even	   more,	   for	   its	   ascetical	   training.348	  Both	   King	   and	   Jack	   Tannous	  have	   emphasised	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   monastery	   of	   Qennešre,	   but	   while	   the	   former	  considers	  it	  to	  have	  been	  a	  centre	  primarily	  of	  ascetic	  training,	  the	  latter	  has	  stressed	  that	  this	  monastery	  was	  famous	  for	  its	  teaching	  of	  Greek	  and	  was	  ‘a	  training	  ground	  for	  almost	  all	   of	   the	  major	   Syrian	  Orthodox	  bishop-­‐scholars	   of	   the	   seventh	   and	   eighth	   centuries’.349	  Tannous	   has	   provided	   a	   list	   of	   the	  well-­‐known	   seventh	   and	   early	   eighth	   century	   figures	  thought	  to	  have	  studied	  there,	  which	  includes:	  Thomas	  of	  Harkel	  (d.	  627CE),	  Paul	  of	  Edessa	  (d.	  526CE),	  Severus	  Sebokht,	  Athanasius	  of	  Balad,	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  (d.	  708CE),	  and	  George,	  Bishop	   of	   the	   Arabs.350	  Brock,	   commenting	   on	   this	   list,	   notes	   that	   ‘the	   last	   four	   wrote	  extensively	  on	  secular	  topics,	  particularly	  philosophy’.351	  Indeed,	  Barhebraeus	  states	  in	  the	  
Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum	  that	  many	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox	  patriarchs	  learned	  Greek	  during	  their	  time	  at	  Qennešre.	  Thus,	  prior	  to	  becoming	  patriarch,	  Julian	  (d.	  708CE)	  trained	  there	  ‘in	  the	  Attic	  tongue’.352	  Tannous’	  argument	  is	  that,	  from	  around	  the	  seventh	  century,	  there	  was	   already	   a	   ‘Miaphysite	   curriculum	   of	   study’	   at	   the	   monastery	   of	   Qennešre,	   that	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  347	  Ibid.,	  37.	  	  348	  King,	  "Why	  Were	  the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	  77,	  n.	  68.	  ‘We	  should	  not	  be	  fooled	  into	  thinking	  of	  Jacob	  and	  his	  fellows	  as	  ivory-­‐tower	  philosophers.	  Qenneshre	  was	  better	  known	  in	  its	  day	  as	  a	  centre	  of	  ascetical	  training	  and	  achievement	  than	  philosophy.’	  349	  Jack	  Tannous,	  "You	  Are	  What	  You	  Read:	  Qenneshre	  and	  the	  Miaphysite	  Church	  in	  the	  Seventh	  	  Century,"	  in	  
History	  and	  Identity	  in	  the	  Late	  Antique	  near	  East,	  ed.	  Philip	  Wood,	  Oxford	  Studies	  in	  Late	  Antiquity	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  94-­‐5.	  350	  Ibid.	   Tannous	   gives	   the	   following	   references	   for	   Barhebraeus’	   entries	   on	   these	   figures	   in	   the	  Chronicon	  
Ecclesiasticum.	   Abbeloos	   and	   Lamy,	   Gregorii	   Barhebraei	   Chronicon	   Ecclesiasticum,	   Quod	   e	   Codice	   Musei	  
Britannici	  Descriptum	  Conjuncta	  Opera	  ed,	  I:267,	  75,	  87,	  90.	  351	  Brock,	  "A	  Syriac	  Intermediary	  for	  the	  Arabic	  Theology	  of	  Aristotle?	  In	  Search	  of	  a	  Chimera?,"	  299.	  352	  Ibid.	   Abbeloos	   and	   Lamy,	   Gregorii	   Barhebraei	   Chronicon	   Ecclesiasticum,	   Quod	   e	   Codice	   Musei	   Britannici	  
Descriptum	  Conjuncta	  Opera	  ed,	  I:295-­‐96.	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reflected	  in	  Barhebraeus’	   list	  of	  books	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  Directions,	   that	  are	  to	  be	  read	  in	  the	  church.353	  	  	  Alongside	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Directions	  in	  which	  Barhebraeus	  outlines	  the	  books	  of	  the	  ‘outsiders’	  to	  be	  read	  in	  the	  monastic	  schools	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Orthodox,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  list	  of	  works	  by	  Christian	  authorities.	  These	   include	   the	  works	  of	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	  Gregory	  Nazianzus,	  Severus	  of	  Antioch,	  Ephrem	  the	  Syrian,	  Jacob	  of	  Serugh,	  Isaac	  of	  Antioch,	  Cyril	  of	  Alexandria,	  and	  Theodotus.	  Also	  proscribed	  are	  the	  Paradise	  of	  the	  Fathers	  by	  Palladius,	  the	  
Hexameron	  of	  Basil,	  texts	  from	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa,	  and	  the	  commentaries	  of	  Moše	  bar	  Kepha	  and	  Dionysius	  Bar	   Ṣalībī.354	  Tannous	  has	   argued	   that	   the	   canon	  of	   authorities	  potentially	  established	  at	  Qennešre,	  was	  part	  of	   the	  effort	   to	  sharpen	   the	   intellectual	   identity	  of	   ‘the	  Syriac-­‐speaking	   Miaphysite	   movement’,	   for	   the	   training	   of	   the	   church	   leadership	   in	   a	  ‘graduate-­‐school	   syllabus’.355	  Only	   those	  who	  had	  graduated	   through	  such	  a	   syllabus	   into	  leadership	  would	   have	   been	   in	   a	   position	   to	   appreciate	   the	   epistemological	   conflict	   that	  underpinned	  the	  curriculum	  in	  the	  West	  Syrian	  monasteries.	  	  Paradoxically,	   the	   canon	   of	   writings	   presented	   in	   Barhebraeus’	   list	   represent	   rival	  epistemological	  frameworks,	  epitomised	  by	  the	  logic	  of	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  mystical	  theology	  of	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius.	   Even	   if	   the	  works	   of	   the	   ‘outsiders’	   and	   the	   ‘insiders’	  were	   studied	  together	  in	  the	  same	  institution	  at	  a	  monastery	  like	  Qennešre,	  there	  would	  have	  remained	  an	  epistemological	  tension	  similar	  to	  that	  which	  existed	  in	  the	  Church	  of	  the	  East.	  Students	  in	  the	  Miaphysite	  Syrian	  schools	  may	  have	  specialised	  more	  in	  one	  set	  of	  authors	  than	  the	  other.	   It	   is	  possible	   that	  only	   a	  minority	   graduated	  onto	   the	   reading	  of	   the	  philosophical	  curriculum,	   in	   an	   inversion	   of	   the	   practice	   that	   occurred	   in	   the	   Church	   of	   the	   East.	   The	  possibility	   remains	   that	   there	   was	   a	   standard	   way	   of	   integrating	   these	   authors	   in	   the	  monastic	  schools.	  Watt	  has	  contended	  that	  the	  integrated	  curriculum	  envisaged	  by	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina	  was	  conceived	  for	  the	  monastic	  school,	  and	  while	   it	   is	  not	  known	  how	  many	  such	   schools	   followed	   this	   model,	   he	   suggests	   the	   monastery	   of	   Qennešre	   as	   a	   likely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  353	  Tannous,	  "You	  Are	  What	  You	  Read:	  Qenneshre	  and	  the	  Miaphysite	  Church	  in	  the	  Seventh	  	  Century,"	  100.	  354	  Ibid.,	  98.	  355	  Ibid.,	  101.	  
	   89	  
candidate.356	  There	   clearly	   was	   a	   strong	   tradition	   of	   Graeco-­‐Syriac	   Aristotelianism	   at	  Qennešre,	  especially	  focussing	  on	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  complete	  Organon.357	  That	  a	  canon	  of	  authorities	  was	  read	  in	  the	  West	  Syrian	  monasteries	  is	  clear,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  worthwhile	  to	  explore	   further	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   harmonisation	   of	   these	   authorities	   succeeded.	  While	  Barhebraeus	   makes	   a	   similar	   attempt	   to	   Sergius	   in	   integrating	   Aristotelian	   logic	   with	  theological	   works	   of	   the	   Greek	   Fathers	   and	   the	   mystics,	   his	   Book	   of	   Directions	   is	   less	   a	  harmonisation	  than	  a	  list	  of	  authorities.	  Indeed	  Barhebraeus’	  particular	  appreciation	  of	  the	  thinking	   of	   Evagrius	   appears	   to	   have	   occurred	  well	   after	   the	   composition	   of	   the	  Book	  of	  
Directions,	  according	  to	  the	  account	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove.358	  	  	  
The	  East	  Syrian	  Scholastic	  Tradition:	  the	  School	  versus	  the	  Monastery	  In	  the	  East	  Syrian	  tradition,	  philosophical	  reasoning	  was	  conducted	  via	  group	  study	  in	  the	  schools	   like	   the	   famous	   School	   of	   Nisibis,	   while	   the	   monks	   conducted	   their	   private	  devotions	  in	  their	  monastic	  cells.	  The	  seventh	  century	  monastic	  movement	  in	  the	  Church	  of	  the	   East,	   came	   to	   deploy	   a	   disparaging	   rhetoric	   against	   the	   schools	   of	   learning	   for	   their	  focus	  on	  the	  application	  of	   logic	  to	  the	  study	  of	  scripture.	  However,	  Becker	  demonstrates	  that	   the	   East	   Syrian	  monasteries	   and	   the	   schools	  were	   not	   entirely	   independent	   of	   each	  other,	  but	  rather	  that	  students	  might	  graduate	  from	  the	  school	  to	  the	  monastery,	  according	  to	   their	   ability.359	  He	   shows	   that	   the	   very	   language	   of	   criticism	   employed	   by	   the	  monks	  often	  portrays	  a	  prior	  philosophical	  training	  acquired	  in	  the	  schools.360	  The	  critique	  coming	  from	  the	  monks	  opposed	  the	  approaches	  of	  these	  two	  institutions	  somewhat	  irreconcilably,	  in	  that	  the	  scholastic	  focus	  on	  logic	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  lower	  path	  of	  instruction,	  but	  actually	  harmful	   to	   the	  monastic	   ideal	  of	  purification	  and	  perfection.361	  The	   faculty	  of	   reason	  had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  356	  Watt,	  "Commentary	  and	  Translation	  in	  Syriac	  Aristotelian	  Scholarship:	  Sergius	  to	  Baghdad,"	  36.	  357	  Ibid.,	  36-­‐7.	  Watt	  also	  states	  that	  it	  was	  at	  Qennešre	  that	  there	  is	  the	  earliest	  evidence	  for	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  complete	  Organon.	  358	  See	  the	  Appendix	  for	  the	  chronology	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  works,	  where	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  the	  Book	  of	  
Directions	  comes	  after	  1272CE,	  while	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  after	  1279CE.	  359	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  196.	  360	  Ibid.,	  190-­‐1.	  361	  Cf.	  King’s	  evaluation	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  attitude	  here.	  ‘The	  Eastern	  ascetics	  who	  vilified	  philosophy	  did	  so	  because	   they	   saw	   it	   as	   nothing	  but	   a	   first	   step	   towards	   their	   higher	   goals;	   Sergius,	   George,	   and	   the	   others	  probably	  agreed,	  but	  they	  concluded	  that	  one	  must	  therefore	  take	  that	  philosophy	  seriously	  and	  on	  its	  own	  terms.’	  King,	  "Why	  Were	  the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	  80-­‐81.	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still	  to	  be	  trained,	  not	  through	  the	  Organon,	  but	  in	  the	  noetic	  intuition	  of	  the	  divine	  wisdom.	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh	  describes	  the	  faculty	  of	  reason	  as	  aspiring	  towards	  ‘divine	  contemplation’,	  and	  this	  contemplative	  faculty	  of	  the	  soul	  ‘brings	  the	  mind	  close	  to	  complete	  mingling	  with	  God,	   causing	   it	   to	  peer	   (ndīq)	   into	  His	  divine	  mysteries	  which	   (exist)	   in	  a	   luminous	   state	  (šapyāʾīt)	  above	  the	  world’.362	  	  The	   East	   Syrian	   spiritual	  writings,	   especially	   those	   of	   the	   seventh	   century	  monks	   of	   Bet	  Qaṭrāyē	   like	   Isaac	   of	   Nineveh,	   also	   provided	   great	   inspiration	   to	   Barhebraeus.	   Many	   of	  these	   texts	  had	   crossed	   confessional	   boundaries,	   to	  be	   read	  by	   the	  West	   Syrians	   in	   their	  monastic	  anthologies.	  The	  tension	  that	  had	  existed	  between	  the	  East	  Syrian	  monks	  and	  the	  schoolmen	   reflected	   rival	   epistemological	   frameworks	   that	   had	   developed	   with	   the	  reception	  of	  Greek	   learning	   in	  Syriac.	  A	   similar	   tendency	  can	  be	  observed	   in	   the	   seventh	  century	   monasteries	   of	   the	   Syrian	   Orthodox,	   though	   the	   hostility	   appears	   to	   be	   less	  widespread.363	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  such	  evidence	  for	  continued	  hostilities	  in	  the	  West	  Syrian	   monasteries	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   own	   time.	   However,	   the	   West	   Syrian	   curriculum	  contained	   in	   fact	   the	   same	   epistemological	   conflict,	   in	   its	   incorporation	   of	   the	   Evagrian-­‐inspired	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	  alongside	  Aristotle.	  	  Becker	   brings	   out	   this	   conflict	   of	   epistemology	   by	   highlighting	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  Evagrian	  system	  of	  thought	  for	  the	  East	  Syrian	  monks.	  In	  Evagrius’	  stages	  of	  contemplation	  or	   theōria,	   the	   ascetic	   aspires	   towards	   the	   theōria	   of	   the	  Holy	  Trinity,	   this	   is	   the	  highest	  stage	  which	  must	  be	  conducted	  in	  silence,	  recognising	  the	  failure	  of	  language	  and	  image	  to	  express	  the	  inaccessible.	  In	  Evagrius’	  Gnosticus,	  there	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  language	  and	  of	  logic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  362	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  185.	  	  Sebastian	  P.	  Brock,	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh	  :	  (Isaac	  the	  Syrian)	  :	  'The	  Second	  Part',	  
Chapters	  IV-­‐XLI,	  2	  vols.,	  Corpus	  Scriptorum	  Christianorum	  Orientalium	  (Lovanii	  Louvain:	  Peeters,	  1995),	  XIX.5-­‐6.	  363	  Brock	  relates	  the	  anecdote	  of	  how	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  was	  invited	  by	  the	  monks	  of	  Eusabona	  to	  teach	  there	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  680s,	  in	  order	  to	  renew	  the	  study	  of	  Greek	  at	  the	  monastery:	  ‘After	  eleven	  years	  however,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  opposition	  of	  some	  of	  the	  monks	  to	  Greek	  culture	  resulted	  in	  Jacob	  leaving	  for	  the	  nearby	  monastery	  of	  Tel	  ʿAda’.	  "A	  Syriac	  Intermediary	  for	  the	  Arabic	  Theology	  of	  Aristotle?	  In	  Search	  of	  a	  Chimera?,"	  299-­‐300.	  Brock	   cites	   the	   source	  of	   this	   information	   as	   the	  biographical	   notice	  on	   Jacob	  of	  Edessa	   given	  by	  Michael	   the	   Syrian	   in	   his	   Chronicle.	   Chabot,	   Chronique	   de	   Michel	   le	   Syrien,	   Patriarche	   Jacobite	   d'Antioche	  
(1166-­‐1199),	  XI.14.	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as	  a	  means	  of	  constructing	  an	  image	  of	  the	  divine	  in	  the	  human	  mind.364	  Evagrius	  states	  in	  the	  Gnosticus,	  	   Every	   proposition	   has	   a	   genus,	   which	   is	   predicated,	   or	   a	   difference,	   or	   a	   species,	   or	   a	   property,	   or	   an	  accident	   or	   what	   is	   compounded	   of	   these:	   but	   nothing	   which	   is	   said	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   Holy	   Trinity	   is	  acceptable.	  Let	  the	  ineffable	  be	  worshipped	  in	  silence.365	  	  From	  the	  statement	  that	  the	  ineffable	  should	  be	  worshipped	  in	  silence,	  can	  be	  understood	  Evagrius’	  understanding	  of	  prayer	  as	  a	  form	  of	  contemplation	  and	  his	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  wordless	  prayer	  in	  the	  Chapters	  on	  Prayer,	  where	  ‘Prayer	  is	  a	  communion	  of	  the	  mind	  with	   God’	   which	   is	   ‘without	   intermediary’.366	  Columba	   Stewart	   explains	   that	   Evagrius’	  teaching	  on	  prayer	  comes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘Evagrius	  follows	  Aristotle	  in	  seeing	  the	   mind	   as	   creating	   an	   inner	   world	   of	   conceptual	   depictions	   relating	   to	   the	   things	  external	  to	  the	  self’.367	  These	  conceptual	  depictions,	  noēmata,	   form	  ‘the	  means	  by	  which	  the	   mind	   processes	   information’. 368 	  It	   is	   because	   of	   this	   shared	   Aristotelian	  understanding	   of	   the	   mind,	   that	   Evagrius	   asserts	   the	   necessity	   of	   true	   prayer	   to	   be	  without	  word	  or	   image,	   since	   the	   contemplation	  of	   the	  Holy	  Trinity	   should	  not	   involve	  any	  proposition	  that	  would	  ground	  the	  ‘ineffable’	  in	  material	  ontology.	  	  The	  Evagrian	  emphasis	  on	  wordless	  prayer	  influenced	  the	  works	  of	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh,	  and	  ‘pure’	  (šapyā)	  prayer	  became	  an	   important	  characteristic	  of	  Syrian	  mysticism.369	  Becker	  has	  portrayed	  Isaac	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  ‘the	  Evagrius-­‐inspired	  monastic	  ideology’	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  364	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  176-­‐77.	  365	  Ibid.,	  177.	  This	   is	  Becker’s	  English	  translation	  of	  the	  Greek	  fragment	  of	  the	  Gnosticus	  41,	  which	  has	  been	  edited	   and	   translated	   into	   French	   by	   Antione	   and	   Claire	   Guillaumont.	   Antoine	   Guillaumont	   and	   Claire	  Guillaumont,	   Évagre	   le	   Pontique.	   Le	   Gnostique,	   ou,	   a	   Celui	   Qui	   est	   Devenu	   Digne	   de	   la	   Science,	   Sources	  Chrétiennes	  (Paris:	  Cerf,	  1989),	  166-­‐67.	  366	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  142.	  Evagrius,	  Chapters	  of	  Prayer,	  114.	  367	  Columba	  Stewart,	  "Imageless	  Prayer	  and	  the	  Theological	  Vision	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,"	  Journal	  of	  Early	  
Christian	  Studies	  9,	  no.	  2	  (2001):	  187.	  Stewart	  quotes	  from	  Aristotle:	  ‘one	  cannot	  think	  without	  imagery,’	  De	  
memoria	  449b,	  ll.	  35–36.	  368	  Ibid.	  	  369	  Sebastian	  P.	  Brock,	  The	  Syriac	  Fathers	  on	  Prayer	  and	  the	  Spiritual	  Life,	  Cistercian	  Studies	  Series	  (Kalamazoo,	  Mich.:	  Cistercian	  Publications,	  1987),	  xxviii.	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was	  common	  to	  the	  East	  Syrian	  monastic	  writers	   in	  this	  period.370	  Furthermore,	  Becker	  has	   claimed	   that	   the	   commentary	  by	   the	  East	   Syrian	  Church	  Father	  Babai	   the	  Great	   (d.	  628/30CE)	  on	  Evagrius’	  Kephalaia	  Gnostica	  attests	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  Evagrian	  thought	  in	   the	   Church	   of	   the	  East.371	  The	   higher	   status	   of	   Evagrius	   for	   the	  East	   Syrians	   from	  at	  least	  the	  seventh	  century	  onwards,	  would	  account	  for	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  corpus	  had	  on	  the	  monastic	  writers,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opposition	  of	  the	  monks	  to	  the	  schools.	  Dadīšō	  quotes	  directly	  from	  Evagrius	  in	  his	  condemnation	  of	  the	  books	  of	  Aristotle,	  and	  specifically	  ‘the	  ones	  which	  are	  for	  the	  learning	  of	  reason	  (yullphānā	  da-­‐mlīlūtā),	   I	  mean,	  the	  Categories,	  
Peri	  Hermeneias,	  Apodeiktikos	  (i.e.	  Posterior	  Analytics),	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  such	  as	  these’.372	  It	  was	  reasoning	  through	  logic	  derived	  from	  the	  books	  of	  the	  Organon	  and	  beginning	  with	  the	  Categories,	  which,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  formed	  the	  particular	  source	  of	  contention.	  
	  Barhebraeus	   shows	   his	   awareness	   of	   the	   antipathy	   of	   the	   East	   Syrian	   monks	   when	  outlining	  the	  monastic	  curriculum	  of	  reading	  in	  the	  Church	  of	  the	  East,	  in	  which	  he	  focuses	  on	  the	  monastic	  ascetics	  rather	  than	  the	  teachers	  in	  the	  schools.	  King	  has	  maintained	  that	  such	   a	   description	   of	   the	   East	   Syrian	   curriculum	   follows	   ‘the	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   East	   Syrian	  commentators	   and	   theologians’,	  who	  were	   those	  who	   clearly	   ‘distanced	   themselves	   from	  what	   they	   perceived	   as	   the	   impurities	   of	   ‘lower’,	   ‘secular’	   learning.’373	  On	   this	   basis,	  Barhebraeus	   appears	   to	   be	   more	   in	   sympathy	   with	   the	   attitude	   of	   the	   East	   Syrian	  monastics,	  despite	  his	  interest	  in	  the	  scholastic	  philosophy	  of	  the	  Alexandrian	  tradition.	  In	  the	  Dove,	  he	  contrasts	  the	  ‘professional	  knowledge’	  of	  the	  teachers	  of	  the	  scriptures	  which	  is	   learnt,	  with	   the	   Initiated	  who	  know	   through	   ‘seeing’,	   that	   is	   they	  possess	   the	   spiritual	  sight	  of	  the	  perfect.374	  He	  similarly	  recognises	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  370	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  184.	  371	  Becker	  refers	  to	  Babai	  the	  Great,	  as	  ‘the	  dominant	  intellectual	  of	  the	  Church	  of	  the	  East	  in	  the	  early	  seventh	  century	  and	  virtual	  leader	  of	  the	  church	  during	  its	  acephalous	  period’.	  Ibid.,	  178.	  372	  Ibid.,	  190.	  The	  passage	  is	  from:	  Dadīšō	  Qaṭrāyē’s	  Commentary	  on	  the	  Book	  of	  Abba	  Isaiah,	  181.13-­‐182.7.	  Rene	  Draguet,	  Commentaire	  du	  Livre	  d'Abba	  Isaie	  (Logoi	  I-­‐XV),	  vol.	  326,	  CSCO	  (Louvain:	  Peeters,	  1972),	  140.	  373	  King,	  "Why	  Were	  the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	  80.	  374	  ‘Some	   of	   the	   teachers	  who	   are	   sufficiently	   trained	   in	   the	   holy	   scriptures	   and	   their	   explanation	   are	   not	  willing	   to	   learn	   the	   way	   of	   the	   kingdom	   from	   the	   Initiated	   who	   are	   not	   trained	   in	   their	   professional	  knowledge.	  They	  do	  not	  understand	  that	  their	  knowledge,	  however	  clever	  they	  may	  be,	  is	  one	  of	  hearing;	  that	  of	   the	   Initiated,	   however	   crude	   they	   may	   be,	   one	   of	   seeing.’	   Wensinck,	   Bar	  Hebraeus's	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   :	  
Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  73,	  591*,	  Sentence	  68.	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philosophers	  who	  attempt	  to	  understand	  God	  as	  the	  necessary	  being	  of	  metaphysics,	  and	  that	  of	  the	  ascetic	  monks	  who	  seek	  the	  direct	  illumination	  of	  divine	  knowledge.	  	  	  In	   the	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove,	   Barhebraeus	   explicitly	   criticises	   the	  method	   of	   using	   syllogisms	  (from	   the	  Posterior	  Analytics	  of	   the	  Organon),	   and	  asserts	   the	   limitations	  of	  metaphysical	  reasoning	   of	   the	   divine	   being,	   to	   insist	   on	   language	   as	   only	   a	   secondary	   means	   of	  representation.375	  This	   reflects	   a	  Neoplatonic	   attitude	   to	   language,	   that	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  the	   supra-­‐natural,	   representational	   language	   becomes	   inadequate.	   The	   Dove	   reveals	   an	  implicit	   sympathy	  with	  a	  more	  Neoplatonic	  position	   like	   that	  of	  Evagrius,	  which	  sees	   the	  limitations	  of	  language	  for	  what	  transcends	  the	  concepts	  of	  metaphysics,	  in	  that	  the	  divine	  being	   goes	   beyond	   the	   relatedness	   of	   the	  word	   and	   the	   thing	   as	   formalised	   in	   logic	   and	  applied	   in	  metaphysics.	  Barhebraeus’	  mystical	   texts	  reflect	  a	  Neoplatonic	  emphasis	   in	  his	  Aristotelian	  principles	  of	  investigation,	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  would	  follow	  the	  late	  Alexandrians	  and	  particularly	  Sergius’	  integration	  of	  philosophical	  systems.	  However	  he	  does	  recognise	  a	  fundamental	  conflict	  of	  approaches,	  the	  illumination	  of	  the	  mind	  by	  the	  light	  of	  the	  Spirit,	  is	  not	   simply	   a	   short-­‐cut	   to	   Aristotelian	   investigations	   through	   training	   in	   logic.	   For	  Barhebraeus,	  the	  divine	  mystery	  goes	  beyond	  all	  representational	  language,	  only	  to	  reveal	  itself	   suddenly	   in	   the	   gift	   of	   love,	   which	   transcends	   the	   rules	   of	   logic. 376 	  Through	  contemplation,	  or	  theōria,	  the	  philosopher	  may	  reach	  the	  highest	  knowledge	  of	  God,	  but	  in	  the	   Evagrian	   system	   this	   is	   only	   the	   theōria	  physikē,	   the	   height	   of	   knowledge	   of	   created	  things.	  Therefore	  illumination	  is	  not	  a	  state	  of	  perception	  that	  the	  mind	  can	  acquire	  of	  its	  own	   accord,	   since	   the	  mind	   is	   constrained	   by	   the	   images	   of	   the	  material	  world.	   Despite	  what	  Sergius	  intimates,	  philosophical	  study	  and	  ascetic	  training	  do	  not	  in	  fact	  aspire	  to	  the	  same	   goal;	   these	   two	   paths	   presuppose	   different	   understandings	   of	   how	   God	   may	   be	  conceived	   which	   determines	   ‘what’	   is	   being	   conceived	   of	   the	   divine.	   For	   God	   not	   to	   be	  another	  image	  constructed	  by	  the	  mind	  there	  must	  be	  a	  descent	  of	  the	  divine	  in	  the	  giving	  of	   the	   gift,	   through	   the	   working	   of	   the	   Spirit	   in	   the	   heart.	   Without	   this	   descent	   into	  immanence,	  symbolised	  by	  the	  heart	  made	  luminous	  through	  the	  illumination	  of	  the	  Spirit,	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  For	  example,	  he	  criticises	  using	  syllogisms	  to	  discern	  the	  divine	  essence.	  Ibid.,	  78,	  596*,	  Sentence	  90.	  376	  Simeon	   d-­‐Taybūṭēh	   describes	   spiritual	   understanding	   as	   a	   gift	   of	   illumination:	   ‘The	   seedling	   of	   prayer	  acquires	  strength	  as	   it	  becomes	  illuminated	  and	  radiant	  with	  spiritual	  understanding;	   it	   is	   full	  of	  peace	  and	  joy,	  burning	  spontaneously	  as	  incense.	  All	  this	  is	  the	  gift	  of	  God.’	  Brock,	  Spirituality	  in	  the	  Syriac	  Tradition,	  114.	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the	  divine	  remains	  an	  image	  in	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  soul	  ‘which	  is	  accustomed	  to	  matter’,	  for	  even	  the	  ‘psychic	  eye’	  is	  unable	  to	  reach	  the	  spiritual	  seeing	  of	  the	  mystics.377	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  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove	   :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	   from	  His	  Ethikon,	   98,	   487*.	   In	  Book	  4,	  Chapter	  15	  of	  the	  Ethicon,	  Barhebraeus	  quotes	  from	  the	  poets	  to	  corroborate	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ‘psychic	  eye	  is	  blinded	  by	  the	  manifestation	  of	  God,	  when	  it	  is	  illuminated	  by	  it’.	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Chapter	  4:	  Barhebraeus’	  Mysticism	  of	  the	  Love	  of	  God	  
Introduction 	  Barhebraeus	   was	   acquainted	   first	   hand	   with	   the	   Arabic	   texts	   of	   medieval	   Islamic	  philosophy,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  for	  his	  philosophical	  output	  to	  be	  considered	  separately	  from	  his	  mystical	  writings.	  However,	  a	  mystical	  text	  like	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  may	  be	  seen	  as	   a	   reflection	   on	   his	   compendiums	   of	   Aristotelian	   philosophy,	   whereby	   Barhebraeus	  reconsiders	  the	  synthesis	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  sciences	  within	  Eastern	  Christian	  theological	  discourse.	  In	  his	  mystical	  texts,	  Barhebraeus	  drew	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  within	  Syrian	  monastic	  spirituality,	  in	  order	  to	  propose	  an	  alternative	  ontology	  of	  God,	  one	  that	   rests	   on	   the	   love	   of	   God	   and	   goes	   beyond	   scholastic	   metaphysics.	   The	   highest	  understanding	  of	  God	  was	   thus	  not	  an	  extension	  of	  an	  Aristotelian	  metaphysics	  of	  being,	  but	  was	  received	  through	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  by	  the	  Spirit.	  	  	  Barhebraeus’	   account	  of	   how	  he	   came	   to	   immerse	  himself	   in	  monastic	   spirituality	   in	   the	  
Dove	   is	  well-­‐known,	  though	  scholars	  have	  pointed	  out	  the	  similarity	  of	  this	  account	  to	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   ‘autobiography’	   in	  the	  al-­‐Munqidh	  min	  al-­‐ḍalāl	  and	  thus	  to	  what	  extent	   it	  should	  be	  taken	  literally.378	  Takahashi	  proceeds	  to	  question	  Barhebraeus’	  credentials	  as	  a	  mystic,	  since	   his	   mystical	   texts	   resemble	   an	   encyclopaedic	   compilation	   of	   other	   such	   works	  belonging	  to	  the	  Islamic	  and	  Syriac	  Christian	  traditions,	  rather	  than	  an	  original	  account	  of	  his	   own	   personal	  mystical	   experiences.379	  Yet,	   for	   an	   author	   to	   cite	   other	  mystics	   in	   his	  texts	   does	   not	   thereby	   disqualify	   him	   as	   a	  mystic;	   in	   fact,	   such	   a	   dependence	   on	   textual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  378	  See	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	   39-­‐41.	   Janssens,	  L'Entretien	  de	  la	  Sagesse	  :	   Introduction	  
aux	  Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	  13.	   Janssens	   is	  sceptical	  about	  Barhebraeus’	  confession	  of	  near	  total	  despair:	  ‘Cette	  confession,	  qui	  paraît	  si	  spontanée,	  serait	  plus	  convaincante	  si	  le	  prototype	  n’en	  figurait	  pas	  dan	  le	  Munkidh	  de	  Gazali’.	  Samir	  Khalil	  Samir	  notes	  the	  similarity	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  fourth	  part	  of	  the	  
Dove	  ‘avec	  le	  début	  de	  l’autobiographie	  de	  Ghazali’	  in	  al-­‐Munqidh	  min	  al-­‐ḍalāl,	  but	  unlike	  Janssens,	  he	  affirms	  that	   ‘l’expérience	   de	   notre	   auteur	   rappelle	   celle	   de	   Ghazālī’:	   Samir,	   "Cheminement	   Mystique	   d'Ibn	   al-­‐'Ibri	  (1226-­‐1286),"	   75	   n.5.	   The	   resemblance	   to	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   work	   is	   originally	   noted	   in	  Wensinck’s	   footnote	   to	  Barhebraeus’	  text:	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  60	  n.1.	  	   	  379	  Takahashi,	   Barhebraeus	   :	   A	   Bio-­‐Bibliography,	   40.	   ‘How	   genuine	   the	   mystical	   experiences	   recounted	   by	  Barhebraeus	  are	  and	  how	  far	  advanced	  he	  was	  in	  his	  way	  of	  mysticism	  are	  questions	  which	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  answer,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  personal	  nature	  of	  the	  matter	  and	  in	  part	  because	  we	  do	  not	  as	  yet	  know	  the	  exact	  extent	  to	  which	  he	  depends	  on	  his	  sources	  in	  his	  mystical	  works.’	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authorities	   may	   be	   used	   as	   a	   corrective	   to	   the	  Western	   emphasis	   on	   personal	   religious	  experience	   as	   the	   all-­‐determining	   model	   for	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism. 380 	  Since	   the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  textual	  tradition	  of	  the	  Syrian	  mystics	  clearly	  had	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  these	  texts	  will	  now	  be	  examined	  in	  some	  detail.	  	  
The Texts of Barhebraeus’ Mysticism 
Categorisation	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  Mystical	  Texts	  In	   his	   comprehensive	   overview	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   oeuvre,	   entitled	   Barhebraeus:	   a	   Bio-­‐
Bibliography,	  Takahashi	  places	  Barhebreus’	  mystical	  works	   into	   the	  category	  of	   theology,	  which	  he	  divides	   into	   three	  parts:	  Exegesis,	  Dogmatic	  Theology,	  and	  Moral	  Theology	  and	  Mysticism.381	  Into	  this	  third	  category	  of	   theology,	  Takahashi	  places	  Barhebraeus’	  mystical	  texts:	  the	  Ethicon,	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  and	  also	  his	  commentary,	  The	  Book	  of	  Excerpts	  on	  
the	   Book	   of	   the	   Holy	   Hierotheos	   (Ktābā	   d-­‐pushshāqā	   d-­‐Īrōte’ōs). 382 	  While	   Takahashi’s	  division	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   works	   has	   the	   advantage	   of	   clarity,	   Takahashi	   makes	   the	  assumption	  that	  mysticism	  is	  associated	  with	  moral	  theology.	  While	  this	  association	  would	  seem	  to	  uphold	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  Ethicon	  and	  the	  Dove	  with	  the	  practical	  way	  of	  life,	  moral	  theology	   is	   not	   addressed	   in	   his	   commentary	   on	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Holy	   Hierotheos.	   The	  instrinsic	  connection	  of	   these	  works	  as	  mystical	   texts	  thus	  requires	   further	  consideration	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  avowed	  intentions.	  	  Barhebraeus	  states	   in	  his	  Preface	   to	   the	  Ethicon,	   that	   this	  work	   is	  purely	  concerned	  with	  practical	   knowledge. 383 	  Wensinck	   has	   highlighted	   the	   distinction	   made	   here	   by	  Barhebraeus	  between	  practical	  and	  speculative	  knowledge,	  384	  and	  considers	  the	  Ethicon	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  380	  Colless’	   conclusion	   to	  his	  article	  on	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	   indicates	   the	  predominance	  of	   this	   classical	  model:	  ‘Finally	  it	  has	  to	  be	  said	  that	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  fully	  established	  how	  far	  Bar	  Hebraeus	  depended	  on	  his	  mystic	   predecessors	   and	   how	   much	   he	   relied	   on	   his	   own	   spiritual	   experience’.	   Brian	   E.	   Colless,	   "The	  Mysticism	  of	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  Orientalia	  Christiana	  Periodica	  54,	  no.	  1	  (1988):	  173.	  	  381	  Takahashi,	   Barhebraeus	   :	   A	   Bio-­‐Bibliography,	   63-­‐67.	   Takahashi’s	   chronology	   for	   Barhebraeus’	   works	   is	  included	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  382	  Ibid.,	  65-­‐67.	  	  383	  Herman	  G.	  B.	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I	  (Louvain:	  E.	  Peeters,	  1993),	  5,	  8*.	  The	  first	  page	  reference	  refers	  to	  Teule’s	  English	  translation,	  the	  second	  [*]	  to	  the	  Syriac	  text.	  384	  Wensinck	  suggests	  that	  the	  monastic	  distinction	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  knowledge	  derives	  from	  ‘the	  divergence	  between	   the	   anchorites	   and	   the	   coenobites’,	   in	  which	   the	   former	   devoted	   themselves	   to	   contemplation	   in	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provide	   ‘books	   for	   the	   practice	   of	   religious	   life,	   not	   as	   speculative	   works’.385	  In	   Teule’s	  translation	   of	   the	   Preface,	   the	   distinction	   made	   by	   Barhebraeus	   is	   between	   ‘theoretical	  knowledge’	  and	   ‘practical’	  or	   ‘active	  knowledge’.	  Through	  theoretical	  knowledge	  one	  may	  understand	  ‘that	  the	  Creator	  is	  one	  and	  the	  world	  has	  a	  beginning’,	  while	  through	  practical	  knowledge	   ‘the	   soul	   receives	   illumination	   by	   the	   emaciation	   of	   the	   body’. 386 	  In	   the	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  does	  not	  specify	  that	  his	  purpose	  is	  to	  expound	  one	  or	  the	  other	  form	  of	  knowledge,	  but	  within	  the	  body	  of	  the	  work	  he	  does	  make	  reference	  to	  both	   paths	   when	   he	   describes	   the	   value	   of	   the	   teacher	   who	   guides	   man	   towards	   ‘true	  contemplation	  and	  profitable	  practice’.387	  Barhebraeus	   separates	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	  Dove	  from	  that	  of	  the	  Ethicon,	  and	  the	  latter	  work	  he	  defines	  as	  a	  book	  of	  ethical	  guidance,	  which	  is	  thus	  part	  of	  gaining	  practical	  knowledge.	  	  Teule	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   very	   title	   of	   the	  Ethicon,	   is	   an	   unusual	   one	   in	   Syriac	   ascetical	  literature,	   and	   in	   fact	   is	   borrowed	   from	   the	   philosophical	   terminology	   of	   the	   pseudo-­‐Aristotelian	  division	  of	  practical	  philosophy	  into	  ‘Ethikon,	  Oikonomikon	  and	  Politikon’,	  i.e.	  moral,	  domestic	  and	  civic	  wisdom.388	  Barhebraeus	  employs	  this	  same	  division	  of	  the	  three	  types	   of	   practical	   wisdom	   in	   his	   section	   on	   the	   practical	   philosophy	   (as	   opposed	   to	   the	  theoretical)	   in	   his	   philosophical	   works,	   the	   Treatise	   of	   Treatises,	   and	   the	   Cream	   of	  
Wisdom.389	  Teule	   concludes	   that	   Barhebraeus	   borrowed	   the	   title	   of	   the	   Ethicon	   from	   a	  philosophical	  rather	  than	  an	  ascetical	  terminology;	  for,	  while	  Evagrius’	  Scholia	  in	  Proverbia	  ‘employs	  the	  word	  êthikê	  to	  denote	  the	  moral	  or	  practical	  part	  of	  his	  doctrine	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  gnostical	  or	  “theoretical”	  part	  (fusikê	  and	  theologikê)’,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  Syriac	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  solitude	   in	   their	  cells,	  and	   the	   latter	   lived	   together	   in	   the	  monasteries	  and	  did	  good	  works;	   	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  
Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  xxvi.	  	  385	  Ibid.,	  xxiii.	  	  386	  Teule,	   Ethicon	   :	   Mēmrā	   I,	   5,	   7*.	   See	   also	   the	   paraphrase	   of	   the	   Preface	   to	   the	   Ethicon	   in	   Wensinck’s	  Introduction,	  thus	  while	  speculative	  knowledge	  is	  concerned	  with	  understanding	  for	  example	  ‘that	  God	  is	  one	  and	  that	   the	  world	  will	  be	  destroyed’,	  practical	  knowledge	   involves	  the	  soul	  becoming	  enlightened	  through	  ascetical	  practice.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  xxiii-­‐xxiv.	  387	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  10,	  529*.	   In	  Wensinck’s	  edition,	   there	   is	   only	   the	   English	   translation	   and	   of	   course	   his	   own	   Introduction,	   Notes	   and	   Glossary.	  Wensinck	   does	   however	   indicate	   precisely	   how	   his	   translation	   corresponds	   to	   the	   pagination	   of	   Bedjan’s	  edition	  of	  the	  Syriac	  text,	  and	  these	  are	  included	  in	  the	  endnote	  thus	  [*],	  for	  ease	  of	  reference.	  388	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  xix.	  	  389	  Ibid.	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translation	  of	   this	  work	   that	  would	  have	  made	   it	   accessible	   to	  Barhebraeus.390	  The	  more	  direct	   terminological	   influence	   therefore	   seems	   to	   be	   Avicennan,	   raising	   the	   question	   of	  what	   was	   the	   intended	   relationship	   between	   the	   Ethicon	   and	   the	   summary	   of	   the	  Avicennan-­‐Aristotelian	  Ethics	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,	  since	  the	  same	  title,	  Ktābā	  
d-­‐ītīqōn,	  is	  used	  for	  both	  books.	  	  	  In	   the	   first	   section	   of	   his	   Ethics,	   Barhebraeus	   provides	   the	   divisions	   of	   philosophy	   into	  theoretical	  and	  practical,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ethics,	  he	  offers	  two	  theories	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  science.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  that	  since	  ethics	  has	  the	  human	  soul	  as	  its	  subject	  and	  the	  choosing	  of	  good	  deeds	  over	  the	  bad,	  man	  should	  therefore	  know	  what	  the	  human	  soul	  is	  and	   how	   its	   faculties	  might	   be	   used	   to	   attain	   the	   perfection	   becoming	   to	   it.	   The	   second	  theory	   is	   that	   the	  ethical	   science	  deals	  not	  with	  natural	  powers,	  but	   the	  governing	  of	   the	  voluntary	   powers.391	  In	   the	   Preface	   to	   the	   Ethicon,	   Barhebraeus	   states	   that	   here	   he	   is	  concerned	   with	   practical	   knowledge,	   ‘to	   distinguish	   good	   from	   evil’,	   rather	   than	   the	  theoretical,	  which	  distinguishes	  ‘truth	  from	  error’.392	  Therefore	  the	  Ethicon	  is	  aligned	  with	  the	   Aristotelian	   ethics	   in	   its	   concern	  with	   attaining	   the	   good,	  while	   it	   also	   identifies	   the	  most	   sublime	   Good	   in	   the	   Neoplatonic	   tradition,	   in	   which,	   following	   Origen	   and	   the	  Christian	  Neoplatonists,	  ‘the	  Good’	  had	  been	  identified	  with	  God.	  	  
An	  Overview	  of	  the	  Mystical	  Texts	  of	  Barhebraeus:	  Editions	  and	  Contents	  The	  main	  works	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism,	   the	  Ethicon	   and	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  will	  be	  examined	   here	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   internal	   structure,	   editions	   of	   the	   Syriac	   text	   as	  well	   as	  modern	  translations.	  Paul	  Bedjan	  edited	  Barhebraeus’	  Ethicon	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  in	  1898;	   these	  Syriac	   texts	  appear	   in	   the	  same	  volume	   that	  was	  published	   in	  Paris.393	  Teule	  notes	   with	   regret	   that	   Bedjan,	   despite	   having	   free	   access	   to	   the	   various	   manuscripts	   of	  these	  two	  books,	  was	  less	  concerned	  to	  compile	  a	  critical	  edition,	  than	  to	  produce	  a	  ‘sort	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  390	  Ibid.,	  xviii-­‐xix.	  	  391	  Joosse,	  A	  Syriac	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Aristolelian	  Philosophy	  :	  Barhebraeus	  (13th	  c.),	  Butyrum	  Sapientiae,	  Books	  
of	  Ethics,	  Economy,	  and	  Politics	  :	  A	  Critical	  Edition,	  with	  Introduction,	  Translation,	  Commentary,	  and	  Glossaries,	  19.	  392	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  5,	  8*.	  393	  Bedjan,	  Ethicon	  :	  Seu,	  Moralia	  Gregorii	  Barhebræi.	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devotional	  handbook’	  for	  his	  own	  Chaldean	  community.394	  In	  1919	  A.J.	  Wensinck	  produced	  only	  a	  partial	  translation	  of	  Bedjan’s	  Syriac	  text	  into	  English.	  This	  translation	  includes	  only	  Chapter	  XV	  of	  Book	  IV	  of	  the	  Ethicon,	  a	  chapter	  which	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  and	  which	  Teule	  suggests	  forms	  something	  of	  ‘an	  appendix’	  to	  Wensinck’s	  translation	  of	  the	  Dove.395	  Wensinck	  chose	  to	  translate,	  in	  its	  entirety,	  this	  much	  shorter	  work,	  in	  which	  the	  same	  theme	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God	  also	  holds	  a	  significant	  position.	  The	  different	  aims	  of	  these	   two	   books	   account	   partly	   for	   their	   length,	   the	   Ethicon	   is	   a	   general	   work	   for	   the	  readership	  of	   the	  Christian	  community,	  which	  engages	   in	  many	  topics	  of	  righteous	   living,	  and	   clearly	   follows	   the	   model	   of	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   comprehensive	   multi-­‐volume	   work,	   the	  ‘Revival	   of	   the	   Religious	   Sciences’	   (Iḥyāʾ	   ʿulūm	   al-­‐dīn).396	  As	   Teule	   has	   pointed	   out,	   the	  fourfold	   structure	   of	   the	  Ethicon	   also	   imitates	   that	   of	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   Iḥyāʾ	  very	   closely,	   and	  thematically	  both	  are	  concerned	  with	  practical	  knowledge.397	  	  	  In	   Barhebraeus’	   explanation	   for	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  Ethicon,	   he	   states	   that	   since	   ‘Every	  activity	  is	  either	  corporeal	  or	  psychic’,	  his	  concern	  is	  thus	  with	  both.	  He	  divides	  the	  Ethicon	  into	  four	  mēmrē,	  the	  first	  two	  parts	  concerning	  the	  training	  of	  the	  body	  in	  right	  conduct	  and	  the	  second	  two	  on	   the	  soul,	   its	  purification	  and	  perfection.398	  The	   fourth	  part	   (Mēmrā)	  of	  the	  Ethicon	   instructs	   on	   the	  way	   of	   life	   for	   the	   perfect,	   the	  gmīrē.	   Thus,	  while	   there	   are	  many	   prescriptions	   applicable	   only	   to	   lay	   people,	   there	   are	   also	   rules	   for	   novices	   and	  solitaries,	   as	   well	   as	   sections	   reserved	   only	   for	   those	   who	   have	   reached	   mystical	  perfection.399	  Teule	  has	  observed	  that	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  indication	  of	  the	  intended	  audience	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  394	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  xii-­‐xiii.	  Teule	  states	  that	  this	  lack	  of	  a	  critical	  edition	  has	  not	  been	  addressed	  in	  the	  new	  Syriac	  edition	  of	  these	  books	  published	  by	  the	  St	  Ephrem	  Monastery	  in	  1985,	  which	  is	  merely	  a	  copy	  of	  Bedjan’s	  edition.	  Gregory	  John	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	  Ethicon	  :	  Christian	  Ethics	  (Morals)	  ([Glane/Losser]	  Holland:	  St.	  Ephrem	  the	  Syrian	  Monastery,	  1985).	  395	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  xxix.	  396	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  xvii-­‐xviii.	  397	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	   xxxi.	  Teule	   represents	   the	  parallel	   structures	  of	   these	  works	   in	  a	  diagram,	  and	  also	  points	  out	  the	  similar	  efforts	  by	  Wensinck	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  Barhebraeus’	  Ethicon,	  to	  juxtapose	  the	  titles	  of	  a	  select	  number	  of	  chapters	  and	  sections	  in	  the	  Ethicon	  and	  the	  Iḥyāʾ.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  
of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  cxi-­‐cxxxvi.	  398	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  5	  and	  8*.	  The	  first	  page	  reference	  refers	  to	  Teule’s	  English	  translation,	  the	  [*]	  to	  the	  Syriac	  text.	  399	  Ibid.,	  xxx.	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of	  the	  book,	   leading	  him	  to	  conclude	  that	   ‘the	  aim	  of	  the	  Ethicon	  is	  to	  regulate	  the	  ethical	  and	  mystical	  life	  of	  every	  Christian	  believer’,	  especially	  that	  of	  the	  lay	  person.400	  	  The	   fourth	  Mēmrā	   lists	   the	   acquisition	   of	   good	   qualities	   in	   the	   soul,	   such	   as	   love	   and	  repentance.401	  Within	  this	  mēmrā	  are	  two	  chapters	  on	  the	  theme	  of	  love:	  Chapter	  XV	  on	  the	  ‘Love	  of	  God’	  (translated	  in	  full	  by	  Wensinck)	  and	  Chapter	  XII	  on	  the	  ‘Love	  of	  the	  Brothers’.	  Teule	  gives	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  this	  latter	  chapter,	  noting	  that	  the	  essential	  content	  is	  also	  discussed	   in	   the	  Dove,402	  and	   that	   Section	   XII	   of	   this	   chapter	   particularly	   deals	   with	   the	  difference	   between	   the	   two	   types	   of	   love,	   ḥubbā	   and	   reḥmtā.	   Love	   (ḥubbā)	   grows	   in	  strength	  to	  become	  reḥmtā,	  a	  word	  which	  Teule	  has	  translated	  using	  ‘dilection’.403	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  section	  essentially	  follows	  the	  distinctions	  made	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  love	  as	  seen	   in	   the	   Homilies	   of	   John	   of	   Dalyatha	   (ca.	   690-­‐780CE).404 	  His	   writings	   provide	   a	  precedent	   for	   the	   distinctive	   nature	   of	   reḥmtā	   or	   ‘dilection’	   in	   Syrian	   spirituality	   and	  primarily	  suggest	  dilection	  to	  be	  a	  state	  of	  enjoyment	  that	  fulfils	  the	  yearning	  of	  the	  lover	  for	  the	  Beloved.405	  	  In	  contrast	   to	   the	  Ethicon,	   the	   intended	  audience	  of	   the	  Dove	   is	   that	  of	  novices	  without	  a	  spiritual	  director.406	  While	  it	  offers	  a	  parallel	  treatment	  of	  themes	  contained	  in	  the	  Ethicon,	  it	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  edited	  summary	  of	  this	  much	  larger	  work.	  The	  Dove	  contains	  three	  main	  sections,	  which	  correspond	  to	  what	  had	  become	  the	  standard	  division	  of	  the	  spiritual	  life	  in	  the	  Syrian	  monastic	  tradition	  into	  three	  degrees	  (mušḥātā),	  that	  of	  the	  body,	  soul	  and	  spirit;	  these	   form	   ascending	   disciplines	   of	   training	   that	   culminate	   in	   spiritual	   perfection.	   Brian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  400	  Ibid.	  401	  Ibid.,	  xxxi.	  402	  Ibid.,	   xxviii.	   See	   Section	   ‘On	   the	   Love	   of	   the	   Brethren’,	   in	  Wensinck,	   Bar	  Hebraeus's	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   :	  
Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  10-­‐11.	  403	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  xxviii-­‐xxix.	  404	  See	  Colless’	  translation	  of	  Homily	  14:	  On	  the	  Charity	  and	  the	  Love	  of	  God.	  Brian	  E.	  Colless,	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  John	  Saba"	  (PhD,	  University	  of	  Melbourne,	  1969),	  186-­‐90.	  405	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  xxviii-­‐xxix.	  This	  French	  word	  ‘dilection’	  is	  also	  used	  by	  Robert	  Beulay	  in	  his	  works	  on	   the	  mysticism	  of	   John	  of	  Dalyatha.	  This	   term	  has	  as	   its	   cognate	   the	  Latin	  dilectio,	   found	   in	   the	  works	  of	  medieval	  European	  mystics	  such	  as	  Bonaventure,	  and	  so	  there	  is	  good	  precedent	  for	  its	  usage	  in	  translating	  the	  Syrian	  mystics.	  While	  the	  word	  is	  too	  archaic	  in	  English	  to	  have	  modern	  currency,	  dilection	  is	  preferred	  in	  part	  to	  avoid	  confusion	  since	  ‘delight’	  is	  used	  by	  Wensinck	  to	  translate	  a	  different	  term	  in	  the	  Syriac.	  406	  Ibid.,	   xxx.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove	   :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	   from	  His	  Ethikon,	   3,	  521.	  Barhebraeus	  says	  that	  he	  composed	  the	  work	  for	  ‘sick	  people	  who	  are	  without	  or	  far	  from	  a	  Director’.	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Colless	  has	  suggested	  that	  Barhebraeus	  follows	  ‘the	  uniquely	  Syrian	  characterisation	  of	  the	  mystical	  stages	  as	  being	  concerned	  respectively	  with	  body,	  soul,	  and	  spirit’.407	  Indeed	  the	  threefold	  division	  that	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  harks	  back	  to	  the	  fifth	   century	   Syrian	  monk	   John	   the	   Solitary,	   also	   called	   John	   of	   Apamea.408	  Barhebraeus’	  Introduction	   to	   the	   Dove,	   outlines	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   book	   into	   four	   parts:	   the	   first	  contains	   ‘instruction	   concerning	   the	   bodily	   labour	   accomplished	   in	   the	   monastery’,	   the	  second	   describes	   ‘the	   quality	   of	   psychic	   labour	   performed	   in	   the	   cell’,	   the	   third	   part	  explains	  the	  ‘spiritual	  rest’	  of	  the	  Perfect	  imparted	  by	  the	  Dove,	  and	  which	  ‘introduces	  them	  into	   the	   divine	   cloud	  where	   the	   Lord	   is	   said	   to	   abide’.409	  Indeed	   the	   third	   spiritual	   part	  constituting	  as	  it	  does	  the	  third	  degree	  of	  the	  Syrian	  mystical	  path,	  brings	  the	  monk	  into	  the	  very	  presence	  of	  God,	  represented	  by	  the	  divine	  darkness	  of	  the	  cloud.410	  In	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  
Dove,	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  treatment	  of	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  occurs	  in	  this	  third	  chapter	  on	  spiritual	  perfection.	  	  	  The	   fourth	   and	   final	   section	   thus	   contains	   the	   ‘centurion’,	   what	   Teule	   has	   termed	   ‘a	  selection	  of	  a	  hundred	  mystical	  and	  hermetical	  sayings,	  intended	  for	  the	  monks	  to	  meditate	  upon’.411	  The	   inclusion	   of	   centuria	   was	  well	   known	   in	   the	   Syrian	   spiritual	   tradition,	   and	  used	  by	  Evagrius	  Ponticus	  in	  his	  Kephalaia	  Gnostica	  (Chapters	  of	  Knowledge),	  a	  work	  of	  six	  chapters	  or	  rather	  centuria.412	  This	  work	  was	  known	  to	  Barhebraeus,	  who	  quotes	   from	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  407	  Colless,	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  159.	  408	  Ibid.	  Colless	  shows	  the	  influence	  of	  this	  division	  on	  other	  Syrian	  mystics	  in	  his	  article,	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  John	  Saba,"	  Orientalia	  Christiana	  Periodica	  39,	  no.	  1	   (1973):	  93-­‐96.	  Beggiani	   includes	  a	  chapter	  on	   John	   the	  Solitary	  in	  his	  Introduction	  to	  Eastern	  Christian	  Spirituality.	  409	  Wensinck,	   Bar	   Hebraeus's	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   :	   Together	   with	   Some	   Chapters	   from	   His	   Ethikon,	   3,	   522*.	  Wensinck’s	   translation	   of	   this	   introductory	   outline	   is	   as	   follows.	   ‘Into	   four	   chapters	   this	   book	   is	   divided,	  which	   is	   small	   in	   extent	   but	   great	   in	   power.	   The	   first	   [contains]	   instruction	   concerning	   the	   bodily	   labour	  accomplished	   in	   the	  monastery.	  The	  second	   [describes]	   the	  quality	  of	  psychic	   labour	  performed	   in	   the	  cell.	  The	  third	  explains	  the	  spiritual	  rest	  which	  the	  consoling	  Dove	  imparts	  to	  the	  Perfect,	  elevating	  them	  to	  royal	  rank	  and	   introducing	  them	  into	  the	  divine	  cloud	  where	  the	  Lord	   is	  said	  to	  abide.	  The	  fourth	   is	  a	   tale	  of	   the	  author’s	  gradual	  progress	  in	  teachings	  and	  some	  sentences	  communicated	  to	  him	  in	  revelations.’	  410	  Ibid.,	  cv.	  411	  Herman	  Teule,	  "An	  Important	  Concept	  in	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  Mysticism:	  The	  Remembrance	  of	  God,	  dhikr	  
Allah	  –	  'uhdōnō	  d-­‐Alōhō,"	  in	  Gotteserlebnis	  Und	  Gotteslehre:	  Christliche	  Und	  Islamische	  Mystik	  Im	  Orient,	  ed.	  Martin	  Tamcke,	  Göttinger	  Orientforschungen,	  Syriaca	  Reihe	  1	  (Wiesbaden:	  Harrassowitz,	  2010),	  12.	  412	  Colless	  points	   out	   that	   the	  Kephalaia	  Gnostica	  was	  only	  preserved	   in	   the	   Syriac	   and	  Armenian	  versions.	  Evagrius’s	   Greek	   writings	   were	   condemned	   after	   his	   death	   as	   ‘Origenism’,	   i.e.	   the	   teachings	   of	   Origen	   of	  Alexandria	   (c.185-­‐254CE).	   Brian	   E.	   Colless,	   The	  Wisdom	   of	   the	   Pearlers	   :	   An	   Anthology	   of	   Syriac	   Christian	  
Mysticism	  (Kalamazoo,	  Mich.:	  Cistercian	  Publications,	  2008),	  23.	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directly,413 	  and	   also	   to	   others	   such	   as	   John	   of	   Dalyatha	   and	   Isaac	   of	   Nineveh,	   who	  themselves	   composed	   centuria.414	  Teule	   also	   makes	   a	   point	   of	   connecting	   the	   monastic	  tradition	   of	   composing	   centuria,	   with	   that	   of	   thirteenth	   century	   Sufi	   writings	  contemporaneous	   with	   Barhebraeus,	   notably	   the	   sayings	   in	   the	   Hikām,	   or	   ‘words	   of	  wisdom’	   of	   Ibn	   ʿAtāʿ	   Allāh	   (1259-­‐1309CE).415	  There	   seems	   to	   be	   ample	   precedent	   for	  Barhebraeus’	  adoption	  of	  this	  genre	  of	  writing	  concise	  spiritual	  sentences,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	   legacy	  of	  Syrian	  monasticism	  and	  popular	   contemporary	  Sufi	  writings.	  Moreover,	   the	  sentences	  (Syr.	  petgāmē)	  of	  Barhebraeus	  provide	  not	  only	  a	  directive	  for	  novitiate	  monks,	  but	  are	  also	  a	  reflection	  of	  his	  engagement	  with	  philosophy	  and	  theology.	  	  In	  addition,	  Teule	  has	  highlighted	  in	  his	  article	  L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  l'œuvre	  de	  Bar	  `Ebroyo,	  a	  number	  of	  poems	  by	  Barhebraeus	  dedicated	   to	   theme	  of	  divine	   love,	   ‘reḥmtō	  alohoytō’,	  that	  are	  yet	   to	   receive	   sufficient	   scholarly	  attention	  and	  remain	  exclusively	   in	  Syriac	  and	  Latin	  editions.416	  A	  summary	  of	  their	  contents	  in	  the	  secondary	  literature	  indicates	  that	  the	  poems	  of	  Barhebraeus	  cover	  a	  variety	  of	  standard	  themes,	  including	  praise,	  philosophy,	  the	  description	  of	  nature,	  and	   less	   typically,	  erotic	   love.417	  Barsoum	  has	  stated	   that	  aphorism	  and	   philosophy	   are	   a	   typical	   theme	   within	   Syriac	   poetry,	   and	   further	   that	   many	   such	  philosophical	   odes	   are	   to	   be	   found	   amongst	   Barhebraeus’	   poems,	   which	   include	   ‘an	  exposition	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   Socrates’.418	  Takahashi	   locates	   the	   poems	   of	   Barhebraeus,	  referred	   to	  variously	  by	   their	  Latin	  and	  Syriac	   titles,	  Carmina	   and	  Mushḥātā	   respectively,	  within	  the	  category	  of	  belles	  lettres,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  his	  poems	  are	  concerned	  with	   themes	   such	   as	   divine	   knowledge	   and	   love,	   which	   are	   explored	   extensively	   in	   his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  413	  Teule,	   "Christian	   Spiritual	   Sources	   in	   the	   Ethicon	   of	   Barhebraeus,"	   341.	   Teule	   lists	   two	   citations	   from	  Chapters	   I	   and	   III	   of	   the	  Kephalaia	  Gnostica	   (I.89	   and	   III.64),	   which	   are	   quoted	   in	   the	  Ethicon,	  Mēmrā	   IV.	  Antoine	   Guillaumont,	   Les	   Six	   Centuries	   des	   "Képhalaia	  Gnostica"	   d'Évagre	   le	   Pontique.	   Édition	   Critique	   de	   la	  
Version	   Syriaque	  Commune	   et	   Édition	  d'une	  Nouvelle	  Version	   Syriaque	   Intégrale	   avec	   une	  Double	  Traduction	  
Française.	   T.28,	   Patrologia	   Orientalis	   (Paris:	   Firmin-­‐Didot,	   1958),	   58,	   122.	   Bedjan,	   Ethicon	   :	   Seu,	   Moralia	  
Gregorii	   Barhebræi,	   317,	   481.	   Barhebraeus’	   second	   quotation	   from	   Evagrius’	  Kephalaia	  Gnostica	   (III.64)	   is	  discussed	  further	  at	  Chapter	  5,	  p158.	  	  414	  Teule,	  "An	  Important	  Concept	  in	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  Mysticism:	  The	  Remembrance	  of	  God,	  dhikr	  Allah	  –	  
'uhdōnō	  d-­‐Alōhō,"	  12.	  	  415	  Ibid.	  416	  For	   this	   reason,	   a	   study	   of	   the	   poems	   themselves	   has	   not	   been	   included	   in	   this	   chapter,	   see	   further:	  	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  263-­‐64.	   	   Scebabi,	  Gregorii	  Bar-­‐Hebraei	  Carmina.	  Dolabani,	  
Mus̆ḥātā.	  417	  Barsoum	  and	  Moosa,	  The	  Scattered	  Pearls	  :	  A	  History	  of	  Syriac	  Literature	  and	  Sciences,	  479-­‐80.	  418	  Ibid.,	  33.	  
	   103	  
mystical	  works.	  The	  longest	  of	  these	  poems	  is	  his	  poem	  on	  Divine	  Wisdom,	  which	  Barsoum	  declares	  is	  ‘considered	  his	  most	  superb	  masterpiece’,	  and	  is	  quite	  unusual	  in	  Syriac	  Poetry	  for	   its	   theme	   of	   erotic	   love	   or	   nasīb.419	  Teule	   has	   suggested	   that	   those	   of	   Barhebraeus’	  poems	   treating	   the	   theme	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God	  as	  an	   intoxicating	  wine	  deserve	  comparison	  with	  the	  mystical	  poetry	  of	  Ibn	  al-­‐Farīd	  (1181-­‐1235CE).420	  	  Barhebraeus	   showed	   great	   interest	   in	   the	  Book	  of	   the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	   and	   searched	   the	  monastic	   libraries	  West	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  in	  order	  to	  procure	  a	  complete	  copy	  in	  1269CE,	  following	   the	   request	   of	   a	  monk	   of	   the	  monastery	   of	  Mar	  Mattai,	   near	  Mosul.421	  He	  was	  sufficiently	   impressed	   by	   its	   contents	   to	  make	   his	   own	   arrangement	   of	   the	   book	   and	   to	  provide	   a	   commentary	   in	  1276CE.422	  However,	  Teule	   concludes	   that	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  
Hierotheos	   was	   ‘certainly	   not	   included	   in	   the	   normal	   spiritual	   reading	   of	   the	   monks	   of	  Barhebraeus’	   times,	   since	   no	   extracts	   are	   found	   in	   the	   common	   spiritual	   anthologies’.423	  Frothingham	  has	   suggested	   that	   in	  making	   his	   own	   compendium,	   Barhebraeus	   distorted	  the	   meaning	   in	   order	   to	   impart	   a	   more	   orthodox	   Christian	   character,	   claiming	   that	   the	  translator	  into	  Syriac	  had	  corrupted	  the	  original	  Greek	  text,	  which	  he	  himself	  then	  sought	  to	   rectify. 424 	  Gherrit	   Reinink	   has	   suggested	   that	   Barhebraeus’	   compendium	   further	  ‘fostered	  the	  popularity	  and	  diffusion	  of	  its	  ideas	  among	  Jacobite	  monks	  in	  Northern	  Iraq’	  of	   the	   thirteenth	   century.425	  He	   states	   that	   the	   authorship	   of	   the	   work	   had	   first	   been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  419	  Ibid.,	  34.	  In	  Arabic	  medieval	  literature,	  nasīb	  is	  the	  generic	  term	  for	  love	  poetry,	  which	  generally	  addresses	  the	  feelings	  of	  erotic	  love	  for	  a	  woman.	  R.	  Jacobi,	  "Nasīb,"	  ed.	  P.	  Bearman,	  et	  al.,	  Online	  ed.,	  The	  Encyclopaedia	  
of	  Islam,	  Second	  Edition	  (Leiden:	  Brill	  Online,	  2013).	  420	  Teule,	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  264.	  421	  Marsh,	  The	  Book	  Which	  Is	  Called	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  with	  Extracts	  from	  the	  Prolegomena	  and	  
Commentary	   of	   Theodosios	   of	   Antioch	   and	   from	   the	   "Book	   of	   Excerpts"	   and	   Other	   Works	   of	   Gregory	   Bar-­‐
Hebræus,	   194-­‐96.	   British	   Museum	   manuscript	   (ADD.	   7189),	   Colophon	   (p167	   b).	   The	   description	   of	  Barhebraeus’	   search	   given	   by	   this	   colophon	   would	   seem	   to	   coincide	   with	   the	   evidence	   of	   the	   addition	   of	  eighty-­‐three	  new	  leaves	  to	  the	  manuscript.	  However,	  whether	  the	  author	  of	  the	  colophon	  and	  the	  copyist	  of	  these	  additional	  leaves	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  hand	  is	  questioned	  by	  Marsh,	  despite	  the	  conclusions	  of	  Wright.	  422	  Ibid.,	  197-­‐99.	  This	  is	  included	  in	  the	  second	  British	  Museum	  manuscript	  (ORIENTAL	  1017)	  recorded	  by	  Marsh,	  folios	  120b-­‐159a	  contain	  the	  rearrangement,	  introduction	  and	  notes	  by	  Barhebraeus.	  423	  Teule,	  "Gregory	  Barhebraeus	  and	  His	  Time:	  The	  Syrian	  Renaissance,"	  24.	  424	  Arthur	  Lincoln	  Frothingham,	  Stephen	  Bar	  Sudaili	  :	  The	  Syrian	  Mystic,	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  Hierotheos	   (Leyden:	  E.J.	  Brill,	  1886),	  84-­‐89.	  Frothingham	  also	  provides	  the	  explanatory	  introductions	  provided	  by	  Theodosius	  and	  Barhebraeus	  to	  their	  commentaries,	  including	  the	  Syriac	  texts	  and	  their	  translation	  into	  English.	  425	  G.	  J.	  Reinink,	  "'Origenism'	  in	  Thirteenth-­‐Century	  Northern	  Iraq,"	  in	  After	  Bardaisan	  :	  Studies	  on	  Continuity	  
and	   Change	   in	   Syriac	   Christianity	   ed.	   Han	   J.	   W.	   Drijvers,	   Alexander	   Cornelis	   Klugkist,	   and	   G.	   J.	   Reinink,	  Orientalia	  Lovaniensia	  Analecta	  (Leuven:	  Peeters,	  1999),	  240.	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questioned	   by	   Cyriacus	   (Patriarch	   of	   Antioch	   from	   793	   to	   817),	   who	   had	   attributed	   the	  book	  to	  the	  heretic	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē	  and	  not	  to	  Hierotheos.426	  Hence	  he	  points	  out	  that	  Barhebraeus	  seems	  to	  have	  changed	  his	  opinion	  on	  the	  issue,	  since	  in	  the	  Candelabrum	  of	  
the	  Sanctuary	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  Directions,	  he	  follows	  Cyriacus’	   identification	  of	  the	  forgery	  by	  the	  heretic	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē,	  while	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  the	  book,	  he	  accepts	  that	  the	  author	  is	  Hierotheos.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  Candelabrum,	  a	  West	  Syrian	  theological	  encyclopedia	  composed	  around	  1266-­‐67,427	  Barhebraeus	  deals	  with	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos	  quite	  simply	   as	   the	   book	   containing	   the	   heretical	   ideas	   of	   the	  monk	   Stephen	   bar	   Ṣūdhailē.	   He	  specifically	  refers	  to	  what	  he	  regards	  as	  the	  central	  inspiration	  for	  the	  monistic	  eschatology	  of	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē,428	  in	  the	  following	  way,	  ‘and	  thus	  even	  Demons	  receive	  grace,	  and	  everything	   returns	   to	   the	  Divine	  Nature,	   according	   as	   Paul	   said,	   “that	   God	  may	   be	   all	   in	  all.”’.429	  However,	  in	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  seemingly	  quotes	  with	  approval	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  this	  doctrine,	  i.e.	  the	  interpretation	  of	  St	  Paul’s	  words	  as	  meaning	  that	  everything	  returns	  to	  the	  Divine	  Nature.430	  It	  could	  indeed	  be,	  as	  Reinink	  suggests,	  that	  after	  having	  studied	  its	  contents	  for	  several	  years	  and	  in	  following	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  authorship	  of	  Hierotheos	  by	   Theodosius,	  who	  made	   a	   commentary	   of	   the	  work	   in	   the	   ninth	   century,	   Barhebraeus	  himself	  came	  to	  accept	  it	  as	  legitimate.431	  	  	  
The	  Monastic	  Sources	  for	  Barhebraeus’	  Spiritual	  Works	  Early	  Syrian	  asceticism	  was	  profoundly	   influenced	  by	  Egyptian	  monastic	  authors	  such	  as	  Evagrius	   Ponticus,	   whose	   writings	   originally	   written	   in	   Greek	   became	   particularly	  prominent	   in	   the	   Syrian	   tradition	   of	   monastic	   spirituality.432	  This	   trend	   rested	   on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  426	  Ibid.,	  239.	  427	  Herman	  Teule,	   "Barhebraeus,"	   in	  Christian-­‐Muslim	  Relations	   :	  A	  Bibliographical	  History.	  Volume	  4,	   (1200-­‐
1350),	   ed.	   David	   Thomas,	   Alexander	   Mallett,	   and	   Juan	   Pedro	   Monferrer	   Sala,	   History	   of	   Christian-­‐Muslim	  Relations	  (Leiden	  ;	  Boston:	  Brill,	  2012),	  595.	  428	  The	  mysticism	  of	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē	  has	  often	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘pantheism’	  in	  scholarship	  on	  Syriac	  studies,	  however	  his	  monistic	  eschatology	  derives	  from	  a	  Neoplatonic	  cosmology.	  429	  See	  Marsh’s	  translation,	  Section	  III.	  Extract	  from	  “The	  Lamp	  of	  the	  Sanctuary;	  concerning	  the	  Ecclesiastical	  Foundations”,	   in:	   Marsh,	   The	   Book	  Which	   Is	   Called	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Holy	   Hierotheos,	   with	   Extracts	   from	   the	  
Prolegomena	  and	  Commentary	  of	  Theodosios	  of	  Antioch	  and	   from	  the	   "Book	  of	  Excerpts"	  and	  Other	  Works	  of	  
Gregory	  Bar-­‐Hebræus,	  175,	  64*.	  430	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  this	  point,	  see	  the	  later	  section	  of	  on	  the	  ‘Unification	  of	  the	  Mind’.	  431	  Reinink,	  "'Origenism'	  in	  Thirteenth-­‐Century	  Northern	  Iraq,"	  239-­‐40.	  432	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  172-­‐75.	  	  	  
	   105	  
translation	   of	   the	   Greek	   writings	   into	   Syriac	   during	   the	   fifth	   and	   sixth	   centuries,	   which	  effected	   a	   transformation	   in	   the	   monastic	   vocabulary.	   In	   their	   Introduction	   to	   A	  
Bibliography	   of	   Syriac	   Ascetic	   and	   Mystical	   Literature,	   Grigory	   Kessel	   and	   Karl	   Pinggéra	  state	  that	  Syriac	  spirituality	  has	  its	  own	  unique	  features	  and	  Semitic	  background,	  but	  note	  that	   it	   ‘also	  relies	  extensively	  on	  the	  Greek	  patristic	   tradition’.433	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Syriac	  translation	  of	  Greek	  mystical	  works	  ended	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Muslim	  invasions	  in	  the	  seventh	  century,	  with	  the	  Scala	  Paradisi	  of	  John	  Climacus	  (525-­‐606CE),	  a	  monk	  from	  the	  monastery	   of	  Mount	   Sinai,	   probably	  being	   the	   last	   such	  work	   to	   be	   translated,434	  the	  influence	   of	   the	   Greek	   mystical	   writings	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   Barhebraeus’	   mysticism.	   This	  emerges	  especially	  in	  the	  key	  figures	  and	  themes	  included	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  mystical	  writing.	  	  In	   the	   introduction	   to	   part	   four	   of	   the	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove,	   Barhebraeus	   identifies	   the	   ‘Aba	  Evagrius’,	   as	   playing	   a	   particularly	   significant	   role	   in	   his	   own	   spiritual	   progress.435	  In	  addition,	  the	  apophatic	  teaching	  of	  Gregory	  of	  Nyssa	  and	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  the	  Areopagite,	  also	  impacted	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism.	  The	  studies	  of	  Robert	  Beulay	  have	  shown	  that	  John	  Sābā	   (also	   known	   as	   John	   of	  Dalyatha)	  was	   heavily	   influenced	  by	   the	   ideas	   of	   these	   two	  mystical	  writers,	  particularly	  in	  his	  placing	  of	  ecstasy	  at	  the	  interior	  of	  the	  divine	  darkness	  (from	  the	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysian	  Mystical	  Theology).	  His	  giving	  of	  a	  dynamic	  character,	   to	   this	  darkness	  which	  emanates	  rays	  of	   light,	   likely	  draws	  from	  Gregory	  of	  Nyssa’s	  notion	  of	  an	  infinite	  progress	   in	   the	  vision	  of	  God.436	  Barhebraeus	  does	  deploy	  the	  Dionysian	   image	  of	  the	   ‘divine	  darkness’	   (derived	   from	  Gregory	  of	  Nyssa),	   in	  which	   the	  One	   is	  grasped	   in	  an	  ignorance	  of	  all	  that	  can	  be	  known.437	  It	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  some	  of	  these	  ideas	  came	  to	  influence	  the	  mysticism	  of	  Barhebraeus	  through	  his	  reading	  of	  John	  of	  Dalyatha.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  433	  Grigory	  Kessel	  and	  Karl	  Pinggéra,	  A	  Bibliography	  of	  Syriac	  Ascetic	  and	  Mystical	  Literature,	  Eastern	  Christian	  Studies	  (Leuven	  ;	  Walpole,	  MA:	  Peeters,	  2011),	  2.	  434	  Ibid.,	  3.	  435	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  61,	  578*.	  436	  Robert	  Beulay,	  "Formes	  de	  Lumiére	  et	  Lumiére	  Sans	  Forme:	  Le	  Théme	  de	  la	  Lumiére	  dans	  la	  Mystique	  de	  Jean	   de	   Dalyatha,"	   in	  Mélanges	   Antoine	   Guillaumont	   :	   Contributions	   À	   L'étude	   des	   Christianismes	   Orientaux,	  
avec	   une	   Bibliographie	   du	   Dédicataire,	   ed.	   Antoine	   Guillaumont,	   Cahiers	   D'orientalisme	   (Genève:	   Cramer,	  1988),	  135.	  437	  Vladimir	   Lossky,	  The	  Vision	  of	  God,	   Library	   of	  Orthodox	  Theology	   and	   Spirituality	   (London:	   Faith	   Press,	  1963),	  100.	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John	  of	  Dalyatha	  is	  one	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  favoured	  spiritual	  authorities	  and	  who	  is	  in	  Teule’s	  estimation,	   ‘probably	   the	  most	   quoted	   Syriac	   author	   in	   the	   Ethicon	   and	   the	   Book	   of	   the	  Dove’.438 	  Teule	   points	   out	   that	   only	   during	   the	   twelfth	   century,	   the	   century	   directly	  preceding	  Barhebraeus,	  did	  the	  writings	  of	  John	  Sābā	  come	  to	  be	  appreciated	  by	  the	  West	  Syrian	  monks,	  who	  ‘inserted	  important	  extracts	  into	  their	  spiritual	  compilations’.439	  While	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  Barhebraeus	  used	  such	  monastic	  compendia,	  Teule	  concludes	  that	  since	  he	  did	  not	  include	  quotations	  from	  John	  of	  Dalyatha’s	  Letters	  in	  the	  Ethicon,	  he	  cannot	  have	  had	   access	   to	   those	  West	   Syrian	   compendia	   devoted	   almost	   exclusively	   to	   John’s	  works,	  and	  including	  both	  the	  Letters	  and	  the	  Homilies	  in	  particular.440	  Teule	  also	  emphasises	  that	  Barhebraeus’	  chapter	  on	  the	  love	  of	  God	  in	  the	  Ethicon	  is	  unique	  in	  Syriac	  literature,	  due	  to	  his	  systematic	  approach	  that	  characterises	  his	  work	  in	  general.	  Indeed	  while	  other	  Syrian	  monastic	   authors	   such	   as	   Isaac	   of	  Nineveh	   (d.	   c.	   700CE)	   and	   John	   Sābā	   give	   comparable	  reflections	   and	   meditations	   devoted	   to	   the	   theme	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   their	   work	   is	   not	  analytical	  in	  the	  manner	  typifying	  Barhebraeus.441	  	  	  
The	  Syrian	  Dionysian	  Tradition	  Barhebraeus	  provides	   two	  specific	  quotations	   from	   the	   ‘Great	  Dionysius	   (Areopagita)’,	   in	  the	  Ethicon	  Mēmrā	  3,	  which	  correspond	  to	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius’	  The	  Divine	  Names	  and	  Letter	  
V.442	  Teule	  also	  notes	  that	  apart	  from	  one	  isolated	  extract,	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius’	  work	  is	  not	  to	  be	  found	  within	  the	  West	  Syrian	  monastic	  compilations.443	  This	  would	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  Barhebraeus	  had	  some	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  texts	  of	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  that	  he	  quotes,	  since	  he	  did	  not	  simply	  lift	  these	  quotations	  from	  an	  anthology.	  From	  the	  fact	  that	  Barhebraeus	  quotes	  directly	   from	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius’	  work	  of	  The	  Divine	  Names,	   it	  would	  seem	  that	  he	  was	  acquainted	  with	  its	  teachings.	  Colless	  suggests	  that	  despite	  Barhebraeus	  only	  making	  two	  direct	  references	   in	  his	  writings	   to	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  (once	   in	   the	  Ethicon	  and	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  438	  Teule,	  "Christian	  Spiritual	  Sources	  in	  the	  Ethicon	  of	  Barhebraeus,"	  342.	  439	  Ibid.,	  351.	  Teule	  gives	  details	  of	   the	   inclusion	  of	   John	  of	  Dalyatha’s	  works	   in	   five	  such	  monastic	  spiritual	  anthologies,	  which	  include	  selections	  from	  the	  Homilies,	  the	  Letters,	  the	  Discourses,	  and	  Chapters	  of	  Knowledge.	  440	  Ibid.,	  343.	  441	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  263.	  442	  "Christian	   Spiritual	   Sources	   in	   the	   Ethicon	   of	   Barhebraeus,"	   346.	   Bedjan,	  Ethicon	   :	  Seu,	  Moralia	  Gregorii	  
Barhebræi,	  315.	  	  443	  Teule,	  "Christian	  Spiritual	  Sources	  in	  the	  Ethicon	  of	  Barhebraeus,"	  353.	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Dove	  respectively),	  ‘his	  influence	  extends	  much	  deeper	  than	  this	  fact	  would	  indicate’.444	  The	  
Ethicon	  and	  particularly	  the	  Dove	  betray	  many	  other	  Dionysian	  motifs	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysian	  works	  which	   are	   thought	   to	   be	   composed	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  sixth	   century	  by	   a	   Syrian	  monk	  who	  adopted	   the	   identity	  of	  Dionysius,	   the	  disciple	  of	   St	  Paul.445	  His	   writings	   had	   considerable	   impact	   both	   in	   the	   East	   and	   West.	   The	   Syrian	  Orthodox	  theologian	  Severos	  of	  Antioch	  (d.	  538CE),	  accepted	  the	  Areopagite’s	  writings	  as	  genuine	  and	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina	   translated	  them	  from	  Greek	   into	  Syriac,	  while	   the	  Latin	  translation	  by	  Erigena	  in	  858,	  was	  followed	  by	  commentaries	  of	  the	  scholastics,	   including	  Albert	  Magnus,	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  and	  Bonaventure	  (c.	  1221-­‐1274CE).446	  	  	  Certain	  Dionysian	  concepts	  are	  also	  of	  considerable	  significance	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism.	  However,	   these	  have	  been	   reinterpreted	   to	   form	  part	  of	  his	  understanding	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God	   that	   is	   distinct	   from	   the	   Dionysian	   metaphysics	   of	   eros.	   Other	   typically	   Dionysian	  concepts	  also	  evident	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism,	  include	  ‘deification’	  (Gr.	  theosis)	  and	  the	  ‘cloud’	   (Syr.	   ʿarpelā;	   Gr.	   gnophos)	   of	   divine	   darkness,	   from	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius’	   Mystical	  
Theology.447	  Barhebraeus	  makes	  many	  other	  references	  to	  the	  cloud,	  as	  noted	  by	  Wensinck,	  though	  he	  does	  not	  quote	  the	  authority	  of	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius.448	  Both	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh	  and	  John	  of	  Dalyatha	  use	  the	  term	  ʿarpelā,	  and	  the	  latter	  author	  is	  quoted	  twice	  by	  Barhebraeus	  in	  the	  Ethicon,	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  vision	  of	  God’s	  glory	  in	  clouds	  of	  light.449	  	  These	  Dionysian	   concepts	   also	  occur	   in	   the	   related	  Syriac	  mystical	  work,	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  
Holy	  Hierotheos,	  whose	   author	   identifies	   himself	   as	   the	   very	   same	  Hierotheos	  whom	   the	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  claims	  as	  his	  teacher.	  Both	  attributions	  are	  pseudonymous,	  the	  identity	  of	   the	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	   remains	   unknown,	   while	   the	   book	   of	   the	   disciple	   of	   St	   Paul,	  Hierotheos,	   supposedly	   the	   teacher	   of	   Dionysius,	   was	   actually	   written	   by	   a	  West	   Syrian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  444	  Colless,	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  155.	  445	  Ibid.	  	  446	  The	  Wisdom	  of	  the	  Pearlers	  :	  An	  Anthology	  of	  Syriac	  Christian	  Mysticism,	  37-­‐39.	  447	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  John	  Saba,"	  101.	  448	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	   ciii-­‐civ,	  193*,	  487*,	  98*,	  505*.	  449	  See	  Wensinck’s	  Introduction,	  with	  references	  to	  Bedjan’s	  text	  of	  the	  Ethicon.	  Ibid.,	  civ-­‐cv,	  10*,	  103*.	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  450	  Colless,	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  155.	  451	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  John	  Saba,"	  100-­‐01.	  452	  Hausherr	  discusses	  the	  conclusions	  of	  A.	  L.	  Frothingham	  at	  some	  length	  in	  Section	  4,	  ‘L’influence	  du	  «Livre	  de	   Saint	   Hiérothée»’.	   Irénée	   Hausherr,	   "De	   Doctrina	   Spirituali	   Christianorum	   Orientalium,	   Quaestiones	   et	  Scripta,	  I	  "	  Orientalia	  Christiana	  30,	  no.	  3	  (1933):	  184,	  94.	  Frothingham,	  Stephen	  Bar	  Sudaili	  :	  The	  Syrian	  Mystic,	  
and	  the	  Book	  of	  Hierotheos,	  58-­‐59.	  453	  Rosemary	   A.	   Arthur,	   "A	   Sixth-­‐Century	   Origenist:	   Stephen	   Bar	   Sudaile	   and	   His	   Relationship	   with	   Ps-­‐Dionysius"	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Twelfth	  International	  Conference	  on	  Patristic	  Studies,	  Oxford,	  1991),	  369.	  	  Arthur	  refers	   to	   the	  dating	  of	   the	  corpus	  suggested	  by	  Rorem	  and	  Lamoreaux,	  see	   further:	  Paul	  Rorem	  and	  John	   C.	   Lamoreaux,	   John	   of	   Scythopolis	   and	   the	  Dionysian	   Corpus	   :	   Annotating	   the	  Areopagite,	   Oxford	   Early	  Christian	  Studies	  (Oxford	  ;	  New	  York:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1998),	  10-­‐15.	  454	  Arthur,	  "A	  Sixth-­‐Century	  Origenist:	  Stephen	  Bar	  Sudaile	  and	  His	  Relationship	  with	  Ps-­‐Dionysius,"	  369.	  Arthur	  refers	  to	  the	  argument	  of	  Irénée	  Hausherr	  for	  this	  dating	  of	  Stephen’s	  activities.	  Hausherr,	  "De	  Doctrina	  Spirituali	  Christianorum	  Orientalium,	  Quaestiones	  et	  Scripta,	  I	  "	  196-­‐97.	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The Knowledge of God and Neoplatonic contemplation 	  In	  the	  one	  hundred	  sentences	  of	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	   the	   love	  of	  God	  surpasses	  all	  other	  means	   of	   knowing	   God.	   For	   Barhebraeus,	   the	   love	   of	   God	   overcomes	   the	   seeking	   of	  knowledge	  of	  God	  in	  terms	  of	  His	  Being.	  Barhebraeus	  emphasises	   in	  the	  Dove,	   the	  way	  of	  the	  ‘faith	  founded	  on	  revelations’,455	  which	  demands	  quite	  a	  different	  path	  to	  the	  necessary	  and	  natural	  knowledge	  of	  God.	  This	  higher	  and	  much	  more	  difficult	  path	  is	  to	  know	  through	  direct	  illumination,	  the	  way	  of	  those	  initiated	  into	  this	  path,	  by	  their	  monastic	  elders.	  What	  identifies	   faith	   (haymānūtā)	   is	   the	   knowledge	   by	   the	   Initiated	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   a	  knowledge	   that	   is	   received	   as	   a	   gift	   and	   not	   acquired	   by	   one’s	   own	   effort,	   and	   thus	   is	  knowledge	  through	  revelations.	  Barhebraeus	  states	  that	  the	  Initiated	  ‘know	  His	  divinity	  by	  essential	  knowledge’	  and	   this	  essential	  knowledge	   forms	   ‘the	   foundation	  of	   their	   love’.456	  Here,	   Barhebraeus	   is	   reiterating	   notions	   found	   in	   the	   writings	   of	   seventh	   century	   East	  Syrian	  mystics	  such	  as	   Isaac	  of	  Nineveh,	  concerning	  the	  divine	  revelation	  of	  spiritual	  and	  essential	  knowledge,	  which	  surpasses	  that	  of	  the	  philosophers.457	  	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh	  hailed	  from	  the	  Church	  of	  the	  East,	  but	  by	  the	  ninth	  century	  his	  writings	  had	   crossed	   over	   the	   Eastern	   denominations,	   coming	   to	   be	   read	   and	   appreciated	   by	   the	  Syrian	   Orthodox	   monks,	   amongst	   others. 458 	  Indeed	   Isaac’s	   criticism	   of	   philosophy	  (pīlāsāwpūtā)	   is	   picked	   up	   in	   the	   writings	   of	   his	   later	   seventh	   century	   monastic	  contemporaries,	   Dadīšō	   of	   Bet	   Qaṭrāyē	   and	   Simeon	   d-­‐Taybūṭēh.459	  Isaac	   characterises	  philosophy	  as	  a	  ‘downwards	  knowledge’,	  in	  quoting	  Basil	  of	  Caesarea,	  which	  is	  ‘a	  converse	  which	  opens	  up	  the	  door	  so	  that	  we	  can	  peer	  (ndīq)	  down	  into	  knowledge	  of	  created	  beings,	  and	  not	  up	   into	  spiritual	  mysteries’.	  According	  to	   Isaac,	   in	  a	   further	  paraphrase	  of	  Basil’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  455	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  65,	  583*,	  Sentences	  19-­‐20.	  456	  Ibid.,	  55,	  573*.	  Here,	  Barhebraeus	  recognises	  that	  even	  faith	  has	  tended	  to	  become	  a	  matter	  of	  tradition	  followed	  blindly	  by	  the	  common	  faithful,	  which	  he	  calls	  ‘shadowy	  faith’	  in	  Sentence	  20.	  457	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  184-­‐86.	  458	  For	  the	  further	  influence	  of	  Isaac,	  even	  beyond	  the	  Middle	  East	  -­‐	  Sebastian	  P.	  Brock,	  "From	  Qatar	  to	  Tokyo,	  by	  Way	  of	  Mar	  Saba:	  The	  Translations	  of	  Isaac	  of	  Beth	  Qaṭraye	  (Isaac	  the	  Syrian),"	  ARAM	  Periodical	  12	  (2000).	  459	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  188-­‐91.	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letter,	  spiritual	  mysteries	  are	  seen	  through	  Evagrius’	  ‘ladder	  of	  the	  intellect’,	  and	  ‘the	  being	  raised	   up	   above	   all	   ordinary	   vision’.460	  Dadīšō	   also	   distinguishes	   the	   spirituality	   of	   the	  ascetics	  from	  the	  endeavours	  of	  the	  ‘school-­‐men’	  (eskōlāyē)	  who	  devote	  themselves	  to	  the	  ‘learning	  of	   reason	  (yullphānā	  da-­‐mlīlūtā)’	   from	  the	  books	  of	  Aristotle.461	  By	  contrast,	   the	  West	  Syrian	  philosopher	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina	  followed	  the	  tradition	  of	  the	  Greek	  authors	  of	  ascetic	  spirituality	  as	  the	  ‘true	  philosophy’,	  462	  rather	  than	  viewing	  their	  form	  of	  spirituality	  in	   opposition	   to	   philosophy	  per	   se.	   Thus	   Barhebraeus,	  while	   drawing	   on	   the	   East	   Syrian	  spiritual	   tradition,	   especially	   Isaac’s	   notion	   of	   revelation	   as	   a	   gift	   which	   comes	   by	   the	  power	   of	   the	   Holy	   Spirit,463 	  combines	   these	   insights	   with	   the	   more	   holistic	   view	   of	  philosophy	  outlined	  in	  the	  spiritual	  curriculum	  of	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina.	  Barhebraeus	  does	  not	  adopt	  the	  ‘anti-­‐intellectual	  tradition’	  of	  the	  East	  Syrian	  ascetics.464	  Furthermore,	  such	  a	  distinction	   between	   scholastic	   philosophy	   and	   ascetic	   spirituality	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   have	  occurred	  in	  the	  same	  way	  for	  the	  West	  Syrians,	  where	  both	  activities	  were	   located	   in	  the	  monastic	  centres,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  East	  Syrian	  school	  system.465	  	  In	  Barhebraeus’	  chapter	  on	  solitude	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  the	  greatest	  profit	  of	  solitude	  is	  ‘spiritual	  enjoyment’,	  acquired	  ‘by	  the	  true	  knowledge	  of	  the	  divine	  nature’.466	  Barhebraeus	  states	  that	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  which	  is	  sought	  through	  syllogisms,	  enslaves	  the	  mind	  to	  ‘time	  and	  place’,	  while	  it	  is	  the	  labours	  of	  soul	  and	  body	  in	  ‘solitude	  and	  silence’	  (w-­‐šelyā	  w-­‐
šetqā),467	  that	   brings	   illumination	   to	   the	   mind	   by	   divine	   revelations.468	  The	   receiving	   of	  ‘revelations’	   (gulyānē)	   from	   the	   Spirit,	   confirms	   the	   understanding	   of	   God	   received	   by	  
theōria.	  Indeed	  he	  states	  that	  his	  sentences	  will	  only	  profit	  those	  who	  have	  ‘trained	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  460	  Ibid.,	  186.	  461	  Ibid.,	  188-­‐90.	  462	  King,	  "Why	  Were	  the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	  67.	  463	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  185-­‐6.	  464	  King,	  "Why	  Were	  the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	  69.	  465	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  64-­‐68.	  466	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  20,	  539*.	  467	  Ibid.,	  79,	  597*,	  Sentence	  95.	  ‘When	  you	  wish	  to	  give	  rest	  to	  your	  mind	  from	  attaining	  profound	  questions	  by	  syllogistic	  intricacies,	  and	  you	  will	  acquire	  solitude	  and	  silence	  with	  steady	  labours,	  then	  be	  patient,	  and	  be	  not	  dejected	  in	  your	  way.	  Ere	  long	  your	  sun	  will	  rise	  and	  illuminate	  your	  evening	  and	  show	  you	  your	  beauty	  and	  liberate	  you	  from	  the	  slavery	  of	  time	  and	  place.’	  468	  Ibid.,	  79,	  597*,	  Sentence	  93.	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knowledge	  of	  divine	  and	  human	  practice,	   longing	  to	  see	  in	  revelations	  those	  things	  which	  his	  speculation	  has	  reached’.469	  Thus	  alongside	  the	  distinction	  between	  knowledge	  gained	  by	  revelations	  and	  knowledge	  by	  tēoriya,	  Barhebraeus	  makes	  a	  further	  distinction	  between	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  or	  speculative	  knowledge,	  asserting	  the	  necessity	  of	  both	  types	  of	  knowledge.	   He	   emphasises	   a	   longing	   for	  what	   goes	   beyond	   the	   acquirement	   of	   practical	  and	   theoretical	  knowledge,	   to	  see	  by	  revelations,	  what	   lies	  beyond	   the	  noetic.	  The	  Syriac	  term,	   tēoriya,	   is	   a	   loan	   word	   from	   Greek	   philosophy,	   which	   became	   widely	   used	   in	   the	  Syrian	  tradition	  with	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  Greek	  writings	  of	  Evagrius	  in	  the	  fifth	  century,	  and	  subsequently	  with	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  Dionysian	  corpus	  by	  Sergius	  of	  Reshʿaina.470	  For	   the	   translator	   and	   philosopher	   Sergius,	   the	   attainment	   of	   theōria	   is	   ‘the	   highest	  knowledge’	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Being,	   to	   which	   all	   men	   aspire.471	  Sergius,	   as	   we	   have	   seen	  already,	  was	   greatly	   influenced	   also	   by	   Evagrius.	   In	   Evagrian	   spiritual	   theology,	   practice	  was	  necessary	  for	  acquiring	  the	  detachment	  of	  apatheia,	  or	  ‘passionlessness’,	  and	  this	  was	  essential	  for	  progress	  to	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  contemplation	  or	  theōria.472	  In	  Brock’s	  article	  on	   theōria,	  he	   indicates	   the	  elements	   in	   Isaac’s	   tēoriya	  which	  are	  particularly	  Evagrian	   in	  origin,	   and	   how	   certain	   elements	   of	   tēoriya	   had	   ‘gained	   currency’	   in	   the	   contemporary	  seventh	  century	  Syriac	  monastic	  writers.473	  Amongst	   the	  East	  Syrian	  mystics,	   tēoriya	  was	  understood	  slightly	  differently	  from	  the	  Greek	  philosophical	  term	  itself,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  in	   the	   kind	   of	   definitions	   of	   tēoriya	   given	   by	   Isaac	   of	  Nineveh,	   such	   as	   ‘spiritual	   prayer’,	  ‘spiritual	  vision’	  and	  ‘vision	  of	  the	  soul’.474	  West	  Syrians	  like	  Sergius	  and	  Barhebraeus	  also	  adopted	   the	   Evagrian	   tradition	   of	   theōria,	   but	   not	   without	   recognising	   its	   philosophical	  background.	  In	  doing	  so,	  these	  philosophers	  presented	  a	  more	  harmonised	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  both	  theōria	  and	  praxis,	  in	  the	  spiritual	  life.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  469	  Ibid.,	  80,	  598*,	  Sentence	  98.	  470	  See	   Sebastian	  P.	  Brock,	   "Some	  Uses	   of	   the	  Term	  Theoria	   in	   the	  Writings	   of	   Isaac	   of	  Nineveh,"	  Parole	  de	  
l'Orient	  20	  (1995).	  In	  the	  seventh	  century,	  significant	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  is	  made	  by	  Babai’s	  commentary	  on	  the	  
Kephalaia	  Gnostica,	  Gregory	  of	  Cyprus,	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh	  and	  Simeon	  d-­‐Taybūṭēh.	  471	  King,	  "Alexander	  of	  Aphrodisias'	  On	  the	  Principles	  of	  the	  Universe	  in	  a	  Syriac	  Adaptation."	  Sergius	  provides	  this	   comment	   to	   his	   translation	   of	   Alexander’s	   treatise,	   ‘Because	   of	   this	  we	   say	   accurately	   that	   everything	  desires	  the	  Being.	  It	  seems	  that	  also	  among	  men	  the	  knowledge	  of	  Him	  -­‐	  what	  we	  call	  theoria	  -­‐	  is	  their	  [men’s]	  fulfilment,	  because	  knowledge	  is	  the	  highest	  blessedness	  and	  fulfilment	  [that	  exists]	  for	  men…	  and	  the	  head	  of	  all	  knowledge	  is	  theoria	  of	  Him.’	  472	  Beggiani,	  Introduction	  to	  Eastern	  Christian	  Spirituality	  :	  The	  Syriac	  Tradition,	  44-­‐45.	  473	  Brock,	  "Some	  Uses	  of	  the	  Term	  Theoria	  in	  the	  Writings	  of	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh,"	  409.	  474	  Ibid.	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  The	   notion	   of	   tēoriya	   that	   became	   so	   influential	   for	   the	   Syriac	   spiritual	   writers,	   who	  followed	  the	  thought	  of	  Origen	  and	  Evagrius,	   is	  highly	  Neoplatonic.475	  Evagrius	  conceived	  of	   humanity	   as	   being	   ‘fallen	   intellects’,	   given	   bodies	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   returning	   to	   God	  through	   the	   stages	   of	   purification	   of	   the	   intellect	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   ‘union	   with	   the	  Godhead	  through	  knowledge’.476	  Seely	  Beggiani	  contrasts	  Evagrianism	  with	  the	  mysticism	  of	   Gregory	   of	   Nyssa	   and	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	   for	   whom	   the	   intellect	   must	   ultimately	  surrender	   itself,	   in	   order	   ‘to	   reach	   a	   level	   of	   ignorance	   which	   is	   above	   any	   human	  knowledge’.477	  In	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   Divine,	   a	   region	   thus	   represented	   as	   darkness,	  Beggiani	   says	   that	   ‘The	   intellect	   ceases	   to	   function,	  and	  no	   further	  human	  understanding	  (theōria)	   is	   possible.’478	  Barhebraeus	   does	  move	   in	   this	   direction,	   but	   he	   does	   not	   speak	  precisely	  of	  the	  goal	  of	  ignorance	  or	  surrender	  of	  the	  intellect,	  instead	  of	  a	  moving	  beyond	  the	  capacities	  of	  the	  intellect,	  towards	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  In	  a	  section	  of	  the	  Ethicon	  wherein	  he	   quotes	   various	   sayings	   of	   the	   Initiated	   about	   love,	   he	   cites	   the	   following:	   ‘Love	   is	   the	  power	  which	  springs	  from	  nature	  and	  superates	  the	  will.	  The	  mind	  cannot	  attain	  it,	  nor	  can	  the	  tongue	  explain	  it.’479	  	  Barhebraeus	   uses	   the	   term	   tēoriya	   not	   only	   for	   the	   Initiated,	   as	   they	   are	   engaged	   in	  ‘contemplation’,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  theoretical	  sciences	  of	  the	  philosophers,	  who	  are	  engaged	  in	  ‘speculation’.	  Wensinck	  uses	  these	  alternative	  translations	  of	  tēoriya,	  contemplation	  and	  speculation,	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  approaches	  of	  these	  two	  groups.480	  However,	  when	  Barhebraeus	  objects	  to	  ‘speculation’	  as	  the	  sole	  means	  of	  understanding	  the	  nature	  of	  God,	  he	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  referring	  only	  to	  the	  methods	  of	  the	  philosophers.	  Indeed	  he	  admits	  that	  he	  cannot	  reject	  tēoriya,	   ‘since	  esoteric	  teachers	  and	  exoteric	  sages,	  by	  their	  intricate	  ways	  of	  thought,	  have	  ascended	  to	  astonishing	  heights	  of	  knowledge’.481	  This	  would	  seem	  to	  include	  both	  the	  ‘exoteric’	  sciences	  of	  philosophy	  and	  theology,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ‘esoteric’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  475	  Beggiani,	  Introduction	  to	  Eastern	  Christian	  Spirituality	  :	  The	  Syriac	  Tradition,	  43.	  476	  Ibid.,	  43-­‐44.	  477	  Ibid.,	  46.	  478	  Ibid.	  479	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  113,	  503*.	  480	  See	  for	  his	  example	  his	  Glossary	  for	  entry	  no.	  30.	  Ibid.,	  142.	  481	  Ibid.,	  79,	  597*,	  Sentence	  94.	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writings	  of	   the	   Initiated	   that	  he	  mentions	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	  Book	   IV	  of	   the	  Dove,	   i.e.	  Evagrius	  and	  others	  of	  the	  East	  and	  West.482	  Barhebraeus	  relativizes	  both	  the	  limitations	  of	  metaphysical	  speculation,	  which	  rationalises	  the	  divine	  being	  through	  syllogisms	  and	  logic,	  and	   spiritual	   contemplation,	   in	   its	   aspiration	   towards	   a	   return	   of	   the	   intellect	   to	   God	  through	  the	  means	  of	  noetic	  training.	  	  	  However,	  the	  heights	  of	  theōria	  are	  not	  the	  final	  stage.	  This	  is	  only	  achieved	  by	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Spirit,	  when	  the	  Dove	  gives	  spiritual	  rest	  to	  the	  Perfect,	  after	  the	  labours	  of	  the	  body	  in	  the	  monastery	  and	  of	   the	  soul	   in	  the	  cell,	  whereby	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  knowledge	   is	  acquired	  in	  preparation	  for	  the	  gifts	  of	  the	  dove.	  For	  Barhebraeus,	  contemplation	  or	  teorya	  is	  an	  intermediate	  stage	  that	  leads	  the	  Initiated	  towards	  receiving	  the	  revelations	  that	  are	  given	   by	   the	   Spirit.	   Instead,	   Barhebraeus	   emphasises	   the	   God	   who	   is	   pure	   spirit,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Dove	  where	  he	  quotes	  the	  instruction	  of	  a	  ‘certain	  Master’	  to	  his	  disciple:	  ‘For	  God	  is	  spirit;	  and	  they	  that	  worship	  him	  must	  worship	  him	  in	  spirit	  and	  in	  truth.	  Stay	  therefore	  in	  your	  cell	  and	  strive	  to	  see	  in	  yourself	  Him	  who	  is	  near	  to	  all.’483	  In	  the	  inspired	  sentences,	  Barhebraeus	  declares	  his	  desire	  for	  something	  of	  ‘the	  true	  light	  of	  the	  Beautiful	  one’,	  so	  that	  ‘I	  may	  no	  longer	  adore	  Him	  that	  I	  know	  not,	  but	  Him,	  that	  I	  know	  in	  spirit	  and	  truth’.484	  To	  know	  in	  spirit	  and	  in	  truth,	  is	  to	  know	  by	  the	  true	  revelations	  of	  the	  spirit,	  and	  to	  seek	  in	  love	  the	  Lord	  Himself	  and	  ‘not	  what	  belongs	  to	  Him’.485	  For	  he	  declares	  that	  the	  ‘knowledge	  of	  the	  perfect	  is	  founded	  on	  revelations’,486	  revelations	  which	  are	  bestowed	  on	  those	  who	  learn	  the	  ‘mysteries	  of	  the	  spirit	  from	  the	  spirit’.487	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  Ibid.,	  61,	  578*.	  483	  Ibid.,	  32,	  550*.	  484	  Ibid.,	  75,	  593*,	  Sentence	  79.	  485	  Ibid.,	  77,	  595*,	  Sentence	  84.	  486	  Ibid.,	  70,	  588*,	  Sentence	  50.	  487	  Ibid.,	  71,	  589*,	  Sentence	  55.	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In	  part	   four	  of	   the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	   contrasts	   the	  practice	  of	  philosophical	   speculation,	  specifically	   the	   rationalising	   of	   the	   divine	   being	   through	   syllogistic	   reasoning,	   with	   the	  illumination	  of	  the	  mind	  by	  the	  Spirit.	  For	  Barhebraeus	  the	  mind	  in	  itself	  is	  only	  capable	  of	  understanding	  God	  according	  to	  its	  own	  capacities,	  and	  thus	  if	  God	  governs	  all,	  he	  asks	  how	  God	  could	  then	  be	  comprehended	  in	  entirety	  by	  the	  mind:	  ‘For	  the	  included	  comprehends	  only	   a	   part	   of	   the	   including,	   not	   the	  whole.’488	  Barhebraeus	   does	   not	   reject	   ‘speculation’	  (tēoriya)	  as	  a	  means	  of	  pursuing	  theoretical	  knowledge,	  nor	  does	  he	  negate	  the	  speculative	  methods	  of	  the	  philosophers	  entirely,489	  but	  rather,	  that	  the	  lines	  of	  inquiry	  pursued	  by	  this	  type	  of	  reasoning	  have	  brought	  a	  manner	  of	  thinking	  about	  God	  that	  is	  insufficient	  for	  the	  God	  revealed	  as	  love	  in	  biblical	  revelation.	  Barhebraeus’	  understanding	  of	  the	  ontology	  of	  God	   through	   the	   love	  of	  God	  provides	  a	  solution	   to	   the	  problems	  of	  pursuing	  speculative	  reasoning	  about	  the	  being	  of	  God.	  	  In	   order	   to	   appreciate	   the	   significance	   of	   Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  of	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   his	  understanding	   of	   the	   ontology	   of	   God	   needs	   to	   be	   explored	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   philosophical	  ground	   in	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   Aristotle	   and	   the	   Neoplatonic	   philosophers.	   Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	   mediated	   between	   the	   scholastic	   tradition	   of	   Aristotelian	   metaphysics	   that	  stressed	  God	  as	  ‘the	  unique	  supreme	  being’,490	  and	  a	  Neoplatonic	  Dionysian	  metaphysics	  of	  love	  that	  rested	  on	  the	  divine	  name	  of	  the	  Good.	  Thus,	  Barhebraeus	  incorporated	  both	  the	  Aristotelian	   metaphysics	   of	   God	   as	   a	   supreme	   being	   amongst	   beings,	   with	   the	   Platonic	  emphasis	   on	   God	   as	   the	   Good.	   The	   Neoplatonists	   had	   wielded	   a	   much	   more	   significant	  influence	  over	  the	  Syrian	  mystics	  from	  the	  fifth	  to	  the	  eighth	  centuries,	  particularly	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  and	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē,	  whose	  works	  contain	  many	  of	  the	  features	  distinctive	  of	  the	  Neoplatonic	  philosophers	  Plotinus	  and	  Proclus.	  Barhebraeus	  prefers	  the	  nomination	  of	  God	  coming	  from	  this	  Neoplatonic	  tradition,	  that	  is,	  God	  as	  the	  Good	  and	  ‘the	  Beautiful	  one’,	   whose	   highest	   contemplation	   comes	   in	   the	   hidden	   cloud	   of	   divine	   darkness.491	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  Ibid.,	  63,	  581*,	  Sentence	  9.	  489	  Ibid.,	  79,	  597*,	  Sentence	  94.	  ‘By	  that	  which	  I	  have	  said,	  and	  say	  and	  shall	  say,	  I	  do	  not	  reject	  speculation…	  But	  when	  I	  see	  that	  some	  of	  them	  have	  dared	  to	  weigh	  all	  in	  their	  scale,	  their	  boast	  does	  not	  seem	  beautiful	  to	  me.’	  490	  Ibid.,	  66-­‐67,	  585*,	  Sentence	  29.	  491	  Ibid.,	  64,	  582*,	  Sentence	  15.	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Knowledge	  of	  this	  God,	  rather	  than	  the	  divine	  being	  of	  metaphysics,	  cannot	  be	  explained	  or	  described	  by	  the	  Initiated.492	  	  Barhebraeus	  insists	  that	  ‘What	  is	  three	  in	  itself	  possesses	  a	  unique	  essential	  idea,	  which	  is	  not	  liable	  to	  be	  divided	  into	  many	  triads;	  and	  in	  this	  intelligence	  it	  is	  one.’493	  The	  notion	  of	  triads	   is	   characteristic	   of	  Neoplatonism,	   and	  Barhebraeus	   is	   clearly	   rejecting	   the	   kind	   of	  system	  taught	  by	  Plotinus,	  in	  which	  from	  the	  One	  emanates	  the	  Divine	  Mind	  and	  the	  World	  Soul.	  Instead	  the	  principle	  of	  a	  single	  intelligence	  or	  essential	  idea	  for	  Barhebraeus	  is	  also	  ‘the	  unique	  supreme	  being’	  that	  is	  three	  in	  its	  possession	  of	  ‘essence	  and	  word	  and	  life’.494	  In	  theological	  terms,	  these	  become	  the	  Father	  who	  causes	  the	  word	  and	  the	  life,	  as	  the	  Son	  and	  the	  Spirit.	  However,	  Barhebraeus	  maintains	  that	  ‘the	  cause	  of	  the	  word	  and	  the	  life	  of	  the	   essence	   cannot	   be	   outside	   the	   essence’,	   since	   the	   Spirit	   and	   the	   Son	   have	   not	   been	  subject	   to	   ‘the	   influence	   of	   an	   other	   being’.495	  Therefore	   Barhebraeus	   appears	   to	   find	   a	  middle	  path	  between	  an	  Aristotelian	  inspired	  notion	  of	  the	  theion,	  the	  highest	  Being	  of	  all	  beings,	  and	  a	  monistic	  understanding	  of	  a	  single	  source	  of	  reality	   in	  the	  Neoplatonic	  One.	  Barhebraeus’s	  notion	  of	  the	  One	  is	  not	  however	  beyond	  being,	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  external	  to	  creation,	  since	  ‘He	  has	  revealed	  himself	  unto	  the	  world	  in	  the	  complete	  son	  of	  man,	  who	  has	  become	   soul	   in	   the	   rational	   and	   recognizing	   initiated	   soul’.496	  Therefore	   Barhebraeus	  accords	  a	  place	  to	  the	  rational	  investigation	  of	  a	  God	  who	  has	  revealed	  Himself	  in	  creation,	  and	   thus	   is	   present	   in	   the	   being	   of	   the	   world	   through	   the	   ‘intermediary’	   of	   created	  bodies. 497 	  However,	   these	   are	   but	   ‘the	   reflexes	   of	   a	   mirror’,	   for	   the	   corporeal	   and	  incorporeal	  kingdoms	  ‘have	  no	  true	  essence	  in	  themselves,	  but	  their	  essence	  depends	  upon	  the	  first	  essence,	  their	  cause’.498	  God	  is	  therefore	  called	  the	  Supreme	  Being,	  the	  first	  essence,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  492	  Ibid.,	  75-­‐76,	  593-­‐94*,	  Sentences	  80-­‐81.	  Barhebraeus	  recounts	  the	  words	  of	  an	  Initiated	  concerning	  his	  experiences:	  ‘Hear	  me,	  hear	  me	  and	  be	  silent.	  But	  say	  not	  to	  me:	  explain	  and	  describe’.	  493	  Ibid.,	  66-­‐7,	  585*,	  Sentence	  29.	  494	  Ibid.	  495	  Ibid.,	  67,	  585*.	  496	  Ibid.,	  67,	  585*,	  Sentence	  33.	  497	  Ibid.,	  67,	  585*,	  Sentence	  32.	  ‘If	  God,	  the	  creator	  of	  the	  universe,	  acts	  according	  to	  His	  will,	  it	  is	  not	  impossible	  for	  the	  creatures	  to	  investigate	  Him	  by	  the	  intermediary	  of	  any	  [created]	  body,	  whatever	  it	  be.’	  498	  Ibid.,	  68,	  586*,	  Sentence	  38.	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or	   even	   ‘the	   supreme	  Essence’.499	  That	   ‘God	   is	   one,	   and	   necessarily	   being’	   is	   declared	   by	  Barhebraeus	  to	  be	  true	  knowledge	  of	  the	  mind.500	  	  Indeed	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  that	  for	  Barhebraeus	  the	  mind	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  seeing	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  God,	  for	  it	  is	  limited	  to	  comprehending	  the	  divine	  in	  terms	  of	   its	  own	  being.	  Barhebraeus	  accepts	   that	  God	  may	  be	  understood	   through	  being,	  and	   indeed	   this	   is	   the	   natural	   tendency	   of	   the	   mind	   to	   comprehend	   the	   laws	   of	   nature	  governing	   its	   own	   existence.	   God	  may	   thus	   be	   investigated	   from	   the	   evidence	   of	   divine	  creation.	   However,	   this	   type	   of	   inquiry	   cannot	   reach	   a	   true	   understanding	   of	   God,	   who	  cannot	  be	  fully	  comprehended	  by	  the	  mind,	  through	  ‘information,	  signs	  and	  testimonies’,	  or	  from	  ‘complicated	  deliberations’,	  but	  only	  through	  ‘shutting	  the	  senses’	  to	  all	  such	  attempts	  to	  know	  God,	   in	  order	   to	   see	  God	   through	   ‘opening	   the	  windows	  of	   the	  heart’.	  501	  	   In	   this	  manner,	  the	  mind	  may	  leave	  behind	  the	  ‘elementary	  knowledge’	  attained	  in	  this	  world,	  to	  penetrate	  the	  divine	  cloud,	  and	  so	  ‘to	  know	  the	  hidden	  and	  incomprehensible	  judgments	  of	  the	  divinity’.502	  	  The	  understanding	  of	  the	  rational	  soul	  is	  that	  of	  simple	  knowledge,	  since	  it	  is	  ‘a	  receptacle	  of	   material	   apperceptions’,	   and	   ‘no	   material	   thing	   is	   a	   receptacle	   of	   intellectual	  apperceptions’.503	  This	   common	   and	   simple	   knowledge	   is	   able	   to	   ‘recognize	   from	   the	  creatures	   their	   creator’,	  while	   the	   sages	  possess	  a	  kind	  of	  knowledge	   ‘by	  which	   from	   the	  being	   he	   whose	   being	   is	   necessary	   is	   recognised’.	   The	   metaphysical	   speculation	   of	   the	  philosophers	   is	   founded	  on	   the	   logic	   that	  since	  man	   is	  a	  potential	  being,	   then	  he	  wants	  a	  necessary	   being,	   and	   thus	   there	   is	   a	   necessary	   being	   in	   the	   divine	   being.504	  Barhebraeus	  does	  accept	   the	  ontological	  division	  of	   the	  Creator	   from	  the	  created,	  but	  he	  suggests	   two	  ways	  of	  knowing	  God	  as	  the	  Creator.	  The	  first	   is	  that	  the	  direct	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Creator	  teaches	  of	  the	  created,	  while	  the	  second	  way	  of	  knowledge	  is	  to	  know	  the	  Creator	  through	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  499	  Ibid.,	  66,	  584*,	  Sentence	  24.	  500	  Ibid.,	  77,	  595*,	  Sentence	  88.	  501	  Ibid.,	  63-­‐4,	  581*,	  Sentences	  9-­‐12.	  For	  the	  seeing	  of	  God	  in	  the	  heart;	  ibid.,	  68-­‐69,	  587*,	  Sentence	  41.	  502	  Ibid.,	  64,	  582*,	  Sentence	  13.	  503	  Ibid.,	  74,	  592*,	  Sentence	  71.	  504	  Ibid.,	  74,	  592*,	  Sentence	  73.	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creation;	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  easier	  path.505	  The	  first	  way	  to	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  is	  possessed	  by	  the	  Initiated,	  which	  is	  knowledge	  given	  by	  the	  illumination	  of	  the	  mind	  through	  which	  the	  love	  of	  God	  is	  nourished	  in	  the	  pure	  heart.506	  Barhebraeus	  contrasts	  the	  second	  way	  of	  knowledge	  through	  metaphysical	  speculation	  with	  the	  intuitive	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Initiated,	  whose	   knowledge	   goes	   beyond	   the	   senses.	  He	   offers	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   scholastic	   trend	   in	  Syrian	   theology,	   to	   treat	  God	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  created	  being,	  and	   thus	   to	  make	  rational	  conclusions	   about	   God	   based	   on	   metaphysical	   speculation	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   created	  being.	   In	   this	   typology	   of	   the	   ways	   of	   knowing	   God,	   Barhebraeus	   introduces	   a	   third	  approach	   that	   supersedes	   these	   two	   ways	   of	   knowing	   God;	   this	   third	   way	   is	   through	  revealed	  knowledge.	  Instead	  of	  understanding	  the	  ontology	  of	  God	  in	  terms	  of	  metaphysics,	  the	  highest	  understanding	  of	  the	  Initiated	  comes	  through	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  The	  Initiated	  thus	  possess	  spiritual	  insight	  through	  revelation,	  by	  which	  ‘the	  tabernacle	  of	  their	   heart	   is	   illuminated’	   and	   the	   kingdom	   of	   God	   comes	   to	   exist	   within	   them.	   By	   this	  indwelling	  of	  the	  Spirit,	  the	  mind	  becomes	  ‘enflamed	  by	  the	  love	  of	  its	  Lord’.507	  	  
The	  Divine	  Spark	  of	  Love	  Barhebraeus	  devotes	  a	  long	  section	  to	  describing	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  in	  the	  heart,	  how	  it	  must	  be	  nourished	  in	  devotional	  and	  practical	  life	  and	  the	  stages	  that	  the	  initiate	  or	  novice	  must	  go	  through,	  in	  order	  for	  love	  to	  purify	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  earthly	  passions	  and	  to	  reach	  ultimately	   the	  desired	  object	   of	   his	   love.	  His	   preferred	   image	  of	   love	   is	   that	   of	   the	  divine	   fire	   as	   it	   operates	   in	   the	   inner	   person,	   possibly	   because	   of	   the	   popularity	   of	   the	  imagery	  of	  love	  as	  a	  purifying	  fire	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  Syrian	  mystics.	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  his	  quotations	  of	  the	  sayings	  of	  ‘the	  Initiated’,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  his	  unacknowledged	  use	  of	  written	  sources.	  The	  first	  saying	  listed	  in	  the	  final	  part	  of	  Chapter	  15	  of	  the	  Ethicon,	  defines	  love	  precisely	  using	  the	  standard	  image	  of	  fire:	  ‘Love	  is	  the	  divine	  fire	  which	  burns	  in	   the	   elect	   and	   banishes	   and	   destroys	   from	   their	   hearts	   every	   other	   desire	   which	   is	  impure.’508	  There	   is	  a	  practical	  sense	  to	  the	  effect	  of	   this	  divine	   fire	  of	   love	  for	   the	  Syrian	  ascetics,	  since	   the	   love	  of	  God	  has	  such	  a	   transformative	  effect	  on	   its	  practitioners	   that	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  505	  Ibid.,	  54-­‐55,	  593*;	  95,	  484*.	  Barhebraeus	  makes	  this	  distinction	  in	  both	  the	  Dove	  and	  the	  Ethicon.	  506	  Ibid.,	  95,	  484*.	  507	  Ibid.,	  74,	  592*,	  Sentences	  74-­‐75.	  508	  Ibid.,	  113,	  502*.	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acts	  within	  them	  as	  a	  fire,	  burning	  away	  impure	  desires.	  Most	  of	  the	  sayings	  listed	  in	  this	  chapter	  concern	  the	  love	  of	  God	  as	  a	  divine	  fire	  at	  work	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  inner	  man.	  	  The	   divine	   fire	   of	   love	   is	   portrayed	   by	   Barhebraeus	   as	   something	   that	   operates	   in	   the	  hearts	  of	  the	  Initiated,	  but	  he	  also	  deploys	  another	  image	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  as	  it	  operates	  amongst	   the	   common	   faithful.	   In	   the	   Ethicon	   he	   states	   that	   ‘no	   single	   believing	   heart	   is	  devoid	  of	  the	  root	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God’,	  and	  yet	  he	  warns	  that	  many	  of	  the	  faithful	  lack	  ‘the	  growth	   of	   the	   tree	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   the	   splendour	   of	   its	   flowers	   and	   the	   burden	   of	   its	  fruits’.509	  Barhebraeus	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  two	  causes	  by	  which	  the	  root	  of	   love	  grows	   in	  the	   heart	   of	   the	   righteous,	   the	   first	   being	   that	   man	   turns	   away	   from	   all	   earthly	   things,	  ‘seeking	  and	  desiring	  the	  One	  only’,	  so	  that	   ‘while	  his	   inner	  being	   is	  cleansed,	  his	  mind	  is	  purified,	  he	  becomes	  one	  of	  the	  pure	  in	  heart,	  that	  see	  God.	  And	  by	  this	  sight,	  the	  fire	  of	  love	  is	   kindled’.510	  The	   second	   is	   that	   man	   grows	   in	   the	   knowledge	   of	   God	   and	   becomes	  ‘illuminated	  and	  instructed’	  by	  it,	  after	  the	  heart	  has	  been	  purified	  from	  the	  passions,	  and	  so	  ‘from	  the	  seed	  of	  knowledge	  love	  is	  born	  and	  grows	  up’.511	  	  The	  growth	  of	  the	   love	  of	  God	  is	  cultivated	  by	  those	  initiated	  into	  the	  mūšḥātā,	   ‘stages	  or	  degrees’,	   of	   love,	   which	   Barhebraeus	   outlines	   in	   both	   the	   Ethicon	   and	   the	   Book	   of	   the	  
Dove.512	  In	  Chapter	  15	  of	  Book	  4	  of	  the	  Ethicon,	  he	  describes	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  in	  some	  detail	  in	  one	  continuous	  section	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  three	  stages	  of	  the	  Initiated	  in	  the	   growth	  of	   their	   love	  of	  God.513	  Barhebraeus	   states	   that	   the	  division	  of	   ‘the	   growth	  of	  love’	   into	   three	  stages	   itself	  originates	  with	   the	   teachings	  of	   ‘the	  holy	  solitaries’,	  and	   that	  these	  stages	  are	  quite	  simply	  ‘the	  first,	  the	  middle,	  and	  the	  third,	  the	  last	  one	  being	  that	  of	  accomplishment’.514	  He	  acknowledges	  in	  his	  description	  of	  the	  progress	  in	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  that	  he	  borrows	  the	  words	  of	  these	  holy	  teachers,	  but	  does	  not	  cite	  any	  by	  name.	  The	  first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  509	  Ibid.,	  94,	  483*.	  510	  Ibid.,	  94,	  484*.	  511	  Ibid.,	  95,	  484*.	  512	  For	  Barhebraeus’	  use	  of	  the	  term	  mūšḥātā,	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  Arabic	  Sufi	  equivalents,	  see	  Herman	  Teule,	  "The	  Idea	  of	  Perfection	  in	  the	  Spiritual	  Works	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus"	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  The	  Image	  of	  the	  Perfect	  Christian	  in	  Patristic	  Thought	  Lviv,	  Ukraine,	  2009),	  198.	  513	  Ethicon,	  IV.15.13.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  
Ethikon,	  107-­‐10,	  496-­‐99*.	  cf.	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  III.1.	  Ibid.,	  46-­‐47,	  565*.	  514	  Ibid.,	  107,	  496*.	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stage	  of	  love	  begins	  when	  ‘grace	  casts	  a	  small	  spark	  of	  the	  love	  of	  the	  Lord	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  novice’.515	  This	   small	   spark	  of	   love	   incites	  him	   to	   the	   love	  of	   serving	  his	  brethren,	   as	  well	   as	   those	   in	   need,	   and	   gives	   him	   ‘silence	   and	   solitude’	   (w-­‐šetqā	  w-­‐šelyā)	   in	   order	   to	  purify	   his	   heart	   of	   the	   ‘passionate	   inclinations’.	   In	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove,	   Barhebraeus	  designates	  this	  initial	  stage	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  perfection,	  but	  this	  time	  it	  is	  the	  dove	  rather	  than	   grace,	   who	   shows	   herself	   in	   her	   beauty	   ‘as	   a	   flash	   of	   lightening’,	   to	   the	   soul	   who	  becomes	   stupefied	   and	   ‘captivated	   by	   desire	   for	   her’.516	  Those	   blessed	   with	   the	   gift	   of	  divine	  love,	  are	  thus	  receivers	  of	  the	  divine	  spark	  of	  love	  from	  the	  dove.	  	  The	  growth	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  is	  thus	  a	  dynamic	  process;	  through	  ‘seeking	  and	  desiring	  the	  Good	  one	  alone’	  and	  purifying	  the	  ‘inner	  heart’,	  the	  Initiate	  is	  granted	  a	  glimpse	  of	  ‘the	  rays	  of	   the	  Essence’.	  Thus	   the	   ‘small	   spark	  of	   love’	   in	   the	  heart	  will	  be	   inflamed,	   to	   ‘become	  a	  mighty	  flame,	  making	  the	  soul	  blaze’.517	  With	  the	  kindling	  of	  this	  spark	  of	  love,	  the	  lover	  of	  God	  ‘thirsts	  to	  behold	  Him,	  longing	  after	  [the	  time]	  when	  he	  shall	  come	  and	  see	  His	  face’.518	  The	  stages	  to	  perfection	  in	  the	  love	  of	  God	  are	  thus	  characterised	  by	  feelings	  of	  longing	  for	  the	  beloved,	  expressed	  variously	  as	   the	  yearning	  to	  see	  the	  divine	  beauty	  or	   for	  vision	  of	  the	  beautiful.	  The	  language	  of	  divine	  love	  as	  a	  fire	  is	  used	  to	  imagine	  its	  operations	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  lover	  in	  the	  progress	  towards	  perfection	  and	  vision.	  To	  receive	  the	  gift	  of	  love	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  passive	  act	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  receiver,	  but	  requires	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  inner	  person.	  	  In	  the	  Ethicon,	  Barhebraeus	  declares	  that	  the	  receiving	  of	  ‘divine	  revelations’	  and	  ‘spiritual	  visions’	   to	   the	  Initiated	  occurs	   in	  solitude	  (šelyā),	  stating	  that	   ‘[s]uch	  solitude	   is	  called	  by	  the	   teachers	   a	   solitude	   which	   makes	   gods’.519	  He	   also	   declares	   that	   through	   this	   quiet	  solitude,	  ‘the	  mind	  acquires	  complete	  unification	  and	  perfect	  mingling	  with	  God,	  and	  vision	  and	  knowledge	  of	  Him’.520	  The	  mind’s	  acquisition	  of	   this	  kind	  of	  vision	  and	  knowledge	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  515	  Ibid.	  516	  Ibid.,	  46,	  564*.	  517	  Ibid.,	  53-­‐54,	  571-­‐72*.	  518	  Ibid.,	  54,	  571*.	  519	  Ibid.,	  103,	  491-­‐92*.	  520	  Ibid.,	  103,	  492*.	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God	   is	   however,	   ‘without	   visible	   vision	   and	   without	   knowable	   knowledge’.521	  This	   he	  describes	   as	   a	   grace	   which	   will	   bring	   further	   consolation,	   especially	   that	   of	   freedom	   of	  speech,	  which	  happens	  through	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  son	  that	  ‘dwells	  in	  the	  perfect’.	  When	  the	  spiritual	  son	  of	  God	  thus	  ‘speaks	  freely	  with	  God’,	  he	  then	  becomes	  ‘the	  same	  as	  the	  person	  who	   dwells	   within	   him’.522 	  Indeed	   Barhebraeus	   ranks	   the	   spiritual	   stage	   as	   that	   of	  perfection,	   when	   the	  mind	   of	   the	   Initiated	   is	   illuminated	   through	   the	   revelations	   of	   the	  spiritual	   dove.	   In	   the	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove,	   Barhebraeus	   describes	   this	   stage	   of	   perfection	   in	  more	   detail,	  whereby	   the	  mind	   ‘acquires	   perfect	   freedom	   of	   speech	  with	   the	   dove’,	  who	  abides	  ‘in	  her	  nest,	  the	  heart’	  (of	  the	  perfect).523	  Then	  the	  mind	  ascends	  on	  the	  wings	  of	  the	  dove,	  ‘from	  glory	  to	  glory	  by	  the	  Lord	  the	  Spirit’,	  and	  in	  the	  inaccessible	  light	  of	  the	  divine	  abode,	  ‘it	  sees	  itself	  in	  the	  likeness	  of	  God’.524	  	  	  
The	  Divine	  Dwelling	  The	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	   repeatedly	   connects	   the	   image	  of	   the	  dove	  and	   the	   cloud,	   since	   the	  mind	  ascends,	  on	  the	  wings	  of	  the	  dove,	  to	  the	  dwelling	  place	  of	  God	  in	  the	  cloud.	  The	  dove	  is	   thus	   portrayed	   almost	   as	   a	  messenger	   of	   divine	   love,	   in	   the	   call	   of	   love	   which	   is	   her	  ‘cooing’	   and	   the	   state	   of	   longing	   and	   stupefaction	   that	   she	   engenders	   in	   the	  human	   soul.	  The	  flight	  of	  the	  soul	  on	  the	  wings	  of	  the	  dove	  is	  thus	  an	  ascent	  in	  love,	  in	  which	  the	  lover	  is	  brought	  to	  behold	  the	  object	  of	  his	  love	  in	  the	  cloud.	  The	  flight	  of	  the	  mind	  on	  the	  wings	  of	  the	  dove	  towards	  ‘the	  cloud	  of	  inaccessible	  light’,	  which	  it	  enters	  to	  become	  ‘radiant’	  in	  the	  beauty	   of	   the	   Lord,	   culminates	   in	   the	   notion	   of	   encountering	   God	   in	   the	   divine	   dwelling	  place.525	  In	  a	  section	  of	  the	  Ethicon	  entitled	   ‘Why	  the	  Creatures	  do	  not	  know	  the	  Creator’,	  Barhebraeus	  quotes	  directly	  from	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	   in	   his	   teaching	   on	   the	   divine	   cloud	  (ʿarpelā)	   that	  represents	  all	   that	   is	  unknown	  of	  God:	   ‘The	  divine	  cloud	   is	   the	   inaccessible	  light,	  wherein	  God	  is	  said	  to	  abide.’526	  Barhebraeus	  explains	  this	  teaching	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	   there	   is	   the	   ‘necessary	  and	  natural	  knowledge’	  of	  God,	  which	   is	  alike	  with	  other	  kinds	  of	  necessary	  knowledge	  and	  then	  there	  is	  ‘all	  that	  is	  unknown	  to	  us’,	  which	  is	  hidden	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  521	  Ibid.	  522	  Ibid.,	  104,	  492-­‐3*.	  523	  Ibid.,	  48,	  566*.	  524	  Ibid.,	  49-­‐50,	  567-­‐68*.	  525	  Ibid.,	  49,	  567*.	  526	  Ibid.,	  97,	  487*.	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from	   man	   because	   of	   its	   deep	   darkness	   or	   ‘on	   account	   of	   its	   being	   too	   manifest’.527	  Surprisingly	  Barhebraeus	  cites	   the	   latter	  cause	  as	  hindering	  mankind	   from	  knowing	  God;	  the	   Dionysian	   image	   of	   the	   divine	   cloud	   of	   inaccessible	   light,	   provides	   the	   example.	   The	  cloud	  therefore	  does	  not	  serve	   for	  Barhebraeus	  as	  a	  motif	   for	   the	  hiddenness	  of	  God,	  but	  quite	  the	  opposite.	  God	  is	  too	  manifest	  to	  be	  perceived	  by	  the	  ‘psychic	  eye’	  of	  man,	  who	  is	  blinded	   by	   the	   ‘essential	   light’,	   which	   thus	   conceals	   God	   in	   light,	   from	   the	   eye	   ‘which	   is	  accustomed	  to	  matter’.528	  	  The	  cloud	  of	  divine	  darkness	   is	   the	  divine	  dwelling	  place	  of	  God,	  but	   the	  Spirit	  desires	  to	  have	  another	  dwelling	  place,	  which	   is	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   inner	  person.	  The	  dove	  calls	   to	  all	  who	   will	   listen	   to	   her,	   and	   all	   those	   who	   answer	   her	   call	   are	   made	   sick	   from	   love	   and	  affection	  (ḥubbā	  and	  reḥmtā).529	  The	  dove	  makes	  her	  nest	  in	  the	  heart,	  and	  illuminates	  this	  dwelling	   place	   to	   transform	   the	   heart	   into	   a	   ‘tabernacle’	   or	   miškan	   of	   the	   divine	  presence.530	  Barhebraeus	   also	  describes	   ‘the	   cause	  of	   all	   causes’	   as	   the	  dove	  who	   is	   ‘life’,	  and	   who	   comes	   to	   abide	   in	   her	   ‘nest’	   of	   the	   purified	   heart.	   Indeed	   it	   is	   in	   showing	   her	  mysteries	   to	   the	  mind,	   that	   the	  mind	   is	   enabled	   to	   acquire	   the	   ‘essential	  wisdom’	   of	   the	  Word.531	  The	  way	  of	   revelations,	   is	   to	  receive	   the	  gifts	  of	   the	  Spirit,	   the	  Spirit	  who	   is	  Life	  and	  gives	  life.	  Barhebraeus	  states	  that	  ‘Life	  however	  reveals	  itself	  in	  the	  living	  as	  long	  as	  it	  lives.’532	  Of	   central	   importance	   in	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	   is	   this	   notion	   of	   the	   life-­‐giving	  nature	  of	  the	  Spirit	  who	  thus	  gives	  life	  to	  the	  world	  through	  its	  gift	  of	  love	  to	  mankind.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  527	  Ibid.,	  97,	  486*.	  528	  Ibid.,	  98,	  487*.	  529	  Ibid.,	  4,	  523*.	  530	  Ibid.,	  74,	  593*,	  Sentence	  74.	  531	  Ibid.,	  48-­‐9,	  566*.	  532	  Ibid.,	  67,	  585*,	  Sentence	  31.	  ‘Now	  the	  word,	  being	  hidden	  in	  the	  rational,	  is	  revealed	  as	  it	  were	  by	  being	  born	  from	  a	  womb.	  Life	  however	  reveals	  itself	  in	  the	  living	  as	  long	  as	  it	  lives.’	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The Divine Name of the Good 
The	  Vision	  of	  the	  Divine	  Beauty	  Barhebraeus’	  connection	  of	  perfection	  with	  beauty	  is	  a	  Neoplatonic	  theme	  that	  he	  inherited	  through	   the	  Syrian	  spiritual	   tradition.	   In	  his	  outline	  of	   the	   third	  and	   fourth	  causes	  of	   the	  love	   of	   God,	   man	   loves	   God	   as	   the	   highest	   exemplar	   of	   perfection	   in	   terms	   of	   both	   the	  inward	  and	  outward	  beauty	  of	  God.	  Thus	  beauty	  has	  become	  the	  measure	  of	  perfection	  that	  connects	   God	   and	   man,	   through	   the	   love	   of	   the	   Beautiful	   and	   the	   Good.	   In	   so	   doing,	  Barhebraeus	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  vision	  of	  God	  in	  this	  life,	  all	  the	  while	  looking	  forward	  to	  the	  beholding	  of	  the	  divine	  Face.	  The	  Neoplatonic	  identification	  of	  beauty	  with	  the	  good,	  as	  the	  kalos	  agathon,	  the	  ‘beautiful	  good’,	  is	  reflected	  in	  East	  Syrian	  mysticism	  as	  the	   highest	   name	   for	   God.533	  This	   notion	   recurs	   throughout	   Barhebraeus’	   mysticism,	   in	  which	   the	   love	  of	  God	  seems	  to	  be	  bound	   inextricably	   to	   the	  divine	  names	  of	  Beauty,	   the	  Beautiful	  and	  the	  Good.	  Barhebraeus	  places	  this	  theme	  of	  the	  divine	  beauty	  within	  his	  list	  of	  the	  five	  causes	  of	  loving	  God,	  and	  thus	  the	  vision	  of	  God	  in	  the	  form	  of	  outward	  beauty,	  increases	  the	  love	  of	  the	  pure	  saints	  for	  God.	  Such	  a	  person	  will	   ‘reject	  all	  race	  and	  family	  and	  become	  a	  stranger	  to	  all	  other	  love,	  that,	  on	  swift	  wings,	  he	  may	  fly	  to	  reach	  the	  love	  of	  the	  amazing	  beauty’.534	  As	  Teule	  has	  noted,	  it	  is	  in	  this	  section	  also,	  that	  Barhebraeus	  uses	  the	   name	   of	   ‘the	   Good’	   or	   tābā,	   and	   connects	   this	   divine	   name	   to	   beauty.535	  Wensinck’s	  translation	   brings	   out	   this	   connection	   thus,	   ‘the	   Good	   one	   will	   show	   Himself,	   when	   He	  appears	  in	  majesty	  in	  such	  a	  form	  that	  His	  beauty	  excells	  all	  other	  beauty’.536	  	  	  In	  the	  third	  section	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  offers	  a	  summarised	  version	  of	  his	  description	   of	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God	   in	   the	  Ethicon.	   In	   so	   doing,	   he	   lists	   the	   five	  causes	  of	  love	  in	  general	  in	  man	  and	  how	  these	  are	  bought	  to	  perfect	  completion	  in	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  in	  whom	  these	  five	  causes	  coincide	  most	  completely.	  Wensinck	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  533	  For	  example,	  the	  association	  of	  the	  good	  with	  the	  beautiful	  in	  the	  love	  of	  God	  is	  present	  in	  John	  Sābā.	  The	  translation	  is	  given	  by	  Colless	  from	  the	  passage	  numbered	  XC	  in	  his	  anthology	  of	  quotations:	  ‘Thus	  it	  is	  with	  you,	  O	  Good	  One:	  you	  are	  present	  with	  them	  in	  ineffable	  wonderment,	  in	  the	  glorious	  loveliness	  of	  your	  beauty,	  in	  the	  potency	  of	  your	  nature,	  in	  your	  absolutely	  supreme	  knowledge’.	  	  Colless,	  The	  Wisdom	  of	  the	  
Pearlers	  :	  An	  Anthology	  of	  Syriac	  Christian	  Mysticism,	  168.	  534	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  90,	  479*.	  535	  Teule,	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  269.	  536	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  90,	  479*.	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five	  causes	  of	  love,	  are	  borrowed	  by	  Barhebraeus	  in	  the	  Ethicon	   from	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  book	  of	  love	  in	  the	  Iḥyāʾ.537	  Teule	  reinforces	  this	  proposition,	  while	  highlighting	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Barhebraeus	  also	  chose	  to	  depart	  from	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  formula.538	  Since	  the	  schema	  of	  the	  five	  causes	  of	  love	  has	  no	  background	  in	  the	  Syrian	  spiritual	  tradition,	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  an	  Islamic	  provenance.539	  	  In	  Chapter	  12	  of	  Book	  4	  of	  the	  Ethicon,	  Barhebraeus	  gives	  his	  fullest	  exposition	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God;	  one	  that	  corresponds	  very	  closely	  to	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  book	  on	  love,	  desire	  and	  intimacy,	  which	   is	   part	   of	   the	   Iḥyāʾ.540	  Teule	   considers	   that	   Barhebraeus	   moves	   from	   the	   general	  causes	  of	  love	  in	  man	  (and	  for	  man),	  to	  that	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  al-­‐Ghazālī.541	  The	  third	  and	  fourth	  causes	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  are	  related	  to	  the	  divine	  name	  of	  ‘beauty’	   (šūprā)	   in	  Barhebraeus,	   following	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	   though	  he	  parts	   company	  with	  him	  concerning	   the	  possibility	  of	   the	  vision	  of	   the	  beauty	  of	  God.542	  Teule	   examines	   the	   third	  cause	  of	  love	  in	  general,	  which	  is	  that	  of	  loving	  an	  object	  for	  itself	  and	  not	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  receiving	  remuneration,	  showing	  how	  Barhebraeus	  follows	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  argument	  that	  this	  cause	  of	  love	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Beautiful	  and	  the	  Good.	  Knowing	  the	  Beautiful	  is	  to	  love	  beauty	  for	  itself,	  and	  not	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  a	  passion	  or	  to	  draw	  any	  profit.	  Teule	  argues	  that	  the	  same	  theme	  is	  reprised	  here	  by	  Barhebraeus	  using	  the	  same	  examples	  as	  al-­‐Ghazālī.	  However,	  when	  these	  authors	  come	  to	  apply	  this	  cause	  of	  love	  in	  general	  to	  that	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  their	  paths	  seem	  to	  separate.543	  	  	  Teule	   explains	   that	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   distinguished	   the	   beauty	   of	   the	   exterior	   form	   that	   is	  perceived	  with	  the	  eyes	  from	  that	  of	  the	  interior	  form	  that	  is	  perceived	  with	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  537	  See	  Wensinck’s	  footnotes	  to	  his	  translation	  of	  this	  section	  in	  the	  Ethicon.	  Ibid.,	  87-­‐88,	  476*-­‐78*.	  538	  Teule,	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  264-­‐65.	  539	  Barhebraeus’	  borrowing	  of	  the	  schema	  of	  the	  five	  causes	  of	  love	  from	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  540	  Teule,	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  264.	  Teule	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  Barhebraeus’	  chapter	  has	  been	  modelled	  in	  such	  a	  precise	  manner	  on	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  treatise	  on	  love,	  that	  it	  is	  almost	  a	  translation	  into	  Syriac	  from	  the	  Arabic	  text	  of	  the	  Iḥyāʾ.	  541	  Ibid.,	  268.	  542	  On	  the	  third	  cause	  of	  outward	  beauty,	  see	  the	  passage	  in	  the	  Ethicon.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  
Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  90,	  479*.	  543	  Teule,	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  268.	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heart	  and	  the	  light	  of	  the	  intelligence.544	  Therefore	  for	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  loving	  God	  as	  the	  highest	  Good	  is	  done	  with	  the	  eyes	  of	   the	  heart	  and	   is	  concerned	  solely	  with	  the	   inner	  beauty.545	  Teule	  argues	  that	  Barhebraeus	  takes	  up	  the	  same	  distinction	  between	  exterior	  and	  interior	  beauty,	  but	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  vision	  of	  this	  exterior	  beauty	  of	  God.	  Of	  course,	  the	  incorporality	  of	  God	  constitutes	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  vision	  of	  his	  exterior	  beauty,	  and	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  not	  allowing	  this	  type	  of	  vision.546	  However	  Barhebraeus	  suggests	  that	  through	  the	  goodness	  of	  God	  -­‐	  and	  here	  God	  is	  called	  tābā,	  or	  the	  Good	  547	  -­‐	  the	  saints	  or	   holy	   ones	   (qadīšē)	   still	   constrained	  within	   the	   life	   of	   the	   body,	  may	   yet	   be	   granted	   a	  glimpse	  of	  the	  majesty	  of	  God.	  To	  the	  pure	  in	  heart,	  ‘the	  Good	  one	  will	  show	  Himself,	  when	  he	   appears	  with	  majesty,	   in	   such	   a	   form	   that	  His	   beauty	   excels	   all	   other	   beauty’.	  548	  This	  ‘vision’	   (ḥezwā)	   is	  described	  though	   images	  originating	   in	   the	  book	  of	  Revelation,	   such	  as	  the	  myriads	  of	  angels	  who	  stand	  before	   the	   throne	  of	  God,	  and	   from	   the	  book	  of	  Ezekiel,	  with	  the	  images	  of	  the	  chariot	  of	  Yahweh.549	  Teule	  has	  observed	  that	  these	  descriptions	  can	  be	  found	  also	  in	  other	  Syro-­‐Oriental	  mystics,	  and	  following	  the	  beatitudes,	  that	  the	  vision	  of	  God	  is	  given	  to	  those	  pure	  in	  heart.550	  	  The	  notion	  of	   the	  vision	  of	  God	   in	  His	  Beauty	  has	  a	   long	  tradition	   in	  Syrian	  mysticism,	   in	  which	   those	   who	   are	   pure	   in	   heart	   may	   see	   God	   as	   ‘the	   Good’	   (tābā).	   John	   of	   Dalyatha	  describes	  the	  vision	  of	  God	  in	  terms	  of	  seeing	  the	  ‘glory’	  of	  God,	  to	  which	  Barhebraeus’	  idea	  of	  seeing	  the	   ‘majesty’	  of	  God	  may	  offer	  a	  correlation.	  Beulay	  suggests	  that	   John	  uses	  this	  term	   ‘glory’	   in	   a	   deliberately	   technical	   sense,	  which	   does	   not	   allow	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	  seeing	  God	  in	  his	  essential	  being	  and	  protects	  the	  divine	  transcendence.551	  He	  has	  pointed	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  John	  Sābā’s	  formulation,	  that	  the	  perfect	  shall	  see	  God	  in	  His	  glory	  or	  
šūbḥā,	  but	  not	  in	  (the	  Essence	  of)	  His	  Nature	  or	  kyānā,552	  which	  allowed	  for	  the	  orthodoxy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  544	  Ibid.	  545	  Ibid.,	  269.	  546	  Ibid.	  547	  For	  Teule,	  this	  divine	  title	  has	  the	  meaning,	  ‘he	  who	  is	  good’	  (‘celui	  qui	  est	  bon’).	  Ibid.	  548	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  90,	  479*.	  549	  Teule,	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  260.	  550	  In	  this	  way,	  so	  Teule	  argues,	  Barhebraeus	  has	  been	  able	  to	  ‘Christianise’	  the	  thought	  of	  the	  Muslim	  author	  al-­‐Ghazālī.	  Ibid.,	  269.	  551	  Robert	  Beulay,	  "Des	  Centuries	  de	  Joseph	  Ḥazzaya	  Retrouvées?,"	  Parole	  de	  l’Orient	  3,	  no.	  1	  (1972):	  29-­‐30.	  552	  Ibid.,	  29.	  
	   125	  
of	  the	  mystical	  vision	  of	  God.553	  For	  John	  of	  Dalyatha	  when	  the	  soul	  beholds	  the	  Face	  of	  God	  and	  reflects	  in	  the	  resplendent	  rays	  of	  His	  beauty,	  she	  (the	  soul,	  napša,	  is	  a	  feminine	  noun	  in	  Syriac)	  remains	  enclosed	  in	  ‘the	  abyss	  of	  His	  greatness’.554	  	  Barhebraeus	  does	  not	  represent	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  beautiful	  as	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  God,	  since	  vision	  is	  of	  the	  outward	  beauty.	  It	  is	  the	  inward	  beauty	  or	  perfection	  of	  God,	  which	  causes	  knowledge	  of	  the	  divine	  mysteries	  by	  the	  perfect	  (gmīrē),	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  good	  qualities	  over	  the	  bad.	  	  The	  fourth	  cause	  of	  love	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  love	  of	  God	  in	  particular,	  Barhebraeus	  identifies	  as	   ‘that	  of	   inward	  beauty’.	  Once	  again	  he	   follows	  the	  definition	  provided	  by	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  as	  Wensinck	   notes	   at	   several	   points	   in	   his	   translation.555	  In	   this	   aspect	   of	   ‘the	   beautiful’,	  Barhebraeus	  affirms	  that	  ‘the	  beauty	  of	  a	  thing	  is	  its	  intrinsic	  perfection	  when	  this	  happens	  to	   it	   by	   any	   influence’.	   Thus	   the	   more	   aspects	   of	   perfection	   a	   thing	   acquires,	   the	   more	  beautiful	  it	  is	  perceived	  to	  be,	  ipso	  facto	   ‘If	  it	  acquires	  only	  partial	  perfection,	  its	  beauty	  is	  measured	   by	   it’.556	  This	   is	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   examples	   of	   prophets,	   apostles,	   teachers	  and	   philosophers.	   In	   the	   corresponding	   section	   on	   the	   fourth	   cause	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God,	  Barhebraeus	  develops	  what	   are	   the	   causes	   of	   this	   internal	   perfection	   in	   such	  persons	   as	  blessed	   prophets	   and	   apostles.	   These	   include	   their	   ‘knowledge	   of	   the	   divine	   mysteries’,	  their	  ability	  to	  lead	  ‘the	  common	  people’	  without	  error,	  and	  their	  adoption	  of	  the	  ‘excellent	  qualities’	  while	   rejecting	   the	  bad.557	  By	  extension,	   since	  God’s	  perfection	  exceeds	  all	   such	  human	   perfections	   so	   exponentially,	   how	   could	   it	   be	   other	   than	   that	   the	   Initiated	   ones	  should	  love	  God	  more	  than	  even	  their	  most	  perfect	  teachers.558	  	  	  Barhebraeus	  describes	  the	  causes	  of	  man’s	  love	  for	  God	  as	  both	  ‘natural’	  and	  ‘justified’,	  for	  God	  is	  the	  benefactor,	  the	  Good	  and	  the	  Beautiful	  par	  excellence.	  The	  final	  cause	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	   is	   ‘a	  hidden	   likeness’	   that	   causes	  man	   to	   ‘love	  his	  Lord	  who	  has	  made	  him	   in	  His	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  Treiger	  has	  related	  the	  possible	  implications	  of	  the	  East	  Syrian	  controversy	  surrounding	  John	  of	  Dalyatha’s	  vision	  of	  God	  to	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  notion	  of	  Christology.	  Alexander	  Treiger,	  "Al-­‐Ghazālī's	  “Mirror	  Christology”	  and	  Its	  Possible	  East-­‐Syriac	  Sources,"	  Muslim	  World	  101,	  no.	  4	  (2011):	  707-­‐13.	  554	  From	  Beulay’s	  French	  translation	  of	  Homélie	  sur	  les	  visites	  accordées	  aux	  moines,	  Degré	  de	  la	  perfection,	  Vat.	  Syr.	  125,	  f.	  172a,	  in:	  Beulay,	  "Des	  Centuries	  de	  Joseph	  Ḥazzaya	  Retrouvées?,"	  33.	  555	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  87-­‐88.	  556	  Ibid.,	  88,	  478*.	  557	  Ibid.,	  90,	  480*.	  558	  Ibid.,	  91,	  480*.	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image	   and	   after	  His	   likeness’.559	  Here,	  Barhebraeus	  uses	   the	  notion	  of	  man’s	   love	   for	   the	  good	  and	  the	  beautiful,	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  understanding	  the	  love	  of	  God	  being	  the	  love	  of	  the	  supreme	  Good,	  in	  whom	  there	  is	  perfect	  completion	  of	  the	  love	  known	  between	  men.	  Thus	  Barhebraeus	  declares	   that	   just	  as	  man	  quite	  naturally	   loves	  his	  own	  good	  as	  he	   loves	  his	  benefactor,	  so	  ‘he	  necessarily	  loves	  him	  who	  maintains	  him,	  namely	  God	  in	  whom	  we	  live	  and	  move	  and	  have	  our	  being’.560	  However,	  love	  of	  anything	  in	  this	  world	  or	  even	  the	  next	  world	  (i.e.	  Paradise),	  becomes	  a	  hindrance	  to	  the	  forgetfulness	  of	  self	  that	  is	  required	  in	  the	  seeking	  after	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  only	  the	  perfect	  (gmīrē)	  who	  can	  speak	  of	  true	  unification	  with	  God	  through	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  	  	  
Unification	  of	  the	  Mind	  with	  the	  Good	  Barhebraeus	  makes	  particular	  reference	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  	  to	  what	  may	  be	  called	  the	  Syrian	   Dionysian	   tradition,	   by	   mentioning	   both	   the	   apostle	   Paul	   and	   his	   disciples	  Hierotheos	   and	   Dionysius.	   In	   Section	   3.4	   on	   the	   unification	   (ḥadāyūtā)561	  of	   the	   mind	  (hawnā),562	  Barhebraeus	   recounts	   the	   words	   of	   ‘the	   blessed	   apostle’	   Paul	   who	   became	  acquainted	   with	   the	   ‘mysteries’	   (rāzē)	   of	   unification,	   and	   recounted	   the	   vision	   in	  
2Corinthians	  12,	  of	  hearing	  ‘unspeakable	  words	  which	  it	  is	  not	  lawful	  for	  a	  man	  to	  utter’.563	  Barhebraeus	  then	  quotes	  from	  ‘his	  disciple’	  Hierotheos,	  who	  ‘has	  transmitted	  to	  his	  disciple	  Dionysios’,	   teachings	   on	   the	   unification	   of	   the	   mind	   with	   God.	   The	   Ethicon	   makes	   the	  reference	  to	  Hierotheos	  following	  the	  words	  of	  the	  soul	  in	  ‘freedom	  of	  speech’	  or	  parrhisiā	  with	  God:	  ‘I	  am	  in	  my	  Father	  and	  my	  Father	  is	  in	  me,	  and	  I	  and	  the	  Father	  are	  one’;	  these	  words	  are	  similarly	  recorded	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove.	  However,	  in	  the	  Ethicon	  Barhebraeus	  goes	  no	  further	  than	  this,	  concluding	  with	  the	  phrase	  –	   ‘together	  with	  other	  things	  which	  (perhaps	  Master	  Hierotheos	  and	  the	  like	  venture	  to	  interpret)’.564	  Barhebraeus	  chooses	  not	  to	  pursue	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  ‘Master	  Hierotheos’	  here,	  though	  as	  Colless	  has	  pointed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  559	  Section	  3.5	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove:	  ibid.,	  52,	  570*.	  560	  Ibid.,	  51,	  569*.	  561	  Teule,	   "The	   Idea	   of	   Perfection	   in	   the	   Spiritual	   Works	   of	   Gregory	   Barhebraeus,"	   200.	   Wensinck,	   Bar	  
Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  10.	  562	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  xxxvi.	  For	  Barhebraeus,	  this	  is	  ‘a	  knowing	  faculty	  susceptible	  to	  intelligible	  matters’	  that	  surpasses	  the	  senses,	  (Ethicon	  3	  I	  1),	  the	  Syriac	  equivalent	  to	  the	  Greek	  nous.	  563	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  also	  refers	  to	  St	  Paul’s	  ascension	  to	  the	  third	  heaven	  in	  the	  Mystical	  Theology,	  and	  doubtless	  Barhebraeus’	  own	  reference	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  this	  tradition.	  564	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  110,	  499*.	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out,	  the	  citation	  in	  the	  Dove	  from	  Hierotheos	  on	  the	  unification	  of	  the	  mind	  with	  God	  ‘shows	  what	  he	  had	  in	  mind	  in	  the	  Ethikon	  passage’.565	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  his	  reserve	  is	  due	  to	  the	  very	  different	  intended	  audience	  for	  the	  Ethicon,	  as	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned.	  	  	  	  In	  his	  article	  on	  Barhebraeus’	  Christian	  Spiritual	  Sources,	  Teule	  notes	  this	  quotation	  from	  the	   Book	   of	   the	   Holy	   Hierotheos,	   together	   with	   a	   parallel	   reference	   in	   the	   Ethicon.566	  However,	   this	   parallel	   reference	   does	   not	   contain	   the	   passage	   cited	   from	   Hierotheos	  above,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  Dove.	  Indeed	  the	  omission	  of	  this	  passage	  in	  Chapter	  15	  of	  the	  Ethicon,	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  deliberate	  move	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Barhebraeus,	  who	  does	  not	  go	  beyond	  the	  state	  of	  ‘accomplished	  love’,	  that	  is	  the	  perfect	  love	  of	  God	  by	  the	  Initiated	  in	  the	  spiritual	  stage	   of	   perfection.567	  Thus	   in	   the	  Ethicon,	   there	   is	   no	   separate	   section	   devoted	   to	   the	  unification	  of	  the	  mind,	  as	  there	  is	  in	  the	  Dove.	  This	  fourth	  stage	  is	  clearly	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  threefold	  development	  provided	  in	  the	  Ethicon,	  which	  actually	  repeats	  material	  that	  comes	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  stage	  of	  perfection	  in	  the	  Ethicon,	  concerning	  the	  ascent	  of	  the	  mind.568	  	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  quotation	  from	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  is	  provided	  here	  in	  full	  from	  Wensinck’s	  translation:	  	  	   When	  the	  mind	  becomes	  united	  with	  the	  Good	  one,	  it	  drops	  the	  name	  of	  love	  and	  affection,	  for	  here	  the	  lover	   and	   the	   friend	   become	   the	   same	   person	   as	   the	  Beloved	   and	   the	   Comrade.	   So	   it	   is	  with	   all	   terms	  denoting	  dualism,	  as	  fathership	  and	  sonship,	  praiser	  and	  praised,	  for	  at	  this	  stage	  the	  mind	  is	  not	  praising	  nor	  being	  praised’.569	  	  The	  beginning	  of	  the	  quotation,	  ‘When	  the	  mind	  becomes	  united	  with	  the	  Good	  one’,	  picks	  up	   the	   opening	   line	   of	   this	   section	   on	   the	   unification	   of	   the	  mind	  with	   the	   Good.570	  The	  point	   is	  made	  emphatically	  that	  the	  mind	  comes	  to	  be	  unified	  not	   just	  with	  God,	  but	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  565	  Colless,	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  171.	  566	  Teule,	  "Christian	  Spiritual	  Sources	  in	  the	  Ethicon	  of	  Barhebraeus,"	  346,	  note	  71.	  567	  Compare	  the	  parallel	  section	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  
with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  50,	  568*.	  568	  Ibid.,	  50,	  567*.	  569	  Ibid.,	  50,	  568*.	  570	  Ibid.,	  49-­‐50,	  567-­‐	  68*.	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‘the	  Good	  one’.	   Indeed	   the	  divine	  name	  of	   ‘love	   and	   affection’	   (ḥubbā	  and	  reḥmtā)	   is	   left	  behind,	  since	   it	  denotes	  dualism,	  and	  similarly	  the	  notions	  of	   fatherhood	  and	  sonship	  are	  rejected	  here,	  as	  the	  mind	  goes	  beyond	  all	  relational	  polarities	  of	  ‘praiser	  and	  praised’,	  and	  also	  of	  lover	  and	  Beloved.	  The	  language	  of	  partial	  love	  between	  fathers	  and	  sons	  in	  the	  way	  of	  reḥmtā,	   or	   love	  as	   ‘dilection’,	   is	  made	  redundant	   in	   this	   stage	  of	  unification.	  As	   can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  quotation	  above,	  Wensinck	  provides	  various	  terms	  to	  give	  a	  series	  of	  contrasts:	  love	   and	   affection,	   the	   lover	   and	   the	   friend,	   the	   Beloved	   and	   the	   Comrade.	   That	   these	  contrasting	  pairs	  are	  synonyms	  is	  evident	  from	  consulting	  the	  Syriac	  text	  of	  Bedjan,	  since	  Barhebraeus	   deploys	   the	   derived	   forms	   of	   only	   two	   verbal	   roots,	   rḥm	   and	   ḥbb.	   Thus,	  ‘affection’,	  ‘friend’	  and	  ‘Comrade’	  are	  all	  translations	  of	  forms	  deriving	  from	  rḥm,	  while	  love,	  ‘lover’	  and	  ‘Beloved’	  are	  similarly	  derived	  from	  ḥbb.571	  Wensinck’s	  translation	  renders	  the	  Syriac	  more	  freely,	  which	  obscures	  the	  fact	  that	  Barhebraeus	  refers	  only	  to	  the	  two	  types	  of	  love,	   ḥubbā	   and	   reḥmtā;	   already	   established	   in	   Syrian	   spirituality	   following	   John	   of	  Dalyatha.572	  Barhebraeus’	   quotation	   of	   Hierotheos,	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   mind	   ascends	  above	   both	   these	   notions	   of	   love,	  ḥubbā	  and	   reḥmtā,	   in	   its	   unification	  with	   the	  Good.	   To	  what	  extent	  Barhebraeus	  agreed	  with	  this	  teaching,	  can	  be	  implied	  from	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  extensive	  quotation	  from	  Hierotheos,	  that	  this	   is	   ‘as	  our	  teacher	  and	  guide	  has	  taught	  us’.573	  
	  
The	  Problem	  of	  the	  Unification	  of	  Substances	  The	   ascent	   of	   the	  mind	   is	   very	  much	   an	   Evagrian	   theme,	   whose	   theology	   is	   considered	  distinctly	   Neoplatonic	   by	   Beggiani,	   following	   in	   the	   tradition	   of	   Evagrius’s	   teachers,	   the	  theologians	   Basil	   of	   Caesaria	   and	   Gregory	   Nazianzen.574	  Reinink	   has	   also	   argued	   that	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē	  was	  very	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  Evagrius.	  Yet	  in	  his	  insistence	  on	  the	  ‘conmingling’	  (ḥbīkūtā)	  of	  ‘the	  nature	  of	  everything	  with	  God’,	  Stephen	  went	  much	  further	  than	  Evagrius,	  who	  always	  upheld	  the	  principle	  of	  divine	  transcendence.	  For	  Evagrius,	  even	  in	   his	   idea	   of	   the	   union	   of	   the	   rational	   beings	   with	   the	   Unity	   of	   God	   in	   the	   Kephalaia	  
Gnostica,	   the	   distinction	   between	   ‘the	   intellect	   becoming	   “God”	   and	   God	   Himself’	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  571	  Bedjan,	  Ethicon	  :	  Seu,	  Moralia	  Gregorii	  Barhebræi.	  572	  See	  above	  for	  Barhebraeus’	  use	  of	  this	  tradition	  in	  his	  Chapter	  in	  the	  Ethicon.	  573	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  51,	  568*.	  574	  Beggiani,	  Introduction	  to	  Eastern	  Christian	  Spirituality	  :	  The	  Syriac	  Tradition,	  43.	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maintained.575	  Barhebraeus’	  reference	  to	  1	  Corinthians	  15:	  28,576	  that	   the	  mind	  returns	   to	  the	   divine	   being	   so	   ‘that	   God	   may	   be	   all	   in	   all’,	   suggests	   that	   he	   had	   moved	   from	   the	  characteristic	   Evagrian	   spirituality	   as	   it	   had	   evolved	   in	   the	   Syrian	   tradition,	   towards	   the	  more	  radical	   implications	   that	  Stephen	  gave	  to	  Evagrian	  theology,	   in	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  
Hierotheos.577	  Beggiani	  comments	   that	  without	  doubt	  Evagrius	  had	   ‘a	  great	   impact	  on	  the	  fundamental	   theory	   of	   Christian	   spirituality	   and	   a	   strong	   influence	   on	   Syriac	  writers’.578	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  no	  less	  with	  Barhebraeus,	  but	  equally	  evident	  is	  the	  particular	  extension	  of	  Evagrianism	  by	  Stephen.	  Thus,	  Barhebraeus	  ends	  his	  extended	  quotation	  of	  ‘Hierotheos’	  in	  a	  manner	  to	  be	  expected	  from	  its	  monistic	  focus:	  	   And	  as	  the	  body	  has	  its	  origin	  in	  the	  elements	  and	  returns	  to	  them,	  so	  the	  mind,	  which	  has	  its	  origin	  in	  the	  divine	  being,	  returns	  to	  it,	  that	  God	  may	  be	  all	  in	  all.579	  	  The	   notion	   of	   the	   mind	   having	   an	   origin	   in	   the	   divine	   being	   is	   typical	   of	   metaphysical	  schemas	  following	  Evagrius	  and	  Origen,	  in	  which	  the	  mind	  returns	  to	  the	  divine	  intellect	  in	  the	  ascent	  to	  unification.	  However	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos	  goes	  further	  than	  these	  thinkers;	   this	   is	  evident	   in	   its	  notion	  of	   the	   final	   state	  beyond	  unification,	  which	   is	   called	  ‘mixture’,	  when	  the	  intellect	  arrives	  to	  a	  state	  without	  any	  distinction.580	  Syriac	  scholarship	  has	  typically	  categorised	  Stephen’s	  system	  as	  ‘pantheistic’,581	  though	  this	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  his	  use	  of	  a	  vocabulary	  concerning	  the	  ultimate	  unification	  of	  the	  intellect	   with	   the	   divine	   being.	   In	   Stephen’s	   cosmology,	   everything	   returns	   to	   the	   One	  without	  distinctions,	  which	  is	  clearly	  monistic	  in	  its	  conclusions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  575 	  Reinink,	   "'Origenism'	   in	   Thirteenth-­‐Century	   Northern	   Iraq,"	   240.	   Reinink	   here	   paraphrases	   the	  conclusions	   of	   Guillaumont	   concerning	   the	   influence	   of	   Evagrian	   doctrine	   on	   Stephen	   bar	   Ṣūdhailē.	   Thus	  Guillaumont	   concludes	   that	   Stephen	   ‘a	  donné	  à	   l’origénisme	  évagrien	   sa	   forme	  extrême,	   le	  portant	   au-­‐delà	  même	  des	   limites	   qu’Evagre	   s’était	   imposées’.	   Guillaumont,	  Les	   'Képhalaia	  Gnostica'	  d'Évagre	   le	  Pontique	  et	  
L'histoire	  de	  L'origénisme	  chez	  les	  Grecs	  et	  chez	  les	  Syriens,	  324-­‐25.	  	  576	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  51,	  568*.	  577	  Beggiani,	  Introduction	  to	  Eastern	  Christian	  Spirituality	  :	  The	  Syriac	  Tradition,	  47.	  ‘The	  one	  who	  took	  his	  teachings	  and	  especially	  their	  Origenistic	  elements	  to	  their	  most	  extreme	  conclusion	  was	  Stephen	  bar	  Sudaile’.	  	  578	  Ibid.	  579	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  51,	  568*.	  580	  Beggiani,	  Introduction	  to	  Eastern	  Christian	  Spirituality	  :	  The	  Syriac	  Tradition,	  106.	  581	  Ibid.	  Beggiani	  confines	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē	   to	  an	  Appendix,	  whose	   ‘spiritual	  pantheism’	   falls	  outside	  of	  Christian	   tradition,	   reiterating	   the	   conclusions	   of	   Guillaumont	   and	   Hausherr.	   Hausherr	   considers	   ‘le	  panthéiste	   syrien’	   to	   go	   beyond	   all	   consideration	   of	   orthodoxy.	   Hausherr,	   "De	   Doctrina	   Spirituali	  Christianorum	  Orientalium,	  Quaestiones	  et	  Scripta,	  I	  "	  198.	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  Barhebraeus	  makes	  reference	  to	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  cosmic	  return	  to	  the	  One	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  ‘teacher’	  (Syr.	  malpānā)	  Hierotheos,	  concerning	  the	  ascent	  of	  the	  mind	  to	  the	  Good,	  ‘so	  the	  mind,	  which	  has	  its	  origin	  in	  the	  divine	  being,	  returns	  to	  it,	  that	  God	  may	  be	  all	  in	  all’.582	  In	  his	  commentary	  however,	  he	  admits	  to	  seeing	  the	  necessity	  of	  editing	  and	  re-­‐arranging	  some	  of	  its	  more	  questionable	  contents.	  In	  particular,	  the	  phrase	  from	  Hierotheos	  that	  ‘God	  may	   be	   all	   in	   all’	   seems	   to	   echo	   that	   of	   1Corinthians	   15:28,	   and	   Barhebraeus,	   while	   he	  seems	  to	  use	  similar	  phrasing	   in	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  actively	  avoids	  such	  eschatological	  references	   that	  would	   be	  more	   representative	   of	   the	  monistic	   cosmology	   of	   Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē.	   In	   Sentence	  49,	  Barhebraeus	  quotes	   those	  of	   spiritual	   sight,	   that	   ‘It	   is	   one	  God,	  which	   works	   all	   in	   all’,	   a	   reference	   to	   1Corinthians	   12:6.583 	  Barhebraeus’	   mysticism	  incorporates	   the	   cosmological	   basis	   found	   in	   Origen	   and	   Evagrius,	   but	   he	   seems	  deliberately	  to	  refrain	  from	  going	  as	  far	  as	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos	  in	  his	  exposition.	  Barhebraeus	   adopted	   a	   more	   Aristotelian	   view	   of	   cosmology	   within	   the	   Conversation	   of	  
Wisdom,	   in	   which	   the	   section	   on	   metaphysics	   follows	   an	   Avicennan	   emanationism.584	  However,	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  critiques	  a	  cosmology	  which	  equates	  God	  with	  the	  Necessary	  Being	   and	   the	   First	   Cause.	   Barhebraeus’	   conclusions	   concerning	   the	   possibility	   of	  unification	  with	  God,	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  light	  of	  his	  use	  of	  Hierotheos	  to	  critique	  the	   equation	   of	   the	   intellect	   with	   God	   that	   would	   ground	   ‘God’	   metaphysically	   as	   the	  ultimate	  ‘Being’	  of	  all	  beings.	  	  In	  his	  list	  of	  the	  twelve	  ‘states’	  (šūḥlāpā)	  of	  the	  perfect,	  which	  was	  borrowed	  from	  Joseph	  Ḥazzāyā,585	  Barhebraeus	   lists	   the	  tenth	  state	  of	   ‘unification’	  (ḥadāyūtā),	  declaring	  that	   ‘all	  numbers	  vanish	   in	   it’	  and	  there	   is	   ‘no	  remembrance	  of	  what	   is	  on	  the	  earth	  nor	  of	   future	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  582	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  51,	  568*.	  583	  This	  is	  Wensinck’s	  observation.	  Ibid.,	  70.	  584	  Janssens	  demonstrates	  diagramatically	  how	  Barhebraeus	  borrowed	  the	  explication	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  plurality	  from	  the	  Neoplatonic	  theory	  of	  emanationism	  in	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  Avicenna.	  Janssens,	  L'Entretien	  
de	  la	  Sagesse	  :	  Introduction	  aux	  Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	  279.	  585	  Colless	   compares	   in	   parallel	   the	   English	   translations	   of	   the	   texts	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   Ethicon	   and	   Joseph	  Ḥazzāyā’s	  “Letter	   to	  a	  Friend	  on	  the	  Workings	  of	  Grace”.	  Colless,	   "The	  Mysticism	  of	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  162-­‐63.	  Teule	  also	  explains	  that	  šūḥlāpā	  is	  ‘a	  technical	  term,	  known	  from	  earlier	  Syriac	  texts	  used	  to	  indicate	  various	  states	  of	  mind,	  such	  as	  outbursts	  of	  tears,	  becoming	  like	  fire,	  unification	  or	  joy’.	  Teule,	  "The	  Idea	  of	  Perfection	  in	  the	  Spiritual	  Works	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus,"	  199.	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things’. 586 	  Here,	   the	   language	   of	   unification	   moves	   beyond	   the	   state	   of	   duality,	   the	  separation	  between	  God	  as	  the	  Creator	  and	  his	  creatures	  that	  is	  characteristic	  of	  the	  second	  state	  of	  ‘distinction’,	  when	  the	  mind	  recognises	  both	  ‘the	  height	  of	  its	  rank	  and	  its	  being	  the	  offspring	  of	  God’.587	  It	  would	  seem	  therefore	  that,	  as	  Teule	  has	  proposed,	  Barhebraeus	  goes	  no	   further	   than	   ‘unification’	   (ḥadāyūtā)	   and	   refrains	   from	   the	   term	   for	   ‘conmingling’	  (ḥbīkūtā)	   between	   the	   mystic	   and	   God,	   as	   was	   used	   by	   Stephen	   bar	   Ṣūdhailē.588	  While	  Barhebraeus	   avoids	   the	   term	   ‘conmingling’	   (ḥbīkūtā),	   he	   does	   not	   entirely	   avoid	   the	  implications	   of	   this	   concept	   for	   the	   pseudo-­‐Hierotheos	   particularly	   as	   it	   involves	   the	  removal	  of	  all	  distinctions.	  F.S.	  Marsh	  translates	   the	  pseudo-­‐Hierotheos’	  differentiation	  of	  
ḥadāyūtā	   and	   ḥbīkūtā	   thus:	   ‘for	   those	   who	   have	   been	   united	   (only)	   cannot	   remove	   all	  distinction,	  there	  remains	  in	  them	  distinct;	  but	  in	  those	  who	  find	  themselves	  in	  the	  state	  of	  conmingling,	  nothing	  distinct	  or	  different	  is	  known	  or	  seen’.589	  However,	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  
Ethicon,	  Barhebraeus	  does	  maintain	  some	  distinction,	  in	  that	  the	  divine	  substance	  and	  the	  human	  substance	  remain	  separated.	  	  	   It	  has	  further	  been	  said:	  Look	  at	  the	  fire	  which	  becomes	  one	  with	  the	  iron	  in	  the	  furnace.	  The	  iron	  alone	  is	  not	  to	  be	  recognised	  there,	  because	  it	  has	  assumed	  the	  likeness	  of	  the	  fire	  by	  their	  union.	  So	  you	  see	  not	  two	  images	  but	  one,	  no	  discrimination	  being	  possible,	  though	  the	  two	  substances	  remain	  separated.590	  	  	  This	   quotation	   clearly	   maintains	   the	   separation	   of	   ‘substance’	   (qnomā)591 	  within	   the	  unification,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  ‘discrimination’	  is	  possible	  when	  the	  iron	  takes	  on	  the	  likeness	  of	  the	  fire.	  The	  divine	  and	  the	  human	  are	  both	  characterised	  as	  substances,	  albeit	  of	  different	  kinds.	  Colless	  has	  shown	  that	  Barhebraeus	  is	  quoting	  anonymously	  from	  John	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  586	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  57,	  575*.	  587	  Ibid.,	  56,	  574*.	  588	  Teule,	  "The	  Idea	  of	  Perfection	  in	  the	  Spiritual	  Works	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus,"	  200.	  589	  Marsh,	  The	  Book	  Which	  Is	  Called	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  with	  Extracts	  from	  the	  Prolegomena	  and	  
Commentary	   of	   Theodosios	   of	   Antioch	   and	   from	   the	   "Book	   of	   Excerpts"	   and	   Other	   Works	   of	   Gregory	   Bar-­‐
Hebræus,	  124,	  12*	  ;	  Teule,	  "The	  Idea	  of	  Perfection	  in	  the	  Spiritual	  Works	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus,"	  200.	  590	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  116,	  506*.	  	  591	  In	  West	  and	  East	  Syrian	  theology,	  qnomā	   is	  the	  Syriac	  equivalent	  to	  the	  Greek	  hypostasis.	  R.	  Payne	  Smith	  and	   Jessie	  Payne	  Smith,	  A	  Compendious	  Syriac	  Dictionary	  :	  Founded	  Upon	  the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  Payne	  
Smith	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon,	  1903),	  510.	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of	  Dalyatha	  here,592	  and	  thus	  in	  the	  end,	  Barhebraeus	  has	  preferred	  the	  formulations	  of	  this	  eighth	  century	  East	  Syrian	  mystic	   to	   that	  of	   the	  pseudo-­‐Hierotheos.	  For	  Barhebraeus,	   the	  equation	  of	  substance	  that	  is	  implied	  in	  Hierotheos	  reduces	  God	  to	  the	  being	  of	  things,	  when	  in	  fact	  God	  transcends	  substance,	  and	  the	  conmingling	  of	  substances	  is	  analogical.	  	  
The	  Denigration	  of	  Love	  in	  the	  Hierotheos	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē	  objects	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  divine	  and	  human	  substances,	  because	  of	   its	   implications	  for	  his	  monistic	  view	  of	  eschatology.	  The	  striking	  passage	  that	  Barhebraeus	  quotes	  on	  the	   loss	  of	  all	  distinctions	  corresponds	  to	   the	   following	  section	   in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos:	  	   Those	  minds,	  therefore,	  that	  have	  been	  accounted	  worthy	  of	  perfection	  no	  longer	  have	  either	  affection	  or	  love;	  for	  they	  leave	  behind	  them	  every	  name	  that	  is	  used	  as	  distinct	  and	  indicating	  something,	  and	  now	  become	  nameless	  above	  name,	  and	  speechless	  above	  speech.593	  	  Beggiani	  makes	  further	  comment	  on	  this	  section	  in	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  namely	  that	  in	  the	  ascent	  of	  the	  intellect	  in	  ‘contemplation’	  or	  theōria,	  the	  intellect	  necessarily	  ‘moves	  beyond	  love’	   in	  its	  perfect	  state,	   in	  that	   love	   ‘still	  supposes	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  subject	  who	  loves	   and	   the	  object	   loved’.594	  Thus	   in	   the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	   love	   is	   described	  as	   ‘a	   sign	  of	  distinction’,	  which	  is	  established	  ‘by	  the	  lover	  and	  by	  that	  which	  he	  loves’	  and	  so	  the	  very	  name	  of	  love	  requires	  of	  necessity	  ‘a	  certain	  distinction	  of	  two’.595	  Such	  a	  denigration	  of	  the	  primacy	  of	  love	  is	  part	  of	  the	  monistic	  eschatology	  in	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  which	  views	  the	  eventual	   reconciliation	  of	   everything	   in	   the	   cosmos	   into	  One	  without	   any	  differentiation,	  ‘For	  One	  neither	  names	  nor	  is	  named.’596	  The	  description	  of	  eschatological	  unification	  from	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos	  has	  been	  translated	  by	  Reinink	  thus:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  592	  Colless	  claims	  that	  the	  quotation	  of	  the	  passage	  on	  the	  iron	  in	  the	  furnace	  is	  inspired	  directly	  from	  John	  Sābā’s	  Sermo	  26,	  along	  with	  six	  other	  anonymous	  sayings	  listed	  in	  the	  final	  section	  of	  Chapter	  15	  which	  have	  been	  borrowed	  by	  Barhebraeus	  from	  John	  Sābā.	  Colless,	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  172.	  	  	  593	  This	  passage	  is	  translated	  by	  Georg	  Widengren.	  Widengren,	  "Researches	  in	  Syrian	  Mysticism:	  Mystical	  Experiences	  and	  Spiritual	  Exercises,"	  194-­‐95.	  594	  Beggiani,	  Introduction	  to	  Eastern	  Christian	  Spirituality	  :	  The	  Syriac	  Tradition,	  105.	  595	  Widengren,	  "Researches	  in	  Syrian	  Mysticism:	  Mystical	  Experiences	  and	  Spiritual	  Exercises,"	  194-­‐95.	  596	  Reinink,	  "'Origenism'	  in	  Thirteenth-­‐Century	  Northern	  Iraq,"	  241.	  Reinink’s	  translation	  of	  Hierotheos	  is	  from	  Marsh’s	  edition	  of	  the	  Syriac	  text.	  Marsh,	  The	  Book	  Which	  Is	  Called	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  with	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   For	   the	   orders	   above	   will	   pass	   away	   and	   the	   distinctions	   beneath	   will	   be	   brought	   to	   an	   end,	   and	  everything	  will	  be	  One.	  For	  even	  God	  will	  pass	  away	  and	  Christ	  will	  be	  brought	  to	  an	  end	  and	  the	  Spirit	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  called	  the	  Spirit.	  For	  names	  will	  pass	  away	  and	  not	  the	  Essence.597	  	  From	  passages	   such	   as	   these,	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   the	   ideas	   and	  writings	   ascribed	   to	  Stephen	   bar	   Ṣūdhailē	   were	   considered	   heretical.	   What	   is	   more	   intriguing	   is	   that	   there	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  rival	  traditions	  concerning	  the	  orthodoxy	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  and	  that	  Barhebraeus	  was	  converted	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Theodosius	  (over	  that	  of	  Cyriacus),	  as	  to	  its	  orthodoxy.	  If	  Barhebraeus	  did	  indeed	  change	  his	  opinion	  of	  the	  book	  on	  reading	  the	  text	  itself,	  then	  it	  seems	  it	  was	  the	  content	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos	  that	  proved	  so	  persuasive	  to	  him.	  Barhebraeus	  only	  makes	  explicit	  reference	  to	  the	  book	  once	  in	  the	  Ethicon	  and	  once	  in	  the	  Dove,	  but	  both	  seem	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  teachings	  on	  the	  unification	  with	  God	  offered	  by	   the	   Holy	   Hierotheos.	   However,	   that	   Barhebraeus	   chose	   to	   quote	   Hierotheos	   as	   an	  authority	  on	  ideas	  that	  had	  proved	  so	  controversial,	  would	  suggest	  that	  they	  had	  come	  to	  occupy	  a	  place	  of	  some	  significance	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  own	  understanding	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  	  The	  discussion	  of	   love	   in	   the	  Holy	  Hierotheos	   is	   so	  significant	   for	  Barhebraeus,	  because	   it	  suggests	  that	  the	  nomination	  of	   love,	   indeed	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  imposes	  a	  limit	   on	   the	   ascension	   of	   the	   mind	   to	   the	   One.	   For	   Stephen	   this	   was	   a	   limit	   that	   must	  necessarily	   be	   overcome	   in	   the	   progress	   to	   unification	   with	   God.	   This	   can	   be	   seen	   in	  Stephen’s	  statement	  on	  the	  conditionality	  of	  all	  nomination	  of	  the	  One:	  ‘For	  names	  will	  pass	  away	  and	  not	  the	  Essence.’598	  While	  both	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē	  and	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  show	  the	   influence	   of	   the	   Neoplatonic	   understanding	   of	   ‘the	   One’,	   this	   manifests	   itself	   in	  divergent	   cosmologies,	   particularly	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   role	   of	   love.599	  Vladimir	   Lossky	  compares	  the	  Dionysian	  corpus	  with	  the	  Neoplatonic	  philosophy	  of	  Plotinus;	   for	  both	  the	  realm	  of	  beings	  must	  be	   left	  behind,	  but	   for	  Dionysius	   ‘God	   is	  not	  unity,	  but	   the	  cause	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Extracts	  from	  the	  Prolegomena	  and	  Commentary	  of	  Theodosios	  of	  Antioch	  and	  from	  the	  "Book	  of	  Excerpts"	  and	  
Other	  Works	  of	  Gregory	  Bar-­‐Hebræus,	  120-­‐21*.	  597	  Reinink,	  "'Origenism'	  in	  Thirteenth-­‐Century	  Northern	  Iraq,"	  241.	  598	  Reinink	  indicates	  that	  the	  Greek	  loan-­‐word	  ousia	  is	  used	  in	  the	  Syriac	  for	  ‘essence’.	  Ibid.	  599	  Arthur	   compares	   the	   considerable	   differences	   between	   the	   Dionysian	   hierarchies	   and	   the	   system	   of	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē.	  Arthur,	  "A	  Sixth-­‐Century	  Origenist:	  Stephen	  Bar	  Sudaile	  and	  His	  Relationship	  with	  Ps-­‐Dionysius,"	  371.	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unity,	  just	  as	  He	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  multiplicity’.600	  In	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	  creation	  is	  an	  ecstatic	  outpouring	  of	  the	  Good,	  to	  which	  all	  beings	  strive	  to	  return,	  as	  the	  source	  of	  their	  existence.	  Beggiani	   describes	   the	   Dionysian	   universe	   of	   dynamic	   eros,	   in	   which	   ‘the	   universal	  circulation	  of	  being,	  from	  the	  Good	  and	  toward	  the	  Good	  is	  a	  circulation	  of	  divine	  love’.601	  Marsh	   has	   pointed	   out	   that	   in	   the	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysian	   corpus	   love	   is	   glorified	   as	   eros,	  following	   the	   thought	   of	   the	   Athenian	   philosopher	   Proclus,	   while	   this	   notion	   is	   entirely	  disparaged	  by	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē.602	  In	   Stephen’s	  monistic	  understanding,	  nothing	   can	  exist	   in	   the	   final	   end	   but	   the	   unified	   essence,	   the	   ousia,	   and	   thus	   love	   becomes	   as	   a	  hindrance	  to	  the	  unification	  of	  everything,	  even	  Son,	  Spirit	  and	  God,	  into	  the	  One.	  There	  can	  only	   be	   the	   essence	   and	   existence	   of	   the	   One,	   since	   all	   other	   existence	   is	   in	   a	   sense	  borrowed	   from	   the	   One.	   For	   Stephen	   then,	   the	   essence	   is	   defined	   by	   ontology,	   the	  metaphysics	   of	   being,	  while	   in	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	   there	   is	   a	   notion	   of	   the	   hyper-­‐essence,	  which	   is	   associated	  with	   love.	   In	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	   the	   ascent	   through	   the	  divine	  names	  must	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  corresponding	  negation	  of	  the	  divine	  names,	  which	  is	  also	  to	  ascend	  higher	  to	  reach	  the	  hyper-­‐essential	  God,	  who	  is	  beyond	  even	  the	  affirmation	  of	  the	  divine	  essence.	  Here,	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  makes	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  revelatory	  energies	  (Gr.	  
dynameis)	  of	  God	  and	  the	  divine	  ousia	  or	  hyperousios,	   the	   ‘super-­‐essence’.603	  Barhebraeus	  does	  not	  employ	  such	  technical	  language,	  nor	  does	  he	  attempt	  to	  differentiate	  between	  the	  paths	   of	   kataphatic	   and	   apophatic	   theology,	   but	   there	   is	   a	   surpassing	   of	   making	  predications	  about	  God.	  Both	  the	  Dionysian	  tradition	  of	  mystical	  theology	  and	  the	  insights	  of	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē	  are	  acknowledged	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  insistence	  on	  the	  contingency	  of	  the	  divine	  names.	  Even	  the	  name	  of	  the	  divine	  ‘Beloved’,	  where	  this	  signifies	  an	  objectifying	  form	  of	  love,	  must	  be	  overcome	  so	  that	  the	  mind	  may	  enter	  the	  divine	  darkness.	  	  Despite	   the	   emphasis	   in	   Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	   on	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   it	   seems	   significant	  that	  he	  has	  taken	  up	  this	  notion	  from	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  that	  the	  objectification	  of	  love	  is	  discarded	  in	  the	  ascent	  of	  the	  mind.	  Although	  Barhebraeus	  incorporates	  the	  critique	  by	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  600	  Lossky,	  The	  Vision	  of	  God,	  101.	  601	  Beggiani,	  Introduction	  to	  Eastern	  Christian	  Spirituality	  :	  The	  Syriac	  Tradition,	  56.	  602	  Marsh,	  The	  Book	  Which	  Is	  Called	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  with	  Extracts	  from	  the	  Prolegomena	  and	  
Commentary	   of	   Theodosios	   of	   Antioch	   and	   from	   the	   "Book	   of	   Excerpts"	   and	   Other	   Works	   of	   Gregory	   Bar-­‐
Hebræus,	  241.	  603	  Lossky,	  The	  Vision	  of	  God,	  102.	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Holy	  Hierotheos	  on	   the	   love	   that	  maintains	   a	   state	   of	   distinction	  between	   the	  mystic	   and	  God,	  he	  does	  not	  view	  this	  kind	  of	   love	  as	  encompassing	   the	   fullness	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God	   -­‐	  there	   is	  a	  more	  essential	   love.	  For	  Barhebraeus,	   the	  culmination	  of	  desire	  also	  has,	  as	   its	  precise	  aim,	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  distinction	  of	  subject	  and	  object	  that	  fuels	  this	  state	  of	  longing	  in	  which	  the	  lover	  desires	  to	  possess	  its	  beloved.	  Thus	  the	  kind	  of	  love	  which	  maintains	  a	  state	  of	  separation	  in	  which	  the	  lover	  desires	  the	  beloved	  as	  an	  object	  distinct	  from	  himself,	  is	   surpassed,	   so	   that	   the	   Good	   is	   no	   longer	   objectified	   as	   an	   object	   of	   Platonic	   longing.	  Instead,	  the	  nature	  of	  God	  is	  revealed	  in	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  and	  for	  Barhebraeus,	  this	  is	  best	  understood	  in	  the	  teaching	  that	  God	  is	  spirit,	  not	  in	  the	  Trinitarian	  title	  of	  the	  Holy	  Spirit,	  one	  person	  of	  three,	  the	  realm	  of	  theological	  dogma,	  but	  that	  God	  is	  essentially	  spirit	  and	  the	   spirit	   reveals	   itself	   in	   love.	   Barhebraeus	   offers	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   rival	  metaphysical	  schemas	  in	  the	  ontology	  of	  God,	  a	  solution	  that	  maintains	  the	  primacy	  of	  God	  as	  love,	  over	  that	  of	  God	  as	  the	  First	  Being	  of	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  Platonic	  Good	  beyond	  being.	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Chapter	  5:	  Barhebraeus	  in	  Dialogue	  with	  Islamic	  Tradition	  	  
Introduction  	  During	  the	  course	  of	  his	  intellectual	  inquiries,	  Barhebraeus	  found	  himself	  enmeshed	  in	  the	  epistemological	  impasse	  latent	  within	  the	  West	  Syrian	  tradition.	  This	  impasse	  had	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  teachings	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,	  who	  came	  to	  be	  so	  influential	  for	  Syrian	  monasticism,	  particularly	   amongst	   the	   East	   Syrians	   and	   the	  mystic	   tradition	   from	   the	   time	   of	   Isaac	   of	  Nineveh.	   The	  main	   epistemological	   problem	   that	   Barhebraeus	   sought	   to	   resolve	  was	   the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  know	  God,	  how	  the	  mind	  could	  conceive	  of	  God	  without	  compromising	  the	   divine	   transcendence.	   Evagrius	   had	   argued	   that	   God	   must	   be	   without	   form	   to	   be	  transcendent,	  and	  that	  the	  truly	  divine	  must	  be	  ineffable	  and	  worshipped	  in	  the	  silence	  of	  prayer.	  Following	  the	  Aristotelian	  analysis	  of	  the	  soul,	  Evagrius	  understood	  that	  the	  mind	  always	  constructs	  images	  in	  its	  perception	  of	  the	  visible,	  and	  thus	  the	  thinking	  about	  God	  must	  work	  itself	  free	  of	  the	  image.	  It	  was	  left	  to	  a	  systematic	  thinker	  like	  Barhebraeus,	  to	  struggle	  with	  the	  intellectual	  inheritance	  of	  the	  scholastic	  reasoning	  based	  on	  the	  logic	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  the	  emphasis	  on	  intuitive	  knowledge	  by	  the	  Evagrian	  mystics	  on	  the	  other.	  	  	  The	  narrative	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fourth	  part	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  which	  frames	  the	  course	   of	   his	   intellectual	   development,	   clearly	   indicates	   that	   Barhebraeus	   conducted	   an	  inquiry	   into	   these	  epistemological	   conflicts.	  He	   studied	   the	  writings	  of	   the	  doctors	  of	   the	  church,	  until	  in	  disillusionment	  he	  turned	  to	  the	  Greek	  philosophers,	  to	  enquire	  into	  every	  branch	   of	   that	   science,	   until	   finally	   he	   turned	   to	   the	   writings	   of	   the	   mystics	   or	   ‘the	  Initiated’.604	  The	   conclusions	   of	   his	   inquiry	   into	   the	   epistemological	   conflict	   within	   the	  Syrian	   tradition	  might	   therefore	  be	   anticipated	   in	   his	  mystical	  writings,	   in	   that	   he	   states	  that	  he	  was	  sustained	  in	  his	  faith	  by	  his	  Lord	  through	  being	  led	  to	  read	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  604	  This	   chronological	   sequence	   requires	   some	   emendations,	   such	   as	   his	   training	   in	   rhetoric	   and	  medicine	  which	   formed	   his	   initial	   programme	   of	   formal	   study,	   before	   he	   entered	   the	   seminary	   and	   ordination.	   In	  addition,	  he	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  entirely	  ignorant	  of	  the	  mystic	  tradition	  until	  such	  a	  late	  point	  in	  his	  career,	  and	  even	  in	  his	  final	  immersion	  in	  the	  mystics,	  he	  never	  actually	  forsook	  the	  Greek	  philosophers.	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Initiated.605	  The	  statement	  of	  his	  near-­‐despair	  of	  both	   ‘psychical’	  and	   ‘bodily’	   life,	   is	  made	  within	   the	  autobiographical	  narrative	  of	   the	   fourth	  part	  of	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  606	  and	   is	  followed	  by	  the	  centuria,	  the	  sentences	  which	  Barhebraeus	  says	  were	  revealed	  to	  him	  as	  ‘a	  flash	   of	   lightning’	   which	   illuminated	   his	   mind	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   his	   deep	   uncertainty	   and	  doubt.607	  These	  aphoristic	  sentences	  form	  a	  particular	  focus	  for	  this	  chapter	  as	  the	  material	  from	  which	   can	   be	   discerned	   Barhebraeus’	   own	   solution	   to	   the	   epistemological	   impasse	  latent	  within	  the	  Syrian	  tradition	  and	  within	  which	  he	  had	  found	  himself.	  	  
The	  Epistemological	  Impasse	  within	  the	  Syrian	  Tradition	  For	   the	   Syrian	   Orthodox,	   the	   monasteries	   were	   centres	   of	   both	   scholastic	   learning	   and	  ascetic	  theology.	  However,	  in	  the	  centres	  of	  Greek	  learning	  such	  as	  the	  East	  Syrian	  school	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  the	  West	  Syrian	  monastery	  of	  Qennešre,	  it	  was	  Aristotle’s	  Organon	  that	  formed	  the	   focus	   of	   studies	   as	   an	   instrument	   of	   reasoning	   for	   intellectual	   inquiry,	   including	  theology	   and	   biblical	   exegesis.608	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   solitaries	   embraced	   the	   ascetic	  theology	   of	   Evagrius,	   who	   had	   synthesised	   the	   Neoplatonic	   tradition	   of	   theōria	   or	  contemplation,	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Desert	  Fathers.609	  Indeed	  Platonic	  thinkers	  such	  as	  Plotinus	  and	   Porphyry	   had	   proved	   particularly	   instructive	   to	   the	   Syrians	   in	   their	   theology	   of	   the	  supernatural.	   Evagrius’	   theology	   drew	   on	   the	   Neoplatonic	   tradition	   through	   Plotinus,	   to	  express	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  engagement	  of	  the	  nous	  in	  the	  three	  hierarchical	  stages	  of	  spiritual	  progress,	  which	  culminate	  in	  theologikē,	  being	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  Holy	  Trinity.610	  On	  the	   other	   side,	   Jacob	   of	   Edessa	   in	   the	   Encheiridion,	   attempted	   to	   reformulate	   the	  terminology	  of	  West	   Syrian	  Christology	  using	   the	   vocabulary	  of	  Aristotelian	  metaphysics	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  605	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  61,	  578*.	  606	  This	  statement	  is	  considered	  further	  in	  the	  section,	  The	  Centrality	  of	  Aristotelian	  Logic,	  of	  Chapter	  3.	  607	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  61-­‐62,	  579*.	  608	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  13-­‐14.	  Becker	  distinguishes	  the	  West	  Syrian	  monastic	  centres	  from	  the	  East	  Syrian	  schools,	   which	   ‘did	   not	   have	   a	   strong	   tradition	   of	   “secular”	   studies	   but	   rather	   incorporated	   the	   Greek	  literature	  they	  found	  more	  fully	  into	  their	  theological	  and	  exegetical	  system’.	  	  609	  Teule	  states	  that	  the	  technical	  vocabulary	  of	  the	  Syriac	  authors	  on	  the	  spiritual	  life	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  Syriac	  terminology	  ‘coined’	  in	  the	  translation	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus	  into	  the	  Greek.	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  xxxiii.	  610	  For	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  Neoplatonic	  parallels	  in	  Evagrian	  theology,	  see	  Brouria	  Bitton-­‐Ashkelony,	  "The	  Limit	  of	  the	  Mind	  (NOYΣ):	  Pure	  Prayer	  According	  to	  Evagrius	  Ponticus	  and	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh,"	  Zeitschrift	  Fur	  
Antikes	  Christentum-­‐Journal	  of	  Ancient	  Christianity	  15,	  no.	  2	  (2011):	  303-­‐06.	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based	  on	  the	  highest	  genus	  of	  substance,	  the	  ousia.611	  Henri	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche	  argues	  that	  in	  undertaking	  the	  Encheiridion,	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  appreciated	  ‘the	  contrasting	  points	  of	  view	  of	   traditional	   philosophy	   and	   of	   the	   Doctors	   of	   the	   Church	   concerning	   crucial	   onto-­‐theological	   issues’;	   that	   is,	  between	   the	  Aristotelian	   tradition	  of	  philosophy	  and	   the	  early	  Church	   Fathers’	   synthesis	   of	   Platonism	  with	   Christian	   dogma.612	  For	   the	  West	   Syrians	   it	  had	  become	  acceptable	   to	  make	  use	  of	  Aristotle	   in	   the	   realm	  of	  natural	   science,	   and	   it	   is	  evident	  from	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa’s	  Hexaemeron	  that	  the	  scientific	  explanations	  of	  Aristotle	  and	  the	   Peripatetics	   might	   be	   incorporated	   into	   the	   account	   of	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   natural	  world.613	  However,	   Aristotelian	   physics	   led	   to	   Aristotelian	   metaphysics,	   and	   the	   kind	   of	  onto-­‐theological	  problems	  that	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  found	  himself	  attempting	  to	  resolve.	  Jacob’s	  approach	  was	  to	  align	  theology	  more	  closely	  with	  metaphysics,	  rather	  than	  to	  question	  the	  validity	   of	   an	   onto-­‐theological	   God	   delimited	   by	   the	   categories	   of	   being.	   However,	   this	  question	  was	  one	  that	  Barhebraeus	  was	  led	  to	  pursue	  many	  centuries	  later.	  	  The	  West	  Syrian	  tradition	  had	  inherited	  the	  Neoplatonic	  Aristotelianism	  of	  Alexandria,	  and	  with	   the	   focus	  on	   the	  books	  of	  Aristotelian	   logic,	   the	  Organon	  was	   thus	  read	   through	   the	  prolegomenon	  of	  Porphyry’s	  Isagoge,	  which	  formed	  an	  introduction	  to	  Aristotle’s	  book	  of	  
Categories.614	  This	  was	  a	  tradition	  that	  continued	  to	  be	  transmitted	  down	  the	  centuries.615	  In	   the	   twelfth	   century	   for	   example,	  Dionysius	  Bar	   Ṣalībī	   composed	   commentaries	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  611	  Henri	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche,	  "Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  and	  the	  Reception	  of	  Aristotle,"	  in	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  and	  the	  Syriac	  
Culture	  of	  his	  Day,	   ed.	  R.	  B.	   ter	  Haar	  Romeny,	  Monographs	  of	  the	  Peshitta	   Institute,	  Leiden	  (Leiden	   ;	  Boston:	  Brill,	  2008),	  221-­‐22.	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche	  argues	  that	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa’s	  development	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  substance	  in	  the	  Encheiridion	  constitutes	  ‘a	  key	  element	  in	  the	  debate	  between	  pagan	  philosophy	  and	  the	  ‘Platonism	  of	  the	  Fathers’.’	  612	  Ibid.,	  221.	  613	  See	  the	  article:	  Marina	  Wilks,	  "Jacob	  of	  Edessa's	  Use	  of	  Greek	  Philosophy	  in	  His	  Hexaemaron,"	  in	  Jacob	  of	  
Edessa	  and	   the	   Syriac	  Culture	   of	  His	  Day,	   ed.	   R.	   B.	   ter	   Haar	   Romeny,	  Monographs	   of	   the	   Peshitta	   Institute,	  Leiden	  (Leiden	  ;	  Boston:	  Brill,	  2008).	  614	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche	   suggests	   that	   the	   Isagoge	   and	   the	   Categories	   were	   the	   first	   parts	   of	   the	   Organon	  translated	   into	   Syriac	   in	   the	   sixth	   century	   and	   that	   they	   occupied	   a	   central	   place	   in	   the	   Syriac	   study	   of	  Aristotle.	  He	  argues	  for	  their	  precedence	  ‘sans	  doute	  qu'il	  y	  est	  question	  de	  la	  substance	  et	  des	  attributs,	  ainsi	  que	   l'ordonnancement	   des	   êtres	   en	   genres	   et	   espèces,	   qui	   commane	   toute	   théorie	   d	   la	   predication’.	   Henri	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche,	   "Le	  Corpus	  Philosophique	   Syriaque	   aux	  VIe-­‐VIIIe	   Siècles"	   (paper	  presented	   at	   the	   "Late	  antiquity	   and	   Arabic	   thought	   :	   patterns	   in	   the	   constitution	   of	   European	   culture"	   Strasbourg,	  March	   12-­‐14	  2004),	  284.	  615	  See	   for	   example,	   Takahashi’s	   introductory	   overview	   on	   the	   Syriac	   Tradition	   of	   Aristotle.	   Takahashi,	  "Edition	  of	   the	  Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	  on	  the	  Edition	  of	   the	  Book	  of	  Heaven	  and	  the	  World	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  Generation	  and	  Corruption	  of	  the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	  109-­‐13.	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Isagoge	  of	  Porphyry	  and	  on	  the	  Organon,	  completed	  in	  1148,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  commentary	  on	  Evagrius	   Ponticus’	   Kephalaia	   Gnostica;	  616	  a	   work	   which	   may	   well	   also	   have	   inspired	  Barhebraeus’	  centuria.	  These	  commentaries	  illustrate	  well	  the	  very	  different	  thinkers	  that	  the	   West	   Syrians	   had	   inherited,	   and	   yet	   both	   Evagrius	   and	   Porphyry	   belonged	   to	   the	  intellectual	  world	  of	  Neoplatonism	  at	  Alexandria.617	  However,	   the	  epistemological	  conflict	  between	  the	  Aristotelian	  tradition	  and	  the	  Platonism	  or	  Neoplatonism	  of	  the	  Fathers	  of	  the	  Church,	   had	   surfaced	   only	   periodically,	   as	   evidenced	   in	   the	   tensions	   between	   the	   East	  Syrian	   schools	   of	   learning	   and	   the	   monasteries.	   For	   Barhebraeus,	   who	   had	   immersed	  himself	   in	   both	   traditions,	   the	   conflicts	   that	   emerged	   in	   his	   own	   writings	   reflected	   this	  epistemological	   conflict	   within	   Syrian	   theological	   discourse.	   However	   Barhebraeus	  appreciated	  that	  these	  differences	  were	  not	  irreconcilable,	  since	  he	  understood	  through	  his	  own	  examination	  of	  Greek	  philosophy	  that	  both	  positions	  depended	  fundamentally	  on	  the	  same	  tradition	  of	  philosophy,	  that	  is,	  the	  Aristotelianism	  of	  the	  Neoplatonic	  commentators.	  Thus	  both	  Aristotelian	  and	  Platonic	  elements	  were	  inherent	  within	  these	  rival	  approaches	  to	  theology,	  since	  both	  the	  East	  and	  West	  Syrian	  scholastics	  and	  mystics	  had	  inherited	  the	  Alexandrian	   tradition	   of	   Neoplatonic	   Aristotelianism.	   Barhebraeus’	   understanding	   of	   the	  love	  of	  God	  corrected	  and	  completed	  the	  metaphysical	  framework	  of	  West	  Syrian	  theology,	  which	  had	  its	  philosophical	  roots	  in	  this	  Alexandrian	  tradition.	  Indeed,	  the	  development	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  position	  might	  be	  understood	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  an	  opposition	  amongst	  some	  monastic	  groups	  to	  the	  incorporation	  of	  logical	  reasoning	  into	  theology.	  	  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  616	  David	  G.	  K.	  Taylor,	  "L'importance	  des	  Pères	  de	  L'eglise	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  Spéculative	  de	  Barhebraeus,"	  Parole	  
de	   l'Orient	   33	   (2008):	   80.	   David	   Taylor	   remarks	   that	   Dionysius	   freely	   used	   the	   work	   of	   his	   East	   Syrian	  predecessor,	  Babai	  the	  Great,	  in	  his	  commentary	  on	  the	  censured	  version	  (S1)	  of	  the	  Centuriae.	  617	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Historia	  Monachorum	  20.15,	  Evagrius	  is	  recorded	  as	  partaking	  in	  the	  disputations	  with	  the	   pagan	   philosophers	   at	   Alexandria,	   during	   his	   time	   in	   Egypt.	   Norman	   Russell,	   The	   Lives	   of	   the	   Desert	  
Fathers	   :	   The	   Historia	   Monachorum	   in	   Aegypto,	   Cistercian	   Studies	   Series	   (London	   ;	   Kalamazoo,	   Mich.:	  Mowbray;	  Cistercian,	  1981),	  107.	  This	  is	  also	  included	  in	  the	  Syriac	  version,	  in	  ‘The	  History	  of	  the	  Monks’	  by	  Hieronymus	  in	  Volume	  I,	  Chapter	  18	  on	  the	  History	  of	  Evagrius.	  E.	  A.	  Wallis	  Budge,	  The	  Paradise	  or	  Garden	  of	  
the	   Holy	   Fathers	   :	   Being	   Histories	   of	   the	   Anchorites,	   Recluses,	   Monks,	   Coenobites,	   and	   Ascetic	   Fathers	   of	   the	  
Deserts	  of	  Egypt	  between	  A.D.	  CCL	  and	  A.D.	  CCCC	  circiter,	  2	  vols.	  (London:	  Chatto	  &	  Windus,	  1907),	  373.	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Rival Conceptual Schemas 
The	  Problem	  of	  Conceptual	  Language	  for	  God	  In	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	   schools	   of	   learning	   and	   the	   monasteries	   amongst	   the	   East	  Syrians,	   the	   dominance	   of	   the	  Organon,	   the	   Aristotelian	   books	   of	   logic,	   for	   the	   study	   of	  Scripture	   in	   the	   schools	   formed	   a	   focus	   for	   critique	   from	   monks	   like	   Dadīšō.	   However,	  Becker	   has	   pointed	   out,	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   study	   of	   logic	  was	   intrinsically	   tied	   up	  with	   the	  understanding	   of	   language.	   The	   Neoplatonic	   tradition	   differentiated	   between	   words,	  concepts	  and	   things,	   that	   is,	   ‘haì	  phōnaí,	   tà	  noḗmata	   and	   tà	  prágmata’.	  618	  However	   in	   the	  scholastic	   curricula,	   the	   logic	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Categories	  was	  used	  as	  a	  categorisation	  of	   the	  order	  of	  being	  in	  creation,	  through	  scholastic	  texts	  such	  as	  The	  Cause	  of	  the	  Foundation	  of	  
the	  Schools	  (an	  anonymous	  text	  composed	  at	  the	  School	  of	  Nisibis,	  581-­‐c.610CE).619	  Becker	  has	  concluded	  that	  in	  this	  process	  ‘the	  logical	  becomes	  the	  ontological’,	  and	  thus	  ‘how	  we	  talk	   and	   think	   about	   things	   reflects	   the	   actual	   order	   of	   things	   as	   it	   truly	   is’.620	  When	   the	  seventh	  century	  East	  Syrian	  monks	  such	  as	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh,	  Dadīšō	  Qaṭrāyē	  and	  Simeon	  d-­‐Taybūṭēh,	   voiced	   their	   critique	   of	   the	   learning	   practices	   in	   the	   schools,	   it	   is	   principally	  Evagrius	   Ponticus	   to	   whom	   they	   turned	   for	   the	   theoretical	   formulation	   of	   this	   critique.	  Indeed	   Evagrius’	   ascetic	   theology	   operates	   precisely	   from	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   Neoplatonic	  division	   of	   word,	   concept	   and	   thing.	   Since	   words	   or	   language	   refer	   to	   mental	   concepts	  which	  represent	  the	  things	  external	  to	  the	  self,	  the	  study	  of	  logic	  through	  language	  relates	  to	   things	   in	   their	  material	   existence,	   but	   the	   immaterial	   and	   the	   divine	   things	   cannot	   be	  objectified	   in	   the	   same	   manner.	   For	   the	   mind	   to	   comprehend	   the	   divine,	   words	   and	  concepts	  could	  not	  be	  used	  as	  an	  objective	  means	  of	  knowledge	  about	  God,	  for	  these	  must	  be	  transcended	  in	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  divine	  transcendent.	  	  The	  East	  Syrian	  scholastic	   texts	  also	  affirm	  the	  unknowability	  of	  God	   in	  His	  Essence.	  God	  must	  be	  a	  simple,	  not	  a	  composite	  entity	   for	  a	  composite	  God	  would	  be	  composed	  by	  His	  parts	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  creation.	  Therefore	  the	  uncreated	  God	  must	  be	  a	  unity.	  The	  Cause	  of	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  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  142.	  619	  Ibid.,	  100.	  620	  Ibid.,	  142.	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the	  Foundation	  of	  the	  Schools	  follows	  Neoplatonic	  commentators	  such	  as	  Ammonius,	  a	  third	  century	   Greek	   philosopher	   from	   Alexandria,	   in	   his	   commentary	   on	   the	   Categories,	   who	  argued	   that	   since	  knowledge	  of	  a	   composite	  entity	   (Gr.	   suntheton)	   concerns	  knowing	   the	  whole	  by	   its	  parts,	   the	   substance	  of	   the	  gods	  must	  be	   simple	   (Gr.	  haploos).621	  Becker	  has	  suggested	  that	  Ammonius’	  commentary	  provides	  the	  model	   for	   the	  East	  Syrian	  scholastic	  text	   the	   Cause,	  when	   it	   concludes	   that	   since	   God	   in	   His	   essence	   cannot	   be	   known,	   the	  ‘investigation	   of	   God	   is	   limited	   to	   how	   he	   exists’,	   and	   this	   is	   established	   as	   ‘eternally	  existent,	   infinite	   spirit,	   the	   cause	   of	   all’. 622 	  Becker	   has	   further	   suggested	   that	   some	  terminology	   of	   the	   Cause	   concerning	   the	   unknowability	   of	   God	   could	   derive	   from	   the	  Evagrian	   corpus,	   particularly	   essence	   (Syr.	   ʾītūtā)	   and	   ineffability.	  When	   the	  Cause	   states	  that	   God	   exists	   ‘“ineffably”	   (lā	   metmallānāʾīt)’,	   an	   adverb	   which	   relates	   to	   the	   Syriac	  cognate	   ‘speech’	   (meltā),	   then	  speech	  cannot	  reach	  God.623	  Therefore	   the	  Evagrian	  notion	  of	  the	  ineffability	  of	  the	  divine	  essence	  is	  shared	  by	  the	  Cause,	  but	  two	  different	  trajectories	  emerge	   from	   this	   assertion.	   The	   scholastic	   approach	   pursued	   the	   investigation	   of	   the	  existence	  of	  God	   through	  metaphysics	  as	   the	   first	   cause	  of	  being,	  while	  Evagrius	  and	   the	  mystics	  pursue	  a	  noesis	  of	   the	  divine	  essence,	   through	  the	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  of	  God	  that	  resists	   reducibility	   to	   what	   can	   be	   spoken	   or	   predicated	   about	   God.	   Evagrius	   was	   not	  concerned	  with	  pursuing	  metaphysical	  investigation	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  being	  of	  things,	  ‘of	  substances	  which	  come	  together	  to	  constitute	  a	  definition	  that	  shows	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  being	  of	  an	  object	  here-­‐below’.624	  Rather	  he	  pursued	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  incorporeal,	  not	  the	  being	  of	  an	  object	  near	  at	  hand,	  but	  the	  Trinity	  in	  whom	  there	  is	  only	  ‘oneness-­‐in-­‐being’	  without	   the	   differentiation	   of	   the	   being	   of	   beings.625	  In	   the	   Gnostikos	   he	   rejected	   the	  attempt	   to	   define	   the	   divine	   God,	   ‘[f]or	   definitions	   belong	   to	   created	   and	   composite	  beings’.626	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  621	  Ibid.,	   136-­‐7.	   Becker	   quotes	   from	   Ammonius,	   In	   Categorias	   35.18-­‐36.3:	   ‘Man	   and	   things	   of	   that	   sort	   are	  composite	  substances.	  The	  substance	  of	  the	  gods	  is	  simple	  substance	  that	  is	  better	  than	  the	  composite’.	  622	  Ibid.,	  138.	  Becker	  quotes	  The	  Cause	  of	  the	  Foundation	  of	  the	  Schools	  334.3-­‐4.	  623	  Ibid.,	  140-­‐41.	  624	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,	  Skemmata	  18,	  in:	  William	  Harmless	  and	  Raymond	  R.	  Fitzgerald,	  "The	  Sapphire	  Light	  of	  the	  Mind:	  The	  Skemmata	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,"	  Theological	  Studies	  62,	  no.	  3	  (2001):	  524.	  625	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,	  Skemmata	  18,	  in:	  ibid.	  626	  Guillaumont	   and	   Guillaumont,	   Évagre	   le	   Pontique.	   Le	   Gnostique,	   ou,	   a	   Celui	   Qui	   est	   Devenu	   Digne	   de	   la	  
Science,	   132.	  Evagrius’	  Gnostikos	   27	   is	   also	   quoted	   in:	  Harmless	   and	   Fitzgerald,	   "The	   Sapphire	   Light	   of	   the	  Mind:	  The	  Skemmata	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,"	  524,	  n.	  90.	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  Evagrius	  of	  Pontus	  was	  fundamentally	  concerned	  with	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  divine	  essence,	  the	  unknowable	  ʾītūtā,	  which	  can	  only	  be	  known	  through	  intuition	  or	  noēsis.	  This	  adopted	  one	  of	  the	  two	  avenues	  of	  investigation	  into	  the	  divine	  (or	  ‘the	  gods’)	  as	  simple	  substances,	  which	   the	  Neoplatonic	   commentators	   of	   Aristotle	   offered.	   Becker	   has	   described	   the	   first	  way	   of	   knowledge	   ‘by	   a	   more	   immediate	   apprehension	   or	   intuition’	   and	   the	   second	  ‘through	  combined	  or	  composite	  statements	  made	  about	  that	  entity’.627	  As	  a	  scholastic	  text	  the	   Cause	   takes	   the	   latter	   approach,	   in	   undertaking	   the	   ‘synthetic’	   knowledge	   of	   God’s	  existence	   while	   acknowledging	   that	   God’s	   being	   is	   not	   synthetic. 628 	  Evagrius’	  understanding	   of	   the	   necessity	   of	   the	   intuition	   of	   the	   mind	   to	   comprehend	   God	  incorporates	   a	   view	  of	   language,	  which	  Becker	   describes	   as	   ‘the	  mutual	   failure	   of	  words	  and	   images	   to	   express	   accurately	   realms	   inaccessible	   to	   immediate	   human	   contact’.629	  From	  this	  stems	  the	  Evagrian	  insistence	  on	  silence	  for	  the	  monastic	  way	  of	  life,	  epitomised	  by	  his	  statement:	  ‘Let	  the	  ineffable	  be	  worshipped	  in	  silence’.630	  Becker	  has	  concluded	  that	  the	   Evagrian	   emphasis	   on	   imageless	   and	   silent	   prayer	   corresponds	   to	   Evagrius’	   view	   of	  perception	  and	  language,	  ‘Just	  as	  images	  are	  insufficient	  for	  conveying	  the	  spiritual	  realm,	  so	  language	  can	  not	  touch	  upon	  the	  divine’.631	  	  	  Barhebraeus	  also	  comprehends	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  inadequacy	  of	   language	  for	  the	  divine,	  when	   he	   questions	   the	   scholastic	   approach	   that	   attempts	   to	   define	   the	   ontology	   of	   God	  according	  to	  a	   foundation	  of	   language	  in	  the	  grammar	  of	   logic.	  Barhebraeus	  declares	  that	  the	  intuition	  of	  divine	  things	  is	  when	  ‘the	  mind	  hears	  unspeakable	  words	  which	  no	  mouth	  is	  able	  to	  explain’.632	  Barhebraeus	  also	  admits	  to	  the	  inevitability	  of	  language	  for	  the	  mystic:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  627	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  138.	  628	  Ibid.	  629	  Ibid.,	  176-­‐77.	  630	  Ibid.,	  177.	  This	  sentence	  concludes	  the	  Greek	  fragment	  (41)	  of	  the	  Gnosticus	  quoted	  previously,	  p91,	  n.364.	  	  631	  Ibid.	  632	  Wensinck,	   Bar	   Hebraeus's	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   :	   Together	   with	   Some	   Chapters	   from	   His	   Ethikon,	   66,	   584*,	  Sentence	  27.	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Above	  and	  beneath,	  before	  and	  behind	  belong	  to	  the	  peculiar	  qualities	  of	  bodily	  things,	  not	  of	  not-­‐bodily	  things.	   But	   on	   account	   of	   the	   inevitability	   of	   names	   and	   the	   necessity	   of	   words,	   he	   who	   speaks	   must	  necessarily	  use	  these	  secondary	  things.633	  	  	  Here	  Barhebraeus	  betrays	  a	  number	  of	  Neoplatonic	  concerns:	  that	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  using	  words	  and	  names	  in	  the	  speaking	  of	  language,	  and	  the	  relation	  of	  words	  to	  ‘bodily	  things’.	  From	  the	  context	  of	  the	  preceding	  sentences,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  only	  way	  of	  overcoming	  the	  necessity	  of	   language	  was	   through	   illumination,	  using	  another	  very	  Neoplatonic	   image	  of	  the	  mind	  as	  a	   lamp.634	  Barhebraeus	  describes	   the	  mind	  becoming	  enflamed	   in	   the	   love	  of	  God,	  and	  this	  love	  provides	  the	  transformative	  impulse	  for	  the	  illumination	  of	  the	  mind.635	  	  	  The	   illumination	   of	   the	   mind	   is	   an	   intuitive	   form	   of	   knowledge,	   which	   is	   not	   based	   on	  reasoning	  derived	  from	  the	  data	  of	  the	  senses.	  When	  Barhebraeus	  refers	  to	  the	  intellect	  as	  
hawnā,	  he	  understands	  this	   to	  be	  the	   ‘knowing	  faculty	  susceptible	  to	   intelligible	  matters’.	  Like	   the	  Evagrian	  nous,	   this	   intellectual	   faculty	  surpasses	   the	  knowledge	  of	   the	  senses.636	  The	  emphasis	  of	  the	  Syrian	  mystics	  on	  the	  intellect	  reflected	  the	  Neoplatonic	  background	  of	  Evagrius,	  who	  used	   the	   term	  nous	   in	  Greek	   to	  denote	   the	   intellect;	   this	   term	   in	   turn	  was	  translated	  into	  Syriac	  by	  hawnā.	  For	  Barhebraeus	  it	  also	  has	  multiple	  connotations;	  being	  translated	  as	  mind,	  intellect,	  or	  even	  heart,	  as	  the	  most	  spiritual	  part	  of	  the	  human	  person.	  However,	  Teule	  has	  suggested	  that	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  interchange	  of	  terms	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  the	   soul	   in	  Barhebraeus,	  which	   is	   variously	   called	   ‘soul’	   (napšā),	   ‘spirit’	   (rūḥā),	   ‘heart’	   or	  ‘intellect’	   (hawnā).	   The	   first	   chapter	   of	   Mēmrā	   III	   of	   the	   Ethicon	   is	   devoted	   to	   the	  philosophical	  discussion	  of	  these	  terms.637	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  633	  Ibid.,	  75,	  593*,	  Sentence	  76.	  634	  The	  image	  of	  the	  lamp	  as	  a	  light	  to	  the	  mind	  extends	  from	  Sentences	  74	  to	  77.	  Ibid.,	  74-­‐75,	  592-­‐93*.	  635	  Ibid.,	  74-­‐75,	  592-­‐93*,	  Sentence	  75.	   ‘When	  the	  mind	  that	   is	   inflamed	  with	  the	   love	  of	   its	  Lord,	   is	  directed	  under	   Him	   as	   it	  were	   by	   the	   plummet,	   its	   flame	  will	   quickly	   become	   straight;	   and	   being	   set	   to	   flame	   in	   a	  moment	  it	  will	  be	  enlightened,	  as	  an	  extinguished	  torch	  is	  kindled	  by	  one	  that	  burns.’	  636	  Teule,	   Ethicon	   :	  Mēmrā	   I,	   xxxvi.	  This	   is	   the	   definition	   that	   Teule	   provides	   in	   his	   list	   of	   technical	   terms,	  which	  he	  derives	  from	  Barhebraeus’	  definition	  of	  hawna	  in	  the	  Ethicon	  3	  I	  1,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  Syriac	  mystics	  for	  whom	  Teule	  says	  it	  meant	  ‘the	  utmost	  susceptibility	  to	  spiritual	  things’.	  637	  Ibid.,	  xxiii.	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Evagrianism	  and	  Imageless	  Prayer	  Evagrius	  Ponticus’	  theology	  of	  prayer,	  formulated	  between	  his	  Greek	  philosophical	  training	  under	   the	   Cappadocian	   Fathers	   and	   the	   ‘Coptic	   spirituality’	   of	   Egyptian	   monasticism,638	  also	   came	   to	   be	   formative	   for	   the	   East	   Syrian	   mystics,	   especially	   Isaac	   of	   Nineveh	   and	  Dadīšō	  Qaṭrāyē.	  Brouria	  Bitton-­‐Ashkelony	  describes	  the	  preparation	  for	  pure	  prayer	  as	  an	  ‘iconoclastic’	  mental	  process,	  being	  a	  process	  which	  is	  ‘characteristic	  of	  an	  epistemological	  movement	   from	  multiplicity	   to	   simplicity’.639	  Becker	  similarly	   refers	   to	   the	   ‘anti-­‐imagism’	  of	  Evagrius	   that	   is	   located	   in	  an	  Aristotelian	  understanding	  of	  sense	  perception,	   in	  which	  the	   things	   of	   this	   world	   are	   perceived	   according	   to	   images	   constructed	   in	   the	   mind.640	  Bitton-­‐Askelony	  also	   locates	  the	  sources	  of	  this	  understanding	  in	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  Stoics,	  with	   Evagrius	   envisaging	   the	   nous	   as	   ‘the	   seat	   of	   representation’;	   this	   representation	   or	  
noēmata	  is	  ‘the	  image	  evoked	  by	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  sensible	  object’.641	  Thus	  the	  mind	  had	  to	  be	  purified	  from	  this	  occupation	  with	  the	  perception	  of	  material	  things,	  in	  order	  to	  enter	  the	  state	  of	  prayer	  that	  is	  freed	  from	  ‘all	  mental	  representations	  deriving	  from	  the	  senses	  or	   from	  memory	  or	   temperament’.642	  Following	  Aristotle’s	   teaching	  on	  the	  soul,	   that	   ‘it	   is	  not	   possible	   to	   think	   without	   an	   image’,643	  the	   Evagrian	   understanding	   of	   prayer	   is	   an	  approach	  to	  God	  through	  the	  stilling	  of	  the	  thoughts,	  by	  preventing	  the	  formation	  of	  images	  in	  the	  mind	  which	  block	  the	  approach	  to	  the	  One.	  In	  Barhebraeus’	  chapter	  on	  prayer,	  which	  forms	  the	  first	  section	  of	  the	  first	  Mēmrā	  of	  the	  Ethicon,	  he	  quotes	  ‘Father	  Evagrius’	  directly	  on	   the	   necessity	   of	   abandoning	   all	   reliance	   on	   sense	   perception	   and	   ‘thinking’,	   in	   the	  concentration	  of	  the	  intellect	  in	  prayer:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  638	  Harmless	  and	  Fitzgerald,	  "The	  Sapphire	  Light	  of	  the	  Mind:	  The	  Skemmata	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,"	  501.	  639	  Bitton-­‐Ashkelony,	  "The	  Limit	  of	  the	  Mind	  (NOYΣ):	  Pure	  Prayer	  According	  to	  Evagrius	  Ponticus	  and	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh,"	  300.	  640	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  176.	  641	  Bitton-­‐Ashkelony,	  "The	  Limit	  of	  the	  Mind	  (NOYΣ):	  Pure	  Prayer	  According	  to	  Evagrius	  Ponticus	  and	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh,"	  300.	  642	  Ibid.,	  301.	  643	  	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  148.	  Becker	  quotes	  Aristotle,	  De	  Anima	  427a18-­‐21.	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if	  the	  great	  Moses,	  when	  trying	  to	  approach	  the	  earthly	  bush,	  was	  prevented	  <from	  approaching>	  until	  he	  had	  loosed	  his	  sandal	  from	  his	  feet	  (cf.	  Ex.	  3:5),	  how	  could	  you	  wish	  to	  see	  Him,	  who	  is	  beyond	  all	  sensual	  apperception	  and	  thinking,	  and	  speak	  with	  Him,	  without	  loosing	  from	  you	  every	  impassioned	  thought.644	  	  Barhebraeus	  further	  reflects	  this	  emphasis	  of	  Evagrian	  psychology	  in	  his	  description	  of	  the	  mind	  as	  a	  mirror,	  which	  is	  stained	  by	  the	  images	  of	  matter,	  and	  can	  only	  reflect	  things	  of	  a	  spiritual	   nature	   according	   to	   its	   state	   of	   cleanness	   and	   purification	   from	   the	   material	  image.645	  	  	  Barhebraeus’	  references	  to	  the	   ‘passions	  of	   the	   flesh’,	  also	  evokes	  the	  Evagrian	   insistence	  on	   the	  necessity	  of	  withdrawing	   ‘from	  the	   flesh’,	   that	   is,	   from	  the	  mental	  representations	  which	  derive	  ‘from	  the	  senses	  or	  from	  memory	  or	  temperament’.646	  Becker	  has	  stated	  that	  a	   sign	   of	   the	   passionless	   state	   of	  apatheia	   is	   that	   ‘memories	   and	   dream	   images	   cease	   to	  arise	   during	   prayer’.647	  Bitton-­‐Ashkelony	   has	   described	   how	   in	   the	   Evagrian	   system,	   the	  mind	  once	  freed	  from	  sensory	  perceptions	  is	  able	  to	  come	  near	  to	  the	  ‘frontiers	  of	  prayer’,	  from	   which	   eros	   can	   transport	   the	   spiritual	   mind	   (pneumatikos	   nous)	   to	   ‘the	   noetic	  realm’.648	  Evagrius	  also	  teaches	  that	  this	  state	  allows	  the	  mind	  to	  become	  luminous	  by	  the	  light	  of	  the	  Holy	  Trinity	  and	  is	  thus	  able	  to	  see	  the	  ‘place	  of	  God’.649	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  reproduces	   these	   features,	   particularly	   through	   their	   development	   in	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  644	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  9,	  10*.	  645	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	   67-­‐68,	  586*,	  Sentence	   36.	   ‘36.	   As	   a	  mirror	   in	   itself	   is	   devoid	   of	   all	   images	   and	   reflexes,	   but,	   according	   to	   its	   purity	   and	  cleanness	   images	   of	   things	   outside	   it	   appear	   in	   it	  —	   so	   the	  mind	   is	   devoid	   of	   images,	   and	   according	   to	   its	  being	  purified	  from	  the	  stains	  of	  matter,	  immaterial	  perceptions	  are	  reflected	  in	  it.’	  646	  Bitton-­‐Ashkelony,	  "The	  Limit	  of	  the	  Mind	  (NOYΣ):	  Pure	  Prayer	  According	  to	  Evagrius	  Ponticus	  and	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh,"	  301.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  66,	  584*,	  Sentence	  24.	  ‘As	  pure	  iron,	  no	  hindrance	  presenting	  itself,	  is	  attracted	  by	  a	  magnet,	  but	  when	  a	  foreign	  substance	  adheres	  to	  it,	  the	  attraction	  diminishes,	  so	  the	  pure	  mind	  is	  in	  its	  entirety	  attracted	  by	  the	  supreme	  Essence;	  but	  when	  the	  passions	  of	  the	  flesh	  adhere	  to	  it,	  the	  attraction	  is	  impeded’.	  	  	  647	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  176.	  648	  Bitton-­‐Ashkelony,	  "The	  Limit	  of	  the	  Mind	  (NOYΣ):	  Pure	  Prayer	  According	  to	  Evagrius	  Ponticus	  and	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh,"	  301.	  649	  Ibid.,	  301-­‐02.	  	  Stewart	  discusses	  the	  significance	  of	  Evagrius’	  notion	  of	  seeing	  the	  place	  of	  God	  through	  the	  internalisation	  of	  prayer,	  inspired	  by	  the	  Septuagint	  version	  of	  Exodus	  24.10-­‐11,	  in	  his	  key	  writings	  on	  prayer:	  Stewart,	  "Imageless	  Prayer	  and	  the	  Theological	  Vision	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,"	  195-­‐98.	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with	   reference	   to	   the	   cloud	   as	   the	  divine	   abode.650	  However,	   Evagrius	  does	  not	   treat	   the	  role	  of	  love	  in	  the	  same	  capacity	  as	  other	  elements	  of	  his	  ascetic	  theology,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  lacking	  an	  explanation	  as	  to	  the	  transformative	  role	  given	  to	  eros	  in	  his	  system.651	  Barhebraeus	  developed	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  beyond	  that	  envisaged	  by	  Evagrius	   and	   the	   Syrian	   mystics,	   to	   bring	   to	   conclusion	   their	   insistence	   that	   the	  contemplation	   of	   God	   must	   be	   conducted	   free	   of	   the	   images	   constructed	   by	   sense	  perception.652	  While	  Barhebraeus	  was	  indebted	  to	  Evagrian	  thought	  in	  his	  mysticism,653	  his	  originality	  lay	  in	  reconciling	  the	  Evagrian	  mystics	  with	  the	  Scholastics.	  	  	  
Barhebraeus	  in	  Epistemological	  Crisis	  Barhebraeus	  was	  well	   aware	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   epistemological	   impasse	   in	   the	   Syrian	  tradition,	  seen	  by	  his	  comment	  in	  his	  autobiographical	  narrative	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove:	  	   During	  this	  dubitation	  I	  halted	  between	  two	  opinions	  till	  some	  of	  the	  rays	  of	  the	  light	  without	  quality,	  in	  the	  way	  of	   lightning	  which	  does	  not	   remain,	   enlightened	  me	  and	  some	  of	   the	   scales	  which	  covered	  my	  eyes,	  fell	  off	  and	  they	  were	  opened,	  so	  that	  I	  saw,	  although	  partly.654	  	  Barhebraeus	  suggests	  here	  that	  there	  were	  two	  epistemological	  positions	  (‘two	  opinions’)	  between	  which	  he	  could	  not	  choose	  and	   that	   this	   state	  of	   indecision	  had	  precipitated	  his	  own	  crisis	  of	  faith.	  The	  narration	  of	  the	  course	  of	  his	  intellectual	  enquiries,	  in	  passing	  from	  the	   theology	   of	   the	   Church	   Fathers	   to	   the	   philosophy	   of	   the	   Greeks	   and	   finally	   to	   the	  mysticism	  of	  the	  Initiated,	  does	  not	  immediately	  clarify	  what	  these	  two	  positions	  might	  be.	  In	   fact,	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  only	  hints	  at	   the	   true	  nature	  of	   the	   impasse,	  which	  becomes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  650	  For	  example:	  	  ‘as	  has	  been	  taught	  by	  the	  great	  Dionysius	  the	  Areopagite,	  who	  says:	  The	  divine	  cloud	  is	  the	  inaccessible	   light,	  wherein	  God	   is	   said	   to	  abide.’	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  
Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  97,	  487*.	  651	  Lossky	   argues	   that	   for	   Orthodox	   spirituality,	   St.	   Maximus	   the	   Confessor	   (580-­‐662CE)	   transformed	   the	  Evagrian	  emphasis	  on	  the	  intellect	  into	  the	  centrality	  of	  love.	  Lossky,	  The	  Vision	  of	  God,	  108-­‐09.	  ‘It	  is	  no	  longer	  gnosis,	  as	  in	  Evagrius,	  but	  rather	  ἀγάπη	  which	  is	  primary	  in	  the	  doctrine	  of	  St.	  Maximus.’	  652	  For	  example,	  Barhebraeus	  quotes	   from	   Isaac	  of	  Nineveh	   (though	  Teule	  notes	   that	   this,	   along	  with	  other	  quotations	  from	  Isaac	  in	  this	  chapter,	  is	  found	  in	  a	  treatise	  on	  prayer	  by	  Simeon	  d-­‐Taybūṭēh),	  ‘And	  Mār	  Isaac	  said:	   “Pure	   prayer	   is	   not	   knowledge	   and	   words,	   but	   emptiness	   of	   the	   intelligence	   and	   a	   quiet,	   collected	  intellect,	  brought	  to	  peace	  by	  the	  silence	  of	  motions	  and	  senses”.’	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  17,	  19-­‐20*.	  653	  David	  Taylor	  emphasises	  the	  profound	  influence	  of	  Evagrius	  on	  the	  Ethicon,	  with	  more	  than	  63	  citations.	  Taylor,	  "L'importance	  des	  Pères	  de	  L'eglise	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  Spéculative	  de	  Barhebraeus,"	  80.	  654	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  61-­‐62,	  579*.	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clearer	   in	   the	   one	   hundred	   sentences,	   as	   that	   between	   the	   epistemology	   of	   monastic	  theology	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   of	   scholastic	   theology	   on	   the	   other.	   The	   theology	   of	   the	  Syrian	  Church	  Fathers	  was	   informed	  by	  Platonic	   theory,	   and	  with	   the	  ascetic	   theology	  of	  Evagrius	   Ponticus,	   the	   epistemology	   of	   monastic	   spirituality	   became	   even	   more	  Neoplatonic	   in	   emphasis.	   The	   influence	   of	   Evagrius	   extended	   beyond	   that	   of	   the	   ascetic	  tradition	   itself;	   Babai	   the	   Great’s	   commentary	   on	   Evagrius’	   Kephalaia	   Gnostica	   was	  concerned	  to	  defend	  Evagrius	  from	  charges	  of	  Origenism.655	  	  	  Barhebraeus’	  description	  of	  being	  saved	  from	  his	  intellectual	  crisis	  uses	  highly	  Neoplatonic	  metaphors.	  The	  very	  language	  of	  illumination	  -­‐	  the	  rays	  of	  ‘light’	  (Syr.	  nūhrā)656	  which	  are	  like	  the	  flashes	  of	   ‘lightning’	  (Syr.	  barqā)657	  that	  give	  him	  some	  partial	  vision	  -­‐	   is	   founded	  on	   a	   Neoplatonic	   view	   of	   the	  mind	   and	   the	   highest	   form	   of	   knowledge	   as	   intuition	   (Gr.	  
noēsis)	  of	  the	  Platonic	  forms.	  This	  ‘light	  without	  quality’,	  is	  also	  the	  agent	  which	  illuminates	  the	  mind	  when	  it	  reaches	  the	  state	  of	  ‘likeness’	  (Syr.	  dāmyūtā)658	  to	  God,	  which	  is	  the	  eighth	  of	  the	  twelve	  states	  of	  the	  perfect,	  as	  listed	  in	  the	  third	  part	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove.659	  This	  lack	  of	  ‘quality’	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  deliberate	  resistance	  on	  Barhebraeus’	  part	  to	  allowing	  the	  divine	  light	  of	  illumination	  to	  be	  subsumed	  under	  definition	  by	  substance;	  for	  quality	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  655	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  182-­‐83.	  Harmless	  and	  Fitzgerald	  note	  that	  Babai	  also	  wrote	  a	  commentary	  on	  the	  Syriac	   text	   of	   the	   Skemmata,	   which	   formed	   something	   of	   a	   ‘supplement’	   of	   additional	   chapters	   to	   the	  
Kephalaia	  Gnostica.	   Harmless	   and	   Fitzgerald,	   "The	   Sapphire	   Light	   of	   the	  Mind:	   The	   Skemmata	   of	   Evagrius	  Ponticus,"	  503.	  656	  Payne	  Smith	  and	  Payne	  Smith,	  A	  Compendious	  Syriac	  Dictionary	  :	  Founded	  Upon	  the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  
Payne	  Smith,	  330.	  Wensinck	  lists	  the	  words	  for	  both	  light	  and	  illumination	  in	  his	  Glossary	  (no.	  19).	  Wensinck,	  
Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  140.	  657	  Wensinck	   supplies	   this	   word	   in	   his	   Glossary	   (no.	   3),	   and	   provides	   what	   he	   considers	   to	   be	   the	   Arabic	  equivalents,	   which	   he	   explains	   in	   his	   Introduction	   (xciv).	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	   Book	   of	   the	  Dove	   :	   Together	  with	  
Some	   Chapters	   from	   His	   Ethikon,	   137.	   Payne	   Smith	   and	   Payne	   Smith,	   A	   Compendious	   Syriac	   Dictionary	   :	  
Founded	  Upon	  the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  Payne	  Smith,	  56.	  658	  A	  Compendious	  Syriac	  Dictionary	   :	  Founded	  Upon	  the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  Payne	  Smith,	   94.	  Wensinck	  also	   lists	   this	   word	   dāmyūtā	   in	   his	   Syriac	   Glossary	   (no.	   8),	   Wensinck,	   Bar	   Hebraeus's	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   :	  
Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  138.	  	  659	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	   57,	  574*.	   ‘The	  eighth	   is	  that	  of	  likeness,	  while	  the	  mind	  is	  illuminated	  by	  the	  light	  without	  quality	  and	  is	  changed	  into	  its	  likeness,	  as	  the	  elegant	  and	  dense	  cloud	  near	  the	  sun	  is	  transformed	  into	  the	  likeness	  of	  the	  sun.’	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one	   of	   the	   ten	   Aristotelian	   categories	   of	   substance.660	  Therefore	   this	   light	   is	   without	  external	  visible	  form,	  being	  supernatural	  and	  not	  one	  that	  can	  be	  observed	  by	  the	  senses.661	  	  
	  Barhebraeus	   did	   not	   in	   fact	   commit	   himself	   to	   the	   Evagrian	   position,	   but	   continued	   to	  maintain	  certain	  Aristotelian	  principles	  of	  onto-­‐theology.	  The	  Lord	  God	  cannot	  be	  defined	  according	  to	  the	  Categories,	  as	  Barhebraeus	  demonstrates	  in	  his	  poems,	  but	  still	  God	  may	  be	   affirmed	   as	   the	   first	   cause	   of	   metaphysics.	   In	   his	   philosophical	   works	   such	   as	   the	  
Conversation	  of	  Wisdom,	  Barhebraeus	  affirmed	  the	  onto-­‐theological	  God	  as	  the	  first	  cause	  of	  creation,	  and	  thus	  God	  could	  be	  affirmed	  as	  both	  the	  efficient	  cause	  (or	  first	  cause)	  and	  the	  final	  cause	  of	  being,	  in	  the	  Aristotelian	  sense.662	  In	  the	  sentences	  of	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  similarly	  accepts	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  mind	  to	  be	  true	  when	  it	  concludes	  ‘that	  God	  is	  one,	  and	   necessarily	   being	   and	   the	   eternal	   creator’.663	  Therefore,	   in	   the	   Dove,	   Barhebraeus	  appears	  to	  mediate	  between	  two	  epistemological	  positions.	  	  In	  Barhebraeus’	  mystical	   texts	  he	  proceeds	   from	   the	  enterprise	  of	   an	  encyclopaedist	   and	  transmitter	   of	   traditions,	   to	   resolve	   in	   a	   unique	   and	   original	   way	   the	   epistemological	  impasse	   that	   he	   had	   encountered	   during	   his	   more	   encyclopaedic	   undertakings.664	  His	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  660	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche	   in	   his	   discussion	   of	   Jacob	   of	   Edessa’s	   translation	   of	   the	   Categories,	   compares	   Jacob’s	  revision	   of	   the	   Anonymous	   Syriac	   translation	   and	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   chapter	   on	   quality,	   the	   fourth	   kind	  includes	   ‘shape	  and	   the	  external	   form’.	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche,	   "Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  and	   the	  Reception	  of	  Aristotle,"	  214-­‐15.	  	  661	  The	   light	   without	   quality	   also	   formed	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   the	   Hesychast	   movement,	   given	   systematic	  treatment	  by	  St	  Simeon	   the	  New	  Theologian.	   In	   the	   thirteenth	  century	   the	   theology	  of	  divine	   light	  was	   the	  subject	  of	  the	  Hesychast	  controversy	  and	  defended	  by	  St	  Gregory	  Palamas	  (1296-­‐1359CE).	  Lossky	  discusses	  this	  in	  his	  final	  chapter,	  see	  especially:	  Lossky,	  The	  Vision	  of	  God,	  128-­‐32.	  While	  Barhebraeus	  does	  not	  make	  reference	  to	  St.	  Simeon,	  he	  does	  make	  substantial	  use	  of	  John	  Climacus’	  Scala	  Paradisi,	  an	  early	  precursor	  to	  Hesychasm.	  Taylor	  has	  found	  more	  than	  29	  references	  to	  this	  work	  in	  the	  Ethicon.	  Taylor,	  "L'importance	  des	  Pères	  de	  L'eglise	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  Spéculative	  de	  Barhebraeus,"	  80.	  662	  In	   the	  Conversation	  of	  Wisdom	  Barhebraeus	   identifies	   the	   ‘Necessary	  Being’	  of	   the	  philosophers	  with	   the	  ‘Father’	   of	   the	   theologians,	   and	   the	   ‘First	   Cause’	   or	   ‘First	   Intelligence’	  with	   the	   Son	   (Book	   IV,	   30).	   Janssens	  points	   out	   that	   the	   philosophical	   system	   being	   referred	   to	   here	   is	   actually	   that	   of	   Avicenna’s.	   Janssens,	  
L'Entretien	  de	  la	  Sagesse	  :	  Introduction	  aux	  Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	  11.	  663	  Wensinck,	   Bar	   Hebraeus's	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   :	   Together	   with	   Some	   Chapters	   from	   His	   Ethikon,	   77,	   595*,	  Sentence	  88.	  664	  That	  Barhebraeus	  was	  obliged	  to	  continue	  with	  producing	  such	  works	  during	  the	  seven	  years	  in	  which	  he	  studied	  the	  mystics	  of	  the	  East	  and	  West,	  is	  also	  mentioned	  in	  this	  narrative.	  ‘I	  meditated	  on	  these	  works	  for	  seven	  years,	  during	  which	  I	  hated	  other	  sorts	  of	  knowledge,	  though	  I	  had	  to	  occupy	  my	  thoughts	  superficially	  with	  some	  of	  them,	  not	  for	  my	  own	  sake,	  but	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  others	  who	  wished	  to	  profit	  by	  me.’	  ibid.,	  61,	  579*.	  Takahashi	   suggests	   that	   this	   is	   a	   reference	   to	   the	   commissions	  of	  works	   in	   the	   secular	   sciences	  by	  Rabban	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uniqueness	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  borrowing	  from	  the	  Islamic	  tradition,	  to	  incorporate	  the	  insights	   of	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   into	   his	   reconciliation	   of	   Aristotelian	   scholasticism	   and	   Platonic	  idealism	   that	   had	   divided	   and	   frustrated	   Syrian	  monasticism	   from	   the	   beginnings	   of	   its	  reception	  of	  Greek	  ideas	  to	  Barhebraeus’	  own	  time.	  Al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  insights	  on	  the	  love	  of	  God	  formulated	  in	  the	  Iḥyāʾ,	  provided	  Barhebraeus	  with	  the	  conceptual	  means	  of	  finding	  a	  third	  position	  that	  brought	  together	  the	  two	  rival	  epistemologies	  within	  the	  Syrian	  tradition	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  resolved	   the	  deficiencies	  of	  each.665	  Through	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  understanding	  of	  the	   love	  of	  God,	  Barhebraeus	  was	  able	  to	  reconcile	   the	  opposition	  between	  the	  scholastic	  and	  the	  mystic	  traditions,	  which	  had	  arisen	  amongst	  the	  East	  and	  West	  Syrians.	  While	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  and	  the	  Avicennan	  tradition,	  as	  it	  was	  developed	  in	  Arabic	  philosophy,	  were	  clearly	  of	  great	   importance	   to	  Barhebraeus	  and	  other	  West	  Syrians	  of	   the	  period	  of	   revival	  and	  re-­‐appropriation	  of	  Aristotelian	  philosophy	   in	  Syriac,	   it	  was	   in	   fact	   the	  reading	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  that	  enabled	  Barhebraeus	  to	  overcome	  the	  impasse	  within	  the	  Syrian	  tradition.666	  	  	  
The	  Idolatry	  of	  the	  Concept	  The	   postmodern	   French	   Catholic	   thinker,	   Jean-­‐Luc	   Marion	   has	   explored	   the	   problem	   of	  thinking	  about	  God	  through	  the	  conceptual	  image.	  He	  has	  drawn	  on	  a	  range	  of	  thinkers,	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  a	  diachronic	  argument	  concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  debate	  between	  the	  scholastic	   tradition	   of	   divine	   being	   carried	   forward	   by	   Avicenna	   and	   Aquinas,	   and	   the	  counter-­‐tradition	   of	   the	   mystics,	   represented	   principally	   by	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	   which	   is	  centred	  on	  the	  love	  of	  God	  as	  the	  Good.667	  Marion	  has	  outlined	  the	  problem	  of	  Aristotelian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  Simeon	  of	  Qalʹa	  Rumaita	  (ob.	  1289),	  who	  worked	  as	  a	  physician	  at	  the	  Ilkhanid	  Court	  between	  1260	  and	  1289.	  Takahashi,	  "Simeon	  of	  Qal'a	  Rumaita,	  Patriarch	  Philoxenus	  Nemrod	  and	  Bar	  'Ebroyo,"	  69-­‐70.	  	  665	  MacIntyre	  makes	  a	  similar	  argument	  for	  the	  achievements	  of	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  whose	  acquaintance	  with	  both	   Aristotelianism	   and	   Augustinianism	   allowed	   him	   to	   reconcile	   these	   two	   systems	   of	   thought.	   Alasdair	  MacIntyre,	  Three	  Rival	  Versions	  of	  Moral	  Enquiry	   :	  Encyclopaedia,	  Genealogy,	  and	  Tradition,	   New	   ed.	   (Notre	  Dame:	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  1992),	  114-­‐16.	  666	  Teule	  concludes	  his	  discussion	  of	   the	   influence	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Barhebraeus,	  by	  saying	   that	  while	  many	  Syriac	  authors	  had	  turned	  to	  Islamic	  philosophers,	  historians	  and	  grammarians,	  ‘The	  Ethicon	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  
the	  Dove	  are	  examples	  that	  Barhebraeus	  did	  not	  only	   look	  up	  to	  Islam	  in	  his	  theoretical	  or	  scientific	  works,	  but	  was	  also	  prepared	  to	  accept	  in	  the	  person	  of	  al-­‐Ghazâlî	  the	  influence	  of	  Islâm	  in	  his	  writings	  of	  a	  spiritual	  character.’	  Herman	  Teule,	  "Barhebraeus’	  Ethicon,	  Al-­‐Ghazâlî	  and	  Ibn	  Sînâ,"	  Islamocristiana	  18	  (1992):	  84.	  667	  For	  example,	  Marion’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  Being	  or	  the	  Good	  as	  the	  first	  divine	  name:	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Marion,	  God	  
without	  Being	   :	  Hors-­‐Texte	   [Dieu	   sans	   l'être.],	   Religion	   and	   Postmodernism	   (Chicago:	   University	   of	   Chicago	  Press,	  1991),	  73-­‐83.	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metaphysics	  for	  the	  theology	  of	  divine	  being,	  through	  the	  image	  of	  the	  idol.	  668	  The	  idol	  that	  Marion	   introduces	   here	   is	   the	   conceptual	   idol,	   which	   he	   defines	   in	   the	   following	   way,	  ‘[w]hen	   a	   philosophical	   thought	   expresses	   a	   concept	   of	   what	   it	   then	   names	   “God,”	   this	  concept	  functions	  exactly	  as	  an	  idol.’669	  Therefore,	  the	  concept,	  ‘when	  it	  knows	  the	  divine	  in	  its	  hold,	  and	  hence	  names	  “God,”	  defines	  it’,	  the	  process	  of	  defining	  is	  also	  a	  measuring,	  and	  thus	  God	   is	  measured	  according	   to	   the	  dimension	  of	   the	  concept’s	  hold.670	  Marion	  quotes	  Gregory	  of	  Nyssa	  for	  the	  historical	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  conceptual	  idol:	  	  	   Every	  concept	  [noēma],	  as	  it	  is	  produced	  according	  to	  an	  apprehension	  of	  the	  imagination	  in	  a	  conception	  that	   circumscribes	   and	   in	   an	   aim	   that	  pretends	   to	   attain	   the	  divine	  nature,	  models	   only	   an	   idol	   of	  God	  [eidōlon	  theou],	  without	  at	  all	  declaring	  God	  himself.671	  	  Indeed,	  it	  can	  be	  observed	  that	  Marion	  in	  constructing	  his	  critique	  of	  ‘onto-­‐theology’,	  that	  is	  the	   metaphysics	   of	   divine	   being	   as	   it	   is	   received	   into	   theology,	   draws	   implicitly	   on	   the	  tradition	  of	  the	  Eastern	  mystics	  and	  their	  own	  critique	  of	  the	  dominant	  philosophy	  of	  their	  time:	   Neoplatonic	   Aristotelianism.	   Both	   Evagrius	   and	   Gregory	   of	   Nyssa	   came	   from	   the	  region	  of	  Pontus	  in	  Cappadocia,	  and	  their	  writings	  betray	  the	  influences	  of	  Origen	  and	  Basil	  of	  Caesarea.672	  The	  Evagrian	  teachings	  on	   imageless	  prayer	   that	  came	  to	  be	  so	  significant	  for	   the	   Syrian	   mystics	   similarly	   reflects	   Gregory	   of	   Nyssa’s	   objection	   to	   the	   attempt	   to	  apprehend	  God	  according	   to	   the	  reliance	  of	   the	  mind	  on	   the	   ‘imagination’	   (Gr.	  eikasīa)	  of	  the	  concept.	  The	  task	  challenging	  these	  thinkers	  concerns	  how	  to	  declare	  ‘God	  himself’,	  i.e.	  how	  to	  express	  God	  beyond	  the	  conceptual	  idol,	  that	  is	  how	  not	  to	  fix	  God	  in	  a	  language	  that	  is	   predicated	   on	   the	   concepts	   of	   the	   imagination,	   the	   lowest	   form	   of	   knowledge	   in	   the	  platonic	   schema	   which	   comprehends	   only	   images	   which	   are	   but	   shadows	   of	   the	   true	  forms.673	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  668	  Ibid.,	  26.	  ‘The	  idol	  produces	  (itself)	  in	  actuality	  (as)	  that	  at	  which	  vision	  intentionally	  aims.	  It	  freezes	  in	  a	  figure	  that	  which	  vision	  intentionally	  aims	  at	  in	  a	  glance.’	  669	  Ibid.,	  16.	  670	  Ibid.,	  29.	  671	  Ibid.,	  n.	  4,	  203.	  Marion	  quotes	  Gregory	  of	  Nyssa,	  Vita	  Moysis,	  II,	  par.	  166,	  P.G.,	  44,	  337b.	  672	  The	  background	  to	  these	  figures	  is	  discussed	  further,	  in	  my	  chapter	  on	  Barhebraeus	  and	  the	  Love	  of	  God	  in	  the	  Syrian	  tradition.	  For	  a	  summary	  of	  Evagrius’	  biography,	  see	  Harmless	  and	  Fitzgerald,	  "The	  Sapphire	  Light	  of	  the	  Mind:	  The	  Skemmata	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,"	  499-­‐501.	  	  673	  Plato	  and	  H.	  D.	  P.	  Lee,	  The	  Republic,	  2nd	  (revised)	  ed.,	  Penguin	  Classics	  (Harmondsworth:	  Penguin,	  1987),	  507b-­‐11e.	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  For	   the	   scholastics	   following	   the	   Aristotelian	   tradition,	   the	   form	   of	   the	   thing	   was	  inseparable	  from	  matter,	  and	  thus	  the	  Platonic	  hierarchy	  of	  knowledge	  was	  irrelevant,	  and	  perception	  formed	  the	  natural	  functioning	  of	  the	  mind.	  Indeed	  the	  perception	  of	  being	  was	  the	  first	  thing	  conceived	  by	  the	  intellect,674	  and	  according	  with	  this	  principle,	  God	  was	  the	  highest	  being	  that	  could	  be	  conceived	  by	  the	  mind	  as	  the	  first	  cause	  of	  all	  being.	  However,	  the	   Syrian	  mystic	   tradition	   retained	   a	  more	  Neoplatonic	   understanding	   of	   knowledge,	   in	  which	  the	  conception	  of	  being	  could	  not	  be	  appropriate	  to	  the	  thinking	  of	  the	  divine	  as	  the	  source	  or	  Form	  (Gr.	  idea)	  of	  the	  Good	  and	  thus	  could	  not	  be	  equated	  with	  beings	  and	  man’s	  own	  particular	  good.	  The	  transcendence	  of	  the	  Good	  is	  described	  in	  these	  terms	  by	  Plato,	  as	  ‘the	  source	  not	  only	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  objects	  of	  knowledge,	  but	  also	  of	  their	  being	  and	  their	  reality;	  yet	  it	  is	  not	  itself	  that	  reality,	  but	  is	  beyond	  it,	  and	  superior	  to	  it	  in	  dignity	  and	  power’.675	  The	  Greek	  tradition	  of	  Christian	  mysticism	  was	  indebted	  to	  Platonic	  theory,	  and	   the	   Syrian	  mystics	   had	   similarly	   incorporated	   a	  Neoplatonic	   epistemology	   into	   their	  thinking	  about	  God.	  	  	  	  This	   questioning	   of	   the	   intellect’s	   immediate	   conception	   of	   being	   in	   the	   theology	   of	   the	  infinite	  is	  implicit	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  cloud	  of	  divine	  darkness	  which	  veils	  God	  from	  human	  sight.	   This	   was	   a	   notion	   developed	   particularly	   by	   Gregory	   of	   Nyssa	   and	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius.676	  Barhebraeus’	   references	   to	   the	   cloud	   in	   his	  mystical	  writings	   represent	   the	  impenetrability	   of	   God	   to	  material	   perception	   and	   thus	   the	   thinking	   of	   being.	   The	   cloud	  recedes	   from	   the	   natural	  working	   of	   the	   intellect,	   which	   is	   to	   comprehend	   being.	   In	   the	  sentences,	   Barhebraeus	   asserts	   that	   the	   cloud	   contains	   images	   hidden	  within	   it	   that	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  674	  Marion,	  God	  without	  Being	  :	  Hors-­‐Texte,	  80.	  Here,	  Marion	  quotes	  from	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  De	  Veritate	  [trans.,	  III,	  p.	  6]:	  ‘being	  [the	  ens]	  is	  what	  is	  first	  conceived	  by	  the	  intellect,	  as	  Avicenna	  says’.	  675	  These	  words	  of	  Socrates	  appear	  in	  Plato’s	  Republic,	  509b,	  Desmond	  Lee’s	  1988	  translation	  (as	  above),	  and	  is	   quoted	   in:	   Stella	   Sandford,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Love	   :	  Gender	  and	  Transcendence	   in	  Levinas	   (London:	   The	  Athlone	  Press,	  2000),	  31-­‐32.	  676	  M.	  Laird,	  "Gregory	  of	  Nyssa	  and	  the	  Mysticism	  of	  Darkness:	  A	  Reconsideration	  (an	  Epistemological-­‐Ethical	  Structuring	  of	  the	  Experience	  of	  Divine	  Union	  in	  Christian	  Literature	  of	  Late	  Antiquity),"	  Journal	  of	  Religion	  79,	  no.	   4	   (1999):	   592-­‐3.	   Laird	   also	   makes	   an	   epistemological	   comparison	   here	   between	   Gregory	   of	   Nyssa’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  divine	  darkness	  and	  Origen’s	  infrequent	  reference	  to	  the	  notion.	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immaterial	  in	  nature,	  and	  as	  such	  cannot	  be	  perceived	  by	  the	  senses.677	  Therefore,	  sensory	  perception	  cannot	  attain	  to	  these	  immaterial	  images,	  since	  the	  images	  hidden	  in	  the	  cloud	  correspond	  to	  the	  Platonic	  forms	  of	  Beauty	  and	  the	  Good.	  Barhebraeus	  describes	  the	  vision	  of	  God	  in	  the	  cloud	  as	  that	  of	  beholding	  the	  Good	  and	  Beautiful	  One.678	  Barhebraeus	  would	  seem	  to	  affirm	  a	  Platonic	  view	  of	  knowledge	  and	  thus	  of	  God	  as	  the	  Good	  beyond	  being,	  but	  in	  fact	  he	  mediates	  between	  the	  two	  epistemological	  positions	  in	  Syrian	  thinking	  through	  his	  mysticism	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  	  
From Epistemology to Ontology 
Love	  as	  a	  Consequence	  of	  Sensory	  and	  Intellectual	  Perception	  Barhebraeus’	   treatment	   of	   sense	   perception	  marks	   a	   departure	   from	   Evagrius,	   since	   the	  senses	  play	  a	  positive	  role	  in	  the	  perception	  of	  God	  through	  the	  perception	  of	  what	  pertains	  to	   the	   love	  of	  God.	   In	   this	  understanding,	  Barhebraeus	  draws	  especially	  on	  chapters	   two,	  five	  and	  nine	  of	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   ‘Book	  of	  Love,	  Longing,	   Intimacy	  and	  Contentment’,	  kitāb	  al-­‐
maḥabba	  wa’l-­‐shawq	  wa’l-­‐uns	  wa’l-­‐riḍā.	   Near	   the	   beginning	   of	   chapter	   two	   on	   the	   ‘True	  Nature	  and	  Causes	  of	  Love’,679	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  states	  that:	  	   Since	  love	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  perception	  and	  knowledge,	  it	  is	  necessarily	  divisible	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  senses	  themselves	  and	  their	  perceptible	  objects	  are	  divided.680	  	  In	   the	   second	   section	   of	   the	  Ethicon,	   Barhebraeus	   reiterates	   this	   argument	   by	  way	   of	   an	  introduction	  to	  the	  five	  causes	  of	  love,	  also	  borrowed	  from	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  second	  chapter,	  and	  similarly	  gives	  examples	  from	  each	  of	  the	  five	  senses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  677	  Wensinck,	   Bar	   Hebraeus's	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   :	   Together	   with	   Some	   Chapters	   from	   His	   Ethikon,	   64,	   582*,	  Sentence	  14.	  ‘14.	  As	  the	  senses	  are	  not	  able	  to	  attain	  immaterial	  images,	  so	  the	  mind,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  has	  not	  yet	  loosened	  the	  shoes	  of	  the	  body	  from	  its	  feet	  is	  not	  able	  to	  attain	  the	  images	  hidden	  in	  the	  cloud,	  but	  only	  dimly	  and	  pervertedly.’	  678	  Ibid.,	  64,	  582*,	  Sentence	  15.	  ‘15.	  The	  mind	  in	  the	  cloud	  has	  unspeakable	  delight	  in	  beholding	  the	  Beautiful	  one.	  This	  happens	  also	  out	  of	  the	  cloud,	  but	  only	  as	  to	  one	  who	  hears	  the	  [description	  of	  the]	  beauty	  of	  the	  Beautiful	  one,	  not	  as	  to	  one	  who	  beholds	  it.’	  679	  Chapter	  headings	  are	  taken	  from	  Eric	  Ormsby’s	  translation.	  680	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  trans.	  Eric	  L.	  Ormsby,	  Islamic	  Texts	  Society	  Al-­‐Ghazali	  Series	  (Cambridge:	  Islamic	  Texts	  Society,	  2011),	  11.	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The	  object	  loved	  is	  either	  to	  be	  attained	  with	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  eye,	  as	  outward	  beauty;	  or	  with	  the	  smell,	  as	  perfumes;	  or	  with	  the	  ear,	  as	  sweet	  melodies;	  or	  with	  taste,	  as	  delicious	  food	  or	  drink;	  or	  with	  touch	  as	  touching	  soft	  objects.681	  	  Like	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  the	  rational	  part	  of	  the	  intellect	  also	  has	  a	  role	  alongside	  sense	  perception,	  and	  is	  another	  means	  of	  attaining	  the	  object	  loved,	  ‘as	  the	  delight	  which	  happens	  to	  us	  by	  the	  knowledge	  of	  what	  was	  unknown	  to	  us’.682	  However,	  Barhebraeus	  does	  not	  repeat	  here,	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  assertion	  that	  ‘[t]he	  beauty	  of	  concepts	  perceptible	  to	  the	  intellect	  is	  far	  lovelier	  than	  the	  beauty	  of	  forms	  external	  to	  the	  eye.’683	  When	  Barhebraeus	  represents	  the	  love	  of	  God	   according	   to	   the	   combined	   aspects	   of	   perception,	   both	   sensory	   and	   intellectual,	   he	  appears	   to	  be	   inspired	  by	   the	  distinction	   that	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   has	  made	  between	   inward	   sight	  (baṣīra)	  and	  outward	  sight	  (baṣar).684	  In	  his	  fifth	  section	  that	  deals	  with	  the	  delight	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God,	  Barhebraeus	  accepts	  that	  the	  mind	  constructs	  images	  both	  in	  its	  sensory	  and	   intellectual	   knowledge	   of	   things,685	  following	   the	   Neoplatonic	   division	   of	   knowledge	  into	   sense	   perception	   and	   intuition.	   It	   is	   through	   the	   objects	   of	   ‘sense	   perception’	   (Syr.	  
regšā)	  that	  the	  mind	  can	  comprehend	  the	  ultimate	  perfection	  of	  these	  objects	  in	  the	  divine	  name	  of	  the	  Good.	  Since	  God	  is	  the	  source	  of	  perfection	  of	  the	  beautiful	  and	  the	  good,	  the	  love	   of	   God	   can	   be	   understood	   both	   in	   a	   sensory	   and	   in	   an	   intellectual	   manner,	   as	   the	  understanding	  of	   love	  which	  has	  been	  derived	   through	   the	   senses	  and	  which	  pertains	   to	  intellectual	  things	  that	  can	  really	  be	  seen	  clearly	  in	  the	  spiritual	  world.686	  	  In	   the	   ninth	   section	   of	   the	  Ethicon’s	   book	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   Barhebraeus	   describes	   the	  state	   of	   longing	   which	   necessarily	   follows	   love,	   and	   in	   this	   he	   follows	   very	   closely	   the	  outline	   given	   in	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   ninth	   chapter	   on	   longing	   (shawq)	   for	   God	   in	   the	   Iḥyāʾ.	  Barhebraeus	   begins	   his	   section	   on	   longing	   by	   stating	   that,	   ‘It	   is	   known	   that	   longing	  necessarily	  follows	  love.	  Everyone,	  therefore,	  who	  loves	  God,	  will	  necessarily	  desire	  to	  see	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  681	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  87,	  476*.	  682	  Ibid.	  683	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  12.	  684	  Ibid.	  685	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  93,	  482*.	  ‘Things	  to	  be	  attained	  are	  of	  two	  kinds,	  sensual	  and	  intellectual.’	  686	  Ibid.,	  93-­‐94,	  482-­‐83*.	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Him’.687	  This	  would	  seem	  to	  refer	  to	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  statement	  in	  the	  opening	  sentences	  of	  his	  chapter	   on	   longing:	   ‘Know	   that	   whoever	   denies	   the	   reality	   of	   God’s	   love	  must	   deny	   the	  reality	  of	  longing.	  Longing	  is	  inconceivable	  except	  for	  a	  beloved.’688	  The	  state	  of	  longing	  is	  thus	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God,	   since	   it	   involves	   the	  desire	   to	   see	   the	  beloved,	   a	  desire	   that	   cannot	   be	   presently	   attained.	   However,	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   also	   connects	   longing	   to	  perception,	  in	  asserting	  that	  ‘[t]he	  utterly	  imperceptible	  cannot	  be	  an	  object	  of	  longing.’689	  For	  man	  must	   perceive	   perfection,	   either	   through	   sight	   or	   description,	   for	   longing	   to	   be	  conceived,	  and	  similarly	   the	  person	  who	   ‘contemplates	  his	  beloved	  and	  gazes	   incessantly	  on	   him	   cannot	   conceive	   of	   longing’.690	  Therefore	   longing	   is	   concerned	  with	  what	   is	   both	  perceptible	  and	   imperceptible,	   to	   fall	  under	   ‘a	  dual	  aspect’.691	  The	  overcoming	  of	  Platonic	  dualism	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  is	  thus	  demonstrated	  in	  his	  understanding,	  drawn	  from	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	   of	   the	   complementary	   aspect	   to	   longing	   in	  man’s	   love	   for	   God,	  which	   is	   both	  sensory	  and	  intellectual.	  	  	  
The	  Knowledge	  of	  God	  as	  a	  Cause	  of	  the	  Love	  of	  God	  For	  Barhebraeus,	  man	  should	   learn	   that	   there	   is	  nothing	  separating	  him	  from	  the	   love	  of	  God,	  and	  that	  the	  highest	  knowledge	  of	  God	  is	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  This	  marks	  a	  departure	  from	  the	   Evagrian	   ordering	   of	   knowledge,	   love	   and	   the	   good.	   According	   to	   Vladimir	   Lossky,	  Evagrius	  identified	  the	  good	  with	  gnosis	  in	  the	  centuriae,	  and	  the	  love	  of	  the	  good	  with	  the	  love	   of	   true	   knowledge.	   For	   Lossky	   the	   Evagrian	   understanding	   of	   love	   has	   ‘a	   strong	  intellectualistic	   accent’,	   in	   that	   the	   perfect	   love	   of	   agapē	   is	   ‘love	   of	   divine	   gnosis’.692	  He	  quotes	  Evagrius’	  Centuriae	   in	  this	  respect:	   ‘Love	  is	  the	  lofty	  state…	  of	  the	  rational	  soul	  by	  virtue	  of	  which	  it	  is	  able	  to	  love	  nothing	  in	  this	  world	  so	  much	  as	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God’.693	  With	  Evagrius,	   the	   love	  of	  God	   is	   considered	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  knowledge	  of	  God,	   as	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  687	  Ibid.,	  99,	  487-­‐88*.	  688	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  88.	  689	  Ibid.	  690	  Ibid.	  691	  Ibid.	   ‘But	  longing	  is	  connected	  solely	  with	  what	  is	  perceptible	  under	  one	  aspect	  and	  imperceptible	  under	  another;	   it	   falls	  under	  a	  dual	   aspect	   that	  may	  be	   clarified	  only	  by	  example	  drawn	   from	   the	   realm	  of	   visual	  experience.’	  	  692	  Lossky,	  The	  Vision	  of	  God,	  86.	  693	  Ibid.	  Lossky	  quotes	  from	  Wilhelm	  Frankenberg’s	  Greek	  selection	  of	  text	  from	  the	  Centuries,	  I.86.	  Wilhelm	  Frankenberg,	  Euagrius	  Ponticus	  (Berlin:	  Weidmannsche	  Buchhandlung,	  1912),	  123.	  
	   155	  
facilitates	   the	  ascendency	  of	   the	  knowledge	  of	  God	   for	   the	  gnostic.	  Therefore,	   the	   love	  of	  God	  is	  apparently	  given	  no	  separate	  ontological	  value	  outside	  of	  the	  primacy	  of	  gnosis.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  is	  also	  apparent	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  reference	  to	  Evagrius,	  in	  his	  fourth	  section	  of	  the	  Ethicon	  on	  the	  delight	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  which	  is	  greater	  than	  all	  others.	  In	  this	  section,	  Barhebraeus	  quotes	  Evagrius	  directly:	  	   As	   Euagrius	   the	   Great	   says:	   If	   among	   things	   to	   be	   tasted,	   there	   is	   none	   sweeter	   than	   honey	   and	  honeycomb	   and	   the	   knowledge	   of	   God	   is	   much	   sweeter	   than	   these,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   nothing	   among	   all	  things	  on	  the	  earth	  gives	  a	  delight	  to	  the	  soul	  as	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  does.694	  	  The	  Syriac	  word	   for	  delight,	  hnīy,	   ‘sweet,	   fragrant,	  pleasant,	  grateful,	   agreeable’,695	  is	  also	  faithful	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  Evagrius	  as	  expressed	  here	  in	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  sweetness	  of	  honey	  likened	  to	  the	  delight	  of	  knowledge	  (īdaʿtā).	  The	  pleasure	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  is	  also	  found	  in	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  and	  this	  section	  of	  the	  Ethicon	  mirrors	  that	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   fourth	  chapter	  on	  the	  knowledge	  (maʿrifa)	  of	  God,	  which	  states	  that	  ‘knowledge	  is	  pleasurable	  and	  the	  most	  pleasurable	  knowledge	  is	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God’.696	  Barhebraeus	  is	  able	  to	  deploy	  these	   arguments	   from	   al-­‐Ghazālī,	   to	   distance	   himself	   from	   the	   reduction	   of	   love	   to	   the	  desire	  for	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God,	  and	  assert	  instead	  that	  the	  love	  of	  God	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God.	  In	  the	  second	  chapter	  of	  his	  book	  of	  love,	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  states	  that	  the	  most	   essential	   characteristic	   of	  man	   is	   love,	   but	   that	   ‘man	   loves	   only	  what	   he	   knows’.697	  Barhebraeus	  again	   follows	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  assertion	  that	   love	  should	  be	  conceived	  as	  coming	  after	  knowledge,	  and	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  he	  states	  that	  ‘because	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  loving	  Him,	  and	  some	  people	  know	  Him	  not	  as	  He	  is,	  consequently	  their	  love	  has	  no	  foundation’.698	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  694	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  92,	  481*.	  This	  second	   quotation	   from	   Evagrius	   by	   Barhebraeus	   is	   from	   Sentence	   64	   of	   the	   third	   chapter	   (III.64)	   of	   the	  
Kephalaia	  Gnostica,	   the	   correspondence	   is	   aleady	   noted	   by	   Guillaumont.	   Guillaumont,	  Les	  Six	  Centuries	  des	  
"Képhalaia	  Gnostica"	  d'Évagre	   le	  Pontique.	  Édition	  Critique	  de	   la	  Version	  Syriaque	  Commune	  et	  Édition	  d'une	  
Nouvelle	  Version	  Syriaque	  Intégrale	  avec	  une	  Double	  Traduction	  Française.	  T.28,	  122.	  695	  Payne	  Smith	  and	  Payne	  Smith,	  A	  Compendious	  Syriac	  Dictionary	  :	  Founded	  Upon	  the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  
Payne	  Smith,	  105.	  696	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  46.	  697	  Ibid.,	  10.	   ‘The	  first	  matter	  to	  be	  determined	  is	  whether	  love	  is	   inconceivable	  except	  after	  knowledge	  and	  perception	   (since	  man	   loves	   only	  what	   he	   knows).	  A	  mineral	   cannot	   conceivably	  be	   characterised	  by	   love.	  Rather,	  love	  is	  the	  essential	  characteristic	  of	  a	  living	  sentient	  being.’	  	  	  698	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  55,	  572*.	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  While	   the	  knowledge	  of	  God	   is	   the	   cause	  of	  man’s	   love	  of	  God,	   love	  begins	  with	   the	   soul	  desiring	   ‘communion	   with	   some	   object	   which	   it	   understands’,699 	  in	   which	   love	   is	   a	  ‘communion’	  (baytāyūtā)	  or	  familiarity	  with	  an	  object	  which	  the	  mind	  can	  comprehend.700	  In	   this	   initial	   stage	   of	   baytāyūtā,	   the	   divine	   thus	   remains	   an	   object	   of	   the	   mind’s	  understanding.	   Barhebraeus	   has	   derived	   this	   definition	   of	   love	   from	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   book	   of	  love,	   Takahashi	   has	   highlighted	   the	   linguistic	   connection	   between	   the	   Syriac	   and	   Arabic	  wording;	   Barhebraeus	   says	   that	   the	   soul	   has	   communion	   ‘with	   an	   object	   that	   can	   be	  grasped	   (metdarkānā,	   √drk)’,	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   takes	   a	   different	   stance	   ‘love	   is	   conceived	   only	  after	   knowledge	   and	   perception	   [idrāk,	   √drk],	   since	   man	   loves	   only	   what	   he	   knows’.701	  Teule	   has	   argued	   that	   Barhebraeus	   has	   deliberately	   chosen	   the	   word	   baytāyūtā	   in	  preference	  to	  īdaʿtā,	  which	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  more	  obvious	  translation	  for	  the	  gnostic’s	  knowledge	  of	  God	  as	  maʿrifa.	  However,	  baytāyūtā	  still	  relates	  to	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  concept	  of	  uns	  or	   intimacy. 702 	  For	   Barhebraeus,	   the	   essential	   importance	   of	   baytāyūtā	   lies	   in	   the	  foundation	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  in	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  as	  the	  Good.	  As	  man	  grows	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  of	  God,	  he	  comes	  to	  delight	  in	  his	  understanding	  and	  then	  to	  the	  fullness	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  Indeed	  the	  Evagrian-­‐Neoplatonic	  understanding	  of	  knowledge	  remains	  fundamental	   to	   Barhebraeus’	   understanding	   of	   the	   knowledge	   of	   God.	   He	   builds	   on	   this	  foundation	  with	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  insight	  that	  the	  love	  of	  God	  comes	  after	  the	  understanding	  of	  God	   as	   the	   Good.	   Columba	   Stewart	   has	   defined	   this	   kind	   of	   Platonic	   knowledge	   as	  ‘participation	  in	  spiritual	  realities’	  and	  ‘contemplative	  union’.703	  Thus	  Barhebraeus	  defines	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  699	  Ibid.,	  87,	  476*.	  	  700	  Teule	   discusses	   the	   significance	   of	   this	   Syriac	  word	   baytāyūtā	   as	   intimacy	   or	   familiarity	  with	   God	   (but	  ‘communion’	   by	  Wensinck),	   a	  word	  which	   derives	   from	   the	  word	  baytā	  as	   in	   ‘house’	   or	   ‘family’,	   and	   thus	  implies	  almost	  a	  domesticity,	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  family.	  Teule,	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  264-­‐68.	  	  701	  Hidemi	  Takahashi,	   "The	   Influence	  of	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	   Juridical,	  Theological	   and	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus,"	   in	   Islam	  and	  Rationality:	  The	   Impact	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī	   (Ohio	   State	   University2011),	   9.	   Takahashi	  compares	  the	  wording	  of	  Barhebraeus	  with	  al-­‐Ghazālī.	  The	  Ethicon	   states	  that	   love	   is	   ‘the	   inclination	  of	   the	  soul	  towards	  communion	  (baytāyūtā)	  with	  an	  object	  that	  can	  be	  grasped	  (metdarkānā,	  √drk)’.	  Cf.	  al-­‐Ghazālī:	  ‘Iḥyāʾ,	  ed.	  Beirut	  1982,	  IV:	  296.15	  ‘...	  that	  love	  is	  conceived	  only	  after	  knowledge	  and	  perception	  [idrāk,	  √drk],	  since	  man	   loves	   only	   what	   he	   knows’;	   IV:	   296.20	   ‘love	   is	   therefore	   the	   term	   for	   the	   inclination	   of	   nature	  towards	  a	  pleasing	  object’.	  	  702	  Teule,	   "L'amour	   de	   Dieu	   dans	   L'oeuvre	   de	   Bar	   Ebroyo,"	   266.	   Teule	   makes	   the	   connection	   between	  
baytāyūtā	  and	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  notion	  of	  uns,	  when	  the	  mystic	  can	  address	  himself	  to	  God	  in	  all	  assurance.	  703	  Columba	  Stewart,	  "Evagrius	  Ponticus	  and	  the	  Eastern	  Monastic	  Tradition	  on	  the	  Intellect	  and	  the	  Passions,"	  Modern	  Theology	  27,	  no.	  2	  (2011):	  270.	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the	   delight	   of	   the	   knowledge	   of	   God	   as	   the	   delight	   ‘caused	   by	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	  mysteries	  of	  His	  wisdom’,	  which	  is	  the	  highest	  form	  of	  delight.704	  	  
The	  Development	  of	  the	  Evagrian	  Tradition	  Within	  the	  monastic	  context,	   the	  phenomenon	  of	   love	  was	  subject	   to	  a	  radical	  distinction	  concerning	  love	  for	  the	  world	  and	  love	  for	  God;	  the	  two	  are	  seen	  as	  mutually	  exclusive.705	  Barhebraeus	  acknowledges	  this	  tradition	  amongst	  the	  monastic	  ascetics,	  and	  quotes	  freely	  from	  their	  sayings.	  In	  the	  fourth	  section	  of	  the	  book	  on	  the	  love	  of	  God	  in	  the	  Ethicon,	  and	  immediately	  following	  his	  quotation	  from	  Evagrius	  on	  the	  delight	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God,	  Barhebraeus	  cites	  an	  anonymous	  Initiated	  concerning	  the	  love	  of	  God	  which	  surpasses	  any	  love	  for	  the	  things	  of	  this	  world:	  ‘If	  anyone’s	  mind	  has	  been	  captivated	  by	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  lord	  of	   the	  universe,	   it	   is	   impossible	   that	   it	   should	  be	   captivated	  anymore	  by	   the	   love	  of	  anything	   in	   the	   world.’706	  The	   East	   Syrian	   mystics	   thus	   stipulated	   that	   the	   monk	   must	  renounce	  a	   love	  for	  the	  things	  of	  this	  world	   in	  order	  to	  find	  the	   love	  of	  God,	  an	  approach	  that	  has	   its	  roots	   in	  the	  ascetic	  tradition,	  evident	   in	  the	  Neoplatonic	  theology	  of	  Evagrius,	  and	   the	   desert	   monasticism	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   Fathers.707	  	   Stewart	   shows	   how	   Evagrius	  followed	  the	   ‘Platonic	  tripartite	  anthropology’	  popular	   in	  Late	  Antiquity,	  of	   two	  irrational	  parts,	  desire	  (epithumia)	  and	  repulsion	  (thumos),	  and	  one	  rational	  part	  (nous).	  All	  of	  these	  three	   parts	   might	   become	   subject	   to	   the	   evil	   thoughts	   (logismoi)	   and	   the	   passions	  (pathē).708	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  practical	   life	  (praktikē)	  of	  ascetic	  discipline	  was	  to	  manage	  and	  transcend	   the	   logismoi	   in	  order	   to	   see	   the	   ‘logoi	   of	  God’s	   self-­‐expression’	   in	   creation	  and	  finally,	  to	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  through	  ‘a	  contemplative	  union	  between	  the	  human	  person	  and	  God	  the	  Trinity’.709	  The	  three	  stages	  of	  Evagrius’	  schema	  are	  again	  apparent,	  from	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  704	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  92,	  481*.	  705	  For	   example,	   as	   quoted	   in	   the	   first	   section	   in	   Barhebraeus’	   book	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God	   -­‐	   ‘John	   de	   Dalyata:	  Those	   in	  whom	  has	  shone	  Thy	   love,	  puerile,	  not	  as	   in	   the	   Initiated,	  have	  rejected	  and	  cast	  away	   family	  and	  race	  and	  all	  bodily	  love,	  and	  have	  alienated	  themselves	  from	  all,	  in	  order	  to	  run,	  naked,	  to	  attain	  Thy	  holy	  love.	  And	  they	  have	  turned	  away	  their	  faces	  from	  what	  they	  possessed,	  without	  seeing	  that	  which	  they	  were	  going	  to	  possess.	  But	  what	  they	  search,	  they	  know	  not	  yet.	  For	  they	  are	  not	  acquainted	  with	  Him	  they	  are	  running	  to	  attain.	  They	  are	   still	   seeking	  what	  belongs	   to	  Him,	  without	  being	  aware	   that	  He	  will	   give	  Himself	   to	   them.’	  ibid.,	  86,	  475*.	  	  706	  Ibid.,	  92,	  481-­‐82*.	  707	  Stewart,	  "Evagrius	  Ponticus	  and	  the	  Eastern	  Monastic	  Tradition	  on	  the	  Intellect	  and	  the	  Passions,"	  267-­‐69.	  708	  Ibid.,	  268.	  709	  Ibid.,	  270.	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praktikē	  comes	  the	  theōria	  physikē,	   the	  contemplation	  of	  the	  divine	   logoi	  in	  creation,	  until	  finally	  the	  ascetic	  ascends	  to	  the	  theologia	  of	  the	  Trinity.	  	  	  These	   stages	   are	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	   mysticism	   of	   Barhebraeus	   but	   with	   some	   subtle	  modifications,	  notably	  in	  his	  shift	  of	  emphasis	  from	  the	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  the	  nous	  to	  that	  of	  its	  purification	  and	  perfection	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  Barhebraeus	  describes	  the	  love	  of	  God	  as	  increasing	  in	  the	  soul	  of	  man	  through	  the	  practical	  stages	  of	  purification	  by	  which	  he	   ‘is	  strengthened	  in	  his	  state	  of	  abstention’	  and	  then	  further,	   ‘when	  he	  meditates	  upon	   the	  wonderful	  works	  of	   the	  Creator;	  when	  his	  mind	  beholds	   the	  divine	  power	   that	  penetrates	  the	  universe’.710	  Thus	  the	  natural	  world	  provides	  a	  means	  through	  which	  man	  might	   meditate	   upon	   the	   Creator,	   in	   imitation	   of	   the	   theōria	   physikē	   of	   Evagrius,	   then	  ‘seeking	  and	  desiring	  the	  Good	  One	  alone’	   in	  the	  hope	  of	  seeing	   ‘something	  of	   the	  rays	  of	  the	  Essence’.711	  The	  final	  stage	  of	  vision	  of	  the	  Holy	  Trinity	  in	  the	  Evagrian	  system	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  Barhebraeus,	  but	  it	  is	  of	  the	  Good	  rather	  than	  the	  Trinity,	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	   glimpse	   being	   to	   inspire	   love	   in	   the	   soul	   for	   God	   alone.	   Evagrius	   had	   been	   heavily	  influenced	   by	   Plotinus’	   notion	   of	   the	  nous	   leaving	   behind	   sense	   perception	   in	   its	   inward	  withdrawal	  to	  self-­‐knowledge,	  and	  also	  that	  in	  this	  self-­‐knowledge	  the	  mind	  is	  illuminated	  by	   the	   Good.712	  In	   Barhebraeus’	   mysticism	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   sensory	   perception	   is	   a	  necessary	  part	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  which	  he	  demonstrates	  through	  the	  Neoplatonic	  concept	  of	   the	   beautiful	   Good	   (ho	   kalos	   agathon).	   While	   the	   divine	   name	   of	   the	   Good	   is	   used	  frequently	   by	   East	   Syrian	   mystics	   following	   Evagrius,	   Barhebraeus	   develops	   his	   own	  understanding	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  through	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  Good,	  which	  was	  inspired	  by	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  five	  causes	  of	  love.	  	  The	  seventh	  and	  eighth	  century	  East	  Syrian	  mystics,	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh	  and	  John	  of	  Dalyatha	  paid	  considerable	  attention	  to	  the	  love	  of	  God.713	  The	  writings	  of	  both	  these	  mystics	  drew	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  710	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  53,	  571*.	  711	  Ibid.,	  53-­‐54,	  571*.	  712	  Bitton-­‐Ashkelony,	  "The	  Limit	  of	  the	  Mind	  (NOYΣ):	  Pure	  Prayer	  According	  to	  Evagrius	  Ponticus	  and	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh,"	  304.	  Brouria	  Bitton-­‐Ashkelony	  discusses	  the	  arguments	  of	  Guillaumont	  and	  Konstantinovsky	  on	  the	  comparison	  between	  the	  mystical	  experience	  of	  Evagrius	  and	  Plotinus.	  713	  For	  the	  focus	  on	  these	  authors	  for	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  it	  may	  be	  noted	  that	  Basil	  of	  Caesarea,	  ‘Aba’	  Evagrius,	  John	  of	  Dalyatha	  and	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh	  are	  quoted	  extensively.	  See	  for	  example,	  the	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on	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	   the	   Areopagite	  whose	   treatment	   of	   eros	   was	  more	   developed	   than	  that	   of	   Evagrius,	   and	   was	   inspired	   by	   Proclan	   eros.714	  However,	   while	   there	   are	   many	  elements	  of	  Dionysian	  metaphysics	  within	  East	  Syrian	  mysticism,	  what	  is	  not	  so	  apparent	  is	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius’	   innovative	   understanding	   of	   the	   divine	   eros,	   in	   its	   ecstatic	   quality	   of	  yearning	   and	   overflow	   of	   the	   Good.	   Barhebraeus,	   for	   his	   part,	   does	   not	  make	   use	   of	   the	  Dionysian	  understanding	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  from	  the	  Neoplatonic	  metaphysics	  of	  Proclus.	  However,	  he	  does	  give	  considerable	  emphasis	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  God	  as	  the	  Good,	  and	  for	  the	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	  the	  good	  (ho	  agathos)	  is	  the	  first	  divine	  name	  that	  precedes	  even	  that	  of	  being	  or	  the	  ens.715	  With	  Barhebraeus	  the	  emphasis	  is	  slightly	  different,	  man’s	  concern	  with	  his	  own	  good	  leads	  him	  to	  the	  intuitive	  understanding	  of	  the	  Good,	  who	  is	  present	  in	  this	  world	  though	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  	  
The	  Conception	  of	  God	  as	  the	  Love	  of	  God	  Barhebraeus’	  understanding	  of	  God	  as	  the	  Good	  rests	  on	  the	  five	  causes	  of	  love,	  which	  he	  incorporates	   from	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	   since	   they	  provide	   the	   justification	   for	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  He	  provides	  the	  more	  detailed	  outline	  of	  the	  five	  causes	  of	  love	  within	  his	  chapter	   on	   the	   love	   of	   God	   in	   the	   Ethicon.	   The	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   by	   comparison,	   only	  provides	  a	  summarised	  version	  of	  the	  five	  causes,	   in	  which	  the	  five	  causes	  of	   love	  in	  man	  and	  by	  extension,	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  are	  given	  in	  the	  same	  section.716	  Takahashi	  has	  commented	  that	  the	  five	  causes	  of	  love	  in	  the	  Dove	  are	  the	  same	  as	  that	  of	  the	  Ethicon,	  even	   if	   the	   phrasing	   is	   slightly	   different.717	  The	   Ethicon	   also	   follows	   the	   structure	   of	   al-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  opening	  section	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  chapter	  on	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  
Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  85-­‐86,	  474-­‐76*.	  714	  The	  distinction	  of	   the	  Neoplatonism	  of	  Evagrius	  and	  of	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	   is	  developed	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  the	   love	   of	  God	   in	   the	   Syrian	   tradition.	   The	   association	  of	   Evagrius	  with	   the	  Neoplatonism	  of	   Plotinus	   and	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  with	  Proclus,	  is	  also	  discussed	  further	  there.	  715	  Marion,	  God	  without	  Being	  :	  Hors-­‐Texte,	  74.	  716	  See	  the	  fifth	  section	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove:	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  
Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  51-­‐52,	  569-­‐70*.	  717 Takahashi,	   "The	   Influence	   of	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	   Juridical,	   Theological	   and	   Philosophical	   Works	   of	  Barhebraeus,"	  10.	  Takahashi	  lists	  these	  five	  causes	  of	   love	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  as	  follows:	   ‘sustenance	  of	  the	   self	   (quyyāmā	   da-­‐qnōmā),	   accomplishment	   of	   what	   benefits	   us,	   outward	   beauty,	   inward	   beauty,	   and	  hidden	  similarity	  (dāmyūtā	  ksītā)’.	  	  Cf.	  The	  causes	  in	  the	  Ethicon:	  ‘1)	  perpetuation	  of	  being	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  self	  (ammīnūt	  ītūtā	  wa-­‐shkīḥūt	  yātā);	  2)	  accomplishment	  of	  what	  benefits	  us	  (sā‘ōrūt	  ṭābtā);	  3)	  outward	  beauty	   (shuprā	  barrāyā);	   4)	   inward	  beauty	   (shuprā	  gawwāyā);	   and	  5)	   hidden	   affinity	   and	   secret	   similarity	  (ḥyānūtā	  ksītā	  w-­‐damyūtā	  gnīztā)’.	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Ghazālī’s	  book	  of	  love	  much	  more	  closely	  than	  the	  Dove,	  in	  that	  there	  is	  a	  separate	  chapter	  for	   these	   two	  aspects	  of	   love.	   In	   the	  Ethicon,	  Barhebraeus	  gives	   the	   fullest	  explanation	  of	  why	   the	   love	   of	   God	   is	   ‘justified’	   according	   to	   the	   five	   causes	   of	   love.718	  Since	   only	   God	  possesses	  all	  of	  the	  five	  causes,	   there	  is	   in	  reality	  no	  love	  of	  anything	  outside	  of	  God.	  The	  argument	  from	  this	  section	  of	  the	  Ethicon	  is	  also	  taken	  from	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  who	  has	  a	  chapter	  devoted	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  why	  God	  alone	  deserves	  love.719	  Indeed	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  concludes	  this	  chapter	   by	   saying	   that	   only	   in	   God	   are	   the	   five	   causes	   ‘most	   fully	  manifest’,	   and	   God	   is	  ‘alone	  worthy	  of	  love	  in	  its	  source	  and	  in	  its	  perfection’.720	  	  For	  Barhebraeus,	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  ‘God’	  is	  one	  that	  must	  inhere	  in	  love,	  and	  consequently	  love	  is	  not	  a	  description	  of	  God’s	  attributes	  or	  even	  essence,	  but	  love	  constitutes	  its	  subject	  -­‐	  God.	   In	   the	   logical	  proposition,	   the	  predicate	  of	  a	   sentence	   is	  an	  attribute	  of	   its	   subject,	  and	  while	   a	  proposition	   consists	  grammatically	  of	   subject-­‐copula-­‐predicate,	   the	   copula	   is	  unnecessary	   in	  the	  Syriac.721	  However,	   the	  construct	  state	  allows	  for	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  subjective	   or	   objective	   genitive.722	  The	   genitive	   phrase,	   ‘love	   of	   God’	   (reḥmat	   ʾallāhā),723	  	  includes	   two	   possibilities,	   man’s	   love	   for	   God	   and	   God’s	   love	   for	  man,	   and	   even	   for	   the	  possibility	  that	  these	  two	  meanings	  might	  come	  together,	  in	  the	  co-­‐inherence	  of	  love.724	  	  	  In	  Barhebraeus	  these	  two	  grammatical	  possibilities	  are	  both	  maintained,	  particularly	  in	  his	  references	  to	  the	  Syrian	  mystics,	  until	  that	  is,	  he	  comes	  to	  the	  explication	  of	  the	  five	  causes	  of	  love,	  inspired	  by	  al-­‐Ghazālī.	  Here,	  God	  ceases	  to	  be	  the	  object	  of	  love,	  but	  ‘love’	  in	  fact	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  718	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  89,	  478*.	  719 	  Takahashi,	   "The	   Influence	   of	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	   Juridical,	   Theological	   and	   Philosophical	   Works	   of	  Barhebraeus,"	   10,	   n.	   36.	   Takahashi	   compares	   the	   Ethicon	   4.15.3	   to	   the	   Iḥyāʾ	   IV.300-­‐307.	   In	   Ormsby’s	  translation	  this	  corresponds	  to	  Chapter	  Three	  of	  the	  book	  of	  love.	  	  720	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  40-­‐41.	  721	  For	  the	  logic	  of	  love	  and	  the	  speculative	  proposition	  following	  Hegel,	  see	  Marion’s	  section	  on	  ‘Conversions’:	  Marion,	  God	  without	  Being	  :	  Hors-­‐Texte,	  189-­‐95.	  722	  In	   Syriac	   the	   genitive	   may	   be	   expressed	   in	   a	   number	   of	   ways,	   but	   in	   the	   phrase	   ‘love	   of	   God’	   in	  Barhebraeus’	   writing,	   the	   first	   noun	   appears	   in	   the	   construct	   state,	   and	   the	   second	   in	   the	   emphatic	   or	  ordinary	   state.	  This	  understanding	  of	   the	   Syriac	   genitive	   relationship	   is	  derived	   from:	   John	  F.	  Healey,	  First	  
Studies	  in	  Syriac,	  University	  Semitics	  Study	  Aids	  (Birmingham:	  University	  of	  Birmingham,	  1980),	  34-­‐35.	  723	  See	   section	   5	   of	   the	   Third	   Part	   to	   the	  Book	   of	   the	  Dove,	   ‘On	   the	   Causes	   of	   Love’.	   Bedjan,	  Ethicon	   :	   Seu,	  
Moralia	  Gregorii	  Barhebræi,	  569.	  724	  Marion	  returns	  at	  several	  points	  to	  the	  declaration	  of	  1John	  4:8	  that	  ‘God	  [is]	  agape’,	  for	  his	  argument	  that	  God	   as	   love	   transgresses	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   encapsulated	   in	   the	   logical	   proposition.	  Marion,	  God	  
without	  Being	  :	  Hors-­‐Texte,	  47-­‐48.	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used	  as	  a	  descriptive	  of	  its	  subject	  ‘God’.	  The	  meaning	  of	  the	  ‘love	  of	  God’	  implies	  that	  God	  inheres	  in	  love,	  and	  equally	  that	  love	  inheres	  in	  God.	  Rather	  than	  ‘God’	  being	  perceived	  as	  an	  object	   of	   the	  mind,	   the	   love	  of	  God	   resolves	   the	  problem	  of	   the	  objectification	  of	  God	  through	  knowledge.	  Barhebraeus	  maintains	  that	  the	  mind	  ultimately	  goes	  beyond	  all	  such	  thinking	  that	  is	  denoted	  by	  dualistic	  terms,	  in	  the	  mind’s	  unification	  with	  the	  Good	  one.725	  	  	  The	  ‘love	  of	  God’	  then	  begins	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  iconoclastic	  process	  that	  began	  with	  the	  Evagrian	  project,	   i.e.	   the	   interrogation	  of	   the	   temptations	  of	   the	  mind.	  Evagrian	   theology	  had	  profoundly	  influenced	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  expositor	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  amongst	  the	  East	  Syrian	  mystics,	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh.726	  	  	  Isaac	  would	  state	  that	  the	  ‘Love	  of	  God	  proceeds	  from	   conversing	   with	   him’,	   and	   further,	   in	   following	   Evagrius,	   he	   states	   that	   ‘this	  conversation	   of	   prayer	   comes	   through	   stillness,	   and	   stillness	   comes	   with	   the	   stripping	  away	  of	  the	  self’.727	  However,	  he	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  supply	  a	  series	  of	  definitions	  for	  love	  or	  a	  systematised	   understanding	   of	   the	   concepts	   that	   he	   uses,	   in	   the	   manner	   of	   Evagrius.	  Instead	  he	  suggests	  that	  the	  significance	  of	  prayer	  lies	  not	  in	  the	  attainment	  of	  knowledge	  of	  God	  but	  the	  love	  of	  God;	  thus	  he	  states	  that	  ‘[t]he	  purpose	  of	  prayer	  is	  for	  us	  to	  acquire	  love	   of	   God,	   for	   in	   prayer	   can	   be	   discovered	   all	   sorts	   of	   reasons	   for	   loving	   God.’728	  The	  theorisation	  of	  these	  ‘reasons’	  for	  the	  love	  of	  God	  into	  the	  ‘causes’	  of	  love	  would	  await	  their	  formulation	  in	  the	  Syrian	  tradition	  by	  Barhebraeus.	  	  	  	  
The Five Causes of Love 
From	  Love	  of	  Self	  to	  the	  Love	  of	  God	  The	   interpenetration	   of	   human	   and	   divine	   love,	   for	   Barhebraeus,	   is	   exemplified	   in	   the	  notion	  of	  God	  as	   the	  Highest	  Good,	   following	   the	  precedent	   set	   by	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  725	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  50,	  568*.	  726	  Columba	   Stewart	   states,	   ‘The	   fullest	   flowering	   of	   Evagrius’	   influence	   in	   the	   Syriac	   world	   was	   in	   the	  spiritual	  writings	   of	   Isaac	   of	  Nineveh	   (d.	   ca.	   700),	   arguably	   the	  most	   profound	  mystical	   author	   of	   the	   first	  millennium,	  who	   relies	   heavily	   on	   Evagrius’	   teaching	   on	   both	   the	   passions	   and	   prayer.’	   Stewart,	   "Evagrius	  Ponticus	  and	  the	  Eastern	  Monastic	  Tradition	  on	  the	  Intellect	  and	  the	  Passions,"	  272.	  727	  From	  Brock’s	  translation	  of	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh’s	  Discourse	  LXIII:	  Brock,	  The	  Syriac	  Fathers	  on	  Prayer	  and	  the	  
Spiritual	  Life,	  250.	  728	  Discourse	  LXIII:	  ibid.	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whom	  the	  divine	  name	  of	   ‘the	  Good’	   is	  asserted	  as	   the	   first	  of	   the	  divine	  names.729	  When	  Barhebraeus	  states	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  third	  section	  on	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  in	  the	  Ethicon,	  that	  those	  who	  are	  not	  familiar	  ‘with	  His	  name’,	  are	  not	  able	  to	  love	  God,	  he	  seems	  to	  allude	  to	  this	  assertion	  by	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius.730	  The	  causes	  of	  the	  love	   of	   God	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   through	   the	   divine	   goodness	   which	   pervades	  everything,	  being	  the	  source	  of	  all	  that	  is	  good.	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  Syrian	  mystic	  tradition	  following	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	   Barhebraeus	   uses	   the	   name	   of	   ‘the	   Good’	   throughout	   his	  chapter	   on	   love	   in	   the	  Ethicon.	   However,	   as	   the	   section	   proceeds,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	  Barhebraeus	   derives	   his	   arguments	   for	   justifying	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God	   from	   al-­‐Ghazālī,	  rather	  than	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius.	  This	  is	  evidenced	  particularly	  in	  the	  first	  two	  causes	  of	  love	  that	  establish	  the	  foundation	  of	  love	  in	  God	  as	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  all	  goodness.	  	  Barhebraeus	   articulates	   the	   first	   cause	   of	   love	   (given	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   on	   the	  divisions	   and	   causes	   of	   love),	   as	   the	   ‘continuation	   of	   being	   and	   the	   maintenance	   of	   the	  self’.731	  Takahashi	   translates	   this	   first	   cause	   slightly	   differently,	   as	   ‘the	   perpetuation	   of	  being	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  self’;732	  a	  translation	  which	  emphasises	  the	  first	  cause	  of	  love	  as	  the	  fundamental	  concern	  with	  the	  self’s	  existent	  being.	  This	  first	  cause	  of	  love	  for	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  self,	  justifies	  the	  love	  of	  God	  as	  the	  maintainer	  of	  his	  being,	  Barhebraeus	  states:	  ‘[t]herefore,	  if	  the	  love	  of	  his	  self	  is	  necessary	  to	  him,	  the	  love	  of	  Him,	  in	  whose	   hand	   his	   self	   is,	   must	   be	   even	   more	   necessary	   to	   him.’733	  His	   first	   cause	   of	   love	  follows	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  description	  very	  closely,	  though	  rather	  more	  succinctly,	  since	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  devotes	  a	  much	  more	  substantial	  chapter	  to	  the	   justification	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God	  than	  does	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  729	  C.	   E.	   Rolt,	   Dionysius	   the	   Areopagite	   :	   On	   the	   Divine	   Names	   and	   the	   Mystical	   Theology	   ([Kila],	   Mont.:	  Kessinger,	   1992),	   86.	   See	  Divine	  Names	   Chapter	   IV.1:	   ‘Now	   let	   us	   consider	   the	   name	   of	   “Good”	   which	   the	  Sacred	  Writers	   apply	   to	   the	   Supra-­‐Divine	   Godhead	   in	   a	   transcendent	  manner,	   calling	   the	   Supreme	   Divine	  Existence	  Itself	  “Goodness”	  (as	  it	  seems	  to	  me)	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  separates	  It	  from	  the	  whole	  creation’.	  730	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  89,	  478*.	  731	  Ibid.,	  87,	  476*.	  732 	  Takahashi,	   "The	   Influence	   of	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	   Juridical,	   Theological	   and	   Philosophical	   Works	   of	  Barhebraeus,"	   10,	   n.	   31.	   Takahashi	   connects	   this	   phrase	   -­‐	   Syr.	   ‘ammīnūt	   ītūta	  wa-­‐shkīḥūt	   yātā’	   -­‐	   with	   two	  explanations	   given	   by	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   in	   his	   chapter	   on	   love.	   The	   shorter	   one	   is	   given	   here	   from	   the	   Iḥyāʾ	   (IV.	  301.8):	   “The	   first	   reason	   [why	   love	   should	   be	   directed	   towards	   God]	   is	   man’s	   love	   for	   himself,	   his	  preservation,	  his	  perfection	  and	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  his	  existence”.	  733	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  89,	  478*.	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Barhebraeus.	  The	  aforementioned	  quotation	  from	  Barhebraeus’	  Ethicon	  seems	  to	  use	  as	  a	  model	  the	  following	  declaration	  by	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  	   Therefore,	  if	  man’s	  love	  for	  himself	  be	  necessary,	  then	  his	  love	  for	  Him	  through	  whom,	  first	  his	  coming-­‐to-­‐be,	  and	  second,	  his	  continuance	  in	  his	  essential	  being	  with	  all	  his	  inward	  and	  outward	  traits,	  his	  substance	  and	  his	  accidents,	  occur	  must	  also	  be	  necessary.734	  	  Since	  the	  first	  object	  that	  man	  knows	  is	  himself,	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  his	  own	  being,	  he	  is	  thus	  essentially	  characterised	  by	  self-­‐love,	  a	  love	  that	  attains	  towards	  the	  source	  of	  his	  well-­‐being.	   Thus	   Barhebraeus	   states	   in	   the	  Book	   of	   the	  Dove	   that	   the	   first	   inclination	   of	  man’s	  love	  is	  for	  the	  one	  ‘who	  maintains	  him’,	  that	  is	  the	  ‘God	  in	  whom	  we	  live	  and	  move	  and	  have	  our	  being’.735	  	  The	  second	  cause	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  is	  the	  love	  of	  ‘doing	  well’.	  It	  extends	  the	  first	  cause	  in	  terms	  of	   understanding	  God	  not	   only	   as	   the	  maintainer	   of	   the	   self,	   but	   as	   the	  beneficent	  source	   of	   his	   good.	   Therefore,	   man	   naturally	   loves	   his	   benefactor,	   with	   a	   love	   which	   is	  founded	  on	  God,	  who	  reveals	  Himself	  in	  the	  love	  that	  man	  naturally	  feels	  for	  the	  one	  who	  does	  him	  good.736	  When	  the	  mind	  recognises	  that	  the	  perfection	  of	  love	  is	  found	  in	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  man	  will	  come	  to	  seek	  after	  his	  own	  good	  as	  it	  is	  extended	  from	  ‘the	  Good	  One’,	  the	  giver	  of	  all	  benefaction.737	  The	  second	  cause	  of	   love,	   ‘the	  accomplishment	  of	  that	  which	  is	  good	  or	  benevolent’,	  brings	  out	  the	  important	  notion	  of	  beneficence	  (ṭābtā).738	  The	  Syriac	  feminine	   singular	   ṭābtā	   has	   the	   overall	   meaning	   of	   ‘that	   which	   is	   good’	   and	   can	   be	  translated	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  English	   terms	   including	   ‘excellence,	   virtue,	   goodness,	  kindness,	  benevolence,	  benefit’.739	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  734	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  25.	  735	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  51,	  569*.	  736	  Ibid.,	  88,	  477*.	   	  737	  Ibid.,	  89,	  478*.	  738 	  Takahashi,	   "The	   Influence	   of	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	   Juridical,	   Theological	   and	   Philosophical	   Works	   of	  Barhebraeus,"	  10.	  Takahashi	   translates	   the	   second	  cause	  of	   love,	   the	   ‘accomplishment	  of	  what	  benefits	  us’,	  which	   he	   says	   corresponds	   directly	   to	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   second	   cause,	   ‘the	   act	   of	   benevolence’	   or	   iḥsān	   (Iḥyāʾ	  IV.298.2).	  739	  Payne	  Smith	  and	  Payne	  Smith,	  A	  Compendious	  Syriac	  Dictionary	  :	  Founded	  Upon	  the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  
Payne	  Smith,	  166.	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Man’s	  love	  of	  his	  own	  self	  has	  thus	  developed	  new	  positive	  meaning	  for	  Barhebraeus,	  from	  that	  of	  the	  Syrian	  monastic	  tradition	  following	  Evagrius,	  through	  his	  reading	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s,	  
Iḥyāʾ.	   Evagrius	   had	   interpreted	   the	   love	   of	   the	   self	   as	   the	   first	   and	   foremost	   of	   the	   evil	  thoughts,	  the	  logismoi.	  In	  chapter	  53	  of	  his	  Skemmata	  (‘Reflections’),	  he	  states	  that	  ‘the	  first	  thought	  of	  all	   is	   that	  of	   love	  of	   self	   (philautia);	  after	   this	   [come]	   the	  eight’.740	  These	  eight	  thoughts	  are	  the	   logismoi,	   the	   list	  which	  he	  has	  already	  provided	  in	  the	  Praktikos,	  and	  on	  which	   the	   latter	   part	   of	   the	   Skemmata	   (40-­‐62)	   is	   focused.741 	  William	   Harmless	   and	  Raymond	  R.	  Fitzgerald	  have	  suggested	  that	  this	  assertion	  of	  ‘a	  ninth	  “thought”	  prior	  to	  the	  others’,	   is	  only	  found	  in	  the	  Skemmata.742	  They	  see	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  notion	  being	  in	  its	  almost	  ‘Augustinian’	  emphasis,	  ‘that	  the	  selfish	  love	  of	  self	  is	  the	  primordial	  evil	  thought,	  a	  sort	  of	  original	  sin’.743	  The	  comparison	  with	  the	  theological	  tradition	  of	  the	  Latin	  West	  is	  apt,	  since	  the	  Evagrian	  logismoi	  are	  known	  to	  have	  translated	  into	  the	  ‘Seven	  Deadly	  Sins’	  of	  the	  Middle	  Ages,	   through	  Evagrius’	  disciple	  John	  Cassian	  (ca.	  360-­‐435CE)	  who	  brought	  the	   list	   to	   the	   Latin	  West.744	  For	   the	   Syrian	  mystics,	   the	   theology	   of	   prayer	   theorised	   by	  Evagrius,	   led	   them	   to	   espouse	   solitude	   and	   the	   discipline	   of	   the	   body	   and	   soul	   in	   their	  internal	  warfare	  against	  the	  ‘passions’	  and	  the	  ‘evil	  thoughts’.	  Indeed	  it	  may	  be	  conjectured	  that	  Evagrius	  occupied	  a	  position	   for	   the	  Syrians	  similar	   to	  that	  of	  Augustine	   in	  the	  Latin	  West,	   and	   as	   such	   represented	   the	   position	   that	   was	   most	   clearly	   opposed	   to	   the	  Aristotelianism	  of	  the	  Syrian	  scholastic	  theology.745	  From	  the	  Evagrian	  criticism	  of	  the	  love	  of	  self	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  path	  into	  the	  evil	  thoughts	  of	  the	  logismoi,	  Barhebraeus	  made	  an	   alternative	   reading	   of	   the	   love	   of	   self	   that	   was	   inspired	   by	   al-­‐Ghazālī.	   In	   this	  development	  of	   the	  Evagrian	   tradition,	  Barhebraeus	  understood	   the	   self	   to	  be	   inherently	  concerned	  with	  the	  good	  of	  its	  own	  existence	  and	  rather	  than	  the	  soul	  having	  an	  inherently	  evil	  inclination.	  Man’s	  desire	  for	  the	  good	  of	  himself	  may	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  desire	  for	  the	  transcendent	  Good	  through	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  740	  Harmless	  and	  Fitzgerald,	  "The	  Sapphire	  Light	  of	  the	  Mind:	  The	  Skemmata	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,"	  511.	  741	  Ibid.,	  507.	  742	  Ibid.,	  511.	  743	  Ibid.	  744	  Ibid.,	  507.	  745	  For	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   opposition	   between	   Augustinianism	   and	   Aristotelianism	   in	   the	   Latin	   West	   of	  Aquinas’s	   time,	   see	   MacIntyre’s	   Chapter	   V:	   Aristotle	   and/or/against	   Augustine:	   Rival	   traditions	   of	   Moral	  Enquiry.	  MacIntyre,	  Three	  Rival	  Versions	  of	  Moral	  Enquiry	  :	  Encyclopaedia,	  Genealogy,	  and	  Tradition,	  105-­‐26.	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Love	  of	  the	  Good	  Barhebraeus	  relies	  greatly	  on	  the	  Evagrian	  tradition	  of	  the	  passions	  and	  the	  evil	  thoughts	  in	  his	  writing	  on	  the	  practical	  training	  of	  the	  body	  and	  the	  soul.746	  However,	  he	  adapted	  the	  Evagrian	  approach	  to	  love	  in	  its	  two	  main	  aspects,	  the	  love	  of	  the	  self	  and	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  in	  turning	   to	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   five	   causes.	   Barhebraeus	   demonstrates	   through	   the	   five	   causes	   of	  love,	  that	  the	  love	  of	  God	  is	  found	  in	  this	  world	  by	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  man’s	  existing	  within	  it,	  and	  his	  pursuit	  of	  the	  good	  of	  his	  own	  being.	  Once	  the	  foundation	  of	  this	  love	  is	  understood,	  a	  foundation	  which	  provides	  the	  principles	  which	  ground	  the	  self	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  good,	  then	   the	  means	   of	   knowing	  God	   other	   than	   that	   of	   seeking	   the	  Good,	   become	   secondary	  abstractions.	   In	   his	   incorporation	   of	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   ideas	   on	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   Barhebraeus	  unites	  the	  predominant	  emphases	  of	  the	  Platonic	  and	  Aristotelian	  traditions	  on	  the	  notion	  of	   the	   good,	   that	   is,	   the	   Platonic	   pursuit	   of	   ‘the	  Good	   beyond	   being’	   and	   the	  Aristotelian	  emphasis	  on	  the	  human	  good	  (eudaimonia).747	  	  	  Barhebraeus	   shows	   some	   familiarity	  with	   the	  philosophy	  of	   Plato	   in	   his	   summary	  of	   the	  main	   doctrines	   of	   the	   Greeks	   in	   his	   Preface	   to	   the	   Candelabrum.	   In	   this	   summary,	  Barhebraeus	   notes	   that	   Plato’s	   theory	   of	   the	   image	   was	   the	   eidos,	   ‘which	   he	   calls	   the	  archetype’,	   that	   ‘in	   its	   likeness	   the	  different	   substances	  were	  created’,	   and	   thus	  he	   called	  the	  eidos,	  ‘God’.748	  Heidegger	  states	  that	  for	  Plato,	  ‘the	  idea	  of	  ideas,	  the	  highest	  idea,	  is	  the	  
idea	   tou	   agathou,	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   good’,	   not	   in	   the	   moral	   sense,	   but	   achieving	   what	   is	  appropriate	   to	   it,	   and	   this	   highest	   idea	   is	   the	   archetype	   which	   allows	   Being	   as	   ousia	   to	  unfold	   as	   the	   prototype,	   and	   thus	   the	   tou	   agathou	   stands	   ‘epekeina	   tēs	   ousias,	   beyond	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  746	  For	  the	  Evagrian	  legacy,	  see	  for	  example	  the	  ninth	  section	  on	  the	  evil	  passions	  in	  the	  second	  chapter	  (on	  the	  psychic	  training	  in	  the	  cell)	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  
with	   Some	   Chapters	   from	  His	   Ethikon,	   32-­‐40,	   550*-­‐58*.	   Wensinck	   emphasises	   the	   influence	   of	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  
Iḥyāʾ	  Book	  III	   in	  his	   Introduction	   (cxxx-­‐cxxxiii)	   and	  also	   the	   similarities	  of	  Barhebraeus’	   list	   to	   that	  of	   John	  Climacus’	  Scala	  Paradisi	  are	  noted	  in	  the	  footnotes	  to	  section	  nine.	  747	  For	   the	   identification	   of	   Plato’s	   ‘Good	   beyond	   being’	   as	   the	   ‘ineffable	   One’	   by	   the	   Neo-­‐Platonists,	   see:	  	  Sandford,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Love	  :	  Gender	  and	  Transcendence	  in	  Levinas,	  31-­‐32.	  MacIntyre	  gives	  a	  chapter	  to	  his	  discussion	  of	  Aristotle’s	  virtue	  ethics,	  but	  specifically	  Aristotle’s	  account	  of	  the	  good	  as	  eudaimonia	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  ‘the	  state	  of	  doing	  well	  and	  doing	  well	  in	  being	  well,	  of	  a	  man’s	  being	  well-­‐favored	  himself	  and	  in	   relation	   to	   the	   divine’.	   	   Alasdair	   MacIntyre,	   After	   Virtue	   :	   A	   Study	   in	   Moral	   Theory,	   2nd	   ed.	   (London:	  Duckworth,	  1985),	  148-­‐49.	  748	  Quotations	  from	  Gottheil’s	  translation,	  Gottheil,	  "A	  Synopsis	  of	  Greek	  Philosophy	  by	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  253-­‐54.	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Being’.749	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   in	   the	   Aristotelian	   tradition,	   the	   concern	   with	   the	   good	   is	  moral,	   and	   is	   explored	   through	   the	   ordering	   of	   the	   virtues	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   ethics.	   In	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism,	  the	  Good	  is	  both	  beyond	  being	  and	  is	  revealed	  in	  being,	  and	  when	  he	  refers	  to	  the	   ‘unique,	  essential	   idea’	  of	  God,	   it	  may	  be	  concluded	  that	  this	  refers	  to	  the	  form	  of	   the	  Good.750	  However,	   this	  unique	   idea	  of	   the	  Good	   is	  not	   to	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  archetype	   from	   which	   unfolds	   the	   prototype	   of	   ousia.	   For	   Barhebraeus,	   the	   Good	   is	   as	  present	   in	   the	  phenomenon	  of	   love	   that	   enflames	   the	  heart	   of	  man,	   as	   it	   is	   distant	   in	   its	  transcendence,	   and	   in	   holding	   together	   this	   apparent	   contradiction	   his	   favourite	   image	  becomes	  that	  of	  the	  spiritual	  dove.751	  	  	  The	   synthesis	   of	   the	  Good	  beyond	  being	  with	   the	   immanent	   good	  of	  man’s	   own	  being	   is	  reflected	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  interest	  in	  ethics,	  to	  which	  he	  devotes	  two	  quite	  different	  works.	  The	   Ethicon	   and	   the	   Ethics,	   are	   connected	   terminologically,	   as	   previously	   noted,	   both	  having	   been	   entitled	   Ktābā	   d-­‐ītīqōn;	   the	   differentiation	   being	   made	   in	   the	   English	  translation	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  two	  works.	  Barhebraeus’	  Ethics,	  draws	   on	   both	   the	   Syriac	   and	   the	   Islamic	   traditions	   of	   philosophy,	   and	   is	   placed	   at	   the	  beginning	   of	   the	   section	   devoted	   to	   practical	   philosophy	   in	   his	   multi-­‐volume	   Cream	   of	  
Wisdom.	   While	   this	   work	   is	   essentially	   modelled	   on	   Ibn	   Sīnā’s	   Kitāb	   al-­‐Šifāʾ	   (Book	   of	  
Healing),	   Joosse	   has	   shown	   that	   for	   his	   Ethics,	   Barhebraeus	   made	   substantial	   use	   of	   al-­‐Ṭūsī’s	   Aḫlāq-­‐e	   Nāṣirī	   (Nasirean	   Ethics).	   This	   well-­‐known	   Persian	   work	   is	   based	   on	   the	  Arabic	   text	   of	   Ibn	   Miskawaih’s	   Tahḏīb	   al-­‐aḫlāq	   (Cultivation	   of	   Morals),	   which	   shows	  evidence	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   both	   Aristotle’s	   Nicomachean	   Ethics,	   and	   Platonic	   or	  Neoplatonic	  teachings.752	  Joosse	  states	  that	  al-­‐Ṭūsī	  is	  concerned	  with	  ‘the	  criteria	  of	  human	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  749	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  Introduction	  to	  Metaphysics	  (New	  Haven	  ;	  London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  210-­‐11.	  This	  is	  a	  further	  reference	  to	  the	  passage	  in	  Plato’s	  Republic	  at	  509b.	  	  750	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	   66-­‐67,	  585*,	  Sentence	   29.	   In	   this	   sentence,	   Barhebraeus	   discusses	   the	   theological	   doctrine	   of	   the	   Trinity	   begun	   in	   the	  previous	  sentence,	  continuing	  with	  this	  theme	  in	  the	  subsequent	  sentences.	  ‘What	  is	  three	  in	  itself	  possesses	  a	  unique	  essential	  idea,	  which	  is	  not	  liable	  to	  be	  divided	  into	  many	  triads;	  and	  in	  this	  intelligence	  it	  is	  one.	  And	  because	  the	  unique	  supreme	  being	  possesses	  essence	  and	  word	  and	  life,	  it	  is	  three.	  So	  it	  is	  one	  in	  nature	  and	  three	  in	  hypostases.’	  751	  Ibid.,	  48-­‐49,	  566*-­‐68*.	  752	  Joosse,	  A	  Syriac	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Aristolelian	  Philosophy	  :	  Barhebraeus	  (13th	  c.),	  Butyrum	  Sapientiae,	  Books	  
of	  Ethics,	  Economy,	  and	  Politics	  :	  A	  Critical	  Edition,	  with	  Introduction,	  Translation,	  Commentary,	  and	  Glossaries,	  1-­‐3.	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behaviour’	  at	  three	  levels,	  the	  first	  being	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  of	  ethics,	  which	  deals	  with	  man’s	  own	  good	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘Man’s	  relationship	  to	  Creation	  and	  the	  Creator’.753	  In	  the	  first	  section	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  book	  of	  Ethics,	  he	  outlines	   this	   threefold	  division	   in	   the	  practical	  part	   of	   knowledge	   (the	   praktikos)	   into	   ethics	   (ethiqon),	   economy	   (oikonomikon)	   and	  politics	   (politikon),	   ‘because	   man	   is	   concerned	   about	   the	   goodness	   of	   himself,	   of	   his	  household	   or	   of	   his	   city’.754	  Ethics	   thus	  deals	  with	   the	   first	   of	   these	   categories,	   i.e.	  man’s	  concern	  with	  his	  own	  good.	  The	  relationship	  of	  the	  Ethicon	  to	  Barhebraeus’	  summary	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  books	  of	  ethics,	  concerns	  the	  insight	  that	  Barhebraeus	  gained	  from	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  namely	   that	   man’s	   pursuit	   of	   the	   good	   finds	   its	   ultimate	   attainment	   in	   the	   love	   of	   God.	  Therefore	  the	  instruction	  of	  the	  Ethicon	  concerns	  how	  man’s	  cultivation	  of	  his	  good	  in	  the	  world	  should	  be	  directed	  towards	  the	  ultimate	  Good	  that	  is	  God;	  the	  terms	  of	  this	  relation	  between	  the	  particular	  of	  man’s	  own	  good	  and	  the	  universal	  Good	  is	  demonstrated	  through	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  	  	  In	   the	  book	  of	  Ethics,	  Barhebraeus	   lists	   the	   three	   faculties	  of	  man,	   the	  animal,	   the	  bestial	  and	   the	   rational.	   With	   the	   perfection	   of	   the	   third	   faculty	   of	   the	   rational	   soul	   realised	  through	  the	  discipline	  of	   the	  will,	   ‘man	  is	  raised	  from	  the	  perception	  of	   the	  particulars	  to	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  universals’.755	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  man	  attains	  to	  the	  knowledge	  of	  universals,	  through	  the	  cultivation	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  ordering	  of	  the	  sciences,	  beginning	  with	  the	  ethics	  and	  culminating	  in	  the	  metaphysics.	  This	  progress	  from	  the	  ethics,	  through	  the	  science	  of	  logic,	  the	  science	  of	  mathematics,	  and	  natural	  science,	  to	  the	  metaphysics,756	  indicates	   the	  connection	  between	  ethics	  and	  metaphysics,	   the	  notion	  of	   the	  good	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  being.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  Ethicon,	  that	  Barhebraeus	  demonstrates	  how	  he	  understands	  the	  two	   to	  be	   inter-­‐related,	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   reconciles	   the	   transcendent	  metaphysics	  of	   the	  ideas	  and	  forms	  in	  the	  Platonic	  tradition	  with	  the	   immanent	  metaphysics	  of	  substance	  or	  
ousia	   in	   the	   Aristotelian	   tradition.	   In	   his	   reading	   of	   al-­‐Ghazālī,	   Barhebraeus	   found	   an	  ontological	  basis	  for	  a	  conception	  of	  God	  which	  was	  not	  constrained	  by	  Aristotelian	  notions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  753	  Ibid.,	  1-­‐2.	  754	  Ibid.,	  2.	  755 	  Section	   4.1.3.	   Ibid.,	   16*,	   17.	   In	   these	   sections	   (4.1.2-­‐4.1.4),	   Joosse	   notes	   in	   his	   Commentary	   that	  Barhebraeus	  follows	  al-­‐Ṭūsī’s	  text	  very	  closely.	  Ibid.,	  64*,	  65.	  756	  Ibid.,	  66*,	  67.	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of	   substance,	   form	   and	   matter,	   but	   provided	   a	   manner	   of	   resolving	   the	   epistemological	  conflict	  in	  the	  Syrian	  tradition	  between	  scholastics	  and	  mystics.	  	  
Love	  of	  Inward	  and	  Outward	  Beauty	  As	  Takahashi	  has	  pointed	  out,	  Barhebraeus’	  third	  and	  fourth	  causes	  of	  love	  do	  not	  actually	  correspond	   directly	   to	   their	   treatment	   in	   al-­‐Ghazālī.757	  The	  Ethicon	   categorises	   the	   third	  cause	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  as	  the	  love	  of	  the	  outward	  beauty	  of	  the	  beloved	  object	  whilst	  the	  fourth	  cause	  is	  the	  love	  of	  the	  inward	  beauty;	  in	  Syriac	  these	  are	  termed	  the	  ‘outer	  beauty’	  (šūprā	   barrāyā)	   and	   the	   ‘inner	   beauty’	   (šūprā	   gawwāyā). 758 	  By	   contrast,	   al-­‐Ghazālī	  combines	  both	  these	  aspects	  into	  his	  fourth	  cause	  of	  love	  for	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  thing,	  which	  is	   ‘subdivided	   into	   the	   beauty	   of	   outer	   form,	   perceived	   by	   the	   physical	   eye,	   and	   into	   the	  beauty	   of	   inner	   form,	   perceived	  by	   the	   eye	   of	   the	  heart	   and	   the	   light	   of	   insight’.759	  In	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  schema,	  these	  do	  not	  represent	  separate	  causes	  of	  love	  as	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  usage,	  but	  represent	  two	  aspects	  of	  the	  fourth	  cause	  of	  love,	  for	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  thing	  in	  itself.760	  	  	  Indeed	  al-­‐Ghazāli	  defines	  the	  fourth	  cause	  as	  ‘the	  love	  of	  every	  beautiful	  thing	  because	  of	  its	  very	  beauty,	  not	  because	  of	  any	  share	  one	  might	  have	  in	  it	  beyond	  sheer	  perception’.761	  In	  the	  Ethicon,	  Barhebraeus	  explains	  the	  fourth	  cause	  as	  the	  beauty	  of	  a	  thing	  in	  its	  ‘intrinsic	  perfection’,762	  while	   the	  perfection	  of	  God	   in	  knowledge	  and	  power	   is	  so	   incomparable	   to	  that	  of	  His	   creatures,	   that	  God	   is	   loved	  more	   than	  anything	   in	   the	  world.763	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   third	   cause	   for	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   is	   ‘when	   you	   love	   a	   benefactor	   for	   his	   own	   sake	  although	   his	   benefaction	   does	   not	   extend	   to	   you	   personally’.764	  Takahashi	   argues	   that	  Barhebraeus	   instead	   incorporates	   ‘al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   third	   cause	   into	   his	   definition	   of	   outward	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  757 	  Takahashi,	   "The	   Influence	   of	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	   Juridical,	   Theological	   and	   Philosophical	   Works	   of	  Barhebraeus,"	  10,	  n.	  33.	  Takahashi	  shows	  that	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  third	  cause	  is	  ‘the	  love	  of	  a	  thing	  for	  itself’	  (Iḥyāʾ	  IV:	  298.15,	  “The	  third	  cause	  is	  that	  a	  thing	  is	  loved	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  and	  not	  for	  the	  good	  that	  is	  conferred	  by	  it	  after	  itself.”)’.	  758	  Ibid.,	  10.	  	  	  759	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  30.	  760 	  Takahashi,	   "The	   Influence	   of	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	   Juridical,	   Theological	   and	   Philosophical	   Works	   of	  Barhebraeus,"	   10,	   n.	   33.	   Takahashi	   notes	   that	   ‘al-­‐Ghazālī	   treats	   beauty,	   both	   inward	   and	   outward,	   as	   his	  fourth	  cause’.	  761	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  30.	  762	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  88,	  477*.	  763	  Ibid.,	  90,	  479-­‐80*.	  764	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  28.	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beauty	   by	   saying	   that	   outward	  beauty	   “is	   loved	   for	   its	   own	   sake	   and	  not	   for	   the	   sake	   of	  something	  (else)”’.765	  	  In	  a	  significant	  departure	  from	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Barhebraeus	  regards	  the	  possibility	  of	  applying	  the	  third	  cause	  of	  the	  outward	  form	  of	  beauty	  to	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  In	  his	  article	  “L'amour	  De	  Dieu	  Dans	  L'oeuvre	  De	  Bar	   'Ebroyo”,	  Teule	  points	  out	  that	  Barhebraeus	  upholds	  that	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   see	   the	   form	  of	  God	   in	   the	  vision	  of	  His	  divine	  beauty.766	  Further	   the	   reasons	  behind	  Barhebraeus’	   insistence	  on	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  outward	  form	  of	  beauty	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  the	   love	   of	   God,	   may	   lie	   in	   the	   tradition	   of	   the	   beatific	   vision	   amongst	   the	   East	   Syrian	  mystics.	  Evagrius’	   theology	  of	   imageless	  prayer	  paradoxically	  allows	   for	   the	  vision	  of	   the	  ‘sapphire-­‐blue	  light’	  of	  the	  Trinity,	  taking	  its	  inspiration	  from	  the	  account	  of	  Moses	  seeing	  ‘the	  place	  of	  God’	   in	  the	  Septuagint	  version	  of	  Exodus	  24.10-­‐11.767	  This	  tradition	  provided	  the	   precedence	   for	   Barhebraeus’	   elucidation	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   outward	  manifestation	  of	  the	  divine	  beauty	  in	  the	  vision	  of	  God.	  	  
The	  Soul	  as	  the	  Image	  of	  God	  In	  the	   fifth	  cause	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God,	  man	   is	  described	  as	  being	  made	   in	  the	  divine	   image.	  The	  Ethicon	  declares	  that	  this	  cause	  is	  due	  to	  ‘a	  hidden	  consanguinity	  and	  a	  secret	  likeness	  between	  God	  and	  mankind’,	  which	  is	  the	   ‘more	  intrinsic’	  cause	  of	  the	   love	  of	  God;	   for	  the	  divine	   word	   ‘shows	   man	   to	   have	   been	   created	   in	   the	   image	   of	   God’.768	  Takahashi	   has	  translated	   the	   fifth	   cause	   of	   love	   in	   the	   Ethicon	   as	   ‘hidden	   affinity	   and	   secret	   similarity	  (ḥyānūtā	  ksītā	  w-­‐damyūtā	  gnīztā)’.769	  Barhebraeus	  also	  refers	  to	  this	  fifth	  and	  final	  cause	  of	  the	   love	   of	   God	   in	   similar	   terms	   in	   his	   shorter	   section	   on	   the	   five	   causes	   of	   love	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  765	  Takahashi,	  "The	  Influence	  of	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  the	  Juridical,	  Theological	  and	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus,"	  10,	  n.	  33.	  766	  Teule,	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo,"	  268-­‐69.	  This	  point	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  in	  the	  section	  The	  Vision	  of	  the	  Divine	  Beauty.	  767	  Stewart,	  "Imageless	  Prayer	  and	  the	  Theological	  Vision	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus,"	  195-­‐96.	  768	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  91,	  480*.	  769 	  Takahashi,	   "The	   Influence	   of	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	   Juridical,	   Theological	   and	   Philosophical	   Works	   of	  Barhebraeus,"	  10.	   In	   a	   footnote	   (34)	  he	   compares	  Barhebraeus’	   fifth	   cause	   to	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   formulation:	   ‘the	  secret	  relationship	  between	  lover	  and	  beloved’,	  Iḥyāʾ	  IV:300.18.	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version	   contained	   in	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove;	   here	   the	   fifth	   cause	   is	   described	   as	   that	   of	  ‘hidden	  similarity	  (dāmyūtā	  ksītā)’.770	  	   And	   if	  a	  hidden	   likeness	   is	  a	  cause	  of	   love,	   then	  that	  man	  would	  be	  a	  wretch	  who	  did	  not	   love	  his	  Lord	  who	  has	  made	  him	  in	  His	  image	  and	  after	  His	  likeness.771	  	  Therefore	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  image	  can	  be	  asserted	  about	  God,	  one	  justified	  by	  Scripture.	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  expresses	  a	  reluctance	  to	  provide	  an	  explanation	   for	   the	  ‘hidden	   affinity’,	   which	   is	   ‘explicable	   neither	   as	   resemblance	   of	   form	   nor	   similarity	   in	  outward	   shape’.772	  This	   affinity	   involves	   ‘secret	   precepts’	  which	   are	   not	   to	   be	  written	   in	  books,	  with	  the	  exception	  being	  the	  imitation	  of	  the	  divine	  moral	  attributes.773	  Barhebraeus	  does	   not	   express	   the	   same	   reluctance	   to	   explain	   this	   affinity	   between	  man	   and	  God	   that	  causes	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  though	  he	  maintains	  its	  ‘secret’	  and	  ‘hidden’	  nature.774	  	  	  However,	  Barhebraeus’	  emphasis	  on	  the	  Spirit,	  to	  which	  he	  devotes	  the	  Dove,	  corresponds	  to	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  reference	  to	  what	  should	  not	  be	  written	  about	  the	  affinity,	  except	  by	  allusion	  to	   the	   speech	   of	   God	   in	   the	   Qurʹan:	   ‘Then	  when	   I	  made	  him	  upright	  and	   I	  breathed	  of	  My	  
spirit	  into	  him’.775	  For	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  this	  verse	  provides	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  affinity	  between	  God	   and	   man,	   by	   virtue	   of	   which	   God	   made	   Adam	   his	   representative	   on	   earth	   and	   the	  angels	   prostrated	   before	   Adam	   on	   the	   divine	   command.776 	  Further,	   when	   al-­‐Ghazālī	  describes	   the	   fifth	  cause	   in	   terms	  of	  human	   love	  between	   lover	  and	  beloved,	  he	  specifies	  the	   ‘spiritual	   affinity’	   between	   the	   two	   persons.777	  The	   spiritual	   aspect	   to	   the	   affinity	  between	   men	   and	   that	   between	   man	   and	   God	   can	   thus	   be	   understood	   as	   having	   been	  established	  and	  maintained	  through	  the	  Spirit	  of	  God.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  770	  Ibid.	  	  771	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  91,	  480*.	  	  772	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  38.	  773	  Ibid.	  774	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  91,	  480*.	  775	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   Love,	   Longing,	   Intimacy	  &	   Contentment,	   38.	   Ormsby	   lists	   the	   references	   as	   the	  
Qurʹan:	  XV.29;	  XXXVIII.72.	  776	  Ibid.,	  38-­‐39.	  777	  Ibid.,	  21,	  38-­‐39.	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In	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  develops	  this	  spiritual	  affinity	  of	  love	  in	  his	  exposition	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  The	  notion	  of	   ‘hidden	  likeness’	  (damyūtā	  ksītā)	  to	  God,778	  is	  developed	  specifically	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  mind	  by	  the	  Spirit.	  While	  man	  has	  been	  created	  in	  the	   image	   of	   God,	   this	   image	   is	   like	   a	   mirror	   which	   has	   become	   rusted	   through	   his	  participation	   in	  controversies	  and	  doubts	  and	  requires	  cleaning,	   in	  the	  purification	  of	   the	  mind	  from	  all	  such	  distractions.779	  In	  the	  process	  of	  purification,	  the	  perfect	  mind	  achieves	  that	   of	   true	   likeness	   through	   illumination	   by	   the	   revelation	   of	   the	   Spirit.780	  Barhebraeus	  thus	  explains	  the	  illumination	  of	  the	  mind	  through	  the	  revelations	  of	  the	  Spirit	  which	  cause	  man	  to	  become	  like	  the	  supernatural	  beings,	  for	  ‘while	  the	  mind	  is	  established	  in	  the	  sight	  of	  them,	  their	  magnificence	  and	  their	  joy,	  it	  becomes	  like	  them’.781	  This	  progressive	  nature	  of	  illumination	  of	  the	  mind	  through	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  affinity	  between	  man	  and	  God	  is	  Barhebraeus’	   singular	   development	   of	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   fifth	   cause	   of	   love.	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   also	   has	  used	   the	  cleansing	  of	   the	  mirror	  as	  a	   symbol	  of	   the	  purification	  of	   the	  soul,	  but	  does	  not	  connect	  it	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  to	  man’s	  spiritual	  affinity	  with	  God.782	  For	  Barhebraeus,	  man	  is	  formed	  in	  the	  divine	  image,	  which	  is	  rusted	  through	  its	  involvement	  with	  the	  world,	  but	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  The	   meaning	   of	   damyūtā	   is	   listed	   in	   Payne-­‐Smith	   as	   ‘likeness,	   resemblance,	   similarity’,	   with	   kesyā	   as	  ‘hiding,	   concealment’.	   Payne	   Smith	   and	   Payne	   Smith,	   A	   Compendious	   Syriac	  Dictionary	   :	   Founded	  Upon	   the	  
Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  Payne	  Smith,	  94,	  221.	  779	  See	  Barhebraeus’	  reference	  to	  the	  cleansing	  of	  the	  mirror	  in	  the	  book	  of	  Ethics,	  and	  the	  addition	  which	  he	  makes	   to	   his	  main	   source	   text:	   (1.5.1)	   ‘…until	   the	  mind	   arrives	   at	   the	  Abode	   of	   the	   Sublime	  Being,	   and	   all	  controversies,	   stumbling-­‐blocks,	   dissensions	   and	   uncertainties	   are	   taken	   away	   from	   it	   and	   its	   mirror	   is	  cleansed	   from	   all	   stains’.	   Joosse,	   A	   Syriac	   Encyclopaedia	   of	   Aristolelian	   Philosophy	   :	   Barhebraeus	   (13th	   c.),	  
Butyrum	  Sapientiae,	  Books	  of	  Ethics,	  Economy,	  and	  Politics	   :	  A	  Critical	  Edition,	  with	  Introduction,	  Translation,	  
Commentary,	  and	  Glossaries,	  196-­‐97.	  In	  his	  Commentary,	  Joosse	  also	  points	  out	  the	  connection	  of	  the	  passage	  to	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  cleansing	  of	  the	  mirror	  of	  the	  mind,	  in	  Sentences	  2,	  36	  and	  58	  of	  the	  Dove.	  	  	  780	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  57,	  574*.	   ‘The	  eighth	   is	   that	  of	   likeness,	  while	   the	  mind	   is	   illuminated	  by	   the	   light	  without	  quality	  and	   is	   changed	   into	   its	  likeness,	  as	  the	  elegant	  and	  dense	  cloud	  near	  the	  sun	  is	  transformed	  into	  the	  likeness	  of	  the	  sun’.	  781	  Ibid.,	   48-­‐49,	   566-­‐67*.	   The	   passage	   continues:	   ‘And	  when	   the	   dove	   spreads	   her	  wings	   together	  with	   the	  angels	  and	  the	  souls	  of	  the	  just	  administering	  her,	  the	  mind	  accompanies	  them	  in	  their	  flight	  and	  in	  a	  moment	  it	   reaches	  with	   them	  the	  cloud	  of	   inaccessible	   light,	   enters	   it,	   is	  hidden	   in	   it	   and	  dignified	  with	   the	  state	  of	  Moses,	  being	  made	  radiant	  in	  stupefaction,	  by	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  Lord,	  the	  Lord	  of	  the	  Universe.’	  782	  Hava	  Lazarus-­‐Yafeh,	  Studies	  in	  Al-­‐Ghazzali	  (Jerusalem:	  Magnes	  Press,	  Hebrew	  University,	  1975),	  264-­‐348.	  Lazarus-­‐Yafeh	  devotes	  a	  whole	  chapter	  (IV)	  to	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  use	  of	  the	  ‘Symbolism	  of	  Light’	  which	  he	  considers	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  Neoplatonic	  philosophy,	  especially	  the	  writings	  of	  Plotinus.	  In	  the	  section	  on	  ‘The	  Parable	  of	  the	  Mirror’,	  Lazarus-­‐Yafeh	  states	  that	   ‘Al-­‐Ghazzālī	  himself	  brings	  it	   in	  in	  different	  contexts,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	   the	  various	   forms	  of	  revelation,	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  religious	  commandments,	   the	   influence	  of	  the	  body	  on	  the	  soul	  etc.	  Usually	  he	  stresses	  the	  ethical-­‐religious	  meaning	  of	  the	  image:	  the	  need	  to	  purify	  the	  heart	  by	  good	  deeds	  from	  the	  filth	  of	  wickedness’,	  p313.	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which	   is	   cleansed	   on	   both	   practical	   and	   theoretical	   levels.783	  The	   ascetic	   disciplines	   his	  body	  in	  order	  to	  remove	  worldly	  appetites,	   i.e.	  the	  Evagrian	  passions,	  but	  equally	  there	  is	  the	  need	  for	  theoretical	  discipline,	  to	  remove	  ‘dissensions	  and	  uncertainties’	  from	  the	  mind.	  This	   model	   would	   seem	   to	   correspond	   to	   Barhebraeus’	   dislike	   of	   disputation	   and	   the	  warnings	   against	   the	   practice	   of	   disputation	   expressed	   in	   the	   Ethicon.	   To	   ascend	   to	   the	  ‘Abode	  of	  the	  Sublime	  Being’,	  the	  scholastic	  methods	  of	  reasoning	  through	  the	  Organon	  and	  the	  Categories	  must	  be	  discarded,	   since	   these	   can	  only	   reveal	   the	  order	  of	   created	  being,	  not	  the	  transcendent	  being.	  	  
Metaphysics and the Love of God 
The	  Problem	  of	  Onto-­‐theology	  in	  Syriac	  Scholasticism	  With	   the	   emergence	   of	   scholastic	   scientific	   texts	   in	   Syriac,	   Aristotelian	   logic	   and	  metaphysics	   came	   to	   be	   incorporated	   into	   theological	   discourse;	   the	   Organon	   assuming	  singular	   importance	   in	   the	   academic	   curriculum	   for	   East	   and	  West	   Syrians.784	  However,	  Aristotelian	  metaphysics	  came	  to	  assume	  a	  fundamental	  significance	  that	  went	  beyond	  that	  of	   the	  Syriac	   text	   itself,	   the	  study	  of	  which	  hardly	  compares	   to	   the	  attention	  given	   to	   the	  
Organon	   by	   the	   schools	   from	   the	   sixth	   and	   seventh	   centuries.785	  The	   implications	   of	  metaphysical	  reasoning	  through	  logic	  had	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  Syriac	  scholasticism;	  this	  philosophy	  was	  translated	  in	  the	  Syrian	  schools	  and	  was	  studied	  primarily	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  theological	  reasoning.	  Heidegger’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  development	  of	  Western	  onto-­‐theology,	  that	  is,	  the	  scholastic	  metaphysics	  of	  Christian	  philosophy	  allows	  the	   connection	   between	   logic,	   metaphysics	   and	   theology	   in	   the	   development	   of	   Syriac	  scholasticism	   to	   be	   understood	   more	   clearly.	   Heidegger	   has	   argued	   that	   in	   Christian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  783	  This	  is	  the	  context	  of	  Section	  1.5.1	  in	  the	  book	  of	  Ethics,	  and	  concerning	  the	  first	  theory	  of	  the	  perfection	  of	  the	  human	  soul	  in	  its	  Theoretical	  and	  Practical	  Faculties.	  ‘The	  first	  (theory):	  The	  perfections	  of	  the	  soul	  are	  of	  two	  (kinds)	  because	  its	  faculties	  are	  also	  two.	  The	  perfection	  of	  the	  Theoretical	  Faculty,	  as	  we	  have	  said	  many	  times	  is	  effected	  through	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  all	  existing	  things	  to	  the	  best	  of	  human	  ability,	  until	  the	  mind	  arrives	  at	  the	  Abode	  of	  the	  Sublime	  Being,	  and	  all	  controversies,	  stumbling-­‐blocks,	  dissensions	  and	   uncertainties	   are	   taken	   away	   from	   it	   and	   its	   mirror	   is	   cleansed	   from	   all	   stains.’.	   Joosse,	   A	   Syriac	  
Encyclopaedia	  of	  Aristolelian	  Philosophy	  :	  Barhebraeus	  (13th	  c.),	  Butyrum	  Sapientiae,	  Books	  of	  Ethics,	  Economy,	  
and	  Politics	  :	  A	  Critical	  Edition,	  with	  Introduction,	  Translation,	  Commentary,	  and	  Glossaries,	  28*,	  29.	  784	  See	  the	  final	  section	  of	  Chapter	  3:	  The	  Conflict	  in	  Thinking	  in	  Syrian	  Hermeneutics.	  785	  For	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Organon	  over	  that	  of	  the	  Physics,	  Ethics	  and	  Metaphysics	  in	  the	  Syriac	  corpus	  of	  Aristotle,	  see	  especially:	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche,	  "Le	  Corpus	  Philosophique	  Syriaque	  aux	  VIe-­‐VIIIe	  Siècles,"	  282-­‐90.	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scholasticism,	  metaphysics	  was	  no	  longer	  understood	  in	  the	  purely	  technical	  sense	  as	  that	  which	  goes	  beyond	  the	  physics.	  Instead	  its	  purpose	  was	  to	  locate	  God	  as	  a	  being	  above	  all	  other	  beings;	  hence	  the	  metaphysical	  God	  denotes	  ‘some	  being,	  albeit	  a	  higher	  being,	  that	  is	  at	  hand	  among	  others’.786	  Scholastic	  metaphysics	  sought	  to	  establish	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	   ‘suprasensuous’	   being	   of	   God	   and	   the	   order	   of	   being	   perceived	   by	   the	   senses.787	  By	  contrast,	   Heidegger	   propounded	   that	   the	  metaphysics	   of	   Aristotle	   had	   ‘two	   fundamental	  orientations	  of	  questioning’;	  the	  first	  orientation	  concerned	  ‘being	  as	  such’	   in	  order	  to	  ask	  ‘what	  belongs	  of	  a	  being,	   insofar	  as	   it	   is	  a	  being’,	  while	   the	  second	  concerned	   ‘beings	  as	  a	  
whole,	   in	   inquiring	   back	   to	   the	   supreme	   and	   ultimate’.788	  Heidegger	   showed	   that	   the	  connection	  of	  metaphysics	  and	   theology	   implicit	   in	  Aristotle	  was	   taken	  over	  by	  medieval	  scholasticism	  to	  subsume	  the	  first	  orientation	  of	  his	  metaphysics	  to	  the	  second.	  Scholastic	  metaphysics	  became	  centred	  on	  the	  specific	  supra-­‐sensory	  order	  of	  being	  (and	  thus	  divine	  being)	  that	  lies	  above	  other	  beings.789	  This	  development	  of	  Greek	  metaphysics	  in	  Western	  scholastic	   theology	   bears	   comparison	   with	   the	   transmission	   of	   Greek	   metaphysical	  thinking	  into	  Syriac	  and	  the	  formal	  study	  of	  logic	  in	  the	  schools.	  	  The	  scholastic	  thinking	  which	  developed	  with	  the	  reception	  of	  Greek	  philosophy	  into	  Syriac	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  need	  to	  harmonise	  the	  Syriac	  theological	  vocabulary	  with	  that	   provided	   by	   Aristotle’s	  Metaphysics.	   King	   has	   asserted	   that	   the	  West	   Syrian	   bishop	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  (640-­‐708CE),	  was	  concerned	  in	  his	  handbook	  of	  logic	  the	  Encheiridion,	  with	  aligning	  the	  ‘Syriac	  philosophical	  lexicon’	  more	  closely	  ‘with	  its	  parent	  Greek’	  according	  to	  the	  divisions	  provided	  by	  Aristotle’s	  Categories	  and	  Metaphysics,	  and	  particularly	  because	  these	   terms	  were	  not	  used	   consistently	  within	   Syrian	   theology	   -­‐	   specifically	  West	   Syrian	  Christology.790	  Henri	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche	   argues	   that	   Jacob	   of	   Edessa	   based	   his	   arguments	  particularly	  on	  the	  book	  Delta	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Metaphysics	  which	  is	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  786	  	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  The	  Fundamental	  Concepts	  of	  Metaphysics	  :	  World,	  Finitude,	  Solitude,	  Studies	  in	  Continental	  Thought	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  44.	  787	  Ibid.,	  43.	  788	  Ibid.	  	  	  789	  Ibid.	  790	  King	  states	  that	  ‘in	  this	  text	  of	  the	  early	  eighth	  century	  we	  have	  apparently	  the	  first	  genuine	  attempt,	  albeit	  a	   rather	   indirect	   one,	   to	   make	   use	   of	   Aristotelian	   logic	   in	   Christological	   discourse’.	   King,	   "Why	  Were	   the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?,"	  75-­‐76.	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the	   definitions	   of	   nature	   (phusis)	   and	   related	   terms	   such	   as	   ousia	   and	   hypostasis.	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche	  argues	  further	  that	  the	  scholarship	  of	  the	  Encheiridion	  attests	  both	  Jacob	  of	   Edessa’s	   philosophical	   culture	   and	   his	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Aristotelian	   tradition	   which	  ‘went	  well	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  logic	  and	  included	  metaphysical	  texts’.791	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  Jacob’s	  interest	  in	  book	  Delta	  of	  the	  Metaphysics,	  in	  which	  Aristotle	  states	  that	  the	  inquiry	  into	  existence	  must	  begin	  with	  ousia	  or	  substance,	  since	  substance	  is	  the	  primary	  category	  of	  being.792	  	  	  The	  concern	  with	  onto-­‐theology	  by	  West	  Syrians	  such	  as	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  correlates	  to	  the	  similar	  appropriation	  of	  Aristotelian	  metaphysics	  in	  the	  East	  Syrians	  schools,	  whereby	  the	  conception	   of	   God	   is	   defined	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   definitions	   of	   substance	   provided	   by	   the	  Porphyrian	   tree,	   as	   it	   appears	   in	   scholastic	   texts	   like	   the	   Cause	   of	   the	   Foundation	   of	   the	  
Schools.793	  Becker	  has	  concluded	  that	  such	  a	  scholastic	   text	   in	   fact	   ‘(mis)	  uses	  the	  Tree	  of	  Porphyry	  by	  inverting	  it	  and	  treating	  it	  as	  an	  ascending	  hierarchy	  of	  excellence’,	  so	  that	  the	  mind	  may	  ascend	   to	  knowledge	  of	   the	  Creator	   ‘through	   the	  diverse	  order	  of	   creation’.794	  According	  to	  Becker,	  the	  Tree	  of	  Porphyry	  is	  used	  not	  as,	  ‘a	  didactic	  tool	  for	  understanding	  the	   genus/species	   relations	   of	   Aristotelian	   logic,	   which	   is	   its	   original	   function,	   but	   as	   a	  dogmatic	  description	  of	  the	  order	  of	  reality,	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  great	  chain	  of	  being’.795	  Here	  the	  East	  Syrian	  scholastics	  were	  following	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  Greek	  commentators	  on	  Aristotle.	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche	   has	   commented	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   Isagoge,	   that	   even	   if	   Porphyry’s	  intention	   had	   been	   to	   present	   an	   introduction	   to	   the	   Categories	   ‘altogether	   free	   from	  ontological	  research’,	  the	  fact	  remains	  ‘that	  the	  treatise	  was	  subsequently	  considered	  as	  the	  main	   source	  of	  Peripatetic	   ontology	   (besides	   the	  Categories),	   and	   that	   the	   commentators	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  791	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche,	  "Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  and	  the	  Reception	  of	  Aristotle,"	  220-­‐21.	  792	  Heidegger	   argues	   that	   in	   the	   Latin	   West,	   the	   main	   term	   ousia	   for	   the	   ‘Being	   of	   beings’	   of	   Aristotelian	  metaphysics	   was	   rendered	   substantia	   in	   the	   Middle	   Ages	   and	   thus	   became	   ‘substance’.	   Heidegger,	  
Introduction	  to	  Metaphysics,	  207.	  793	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  142.	  	  794	  Ibid.,	  148-­‐9.	   ‘This	  is	  because	  the	  ordered	  system	  of	  Aristotelian	  logic	  is	  not	  an	  invention	  of	  the	  mind,	  but	  rather	  reflects	  the	  order	  that	  God	  has	  imposed	  on	  creation.	  According	  to	  the	  Cause,	  aside	  from	  revelation	  all	  knowledge	  of	  God	  is	  synthetic	  and	  representational.	  The	  mind	  through	  the	  tool	  of	  rationality	  paints	  an	  image.’	  795	  Ibid.,	  143.	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found	  therein	  the	  decisive	   formulation	  of	  a	   theory	  of	  substance’.796	  The	  problem	  with	  the	  theorising	  of	   substance	  according	   to	   the	  Categories	   lay	   in	  placing	  God	  at	   the	  head	  of	   this	  Porphyrian	   tree	  of	   substance.797	  By	   this	  move,	  God	  was	  made	   the	  Being	  of	   all	   being,	   and	  theology	  became	  onto-­‐theology,	  that	  is,	  the	  discourse	  about	  the	  being	  of	  God.	  The	  scholastic	  concern	   with	   developing	   a	   comprehensive	   onto-­‐theology	   based	   on	   Aristotelian	  metaphysics	  can	  be	  seen	  with	  West	  Syrians	  like	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa.	  Barhebraeus	  inherited	  the	  onto-­‐theology	   of	   scholastic	  metaphysics,	   but	   by	   the	   thirteenth	   century	   the	   situation	   had	  become	  additionally	  complicated	  by	  the	  Avicennan	  tradition	  of	  onto-­‐theology.798	  	  The	   mapping	   of	   the	   theory	   of	   substance	   onto	   the	   order	   of	   creation	   that	   occurred	   in	  scholastic	  texts	  may	  be	  juxtaposed	  with	  the	  strategies	  of	  mystic	  discourse,	  which	  displayed	  the	   tendency	   to	   resist	   attribution	   of	   the	   analysis	   of	   substance	   to	   the	   divine	   who	  transcended	  the	  Aristotelian	   insistence	  on	  the	   inseparability	  of	   form	  with	  matter.799	  Thus	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē,	   the	  East	  Syrian	  mystic,	  was	   concerned	   in	   the	   first	  discourse	  of	   the	  
Book	   of	   the	   Holy	   Hierotheos,	   with	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   ‘Universal	   Essence’.	   He	   asserts	   in	  parenthesis	  ‘[Now	  it	  has	  been	  called	  “Universal”	  because	  from	  it	  all	  distinctions	  (of	  being)	  were	   brought	   into	   existence;]’.800	  Stephen	   declares	   that	   he	   himself	   has	   received	   this	  teaching	  through	  the	  revelation	  of	  secrets	  to	  the	  mind	  by	  the	  Universal	  Essence,	  ‘and	  by	  it	  I	  too	  was	  divinely	  taught,	  and	  mystically	  informed	  what	  is	  the	  secret	  of	  distinctions’.801	  The	  
Book	   of	  Holy	  Hierotheos	   inhabits	   a	   complex	   cosmology,	   in	   which	   ‘God’	   is	   not	   in	   fact	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  796	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche,	  "Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  and	  the	  Reception	  of	  Aristotle,"	  219.	  797	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  143.	  798	  Nader	  El-­‐Bizri’s	  article	  considers	  the	  influence	  of	  Avicenna	  on	  the	  metaphysical	  debates	  of	  the	  Latin	  West,	  as	  well	   as	  how	   this	   influence	  has	  meant	   that	  modern	  Western	  philosophers	  have	   tended	   to	  view	  Avicenna	  through	  this	  legacy.	  N.	  El-­‐Bizri,	  "Avicenna	  and	  Essentialism,"	  Review	  of	  Metaphysics	  54,	  no.	  4	  (2001):	  273-­‐75.	  799	  Barhebraeus	  makes	  reference	  to	  this	  theory	  in	  the	  book	  of	  Ethics,	   in	  regards	  to	  the	  perfection	  of	  first	  the	  Theoretical	  Faculty	  and	  secondly	  to	  the	  Practical	  Faculty,	  in	  1.5.1:	  ‘Wise	  men	  have	  compared	  form	  to	  the	  first	  perfection,	   and	  matter	   to	   the	   second	   (perfection)	   and	   they	   have	   said:	   just	  as	   form	  has	  no	  existence	  without	  
matter	  and	  matter	  has	  no	  existence	  without	  form,	   in	   the	   same	  way	  knowledge	  without	  deeds	   is	  useless	   and	  deeds	   without	   knowledge	   are	   ineffectual’,	   (italics	   are	   mine).	   Joosse,	   A	   Syriac	   Encyclopaedia	   of	   Aristolelian	  
Philosophy	   :	   Barhebraeus	   (13th	   c.),	   Butyrum	   Sapientiae,	   Books	   of	   Ethics,	   Economy,	   and	   Politics	   :	   A	   Critical	  
Edition,	  with	  Introduction,	  Translation,	  Commentary,	  and	  Glossaries,	  28*,	  29.	  800	  Marsh,	  The	  Book	  Which	  Is	  Called	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  with	  Extracts	  from	  the	  Prolegomena	  and	  
Commentary	   of	   Theodosios	   of	   Antioch	   and	   from	   the	   "Book	   of	   Excerpts"	   and	   Other	   Works	   of	   Gregory	   Bar-­‐
Hebræus,	  6,	  5*.	  801	  Ibid.,	  6,5*.	  
	   176	  
highest	  principle,	  and	  this	  is	  perhaps	  in	  deliberate	  reaction	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘God’	  as	  the	  highest	  distinction	  of	  being	  in	  scholastic	  metaphysics.	  In	  this,	  Stephen	  follows	  the	  Evagrian	  insistence	   that	   the	   distinctions	   of	   form	   and	   species	   could	   not	   be	   abstracted	   to	   the	  insubstantial,	   the	   ineffable	   God.	   Evagrius’	   influence	   emerges	   furthermore	   in	   Stephen’s	  works	   when	   he	   refers	   to	   language	   as	   a	   secondary	   thing.802	  This	   Evagrian	   approach	   to	  language	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  mystical	  writings,	  and	  in	  the	  Hierotheos	  it	  is	  stated:	  	   Yet,	  so	  far	  as	  it	  can	  be	  done,	  even	  I	  myself	  am	  attempting	  to	  say	  in	  human	  speech	  things	  which	  are	  not	  (to	  be)	   reduced	   to	   speech,	   because	   the	   Spirit	   teaches	   all,	   and	   the	   Spirit	   judges	   everything,	   and	   the	   Spirit	  searches	  even	  the	  depths	  of	  God,	  and	  we	  have	  received	  the	  Spirit.	  803	  	  Stephen’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  Spirit,	  as	  a	  principle	  more	  transcendent	  even	  that	   ‘God’,	  could	  form	  part	  of	  the	  inspiration	  for	  Barhebraeus’	  own	  emphasis	  on	  the	  Spirit	  of	  God	  as	  the	  dove,	  and	   why	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   dove	   is	   so	   intrinsic	   to	   Barhebraeus’	   mysticism.	   In	   his	  introduction	  to	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  states	  that	  the	  dove	  gives	  ‘reason	  to	  the	  rational’,	   (meltā	   l-­‐melīle). 804 	  The	   feminine	   singular	   emphatic	   noun,	   meltā	   translates	  variously	   as	   ‘word,	   saying,	   precept,	   the	   Logos’	   but	   also	   ‘the	   faculty	   of	   speech,	   thought,	  reason,	   energy	   of	   the	  mind’,805	  while	   the	  meanings	   of	   ‘melīle’,	   the	   Pe’al	  masculine	   plural	  adjectival	  participle	  of	   the	  verbal	   root	  ML,	  encompass	   ‘endowed	  with	  speech	  and	  reason,	  articulate,	  rational’.806	  Becker	  has	  shown	  that	  meltā	  equates	  with	  the	  Greek	   logos,	  both	  of	  which	  could	  refer	  to	  terms	  related	  to	  language	  and	  rationality.807	  The	  application	  of	  meltā	  in	   Stephen	   and	   in	  Barhebraeus	  contains	   this	   double	   referent,	   pertaining	   both	   to	   ‘speech’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  802	  This	  Neoplatonic	  attitude	   to	   language	  has	  been	  discussed	   in	   the	   section,	  Rival	  Conceptual	  Schemas:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Conceptual	  Language	  for	  God.	  803	  Marsh,	  The	  Book	  Which	  Is	  Called	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  with	  Extracts	  from	  the	  Prolegomena	  and	  
Commentary	   of	   Theodosios	   of	   Antioch	   and	   from	   the	   "Book	   of	   Excerpts"	   and	   Other	   Works	   of	   Gregory	   Bar-­‐
Hebræus,	  7,	  6*.	  804	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  4,	  532*.	  805	  Payne	  Smith	  and	  Payne	  Smith,	  A	  Compendious	  Syriac	  Dictionary	  :	  Founded	  Upon	  the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  
Payne	  Smith,	  274-­‐75.	  806	  Ibid.,	  273.	  807	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  
Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  133.	  Henry	  George	  Liddell,	  A	  Greek-­‐English	  Lexicon,	  ed.	  Robert	  Scott,	  Henry	  Stuart	  Jones,	   and	   Roderick	  McKenzie,	   9th	   ed.,	   2	   vols.,	   vol.	   II	   (Oxford:	   Clarendon),	   1057-­‐59.	   Liddell	   and	   Scott	   lists	  these	  primary	  meanings	  for	  logos:	  (I)	  computation,	  reckoning;	  (II)	  relation,	  correspondence,	  proportion;	  (III)	  explanation;	  (IV)	  inward	  debate	  of	  the	  soul	  (i.e.	  thinking,	  reasoning,	  reflection,	  deliberation);	  (V)	  continuous	  statement,	  narrative,	  oration;	  (VI)	  verbal	  expression	  or	  utterance;	  (VII)	  a	  particular	  utterance,	  saying;	  (VIII)	  thing	  spoken	  of,	  subject	  matter;	  (IX)	  expression,	  utterance,	  speech;	  (X)	  the	  Word	  or	  Wisdom	  of	  God.	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and	  to	   ‘reason’.	  Therefore,	  the	  Spirit	  gives	  speech	  to	  man,	  and	  contained	  implicitly	  within	  this	  endowment	  is	  the	  faculty	  of	  reasoning,	  but	  the	  Spirit	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  what	  it	  gives,	  
logos	  or	  meltā.	   Stephen’s	  bold	  assertion	   that	   ‘the	  Spirit	   searches	  even	   the	  depths	  of	  God’,	  would	  seem	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  onto-­‐theological	  God,	  the	  God	  who	  is	  understood	  as	  contained	  within	   being,	   and	   thus	   through	   the	   metaphysical	   reasoning	   of	   the	   Being	   of	   being	   as	  constituting	  the	  divine	  being.	  The	  classification	  of	  being	  through	  Aristotle’s	  Categories	  and	  
Metaphysics,	  provides	  a	  logical	  mapping	  of	  existent	  being	  through	  the	  primary	  category	  of	  
ousia	  or	  its	  equivalents.	  However,	  such	  metaphysical	  reasoning	  does	  not	  inquire	  into	  what	  gives	  being,	  nor	  does	  it	  seek	  to	  inquire	  beyond	  its	  structures	  of	  onto-­‐theological	  thinking.808	  Similarly,	   the	   Evagrian	   mystics,	   in	   their	   tendency	   towards	   Platonic	   idealism	   and	   their	  suspicion	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  representative	  thinking	  about	  the	  divine,	  especially	  that	  provided	  by	  metaphysics,	  did	  not	  enter	  into	  this	  inquiry.	  Barhebraeus	  develops	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  Spirit	  as	  instrumental	  to	  overcoming	  the	  limit	  of	  the	  onto-­‐theological	  thinking	  of	  being	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  God	  through	  his	  ontology	  of	  the	  gift	  of	  the	  Spirit;	  the	  theme	  of	  a	  later	  section	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  
The	  Necessary	  Existent	  and/or	  the	  Good	  When	  Barhebraeus	  reiterates	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  notion	  that	  the	  love	  of	  God	  begins	  with	  self-­‐love	  and	  the	   love	  of	  continuation	  of	  one’s	  being	  (as	   the	   first	  cause	  of	   love),	  he	  also	   follows	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   conclusion,	   that	  God	   is	   loved	  as	   the	  highest	  benefactor.	  According	   to	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  that	  God	  is	  loved	  as	  the	  Good	  -­‐	  the	  source	  of	  all	  benefaction	  -­‐	  depends	  on	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  divine	  existence,	  for	  the	  being	  of	  God	  depends	  on	  no	  other	  cause	  but	  Himself,	  and	  thus	  the	  divine	  being	  is	  the	  first	  cause	  of	  all	  being	  and	  all	  that	  is	  good.	  Barhebraeus	  also	  seems	  to	  draw	   implicitly	   on	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   argument	   that	   man	   can	   ultimately	   only	   love	   God	   as	   the	  transcendent	  One	  whose	   absolute	  perfection	  merits	   love;	   for	   only	  God	   is	   the	  unique	   and	  eternal	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   necessity	   of	   his	   own	   existence. 809 	  The	   formulation	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  808	  Jean-­‐Luc	   Marion,	   "The	   "End	   of	   Metaphysics"	   as	   a	   Possiblity,"	   in	  Religion	   after	  Metaphysics,	   ed.	   Mark	   A.	  Wrathall	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  171-­‐73.	  Following	  Heidegger’s	  questioning	  of	  onto-­‐theological	   thinking,	  Marion	   argues	   that	   ‘Metaphysics	   thinks	   beings,	   because	   it	   thinks	   only	   in	   the	  mode	   of	  representation;	   it	   thus	  only	  broaches	  ontological	  difference	  within	   the	  horizon	  of	  beings	  and	   their	  mode	  of	  being.’	  Marion	  continues	  that	  metaphysicians	  ‘ask	  what	  beings	  are	  as	  beings	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  question	  as	  Aristotle	  did	  through	  the	  ousia	  or	  its	  later	  figures’.	  809	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  35.	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‘Necessarily	  Existent’	  is	  derived	  from	  Avicennan	  metaphysics,	  following	  the	  argument	  that	  since	  God’s	   existence	   is	   necessary	   to	  His	   essence,	  God	   cannot	  not	   exist,	   and	   thus	  He	   is	   a	  necessary	   being,	   the	   ‘necessary	   of	   existence’	   (wājib	  al-­‐wujūd),	   as	   opposed	   to	   ‘possible	   of	  existence’	  (mumkin	  al-­‐wujūd).810	  In	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  schema,	  since	  God	  as	  the	  necessary	  existent	  is	  the	  only	  truly	  existent	  being,	  all	  other	  existence	  (wujūd)	  is	  borrowed	  from	  Him,	  and	  thus	  only	  God	   is	   the	  perfection	   of	   all	   being.811	  Barhebraeus	   seems	   to	   follow	   this	  metaphysical	  understanding,	  in	  his	  usage	  of	  the	  mirror	  analogy	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  ontological	  difference	  between	  those	  things	  which	   ‘have	  no	  real	  essence	   in	  themselves’	   -­‐	   that	   is	   the	  kingdom	  of	  this	  world	  and	  the	  kingdom	  of	  heaven	  -­‐	  and	  God	  Himself;	  for	  the	  two	  kingdoms	  are	  merely	  a	  reflection	  of	  what	  is	  their	  essential	  ‘cause’	  (Syr.	  ʿeltā).812	  	  	  Barhebraeus	  appears	  to	  make	  reference	  to	  the	  Avicennan	  formula	  of	  the	  necessary	  existent	  in	   the	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove,	   when	   he	   states	   that	   since	  man	   is	   a	   potential	   being,	   he	  wants	   a	  necessary	  being,	  and	  so	  it	  follows	  that	  this	  is	  God.813	  The	  term	  for	  the	  divine	  ‘being’	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  Sentence	  73	  is	  ʿītūtā.814	  While	  it	  has	  no	  obvious	  linguistic	  connection	  to	  the	  Arabic	  phrase	  al-­‐wajib	  al-­‐wujūd,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  conceptual	  link	  to	  Avicenna’s	  ‘first	  efficient	  cause’,	  which	  provides	  the	  onto-­‐theological	  principle	  of	  the	  necessary	  being	  to	  which	  both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  810	  Alexander	  Treiger,	  "Monism	  and	  Monotheism	  in	  Al-­‐Ghazālī's	  Mishkāt	  Al-­‐Anwār,"	  Journal	  of	  Quranic	  Studies	  9,	  no.	  1	  (2007):	  8.	  811	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  23-­‐24.	  The	  first	  cause	  of	  love	  ‘necessitates	  the	  utmost	   love	   for	  God	  since	  whoever	  knows	  himself,	   and	  knows	  his	  Lord,	  knows	  absolutely	   that	  his	  own	  existence	  does	  not	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  his	  own	  nature	  but	  rather,	  that	  his	  existence	  prolonged	  and	  perfected,	  comes	  from	  God	  and	  goes	  to	  God	  and	  is	  [sustained]	  by	  God.’	  812	  Wensinck,	   Bar	   Hebraeus's	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   :	   Together	   with	   Some	   Chapters	   from	   His	   Ethikon,	   68,	   586*,	  Sentence	   38.	   Barhebraeus	   uses	   the	   mirror	   analogy	   on	   many	   different	   occasions,	   but	   particularly	   in	   the	  sentences.	  Sentence	  38	  refers	  to	  the	  kingdoms	  of	  earth	  and	  heaven,	  quoted	  here	  in	  full:	   ‘As	  the	  reflexes	  of	  a	  mirror	  have	  no	  real	  essence	  in	  themselves,	  but	  their	  essence	  depends	  upon	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  things	  reflected,	  so	  the	  two	  kingdoms	  –	  that	  of	  corporeal	  and	  that	  of	  uncorporeal	  things	  –	  have	  no	  true	  essence	  in	  themselves,	  but	  their	  essence	  depends	  upon	  the	  first	  essence,	  their	  cause.’	  813	  Ibid.,	  74,	  592*,	  Sentence	  73.	  The	  possible	  reference	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  necessary	  of	  existence,	  al-­‐wajib	  al-­‐
wujūd,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Wensinck	  (footnote	  2),	  is	  quoted	  here	  from	  Sentence	  73:	  ‘But	  the	  subtle	  speculation	  of	  the	  sages	  possesses	  a	  different,	  peculiar	  knowledge,	  by	  which	  from	  the	  being	  he	  whose	  being	  is	  necessary	  is	  recognized.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  if	  he	  that	  is,	  is	  necessarily	  being,	  this	  is	  what	  is	  requisited.	  If	  he	  is	  a	  potentially	  being,	  he	  wants	  a	  necessarily	  being;	  so	  there	  is	  a	  necessarily	  being.’	  	  	  814	  Bedjan,	  Ethicon	  :	  Seu,	  Moralia	  Gregorii	  Barhebræi,	  592.	  Payne	  Smith	  and	  Payne	  Smith,	  A	  Compendious	  
Syriac	  Dictionary	  :	  Founded	  Upon	  the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  Payne	  Smith,	  15.	  Payne-­‐Smith	  gives	  ousia	  as	  the	  equivalent	  of	  ʿītūtā,	  with	  the	  principle	  meaning	  of	  ‘being,	  essence,	  substance’.	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Barhebraeus	   and	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   refer.815	  However,	   Barhebraeus	   forms	   an	   implicit	   critique	   of	  this	   metaphysical	   reasoning	   about	   God,	   which	   proceeds	   from	   the	   potentiality	   of	   man’s	  being	  in	  order	  to	  argue	  that	  since	  man	  is	  a	  potential	  being	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  him	  not	  to	  exist,	  since	   this	   in	   itself	   requires	   that	   God	   must	   be	   the	   necessary	   being	   that	   causes	   potential	  beings.	   Therefore,	   the	   necessity	   of	   God’s	   being	   is	   more	   a	   requirement	   of	   this	   form	   of	  reasoning	   rather	   than	   an	   axiomatic	   proof	   that	   cannot	   be	   refuted.	   In	   the	   sentence	  which	  follows,	   that	   is,	  Sentence	  74,	  Barhebraeus	  sublimates	   this	  manner	  of	   reasoning	  about	   the	  necessary	   being	   of	   God,	   to	   that	   of	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Initiated	   through	   illumination.	  Rather	   than	   deciding	   the	   nature	   of	   God	   as	   a	   necessary	   being,	   the	   object	   of	   the	   mind’s	  reasoning,	  the	  Spirit	  dwells	  within	  the	  heart	  of	  man.816	  In	  this	  state	  of	  divine	  presence	  and	  indwelling,	   the	   essential	   reality	   of	   love	   is	   thus	   found	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   God.	   For	  Barhebraeus,	  the	  love	  of	  God	  does	  not	  require	  the	  proofs	  from	  the	  logic	  of	  metaphysics,	  for	  love	   provides	   its	   own	   logic,	   the	   logic	   of	   self-­‐giving	   in	   the	   revelation	   of	   God’s	   love	   to	   the	  heart	  of	  man	  which	  enflames	  his	  mind	  and	  body.817	  Since	  God	  is	  essentially	  Spirit,	  the	  Spirit	  gives	  all	  things	  to	  creation,	  including	  rationality	  to	  the	  mind	  and	  life	  to	  the	  soul,	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	   nature	  of	   giving.818	  The	   revelation	  of	   the	   Spirit	   functions	   to	  dissolve	   the	  metaphysical	  distinctions	  of	  essence	  and	  existence	  in	  God,	  who	  is	  immediately	  present	  in	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  and	  transcendent	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  form	  and	  matter.	  	  	  In	   appropriating	   the	   five	   causes	   of	   love	   and	   the	   love	   of	   God	   from	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   Iḥyāʾ,	  Barhebraeus	  finds	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  impasse	  between	  the	  Evagrian	  monastic	  tradition	  and	  the	  Aristotelian	  scholastics.	  Since	  man	  loves	  primarily	  himself	  as	  a	  potential	  being,	  whose	  being	  he	  wishes	  to	  preserve	  and	  continue,	  he	  necessarily	  seeks	  after	  the	  cause	  of	  his	  being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  815	  Treiger	  argues	  that	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  ‘monistic	  ontology’	  follows	  Avicenna’s	  argument	  about	  the	  chain	  of	  efficient	  causes	  very	  closely,	  with	  only	  some	  modifications.	  Treiger,	  "Monism	  and	  Monotheism	  in	  Al-­‐Ghazālī's	  Mishkāt	  Al-­‐Anwār,"	  8.	  In	  the	  Conversation	  of	  Wisdom,	  Barhebraeus’	  summary	  of	  Avicennan	  theoretical	  philosophy,	  the	  third	  chapter	  of	  the	  Metaphysics	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  proof	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  Necessary	  Being	  through	  Essence	  –	  see	  Janssens’	  edition	  of	  the	  text.	  Janssens,	  L'Entretien	  de	  la	  Sagesse	  :	  Introduction	  aux	  
Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	  100*,	  297.	  816	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  74,	  592*,	  Sentence	  74.	  817	  For	  example,	  Sentences	  80-­‐2	  recount	  the	  experience	  of	  an	  Initiated	  as	  the	  lover	  whose	  entire	  being	  burns	  with	  the	  love	  of	  his	  Beloved	  Lord.	  Ibid.,	  75-­‐76,	  593-­‐94*.	  818	  Ibid.,	  4,	  523*.	   In	  his	   Introduction	   to	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  says	  of	   the	  dove:	   ‘She	  even	  gives	  reason	  to	  the	  rational	  and	  life	  to	  the	  living.’	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in	   the	  necessary	  or	   first	  being,	  and	   in	  the	  manner	  of	  scholastic	   theology.819	  However,	   this	  manner	   of	   reasoning	   cannot	   discern	  what	   is	   behind	   this	   first	   cause,	   for	   ‘the	   cause	   of	   all	  causes’	   is	  not	  delimited	  by	  being	  but	   is	   the	  Spirit	   that	  gives	   life.820	  The	  Spirit	   is	  so	  named	  because	   ‘she’	   is	   both	  outside	  of	   and	  yet	   sustains	  material	   existence,	  without	   occupying	   a	  position	  that	  can	  be	  identified	  within	  a	  classification	  of	  being.	  Barhebraeus	  offers	  the	  image	  of	  the	  dove	  that	  dwells	  in	  ‘her	  place’	  in	  heaven	  and	  yet	  reaches	  ‘all	  quarters’	  of	  the	  earth.821	  Barhebraeus	  does	  not	  discount	   the	   inquiry	   into	  God	  as	   the	   ‘Cause	  of	  all’	  as	   inappropriate	  for	   thinking	   about	   the	   essential	   God,822	  but	   maintains	   that	   from	   metaphysics	   one	   must	  progress	  into	  a	  further	  stage,	  of	  what	  gives	  being.	  The	  giving	  of	  being	  is	  through	  the	  cause	  (Syr.	   ʿeltā;	   Gr.	   aitia)823	  of	   all,	   in	   which	   Barhebraeus	   follows	   the	   in	   tradition	   of	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  that	  the	  causation	  of	  all	   things	  is	  a	   ‘function’	  and	  not	  a	   ‘category’	  of	  God.824	  For	  Barhebraeus,	  being	  is	  given	  through	  the	  working	  of	  the	  spiritual	  dove	  to	  extend	  the	  divine	  goodness	   to	  all	   things.	  The	  divine	  Good	   is	   thus	  not	  dependent	  on	  being,	  nor	   is	   it	  beyond	  being,	  but	  gives	  itself	  without	  restriction	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  being	  through	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  	  	  	  
The	  Ontological	  Love	  of	  the	  Avicennan	  Tradition	  In	  his	  exposition	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  constantly	  draws	  on	  examples	  of	  human	  love.	  Since	   the	   love	   of	   God	   is	   present	   in	   existence,	   this	   love	   can	   only	   be	   sought	   through	   an	  understanding	  of	  the	  ‘subsistence’	  of	  the	  self	  in	  God.	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  asks,	  ‘How	  can	  a	  man	  love	  himself	   and	   not	   love	   his	   Lord	   through	   whom	   his	   very	   subsistence	   occurs?’825	  In	   his	  metaphysical	   understanding	   of	   the	   cosmos,	   all	   beings	   subsist	   through	   God,	   who	   is	   the	  principle	  of	  all	  existence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  819	  This	  development	  of	  self-­‐love	  to	   love	   for	  the	  necessary	  being	  may	  be	   inferred	  from	  Sentence	  73	  and	  the	  following	  sentences.	  Ibid.,	  74-­‐75,	  592*.	  820	  Ibid.,	  48.	  566*.	  	  821	  Ibid.,	  4,	  523*.	  The	  quotation	  given	  above	  from	  the	  Introduction	  continues	  thus:	   ‘She	  flies	  without	  leaving	  her	  nest	  above,	  the	  church	  of	  the	  firstborn	  in	  heaven.	  She	  reaches	  all	  quarters	  without	  stirring	  from	  her	  place.’	  	  822	  Becker	  notes	  that	  the	  Syriac	  phrase	  ‘Cause	  of	  all’	  was	  a	  ‘common	  appellation	  of	  God’	  in	  the	  scholastic	  cause	  genre	  from	  the	  mid-­‐sixth	  century,	  eg.	   the	  Cause	  of	  the	  Foundation	  of	  the	  Schools.	  Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  
Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  104.	  823	  Ibid.	   Becker	   suggests	   a	   Greek	   philosophical	   background	   to	   the	   cause	   genre	   that	   may	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  Neoplatonic	  commentaries	  on	  Aristotle.	  824	  Marion,	  God	  without	  Being	  :	  Hors-­‐Texte,	  75.	  825	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  24.	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In	  sum,	  nothing	  in	  existence	  possesses	  within	  itself	  the	  principle	  of	  its	  own	  existence	  except	  for	  the	  Self-­‐Subsistent	   One	   Himself	   (al-­‐Qayyūm),	   the	   Living	   One	   (al-­‐Hayy)	   who	   subsists	   through	   His	   own	   essence	  while	  everything	  but	  Him	  subsists	  through	  Him.826	  	  	  For	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  God	  loves	  himself	  since	  nothing	  is	  outside	  of	  His	  Essence,	  and	  all	  other	  being	  is	  borrowed	  from	  His	  being;	  God	  is	  the	  only	  truly	  Existent	  Being.827	  In	  his	   introduction	  to	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  book	  of	  love,	  Eric	  Ormsby	  comments	  that	  he	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  Ibn	  Sīnā’s	  notion	  expressed	   in	   the	  Shifāʾ,	   that	  God	   is	   ‘the	   lover	  of	  His	  own	  essence’.828	  Furthermore,	  Ormsby	  suggests	   that	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   insistence	  on	  God	   ‘as	   the	  only	   true	  beloved,	  beyond	  all	  appearances,	   rests	   in	  part	  on	   Ibn	  Sīnā’s	   characterisation	  of	  God	  as	   the	   ‘“first	  good	   that	   is	  loved”	   (al-­‐khayr	   al-­‐maʿshūq	   al-­‐awwal)’.829	  In	   his	   tenth	   chapter	   on	   ‘the	   Meaning	   of	   God’s	  Love	  for	  Man’,	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  does	  indeed	  affirm	  that	  since	  nothing	  exists	  apart	  from	  the	  divine	  essence	  and	  acts,	  then	  God	  only	  loves	  Himself.	  For	  God,	  in	  loving	  only	  his	  own	  essence	  and	  actions,	   ‘does	  not	  pass	  beyond	  his	  own	  essence	   in	  his	   love	  nor	   the	   consequences	   issuing	  from	  his	  essence,	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  stand	  in	  a	  nexus	  with	  his	  essence’.830	  Barhebraeus	  does	  not	   express	   these	   views	   in	   either	   the	  Dove	  or	   the	  Ethicon.	  Whilst	   the	   latter	  work	   closely	  follows	  the	  structure	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  book	  of	  love,	  there	  is	  no	  parallel	  to	  this	  tenth	  chapter	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī,	  which	  would	  suggest	  that	  Barhebraeus	  deliberately	  omitted	  to	  include	  it	   in	  his	  own	  work.	  Instead,	  he	  makes	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  eleventh	  chapter	  the	  subject	  of	  his	  tenth	  section,	  the	  distinctive	  marks	  of	  man’s	  love	  for	  God.	  As	  previously	  argued,	  despite	  his	  inclusion	  of	  metaphysics	  within	  his	  other	  works	  drawing	  on	  Avicennan	  philosophy,	  Barhebraeus	  takes	  a	  more	   critical	   stance	   towards	   Avicennan	  metaphysics	   in	   regards	   to	   its	   onto-­‐theological	  implications,	  than	  does	  al-­‐Ghazālī.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  Ethicon	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	   is	  not	   to	   disparage	   this	   kind	   of	   philosophy	   entirely,	   but	   to	   mediate	   between	   the	   onto-­‐theological	  conception	  of	  God	  and	  the	  typically	  anti-­‐scholastic	  stance	  of	  the	  mystics.	  	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  critiqued	  Ibn	  Sīnā,	  but	  was	  also	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  this	   tradition	  of	  Aristotelian	  philosophy,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  even	  in	  his	  later	  works	  that	  are	  subsequent	  to	  his	  account	  in	  al-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  826	  Ibid.	  827	  Ibid.,	  85.	  ‘Existence	  belongs	  only	  to	  the	  One,	  the	  True,	  by	  Whom	  all	  actions	  come	  to	  be’.	  	  828	  Ibid.,	  xxxvi.	  	  829	  Ibid.,	  xix.	  	  830	  Ibid.,	  101-­‐2.	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Munqidh	  min	  al-­‐ḍalāl	  (The	  Deliverer	  from	  Error)831	  of	  his	  supposed	  rejection	  of	  Peripatetic	  philosophy.832	  His	   understanding	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God	   was	   very	   much	   influenced	   by	   the	  insights	   that	   he	   gained	   through	   his	   inquiry	   into	   Avicennan	   metaphysics,	   which	   he	   had	  summarised	   in	   the	  Maqāṣid	   al-­‐falāsifa	   (The	   Intentions	   of	   the	   Philosophers),	   his	   work	   of	  philosophy	   based	   on	   Ibn	   Sīnā’s	  Dānishnāma-­‐yi	   ʿAlāʾī	   (The	  Book	  of	  Knowledge	   for	   ʿAlāʾ	   al-­‐
Dawlah).833 	  Even	   in	   his	   subsequent	   refutation	   of	   philosophy,	   Tahāfut	   al-­‐falāsifa	   (The	  
Precipitance	   of	   the	   Philosophers),	   when	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   summarises	   the	   notion	   of	   God	   as	   ‘the	  ultimate	   beloved’	   in	   the	   tradition	   of	   the	   falāsifa,	   Ormsby	   has	   proposed	   that	   this	   is	   ‘with	  apparent	  approval’	  rather	  than	  condemnation.834	  	  	  
The	  Ontology	  of	  the	  Gift	  of	  Love	  The	  metaphysical	  understanding	  of	  God	  as	  the	  necessary	  existent	  in	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  provides	  the	  basis	   for	  his	   ontology	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God	   as	   a	   gift	   through	   the	  divine	   goodness.	  When	  he	  extrapolates	   the	   five	   causes	   of	   love,	   al-­‐Ghazālī	   begins	  with	   self-­‐love,	   i.e.	   the	   love	   for	   the	  continuation	   of	   one’s	   own	   being,	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   the	   love	   of	   benefaction	   and	   the	  benefactor,	  which	  finds	  its	  ultimate	  completion	  in	  God	  as	  the	  perfect	  benefactor,	  who	  gives	  being	  to	  man	  without	  any	  consideration	  other	  than	  the	  giving	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  itself.	  The	  gift	  model	  for	  the	  love	  of	  God	  can	  thus	  be	  extrapolated	  from	  the	  first	  three	  causes	  of	  love:	  
• love	  for	  oneself	  
• love	  for	  one’s	  own	  benefactor	  	  
• love	  for	  the	  benefactor	  for	  his	  own	  sake	  (i.e.	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  benefaction	  in	  itself	  and	  not	  any	  personal	  benefaction	  that	  might	  be	  immediately	  derived).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  831	  Al-­‐Ghazālī's	  Path	  to	  Sufism	  and	  His	  Deliverance	  from	  Error	  :	  An	  Annotated	  Translation	  of	  Al-­‐Munqidh	  Min	  Al-­‐
Dalal,	  trans.	  Richard	  Joseph	  McCarthy	  (Louisville,	  KY:	  Fons	  Vitae,	  2000).	  	  832 	  Takahashi,	   "The	   Influence	   of	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	   Juridical,	   Theological	   and	   Philosophical	   Works	   of	  Barhebraeus,"	  20.	  For	  the	  influence	  of	  Avicennan	  philosophy	  even	  in	  his	  later	  works,	  see	  Alexander	  Treiger’s	  introduction	   to	   the	   recent	   scholarship	   on	   this	   issue:	   Alexander	   Treiger,	   Inspired	   Knowledge	   in	   Islamic	  
Thought	  :	  Al-­‐Ghazali's	  Theory	  of	  Mystical	  Cognition	  and	  Its	  Avicennian	  Foundation,	  Culture	  and	  Civilization	   in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (London	  ;	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  1-­‐4.	  Treiger’s	  translation	  of	  the	  titles	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  works	  has	  been	  preferred	  in	  the	  thesis,	  though	  in	  general	  these	  works	  have	  been	  cited	  in	  the	  Arabic.	  833	  Takahashi,	  "The	  Influence	  of	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  the	  Juridical,	  Theological	  and	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus,"	  12.	  834	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  xix.	  In	  Marmura’s	  edition,	  this	  occurs	  in	  Discussion	  5	  (34-­‐35).	  The	  Incoherence	  of	  the	  Philosophers	  =	  Tahāfut	  Al-­‐Falāsifah:	  A	  Parallel	  English-­‐Arabic	  Text,	  trans.	  Michael	  E.	  Marmura,	  Islamic	  Translation	  Series	  (Provo,	  Utah:	  Brigham	  Young	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  94-­‐95.	  
	   183	  
With	   the	   first	   cause	   of	   love,	   the	   gnostic	   begins	   with	   the	   love	   of	   himself,	   and	   then	   in	  recognition	  of	  the	  bestowal	  of	  his	  existence	  by	  God,	   ‘he	  perforce	  loves	  Him	  who	  accorded	  existence	  to	  him’.835	  According	  to	  the	  second	  cause	  of	  love,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  feel	  love	  for	  one’s	  benefactor;	  however	  ‘a	  gnostic	  must	  not	  love	  anyone	  but	  God	  inasmuch	  as	  goodness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  anyone	  but	  God	   is	  unthinkable’.836	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	   states	   that	  only	  God	  can	  be	   the	   true	  giver,	   since	   God	   himself	   is	   the	   perfection	   of	   all	   that	   is	   good,	   and	   alone	   deserving	   of	   the	  attribution	   of	   goodness.837	  The	   third	   cause	   of	   love,	   loving	   a	   benefactor	   for	   his	   own	   sake,	  also	  leads	  to	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  since	  God	  is	  the	  benefactor	  to	  all	  creatures	  by	  causing	  them	  to	  exist	  and	  further	  by	  perfecting	  and	  beautifying	  the	  forms	  of	  their	  existence.	  It	  is	  only	  God’s	  beneficence	   that	   gives	   to	   man	   through	   the	   creative	   act	   ‘beyond	   the	   realm	   of	   what	   is	  essential	  or	  even	  needed’;	   this	  divine	  beneficence	  gives	   itself	   in	   ‘loving-­‐kindness’	  without	  any	  distinction	  of	  being.838	  It	  may	  be	  concluded	  from	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  that	  only	  God	  loves	  without	  the	   requirement	   of	   a	   return	   or	   the	   seeking	   of	  mutual	   benefit.	   However,	   in	   following	   the	  Avicennan	  notion	   that	  God’s	   love	   is	  essentially	   for	  himself,	   the	  divine	  gift	  of	   life	  becomes	  restrained,	  since	   this	  giving	   loses	   the	  quality	  of	  giving	   to	  another,	  which	   is	  natural	   to	   the	  operation	   of	   love.	   Barhebraeus	   entirely	   avoids	   such	   implications	   coming	   from	   the	   onto-­‐theological	   concept	   of	   God	   as	   the	   necessary	   existent	   being.	   For	   this	   reason,	   he	   omits	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  argument	  for	  the	  third	  cause	  of	  love	  (the	  love	  for	  a	  benefactor	  for	  his	  own	  sake),	  in	  which	  love	  is	  deserved	  by	  God	  alone	  due	  to	  the	  necessary	  love	  of	  a	  being	  for	  its	  cause.839	  If	   God	   only	   truly	   loves	   Himself,	   and	   man’s	   love	   is	   a	   necessary	   one,	   then	   the	   gift-­‐model	  becomes	   restricted	   to	   the	  point	   that	   it	   ceases	   to	  operate.	  Love	  would	  not	   seem	   to	   follow	  from	   the	   necessary	   cause	   of	   existence,	   for	  what	   comes	   into	   being	   by	   necessity	   does	   not	  have	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  gift.	  	  	  Barhebraeus’	   appropriation	   of	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   five	   causes	   of	   love	   does	   reveal	   an	   ontology	   of	  God’s	   love	  based	  on	   the	   gift	  model,	   but	   it	   differs	   in	   certain	   respects,	   in	   keeping	  with	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  835	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment,	  24.	  836	  Ibid.,	  28.	  ‘Even	  if	  it	  is	  natural	  for	  us	  to	  love	  a	  benefactor,	  still	  a	  gnostic	  must	  not	  love	  anyone	  but	  God	  inasmuch	  as	  goodness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  anyone	  but	  God	  is	  unthinkable.	  God	  alone	  is	  worthy	  of	  this	  love.’	  837	  Ibid.	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  states	  further	  that	  ‘The	  words	  “generosity”	  or	  “goodness”	  are	  either	  mendacious	  or	  metaphorical	  with	  regard	  to	  anyone	  but	  God.’	  838	  Ibid.,	  29.	  839	  Ibid.	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modifications	  that	  he	  made	  to	  the	  five	  causes.	  In	  particular,	  Barhebraeus	  develops	  the	  fifth	  cause	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   which	   is	   the	   spiritual	   affinity	   between	   man	   and	   God.	   He	  understands	  the	  significance	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  fifth	  cause	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  man	  is	  the	  divine	  image.840	  The	  Spirit	  of	  God	  has	  given	  the	  form	  of	  man,	  for	  the	  Spirit	  gives	  life,	  as	  the	  dove	  who	  gives	  life	  to	  the	  living.841	  The	  soul	  or	  spirit	  of	  man	  is	  thus	  the	  divine	  image,	  and	  reveals	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  giver	  in	  the	  gift	  of	   life.	  This	  is	  instigated	  through	  love;	  the	   love	  of	  God	  provides	   the	   foundation	  of	   the	  gift,	   in	  which	   love	  gives	  being	   to	  mankind	  and	  form	  to	  the	  soul	  of	  man.	  Thus	  the	  soul	  or	  spirit	  of	  man	  reflects	  the	  divine	  image,	  and	  reveals	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  giver	  in	  the	  gift	  of	  life.	  While	  Barhebraeus	  refers	  to	  God	  as	  the	  Lord	  of	  all	  beings,842	  this	  title	   is	  not	  sufficiently	  adequate	  to	  express	  the	  divine	  presence	   in	  the	  world	  as	  the	  giving	  of	  the	  Spirit	  which	  pervades	  the	  earth.843	  Thus	  it	  is	  only	  in	  this	  giving,	  and	  not	  as	   the	  Being	  of	  beings,	   that	  God	  can	  be	  divined	   in	   the	   trace	  of	   the	  gift	  of	   love.844	  Marion	  describes	   the	  model	  of	   the	   gift	   that	   is	   expressed	   in	   love	   as	   the	   ‘charity’	   or	  agapē	  which	  gives	  being.845	  This	   gift	  model	   is	  defined	  by	  distance,	   and	   thus	   longing	  defines	   the	  existential	  state	  of	  man	  as	  the	  lover	  whose	  object	  of	  love,	  the	  divine	  beloved,	  is	  absent	  from	  being,	  but	  present	  in	  his	   imagination.	  The	  state	  of	   longing	  thus	  expresses	  the	  receiving	  of	  the	   gift	   of	   love	  which	   is	   inscribed	   in	   distance	   the	   divine	   is	   present	   in	   the	   love	  which	   is	  perceived	  in	  the	  longing	  of	  the	  imagination	  for	  the	  perfection	  of	  what	  it	  lacks.	  	  	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  states	  that	  longing	  depends	  on	  the	  remembrance	  of	  the	  image	  of	  the	  beloved	  in	  the	  heart	  of	   the	   lover,	  and	  thus	   for	  the	   lover	  whose	  beloved	  object	   is	  absent,	   ‘His	   longing	  denotes	  an	  inner	  yearning	  to	  perfect	  his	  imagination’.846	  In	  this	  transcendent	  aspect	  of	  love,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  840	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  48,	  566*.	  841	  See	  the	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  as	  quoted	  above.	  Ibid.,	  4,	  523*.	  842	  Barhebraeus	   states	   in	   the	   fourth	   section	   of	   the	   Ethicon,	   that	   ‘among	   all	   beings	   there	   is	   none	   more	  admirable	  and	  amazing,	  more	  exalted	  and	  wonderful,	  more	  complete	  and	  perfect	  than	  the	  Lord	  and	  the	  God	  of	  the	  beings’.	  Ibid.,	  92,	  481*.	  	  843	  Ibid.,	  4,	  523*.	  844	  Marion,	  God	  without	  Being	  :	  Hors-­‐Texte,	  105-­‐06.	  ‘The	  giving,	  in	  allowing	  to	  be	  divined	  how	  “it	  gives,”	  a	  giving,	  offers	  the	  only	  accessible	  trace	  of	  He	  who	  gives.’	  845	  Ibid.,	  102.	  ‘For	  the	  gift	  itself	  is	  liberated	  only	  in	  its	  exertion	  starting	  from	  and	  in	  the	  name	  of	  that	  which,	  greater	  than	  it,	  comes	  behind	  it,	  that	  which	  gives	  and	  expresses	  itself	  as	  gift,	  charity	  itself.	  Charity	  delivers	  Being/being.’	  846	  Al-­‐Ghazālī,	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   Love,	   Longing,	   Intimacy	   &	   Contentment,	   89.	   ‘So,	   for	   example,	   we	   say,	   “A	   man	  whose	  beloved	  is	  absent	  but	  in	  whose	  heart	  an	  image	  remains,	  longs	  to	  complete	  that	  image	  by	  direct	  sight.”	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the	  longing	  for	  completion	  and	  perfection	  of	  one’s	  being	  lies	  in	  the	  desire	  for	  the	  other.	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	   says	   that,	   ‘[e]very	  beloved	   in	  his	  concealment	  must	  become	  an	  object	  of	   longing’,	  and	  the	  love	  which	  cannot	  be	  attained	  becomes	  longing	  and	  affirms	  distance.	  847	  The	  lover	  seeks	   the	  beloved	  who	   is	  not	  possessed	  nor	   fully	   comprehended,	   and	   thus	   in	   the	   love	  of	  God,	  the	  mind	  yearns	  for	  the	  beloved	  who	  is	  veiled	  in	  mystery.848	  Barhebraeus	  follows	  the	  analogy	  provided	  by	  al-­‐Ghazālī	  between	  the	  corporeal	  longing	  of	  the	  lover	  for	  his	  beloved	  and	  that	  of	  the	  love	  of	  the	  Initiated	  for	  their	  Lord.	  The	  lover	  desires	  to	  complete	  the	  image	  of	  beauty	   that	  he	  has	   for	  his	  beloved,	  whose	   inward	  beauty	   is	  hidden	   from	  the	   lover;	   the	  desire	  to	  see	  this	  inward	  beauty	  fuels	  the	  longing	  of	  the	  lover.	  Thus,	  the	  beloved	  is	  present	  in	   the	   imagination,	   in	   the	   remembrance	   of	   the	   image	   of	   beauty.849 	  Barhebraeus	   has	  borrowed	   from	   al-­‐Ghazālī’s	   discussion	   of	   longing	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   the	   aspect	   of	  distance	   in	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   positive	   and	  necessary	   role	   of	   the	   faculties	   of	  imagination	  and	  memory	  in	  constructing	  the	  image	  of	  divine	  beauty	  as	  it	  reflects	  the	  form	  of	   the	  Good.	  Thus	   the	   Initiated	  must	  maintain	  a	   sense	  of	   this	   aesthetic	   awareness	  of	   ‘the	  heavenly	  gift’,	  and	  avoid	  being	  occupied	  with	  ‘earthly	  things’.850	  	  Barhebraeus’	   understanding	   of	   the	   gift	   of	   love	   corresponds	   to	   Marion’s	   gift	   model	   of	  ‘distance’,	   within	   which	   the	   two	   poles	   of	   this	   love,	   man	   and	   God,	   are	   ‘traversed’	   by	   the	  Spirit.851	  The	   love	   of	   God	   even	   as	   it	   is	   given,	   preserves	   this	   distance,	   in	   what	   Marion	  describes	  as	  ‘a	  ceaseless	  play	  of	  giving,	  where	  the	  terms	  are	  united	  all	  the	  more	  in	  that	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  But	  if	  his	  remembrance	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  image	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  loved	  one	  vanished	  from	  his	  mind,	  so	  that	  he	  forgot	  him,	  he	  could	  not	  conceive	  of	  longing	  for	  him.’	  847	  Ibid.,	  88.	  848	  Ibid.	  849	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	   99,	  487-­‐88*.	  ‘Among	  bodily	  friends	  the	  lover	  longs	  after	  his	  beloved	  in	  a	  twofold	  wise.	  When	  the	  beloved	  is	  absent	  and	  the	  image	  of	  his	  beauty	  is	  recollected,	  the	  lover	  desires	  to	  see	  him,	  that	  his	  joy	  may	  be	  complete	  by	  meeting	  the	  beloved.	   Or,	   when	   this	   beloved	   is	   near,	   but	   his	   face	   is	   only	   visible	   to	   his	   friend,	   while	   his	   other	   inward	  beauties,	  which	  are	  shown	  in	  intercourse,	  are	  hidden,	  the	  lover	  longs	  after	  being	  consoled	  also	  by	  the	  sight	  of	  what	  is	  hidden.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  the	  Initiated	  are	  necessarily	  acquainted	  with	  these	  two	  sorts	  of	   longing,	   in	  view	  of	  the	  love	  of	  their	  Lord.’	  850	  Ibid.,	  72,	  590*,	  Sentence	  61.	  ‘…And	  in	  the	  soul	  whose	  thought	  is	  directed	  towards	  earthly	  things,	  the	  heavenly	  gift	  will	  not	  endure.’	  851	  Marion,	  God	  without	  Being	  :	  Hors-­‐Texte,	  104.	  Marion	  maintains	  that	  in	  this	  distance	  model	  of	  giving,	  ‘Distance	  can	  be	  exchanged	  only	  in	  being	  traversed.’	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are	  never	  confused’.852	  Barhebraeus	  affirms	  the	  distance	  in	  the	  union	  of	  the	  mind	  with	  God	  even	  in	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  love.	  He	  quotes	  an	  anonymous	  Initiated	  on	  the	  image	  of	  iron	  in	  the	  fire	  of	  the	  furnace;	  this	  was	  an	  image	  typical	  of	  the	  Syrian	  mystics,	  thus	  ‘[t]he	  iron	  alone	  is	  not	  to	  be	  recognized	  there,	  because	  it	  has	  assumed	  the	  likeness	  of	  the	  fire,	  by	  their	  union.’	  However	   even	   in	   this	   likeness	   with	   God,	   whereby	   ‘you	   see	   not	   two	   images	   but	   one,	   no	  discrimination	  being	  possible’,	  he	  maintains	  that	  ‘the	  two	  substances	  remain	  separated’	  in	  the	   distance	   of	   the	   two	   terms	   in	   the	   love	   of	   God.853	  The	   love	   of	   God	   transforms	  man	   to	  become	   the	   image	  of	  God	   through	   the	  burning	   fire	  of	   love	  which	  gives	   to	   the	   Initiated,	   a	  beneficent	  love	  for	  the	  good	  of	  all	  things,	  ‘for	  then	  his	  mercy	  is	  poured	  out	  over	  all,	  like	  that	  of	  God’.854	  True	  giving	  is	  to	  give	  without	  thought	  of	  recompense,	  to	  give	  freely	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  gift-­‐giving,	  and	  therefore	  the	  Initiated	  when	  he	  is	  transformed	  into	  the	  likeness	  of	  God,	  pours	  out	   love	  without	  distinction	   in	  the	  merciful	   love	   for	  all	  creation.855	  To	   love	  without	  thought	  of	  return	  is	  thus	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  receiver	  of	  the	  gift,	  to	  imitate	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  gift	  of	  love	  freely	  given.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  852	  Ibid.,	  105.	  ‘Distance	  lays	  out	  the	  intimate	  gap	  between	  the	  giver	  and	  the	  gift,	  so	  that	  the	  self-­‐withdrawal	  of	  the	  giver	  in	  the	  gift	  may	  be	  read	  on	  the	  gift,	  in	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  it	  refers	  back	  absolutely	  to	  the	  giver.’	  853	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  116,	  506*.	  854	  Ibid.,	   116,	   505*.	   ‘Love	   makes	   the	   body	   and	   the	   senses	   silent;	   it	   elevates	   the	   mind	   to	   gaze	   on	   the	  inaccessible	  light	  of	  the	  Desired.	  Mercy	  dawns	  unto	  it	  and	  takes	  it	  to	  place	  without	  place,	  the	  world	  without	  denomination,	  the	  nature	  without	  beginning.	  	  And	  when	  the	  solitary	  reaches	  the	  Divine	  Cloud	  and	  enters	  the	  harbour	  of	  all	  service	  and	  sees	  with	  his	  mind,	  face	  to	  face,	  the	  glory	  of	  the	  Lord	  and	  is	  made	  radiant	  by	  it	  and	  is	  transformed	  into	  his	  likeness,	  then	  his	  mercy	  is	  poured	  out	  over	  all,	  like	  that	  of	  God,	  and	  the	  One	  beloved	  of	  all	   shows	  him	   love.’	  Brian	  Colless	  points	  out	   that	  both	   this	  quotation	  and	   the	   following	  one	  concerning	   the	  iron	  in	  the	  furnace	  -­‐	  which	  he	  numbers	  10	  and	  11	  in	  the	  twelve	  quotations	  that	  are	  contained	  in	  this	  section,	  ‘A	  Collection	  of	  Scattered	  Sayings	  concerning	  Love’	  -­‐	  are	  taken	  from	  John	  of	  Dalyatha’s	  Sermo	  26.	  Colless,	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  Bar	  Hebraeus,"	  170-­‐73.	  855	  The	  gift	  of	  the	  merciful	  heart	  is	  also	  an	  important	  notion	  for	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh.	  Sebastian	  Brock	  translates	  this	   passage	   from	  Discourse	   LLXIV:	   ‘And	  what	   is	   a	  merciful	   heart?	   He	   replied,	   ‘The	   heart’s	   burning	   for	   all	  creation,	  for	  human	  beings,	  for	  birds	  and	  animals,	  and	  for	  demons,	  and	  everything	  there	  is.	  At	  the	  recollection	  of	  them	  and	  at	  the	  sight	  of	  them	  his	  eyes	  gush	  forth	  with	  tears	  owing	  to	  the	  force	  which	  constrains	  his	  heart,	  so	  that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  abundant	  sense	  of	  mercy,	  the	  heart	  shrinks	  and	  cannot	  bear	  to	  hear	  or	  examine	  any	  harm	  or	  small	  suffering	  of	  anything	  in	  creation.’	  Brock,	  The	  Syriac	  Fathers	  on	  Prayer	  and	  the	  Spiritual	  Life,	  251.	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Chapter	  6:	  Syrian	  Hermeneutics	  and	  the	  Academic	  Study	  of	  Mysticism	  	  
Introduction: The Epistemological Impasse in the Academy 	  Barhebraeus	   was	   concerned	   with	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   conception	   of	   God,	   which	   he	  articulated	  according	  to	  the	  rival	  traditions	  amongst	  the	  Syrians.	  The	  study	  of	  religion	  and	  its	  subdivision,	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  have	  similarly	  inherited	  rival	  traditions	  of	  thinking	  about	   God.	   The	   classical	   scholars	   following	   Schleiermacher	   and	   Otto,	   have	   emphasised	  religious	   feeling	   and	   the	   intuitive	   sense	   of	   the	   numinous.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   critical	  scholars	  have	  been	   influenced	  by	   the	  empirical	   tradition,	   and	   rather	   than	   transcendental	  values,	  it	  is	  on	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  Timothy	  Fitzgerald	  insists,	  for	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  religion.856	  The	   critical	   school	   of	   modern	   religious	   studies	   has	   led	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	  metaphysical	  truth	  claims	  of	  religions	  according	  to	  empirical	  methods	  of	  inquiry,	  i.e.	  what	  can	  be	  empirically	  established	  by	  objective	  observation.857	  This	  attitude	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  study	   of	   mysticism	   by	   the	   wealth	   of	   academic	   literature	   on	   the	   empirical	   content	   of	  mystical	   experience,	   including	   research	   into	   the	  physiological	   and	  psychological	   states	  of	  mystical	  consciousness.858	  	  The	   classical	   scholars	   have	   assumed	   a	   single	   super-­‐sensory	   reality	   to	  which	   all	  mystical	  phenomena	  ultimately	  refer,	  and	  thus	  the	  mystical	  experience	  is	  referential	   in	  nature	  and	  descriptive	  of	  this	  ultimate	  reality.859	  The	  supposedly	  ‘common	  core’	  of	  mysticism,	  such	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  856	  Timothy	  Fitzgerald,	  The	  Ideology	  of	  Religious	  Studies	  (New	  York	  ;	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  47.	  Fitzgerald	  makes	  this	  argument	  here	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  classical	  approach	  to	  religion	  by	  W.	  C.	  Smith.	  857	  Flood,	  Beyond	  Phenomenology	  :	  Rethinking	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion,	  170-­‐75.	  Flood	  critiques	  this	  development	  in	   religious	   studies	   thus	   (p171):	   ‘The	   truth	   value	   of	   religious	   language	   that	   is	  metaphysical	   (and	   does	   not	  make	   empirical	   claims	   subjected	   to	   contradiction	   by	   strong	   counter-­‐evidence)	   cannot	   be	   recognized	   by	  criteria	  of	  truth	  brought	  in	  from	  another	  discourse,	  particularly	  a	  scientific	  one.’	  858	  Jonathan	   Shear,	   "On	   Mystical	   Experiences	   as	   Support	   for	   the	   Perennial	   Philosophy,"	   Journal	   of	   the	  
American	  Academy	  of	  Religion	  62,	  no.	  2	  (1994):	  328-­‐31.	  This	  kind	  of	  objective	  scientific	  research	  is	  outlined	  by	  Shear	  in	  his	  response	  to	  Bertrand	  Russell’s	  1961	  essay,	  “Critique	  of	  Mysticism”.	  859	  Waardenburg	   outlines	   the	   understanding	   of	   religion,	   including	   that	   of	   spirituality,	   held	   by	   the	   ‘classical	  scholars’	   of	   religion	   such	   as	   Rudolf	   Otto,	   Max	   Weber	   and	   Evelyn	   Underhill,	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	  academic	  study	  of	   religion	   from	  1850	   to	  1950;	  see	  particularly	   the	  section	  on	   ‘The	  Classical	  Scholars:	   their	  Virtues	   and	   Limitations’	   in	   his	   Preface.	   Waardenburg,	   Classical	   Approaches	   to	   the	   Study	   of	   Religion	   :	   Aims,	  
Methods,	  and	  Theories	  of	  Research,	  x-­‐xiv.	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Otto’s	  theory	  of	  the	  numinous	  where	  the	  mystical	  experience	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  sense	  of	   the	   ‘wholly	   other’,	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   this	   transcendental	   ideal.860	  The	   emphasis	   on	  religious	   feeling	   by	   Schleiermacher	   that	  was	   so	   influential	   for	   Otto,	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   an	  intuitive	  sense	  of	  God	  that	  contains	  its	  own	  non-­‐propositional	  claim	  to	  truth,	  even	  if	  such	  intuitions	  can,	  according	  to	  Otto,	   ‘neither	  be	  built	  into	  a	  system	  nor	  used	  as	  premisses	  for	  theoretical	   conclusions’.861 	  Schleiermacher	   formulated	   his	   theory	   of	   religion	   in	   direct	  response	   to	   the	   scientific	   rationalisation	   of	   religion,	   and	   thus	   the	   roots	   of	   the	   impasse	  within	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  lie	  in	  the	  field	  of	  religion.	  	  Richard	   King	   has	   identified	   the	   division	   in	   the	   approaches	   to	   the	   study	   of	  mysticism	   as	  forged	  between	   the	   supposition	  of	   a	   transcendent	   reality	   to	   all	  mystical	   experiences	   and	  the	   view	   that	   such	   experiences	   are	   bound	   to	   the	   cultures	   which	   construct	   them.	   The	  perennialist	   philosophy	   of	   mysticism,	   believes	   in	   what	   King	   calls	   the	   ‘Myth	   of	   the	  Transcendent	  Object’.	  This	  position	  extends	  the	  presupposition	  of	  a	  universal	  ontic	  reality	  by	   the	   classical	   scholars	   into	   the	   modern	   study	   of	   mysticism,	   with	   contemporary	  proponents	   such	   as	   Huston	   Smith. 862 	  A	   counter-­‐position	   is	   taken	   by	   those	   scholars	  following	  the	  constructivist	  approach,	  for	  whom	  mystical	  experience	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  context	  which	   is	   formative,	   and	   thus	   they	  depend	  on	   another	   ‘myth’,	   that	   of	   the	   isolated	  context:	  	   Perennialist	  philosophers	  postulate	  a	  common	  core	  –	  that	  is,	  some	  kind	  of	  transcendent	  reality	  or	  truth	  that	  underlies	  the	  diversity	  of	  mystical	  accounts.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  Katzian	  constructivism	  is	  grounded	  in	  a	  form	  of	  cultural	  isolationism	  or	  the	  ‘Myth	  of	  the	  Isolated	  Context’.	  On	  this	  view	  all	  mystical	  experiences	  are	  fundamentally	  culturally	  bound,	  rendering	  the	  establishment	  of	  cross-­‐cultural	  similarities	  inherently	  problematic.863	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  Otto,	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Non-­‐Rational	  Factor	  in	  the	  Idea	  of	  the	  Divine	  and	  Its	  Relation	  
to	  the	  Rational,	  25-­‐30.	  861	  Otto	  discusses	  Schleiermacher’s	  idea	  of	  the	  mind’s	  capability	  for	   ‘intuitions’	  and	  ‘feelings’	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  faculty	  of	   ‘divination’,	  whereby	   ‘Their	   import	   is	   the	  glimpse	  of	  an	  Eternal,	   in	  and	  beyond	   the	   temporal	  and	  penetrating	   it,	   the	   apprehension	   of	   a	   ground	   and	   meaning	   of	   things	   in	   and	   beyond	   the	   empirical	   and	  transcending	  it.’.	  Ibid.,	  146-­‐47.	  862	  For	   example,	   Huston	   Smith,	   "Is	   There	   a	   Perennial	   Philosophy?,"	   Journal	   of	   the	   American	   Academy	   of	  
Religion	  55,	  no.	  3	  (1987).	  863	  King,	  Orientalism	  and	  Religion	  :	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Theory,	  India	  and	  the	  Mystic	  East,	  183.	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The	  current	   impasse	   in	   the	  academic	   study	  of	  mysticism	   is	  between	  a	  naive	  essentialism	  that	  would	  pose	  universal	  transcendent	  objects	  for	  mysticism	  and	  a	  cultural	  relativism	  that	  would	   concentrate	   on	   the	   social	   contingency	   of	   the	   mystic’s	   experience,	   which	   is	   the	  emphasis	  promulgated	  by	  Katz.864	  These	  are,	  of	  course,	  the	  extreme	  positions	  in	  the	  study	  of	   mysticism.	   There	   are	   scholars	   who	   have	   espoused	  more	   nuanced	   positions,	   but	   even	  these	  can	  be	  broadly	  categorised	  as	  assuming	  either	  a	  universal	  reality	  (be	  it	  consciousness	  or	   transcendent	   object)	   or	   a	   socio-­‐linguistic	   context,	   as	   formative	   for	   the	   mystical	  experience.	  	  For	   Katz	   and	   the	   other	   contributors	   to	   his	   volumes	   on	   mysticism,	   the	   cultural	   context	  constructs	  the	  mystical	  experience,	  following	  the	  theorisation	  of	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  all	   knowledge	  put	   forward	   in	   the	   field	  of	   sociology	  by	   scholars	   such	  as	  Peter	  Berger	  and	  Thomas	   Luckmann. 865 	  This	   approach	   may	   also	   be	   called	   ‘perceptual	   relativism’,	   as	  classified	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  edited	  volume	  Rationality	  and	  Relativism,	  in	  contrast	  to	  moral	  or	   conceptual	   relativism.866	  Perceptual	   relativism	  has	   two	  related	  strands,	   the	   first	  being	   that	   ‘what	  we	  perceive	   cannot	  be	  perceived	  by	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  object	  perceived’,	  and	  the	  second	  being	  the	  more	  specific	  claim	  that	   ‘language	  in	  some	  sense	  determines	  or	  constitute	  what	   is	  perceived’.867	  Peter	  Winch	  in	  The	  Idea	  of	  a	  Social	  Science	  expresses	  this	  kind	  of	  relativism	  in	  his	  statement	  that	  ‘Our	  idea	  of	  what	  belongs	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  reality	  is	  given	  for	  us	  in	  the	  language	  that	  we	  use.’868	  Barry	  Barnes	  and	  David	  Bloor	  have	  argued	  in	  their	   article,	   “Relativism,	   Rationalism,	   Sociology	   of	   Knowledge”,	   that	   there	   is	   no	   core	   of	  concepts	   which	   depend	   upon	   a	   form	   of	   reasoning	   that	   is	   not	   conditioned	   by	   culturally	  specific	  conventions:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  864	  Katz,	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  26.	  865	  King,	   Orientalism	   and	   Religion	   :	   Post-­‐Colonial	   Theory,	   India	   and	   the	   Mystic	   East,	   169-­‐70.	   This	   point	   is	  discussed	  in	  my	  chapter	  on	  the	  Hermeneutics	  of	  Mysticism.	  866	  Martin	  Hollis	  and	  Steven	  Lukes,	  Rationality	  and	  Relativism	  (Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  1982),	  5-­‐9.	  867	  Ibid.,	  8.	  868	  Winch,	  The	  Idea	  of	  a	  Social	  Science,	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Philosophy,	  15.	   ‘The	  concepts	  we	  have	  settle	   for	  us	  the	  form	  of	  the	  experience	  we	  have	  of	  the	  world.’	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There	  are	  no	  privileged	  occasions	  for	  the	  use	  of	  terms	  –	  no	  ‘simple	  perceptual	  situations’	  –	  which	  provide	  the	  researcher	  with	  ‘standard	  meanings’	  uncomplicated	  by	  cultural	  variables.869	  	  The	   volumes	   edited	   by	   Katz,	   broadly	   approach	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism	   from	   this	  perceptual	   relativism,	   generally	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   secondary	   literature	   as	  ‘constructivism’.870	  In	   the	  1970’s	   and	  1980’s	  Katzian	   constructivism	  appeared	   to	  be	   the	  dominant	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  due	  to	  the	  publication	  of	  two	  monographs:	  
Mysticism	  and	  Philosophical	  Analysis	   (1978),	  and	  then	  Mysticism	  and	  Religious	  Traditions	  (1983).871	  	  Robert	  Forman,	   a	   staunch	   critic	  of	  Katz’s	   approach,	   edited	  a	   rival	   volume	  of	  articles	   published	  The	  Problem	  of	  Pure	  Consciousness	  (1990)	  which	   took	   a	   substantially	  ‘destructive’	   approach	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   epistemology	   assumed	   as	   normative	   by	   scholars	  including	   Steven	   Katz,	   Kenneth	   Moore,	   Hans	   Penner	   and	   Wayne	   Proudfoot.872	  Donald	  Rothberg	   has	   located	   the	   epistemological	   position	   of	   these	   scholars	   broadly	  within	   the	  Western	  tradition	  of	  ‘post-­‐Kantian	  epistemology’,	  scholars	  for	  whom	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  mediation	  of	  all	  experience	  is	  foundational	  to	  their	  epistemological	  model	  for	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism.873	  Rothberg	  thus	  has	  stated:	  	   Katz’s	   constructivist	   approach	   to	   mystical	   traditions	   seems	   to	   come	   closest	   to	   a	   combination	   of	  naturalism	  and	  especially	  to	  what	  I	  have	  called	  contextualist	  interpretative	  theory.874	  	  For	  Rothberg,	  the	  naturalistic	  approach	  is	  one	  that	  seeks	  causal	  explanation,	  and	  this	  kind	  of	  inquiry	  ‘aims	  at	  empirical	  explanation’.	  875	  The	  contextualists,	  also	  identified	  by	  Rothberg	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  869	  Barry	  Barnes	   and	  David	  Bloor,	   "Relativism,	  Rationalism	  and	   the	   Sociology	  of	  Knowledge,"	   in	  Rationality	  
and	  Relativism,	  ed.	  Martin	  Hollis	  and	  Steven	  Lukes	  (Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  1982),	  39.	  870	  See	  Forman’s	  introduction	  to	  this	  volume.	  Robert	  K.	  C.	  Forman,	  "Introduction:	  Mysticism,	  Constructivism,	  and	   Forgetting,"	   in	  The	  Problem	  of	   Pure	  Consciousness	   :	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	   ed.	   Robert	   K.	   C.	   Forman	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  3.	  871	  Katz	  has	  proceeded	  with	  two	  more	  recent	  volumes	  of	  articles	  on	  mysticism.	  Steven	  T.	  Katz,	  Mysticism	  and	  
Language	  (New	  York,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  1992).	  Mysticism	  and	  Sacred	  Scripture	  (Oxford	  England	  ;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  872	  Forman	   outlines	   the	   approach	   of	   this	   collected	   volume	  The	  Problem	  of	  Pure	  Consciousness	   in	   his	   article.	  Robert	   K.	   C.	   Forman,	   "Mystical	   Knowledge:	   Knowledge	   by	   Identity,"	   Journal	   of	   the	   American	   Academy	   of	  
Religion	  61,	  no.	  4	  (1993):	  708.	  	  873	  Donald	   Rothberg,	   "Contemporary	   Epistemology	   and	   the	   Study	   of	   Mysticism,"	   in	   The	   Problem	   of	   Pure	  
Consciousness	  :	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	  ed.	  Robert	  K.	  C.	  Forman	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  174.	  874	  Ibid.,	  178.	  875	  Ibid.,	  176.	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as	  ‘cultural	  relativists’,	  are	  divided	  from	  the	  universalists,	  in	  their	  insistence	  that	  ‘there	  are	  no	   fixed	  meanings	  or	   rules	   “out	   there”	  or	  embedded	  “in	  here”	   in	   the	  subject’.876	  Amongst	  the	  most	   influential	   theorists	  of	   interpretive	   inquiry	  for	  the	  contextualists,	  Rothberg	  cites	  the	  claim	  by	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	   ‘that	  there	  is	  no	  neutral	  epistemological	  vantage	  point’,	  alongside	  the	  approaches	  of	  Peter	  Winch,	  Gadamer,	  Richard	  Rorty	  and	  Jacques	  Derrida.877	  However,	   for	   the	   constructivist	   position	   in	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism,	   the	   emphasis	   of	  Wittgenstein	   on	   language	   games	   and	   of	   Winch	   on	   local	   standards	   of	   rationality,	   would	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  more	  dominant	  influences.	  Gadamer’s	  model	  of	  dialogical	  hermeneutics	  as	  interpretive	  inquiry	  does	  not	  actually	  belong	  to	  cultural	  relativism,	  but	  rather	  can	  be	  used	  to	  resolve	  the	  epistemological	  impasse	  with	  the	  universalism	  or	  essentialism	  in	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism.	   The	   dialogical	   model	   of	   inquiry	   would	   allow	   mystical	   traditions	   to	   inform	  epistemological	  assumptions,	  essentialist	  and	  constructivist,	   instead	  of	  approaching	  these	  traditions	  as	  simply	  the	  data	  for	  academic	  study.	  	  	  
Epistemology	  and	  the	  Intentionality	  of	  Consciousness	  In	   contrast	   to	   Syrian	   epistemology,	   when	   the	   modern	   study	   of	   mysticism	   affirms	   the	  intentionality	  of	  consciousness	  as	  ‘consciousness	  of’	  something,	  it	  does	  not	  posit	  ‘God’	  or	  an	  equivalent	   concept	   like	   ‘the	   supernatural’	   as	   the	   object	   of	   mystical	   consciousness,	   but	  instead	  an	  experiential	  state	  takes	  the	  place	  of	  the	  transcendental.	  The	  consciousness	  of	  the	  mystic	  or	  the	  mystical	  consciousness	  is	  reduced	  either	  to	  the	  culturally	  conditioned	  beliefs	  of	   the	  mystic	  or	   to	   the	  purely	  phenomenological	  characterisation	  of	   the	  experience	   itself,	  principally	  the	  pure	  consciousness	  of	  ‘forgetting’.	  The	  consequence	  of	  this	  epistemological	  focus	   on	   the	   mystical	   experience,	   has	   overshadowed	   the	   inquiry	   into	   the	   mystics’	  ontological	  understanding	  of	  God.	  Therefore	  when	   the	  mystical	  experience	   is	  understood	  as	   either	   the	   ‘deconditioning’	   or	   the	   ‘reconditioning’	   of	   consciousness,	   the	   academic	  literature	  has	  apparently	  little	  to	  say	  about	  the	  intentional	  object	  of	  these	  processes,	  except	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  876	  Ibid.,	  177.	  877	  Ibid.	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in	   terms	   of	   the	   characterisation	   of	   the	   consciousness	   itself,	   the	   deconditioned	   ‘pure	  consciousness’	  or	  a	  form	  of	  ‘conditioned-­‐contextual	  consciousness’.878	  	  	  The	   perennial	   philosophy	   uses	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   common	   core	   of	   mystical	   experience	   as	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  divine	  order	  of	  being.879	  However,	  the	  critical	  scholars	  have	  distanced	   themselves	   from	  such	  metaphysical	   speculation,	   and	   in	   the	   study	  of	  mysticism	  Katz	  has	  asserted	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  his	  new	  contextual	  approach	  has	  been	  specifically	  not	  to	  ‘begin	  with	  a	  priori	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  ultimate	  reality’.880	  Wayne	  Proudfoot	  argues	   that	   the	   intuition	   emphasised	   by	   Otto	   and	   Schleiermacher,	   presupposes	   the	  intentionality	  of	  the	  mind	  towards	  an	  object	  of	  consciousness	  and	  is	  based	  on	  the	  equation	  of	   intuition	  with	  religious	  feeling	  that	  would	  have	  the	   immediacy	  that	   is	   ‘characteristic	  of	  sensations’. 881 	  Since	   sensations	   are	   subject	   to	   the	   doctrine	   of	   intentionality,	  Schleiermacher’s	   emphasis	   on	   the	   feeling	   of	   absolute	   dependence	   cannot	   escape	   the	  subject-­‐object	  problem.	  Schleiermacher’s	  religious	  ‘feeling	  of’	  requires	  an	  intentional	  object	  for	   its	   state	   of	   dependence	   and	   thus	   in	   his	   formulation,	   ‘that	   object	   is	   given	   by	   the	  prepositional	   object	   used	   to	   specify	   the	   state’. 882 	  Schleiermacher’s	   understanding	   of	  religion	  is	  thus	  not	  theoretically	  consistent	  in	  Proudfoot’s	  reading,	  though	  it	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	   resolve	   the	   subject-­‐object	   problem	   in	   the	   conception	   of	   God.	   In	   their	   article	   on	   the	  critical	   term	   ‘God’	   in	   religious	   studies,	   Schüssler	  Fiorenza	  and	  Kaufman	  show	  how	   in	   the	  Western	  turn	  to	  subjectivity,	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  became	  ‘restricted	  to	  subjectivity’,	  with	  the	   ‘idea	   of	   the	   infinite’	   grounded	   in	   the	   reasoning	   subject	   by	  Descartes	   (1596-­‐1650CE),	  and	   with	   religion	   a	   ‘pious	   subjectivity’	   located	   in	   inner	   feeling	   by	   Schleiermacher	   as	   a	  response	  to	  Enlightenment	  rationality.883	  This	  is	  partly	  why	  Schleiermacher’s	  approach	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  878	  Katz	   argues	   for	   the	   latter	   position.	   Katz,	   "Language,	   Epistemology,	   and	   Mysticism,"	   57.	   For	   it	   is	   in	  appearance	   only	   that	   such	   activities	   as	   yoga	   produce	   the	   desired	   state	   of	   'pure'	   consciousness.	   Properly	  understood,	  yoga,	  for	  example,	  is	  not	  an	  unconditioning	  or	  deconditioning	  of	  consciousness,	  but	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  
reconditioning	   of	   consciousness,	   i.e.	   a	   substituting	   of	   one	   form	   of	   conditioned	   and/or	   contextual	  consciousness	   for	   another,	   albeit	   a	   new,	   unusual,	   and	   perhaps	   altogether	   more	   interesting	   form	   of	  conditioned-­‐contextual	  consciousness.’	  879	  Forman,	  "Introduction:	  Mysticism,	  Constructivism,	  and	  Forgetting,"	  3-­‐5.	  880	  Katz,	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  66.	  881	  Proudfoot,	  Religious	  Experience,	  11.	  882	  Ibid.,	  33.	  883	  Francis	  Schüssler	  Fiorenza	  and	  Gordon	  D.	  Kaufman,	  "God,"	  in	  Critical	  Terms	  for	  Religious	  Studies,	  ed.	  Mark	  C.	  Taylor	  (Chicago	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1998),	  146.	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religion	   has	   proved	   so	   influential	   to	   the	   classical	   scholars	   of	   mysticism,	   for	   whom	   the	  mystical	  experience	  provides	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  a	  phenomenon	  which	  overcomes	  the	   rationalisation	   of	   religion	   in	   modernity,884	  and	   similarly	   for	   the	   constructivists,	   this	  focus	  on	  subjectivity	  is	  maintained	  in	  the	  emphasis	  on	  mystical	  consciousness.	  	  Rothberg	   shows	   that	   scholars	   such	   as	   Proudfoot	   and	   Katz	   have	   assumed	   objective	  neutrality	   in	   their	   epistemological	   approach,	   which	   in	   fact	   depends	   on	   the	   history	   of	  modern	  Western	  epistemology	  and	  thus	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  Western	  context.	  Rothberg	  argues	  that	  it	   follows	  from	  the	  approach	  of	  these	  scholars,	  that	  through	  an	  understanding	  of	   ‘the	  inescapability	  of	  context	  and	  the	  mediated	  nature	  of	  all	  experiences’,	  we	  are	  provided	  with	  ‘a	   more	   “objective”	   way	   to	   understand	   mysticism’.885	  However,	   such	   an	   epistemology	   is	  specifically	   derived	   from	   the	   post-­‐Kantian	   tradition	   and	   this	   understanding	   of	   mystical	  consciousness	   is	   developed	   from	   the	   theory	   of	   intentionality	   in	   the	   phenomenology	   of	  Husserl	  and	  Brentano.	  It	  is	  to	  Franz	  Brentano’s	  theory	  of	  ‘intentional	  inexistence’	  that	  Katz	  refers	  when	   he	   affirms	   ‘that	   linguistic	   intentionality	   does	   not	   generate	   or	   guarantee	   the	  existence	  of	   the	   'intentional	  object’,’	   and	   thus	   for	  Katz,	   the	   intentional	  objects	  of	  mystical	  consciousness	   are	   not	   assured	   an	   ontological	   category	   of	   existence. 886 	  Katz	   further	  concludes	  that	  intentional	  language	  is	  formative	  for	  the	  acts	  of	  consciousness,	  	  	   …	  but	  we	  must	  also	  recognize	  the	  epistemologically	  formative	  character	  of	  intentional	  language	  mirroring	  as	   it	   does	   intentional	   acts	   of	   consciousness.	   Using	   the	   language	   modem	   phenomenologists	   favour	   we	  might	   say	   that	   'intentionality'	   means	   to	   describe	   a	   'datum	   as	   meant',	   i.e.	   to	   be	   aware	   that	   an	   action	  includes	  a	  reach	  for	  some	  specific	  meaning	  or	  meaningful	  content.887	  	  In	  this	  manner,	  Katz	  is	  content	  to	  focus	  on	   ‘the	  epistemologically	  formative	  character	  of	  intentional	   language’,	   rather	   than	   the	   referential	   objects	   within	   the	   language	   of	   the	  mystics,	   and	   the	   meaning	   of	   this	   data	   is	   always	   subsumed	   to	   circumstances	   of	   the	  intentional	   experience,	   rather	   than	   the	   meaning	   that	   is	   expressed	   in	   language.	   This	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  884	  This	   is	   for	  example,	   the	  complaint	  of	  William	   James	   in	  his	   lecture	  on	  philosophy.	   James,	  The	  Varieties	  of	  
Religious	  Experience	  :	  A	  Study	  in	  Human	  Nature,	  431.	  	  885	  Rothberg,	  "Contemporary	  Epistemology	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  Mysticism,"	  170.	  886	  Katz,	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  63.	  887	  Ibid.	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becomes	   problematic	  when,	   as	   his	   critics	   like	   Forman	   and	  Rothberg	   point	   out,	  mystics	  often	  specifically	  claim	  to	  possess	  a	  type	  of	  knowledge	  that	  is	  not	  structured	  according	  to	  Western	   epistemology	   in	   its	   post-­‐Kantian	   vein.	   For	   example,	   Rothberg	   accuses	   Katz	   of	  instituting	   a	   “hermeneutics	   of	   suspicion”,	   against	  mystical	   traditions	  which	   espouse	   an	  epistemology	   which	   conflicts	   with	   the	   one	   to	   which	   he	   adheres.888	  For	   Rothberg	   the	  constructivist	   epistemology	   of	   mysticism	   ‘flounders	   in	   the	   aporia	   created	   by	   affirming	  that	   all	   viewpoints	   are	   situated	   and	   mediated	   while	   implicitly	   affirming	   that	   his	   own	  approach	   is	  an	  exception’.889	  However,	   the	  theory	  of	  pure	  consciousness,	  does	  not	  solve	  this	   aporia	   posed	   by	   cultural	   relativism,	   and	   instead	   reaffirms	   the	   epistemological	  impasse	   by	   adopting	   an	   essentialist	   view	   of	   the	   mystical	   experience	   against	   the	  constructivists.	  	  In	  order	  to	  overcome	  this	  impasse,	  it	   is	  necessary	  to	  inquire	  into	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  both	   positions	   in	   the	   argument	   over	   the	   intentionality	   of	   mystical	   consciousness.	   The	  exclusive	  focus	  of	  this	  debate	  is	  on	  the	  subjective	  nature	  of	  the	  mystical	  experience,	  and	  the	   kind	   of	   epistemology	   appropriate	   to	   the	   task	   of	   interpretation,	   and	   the	   objective	  content	  of	  mystical	  claims	  have	  tended	  to	  be	  overlooked.	  However,	  both	  the	  objective	  and	  the	  subjective	   features	   form	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   the	  mystical	  phenomenon,	  as	  Frits	  Staal	  points	   out,	   and	   thus	   while	   ‘mystical	   doctrines	   purport	   to	   deal	   with	   objective	   reality,	  mystical	  experiences	  have	  a	  subjective	  quality’.890	  For	  Staal,	  there	  are	  two	  aspects	  then	  to	  the	  investigation	  into	  mystical	  claims,	  both	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  experiencing	  subject	  and	  to	  an	  order	  of	  ontological	  reality.891	  Katz	  does	  state	  explicitly	  that	  the	  objects	  of	  mystical	  experience	   as	   they	   are	   described	   are	   not	   ‘arbitrary	   labels	   of	   some	  underlying	   common	  reality’,	   but	   rather	   they	   ‘carry	   a	   meaning	   relative	   to	   some	   ontological	   structure’.892	  However,	  Katz	  still	  manages	  to	  essentialise	  the	  mystical	  claims	  about	  objective	  reality	  and	  its	  ontological	  structure	  according	  to	  his	  universal	  theory	  of	  consciousness.	  On	  the	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  888	  Rothberg,	  "Contemporary	  Epistemology	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  Mysticism,"	  180.	  889	  Ibid.,	  182.	  890	  Staal,	  Exploring	  Mysticism	  :	  A	  Methodological	  Essay,	  57.	  891	  Staal	   clarifies	   his	   own	   use	   of	   the	   terms	   subjective	   and	   objective	   in	   his	   methodological	   essay,	   that	   is:	  ‘“subjective”	   in	   the	   sense	  of	   “relating	   to	   the	   subject,”	  which	   is	   complemented	  by	   “objective”	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  “relating	  to	  the	  object.”.’	  ibid.	  892	  Katz,	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  56.	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hand,	   the	   approaches	   of	   the	   perennialist	   and	   classical	   scholars	   tend	   to	   pose	   universal	  frameworks	  for	  the	  objects	  of	  mystical	  experience	  in	  a	  way	  which	  is	  similarly	  based	  on	  an	  essentialist	  understanding	  of	  mystical	  subjectivity	  as	  a	  sense	  of	  something	  other.	  Neither	  approach	  appreciates	  that	  their	  near-­‐exclusive	  concern	  with	  the	  epistemology	  of	  how	  the	  mind	   knows	   its	   object	   of	   consciousness,	   assumes	   a	   subject-­‐object	   structure	   to	   the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  that	  is	  universal	  across	  religious	  traditions,	  when	  in	  fact	  it	  belongs	  to	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  philosophy.	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  the	  background	  to	  this	  legacy	  of	  thinking	  about	  God	  for	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  will	  be	  further	  considered	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possibilities	  for	  its	  revision,	  in	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Syrian	  mystics.	  	  
The Problem of ‘God’ in the Study of Mystical Experience 	  Religious	   traditions	  presuppose	  an	  object,	  an	  object	  called	   ‘God’	   in	   the	  academic	  study	  of	  religion;	   but	   this	   relies	   on	   the	   epistemology	   of	   a	   subject-­‐object	   distinction	   between	  man	  and	   God,	   a	   distinction	   which	   necessitates	   the	   objectification	   of	   ‘God’	   and	   provides	   the	  connection	  between	  epistemology	  and	  ontology.	  The	  notion	  of	  God	  as	  a	  radically	  different	  object	   is	   implicit	   in	   the	   academic	   study	   of	   mysticism,	   which	   has	   tended	   to	   impose	   this	  subject-­‐object	   distinction	   on	   the	   traditions	   that	   it	   studies.	   Therefore	   a	   more	   reflective	  approach	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  God	  will	  inform	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  leading	  to	  the	  substantive	  issue	  of	  how	  God	  is	  to	  be	  studied,	  and	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  two	  standard	  ontological	  models	  suggested	   by	   academics	   as	   a	   framework	   for	  mysticism,	   the	   theistic	   and	   the	  monistic.	   In	  studying	  the	  Syrian	  mystical	  tradition,	  it	  may	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  true	  knowledge	   of	   God	   was	   subject	   to	   similar	   tensions	   according	   to	   the	   rival	   epistemologies	  inherited	  from	  the	  Greeks.	  The	  conclusions	  reached	  by	  Barhebraeus	  also	  offer	  substantive	  insights	  into	  how	  mystical	  traditions	  respond	  to	  the	  objectification	  of	  God	  as	  the	  concept.	  	  
The	  Subject-­‐Object	  Distinction	  in	  the	  Epistemology	  of	  Mystical	  Experience	  	  The	   substantive	   issue	   of	   how	   the	   nature	   of	   God	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   the	   mystical	  experience	  has	  been	  largely	  absent	  from	  discussions	  of	  mysticism	  in	  the	  Western	  academy,	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partly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   relativist	   criticism	   of	   the	   metaphysical	   presuppositions	   of	   the	  classical	  scholars	  in	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism.	  The	  classical	  approach	  to	  mysticism	  has	  been	  substantially	  critiqued	  both	  within	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  and	  also	  more	  broadly	  within	  the	  study	  of	  religion	  by	  the	  critical	  school.	  Fitzgerald	  has	   for	  example	  dismissed	  scholars	   like	  Smart	  who	  in	  continuing	  the	  approach	  of	  Schleiermacher	  and	  Otto,	  conduct	  the	  agenda	  of	  ecumenical	   liberal	   theology	   for	   religious	   studies.893 	  However,	   Smart’s	   approach	   does	  attempt	  to	  develop	  the	  classical	  scholars’	  contribution	  in	  a	  more	  nuanced	  direction,	  rather	  than	   rejecting	   their	   work	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   its	   theological	   bias.	   The	   so-­‐called	   ecumenical	  liberal	   theology	  of	   the	   classical	   scholars	   is	   apparent	   in	   the	  metaphysical	   presuppositions	  imposed	   on	   their	   material,	   along	   with	   the	   tendency	   to	   universalise	   traditions	   that	   have	  become	   homogenised	   when	   displaced	   from	   their	   context	   and	   reformulated	   within	   the	  prejudices	  of	  the	  Western	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism.894	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  subsequent	  trends	  in	  this	  discipline	  have	  offered	  similarly	  constrictive	  frameworks	  according	  to	  their	  Western	   epistemological	   background;	   in	   avoiding	   metaphysical	   questions	   they	   have	  projected	   on	   their	   data	   materialist	   or	   naturalistic	   viewpoints,	   which	   contain	   their	   own	  metaphysical	  presuppositions.	  	  The	   classical	   scholars	   typically	   presumed	   a	   theistic	   understanding	   of	   mysticism;	   Otto’s	  theology	   of	   the	   ‘numen’	   is	   the	   basis	   for	   his	   understanding	   of	   mysticism,	   with	   mystics	  possessing	  in	  the	  numinous	  consciousness,	  a	  feeling	  of	  the	  ‘wholly	  other’	  which	  is	  beyond	  ordinary	   experience	   and	   ‘Being’.895	  Zaehner	   and	   Stace	   developed	   the	   classical	   models,	  seeking	   to	  diversify	   the	   theistic	  understanding	  of	   the	  mystical	  experience,	   inherited	   from	  Schleiermacher	  and	  his	  sense	  of	  absolute	  dependence	  (on	  God).	  Smart	  adapted	  Zaehner’s	  theistic	   and	   monistic	   positions	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   numinous	  experience	  of	  a	  sacred	  other,	  and	  the	  attainment	  of	  an	  inner	  state	  of	  mystical	  subjectivity,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  893	  Fitzgerald,	  The	  Ideology	  of	  Religious	  Studies,	  7.	  894	  Flood,	  Beyond	  Phenomenology	  :	  Rethinking	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion,	  172.	  Flood	  asserts	   that	   for	  academics	   to	  make	   universalist	   assumptions	   about	   the	   metaphysical	   reality	   of	   nibbāna	   or	   theosis,	   ‘from	   an	   external,	  supposedly	   epistemically	   neutral	   standpoint,	   is	   in	   fact	   to	   recontextualise	   the	   concepts	   within	   another	  framework	  with	  its	  own	  rules	  of	  coherence’.	  895	  Otto,	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Non-­‐Rational	  Factor	  in	  the	  Idea	  of	  the	  Divine	  and	  Its	  Relation	  
to	  the	  Rational,	  29.	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state	   which	   was	   not	   unlike	   Zaehner’s	   ‘panenhenic’	   experience.896	  However,	   in	   Stace’s	  understanding	   of	   mysticism	   there	   is	   a	   narrowing	   of	   focus	   on	   the	   subjectivity	   of	   the	  experiencing	  self;	  such	  an	  emphasis	  that	  might	  be	  understood	  according	  to	  what	  Katz	  calls	  ‘Stace’s	   own	   monistic,	   introvertive	   bias’.897	  Moreover,	   Stace’s	   notion	   of	   the	   introvertive	  mystical	  experience	  as	  one	  of	  unitary	  or	  ‘pure’	  consciousness,	  without	  empirical	  content,898	  has	  become	   influential	   for	   contemporary	   scholars	   seeking	  a	  universal	   trait	   for	  mysticism	  that	  would	  counter	  the	  excessive	  relativizing	  of	  mystical	  traditions	  by	  the	  constructivists.	  	  	  Forman	  has	  led	  a	  concerted	  attempt	  to	  revise	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  earlier	  theorists	  of	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  mysticism	  such	  as	  Stace	  and	  Zaehner,	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative	  epistemological	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism.	  In	  particular,	  he	  has	  developed	  Stace’s	  idea	   of	   the	   experience	   of	   pure	   consciousness	   in	   introvertive	   mysticism,	   whereby	   ‘the	  experience	   is	   of	   the	   self	   itself’. 899 	  Forman’s	   championing	   of	   the	   empirical	   and	  epistemological	  value	  of	  the	  mystical	  experience	  of	  pure	  consciousness,	  forms	  the	  basis	  for,	  if	  not	  a	  common	  core,	  at	  least	  a	  common	  trait	  in	  mystical	  experience,	  such	  that	  the	  mystical	  experience	   can	   be	   rescued	   from	   the	   intentionality	   of	   ordinary	   consciousness.	   However	  Forman’s	   new	  model	   for	   mystical	   experience	   has	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   neglecting	   the	   other	  emphasis	   in	   the	  mystical	   experience	   suggested	  by	   the	   classical	   scholars,	   the	   sense	  of	   the	  numinous	  or	  the	  perception	  of	   transcendence.	   In	  Forman’s	  view	  of	  mysticism	  the	  theistic	  model	  of	  mysticism	  has	  receded	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  nihilistic,	  consequently	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘God’	  as	  an	  object	  of	  the	  mystical	  experience	  has	  disappeared	  from	  view.	  Along	  with	  the	  tendency	  of	   the	   classical	   scholars	   to	   emphasise	   a	   particular	   metaphysical	   viewpoint	   over	   others,	  Forman’s	  model	  has	  universalised	  the	  perspective	  of	   the	  Adavaitan	  and	  Buddhist	  schools	  across	   mystical	   traditions.	   According	   to	   his	   reading,	   Shankara,	   Meister	   Eckhart	   and	   the	  author	   of	   the	   Cloud	   of	   Unknowing	   would	   all	   seem	   to	   refer	   to	   pure	   consciousness	   as	   an	  experience	   of	   nothingness.900	  Thus	   Louise	   Nelstrop,	   in	   her	   overview	   of	   contemporary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  896	  Smart	  adapts	  Zaehner’s	  rather	  dogmatic	  distinction	  between	  the	  theistic	  and	  monistic	  forms	  of	  mysticism	  into	  his	  own	  division	  of	   the	   ‘numinous’	   from	   the	   ‘mystical’	   experience.	  For	   the	  distinction	  of	   the	  numinous	  from	  the	  mystical,	  see	  Smart,	  "Understanding	  Religious	  Experience,"	  13.	  	  	  897	  Katz,	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  51.	  898	  Stace,	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	  86.	  899	  Forman,	  "Introduction:	  Mysticism,	  Constructivism,	  and	  Forgetting,"	  8.	  900	  Forman	  recognizes	  this	  as	  a	  criticism	  of	  his	  model.	  "Mystical	  Knowledge:	  Knowledge	  by	  Identity,"	  732.	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theoretical	   approaches	   to	   Christian	   mystics,	   suggests	   that	   Forman	   ‘can	   arguably	   be	  described	   as	   extending	   a	   perennialist-­‐type	   position’	   in	   his	   approach	   to	   mysticism.901	  Forman	   has	   substituted	   the	   transcendental	   object	   of	   the	   perennial	   philosophy	   for	   the	  atheistic	   ideals	   of	   Theravāda	   Buddhism,	   so	   that	   his	   universal	   trait	   of	   the	   mystical	  experience	   is	   not	   an	   experience	   of	   God.	   It	   may	   be	   acknowledged	   that	   there	   is	   indeed	  precedent	   in	   the	   religious	   traditions	   of	   Jainism	   and	   Theravāda	   Buddhism	   for	  what	   Staal	  calls,	  the	  ‘view	  that	  mysticism	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  Gods’.902	  However,	  with	  Forman	  this	  perspective	  has	  been	  elevated	  to	  a	  normative	  status	  for	  the	  mystical	  consciousness	  per	  se,	  which	  fails	  to	  differentiate	  the	  kind	  of	  negative	  assertions	  made	  in	  Buddhism	  to	  those	  made	  in	  other	  mystical	  traditions,	  particularly	  theistic	  ones.	  	  Forman’s	   emphasis	   on	   the	   type	   of	   mystical	   consciousness	   that	   is	   ‘without	   the	   ordinary	  subject-­‐object	   distinction’	   is	   insightful. 903 	  However,	   he	   proceeds	   to	   impose	   his	   own	  empirical	  theory	  of	  pure	  consciousness	  on	  all	  kinds	  of	  mystical	  data	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  dualist	  ontological	   structures.	   Forman	   states	   that	   the	   ‘what’	   that	   is	   encountered	   in	   the	   highest	  mystical	  experience	  of	  the	  soul,	  ‘is	  the	  merest	  awareness	  itself’,	  and	  continues	  that	  this	  state	  of	  awareness	  cannot	  be	  classed	  as	  an	  object	  of	  consciousness,	  for	  ‘[t]here	  is	  no	  distinction	  between	   subject	   and	   object	   in	   it,	   and	   it	   is	   the	  merest	   being	   present’.904	  In	   asserting	   that	  pure	   consciousness	   is	   devoid	   of	   any	   distinction	   between	   subject	   and	   object,	   Forman	  appears	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  nothingness	  of	  the	  mystical	  experience	  precludes	  any	  reference	  to	   ‘God’,	   since	   the	   highest	  mystical	   experience	   is	  without	   any	   object	   external	   to	   the	   self,	  transcendent	  or	  otherwise.	  	  	  The	   epistemological	   problem	   debated	   between	   Katz	   and	   Forman,	   is	   how	   the	   mind	   can	  possess	  unmediated	  awareness	  of	  anything.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Katz	  argues	  that	  even	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘mystical	   consciousness’	   experiences	   its	   objects	   though	   the	   structures	   of	   language,	  doctrine	  and	  belief.	  On	  the	  other,	  Forman	  maintains	  that	  the	  mystical	  consciousness	  is	  to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  901 	  Louise	   Nelstrop,	   Kevin	   J.	   Magill,	   and	   Bradley	   B.	   Onishi,	   Christian	   Mysticism	   :	   An	   Introduction	   to	  
Contemporary	  Theoretical	  Approaches	  (Farnham:	  Ashgate,	  2009),	  10.	  902	  Staal,	  Exploring	  Mysticism	  :	  A	  Methodological	  Essay,	  196.	  Staal	  also	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  Advaita	  Vedānta	  as	  offering	  a	  similar	  perspective	  of	  mystical	  states	  being	  without	  a	  divine	  cause.	  903	  Forman,	  "Mystical	  Knowledge:	  Knowledge	  by	  Identity,"	  732.	  904	  Ibid.,	  714.	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distinguished	   from	   ordinary	   consciousness	   in	   being	   object-­‐less.	   Both	   readings	   are	  problematic	   in	   that	   the	   ontological	   claims	   contained	   within	   the	   accounts	   of	   mystical	  experiences	   are	   put	   to	   one	   side.	   The	   dispute	   over	   the	   correct	   epistemology	   for	   the	  interpretation	   of	   the	   mystical	   experience	   does	   not	   engage	   with	   the	   metaphysical	   truth	  claims,	   both	   positive	   and	   negative,	   implied	   by	   the	   intentional	   object(s)	   of	   mystical	  consciousness.	   In	   the	   theorisation	   of	   pure	   consciousness	   by	   Forman	   and	   others	   such	   as	  Rothberg,	   any	   transcendent	   aspect	   to	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   experiencing	   self,	   which	   is	  retained	   for	   example	   even	  within	   Zaehner’s	   notion	   of	   the	   panenhenic	   experience	   of	   the	  oneness	   of	   self	   with	   being,	   is	   precluded	   by	   the	   insistence	   on	   the	   lack	   of	   any	   cognitive	  content	  to	  the	  Pure	  Conscious	  Event	  or	  PCE.	  	  	  However,	   omitting	   the	   subject	   of	   God	   from	   the	   inquiry	   into	   mysticism	   itself	   makes	   a	  further	   assumption,	   namely	   that	   in	   avoiding	   the	   subject-­‐object	   distinction	   between	  man	  and	   the	   God,	   the	   mystic	   retreats	   from	   any	   notion	   of	   ‘God’	   whatsoever.	   In	   fact,	   it	   is	   the	  ontology	   of	   God	   presumed	   by	   the	   subject-­‐object	   distinction	   that	   is	   the	   problem	   for	   the	  mystics,	   for	   whom	   the	   distinction	   implies	   an	   objectification	   of	   God.	   It	   is	   the	   mystic’s	  critique	  of	   conventional	  metaphysics,	   reflected	   in	   their	   secondary	  critique	  of	   the	   subject-­‐object	   epistemology	   in	   the	   concept	  of	  God,	  which	   is	   the	   inspiration	   for	   their	   assertion	  of	  nothingness.	   This	   serves	   as	   a	   negation	   of	   the	   epistemology	   that	   conceives	   of	   God	   as	   an	  object	  of	  the	  mind’s	  perception.	  	  	  
The	  Metaphysical	  Critique	  in	  Mystic	  Discourse	  In	   the	   mystical	   tradition	   of	   the	   Syrian	   monastics,	   the	   problem	   lies	   not	   with	   the	  characterisation	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  God,	  but	  how	  God	  can	  be	  experienced	  by	  the	  mind	  in	  a	  way	   that	   does	   not	   reduce	   God	   to	   a	   concept.	   For	   the	  mystics	   of	   the	   Syrian	   tradition	  who	  were	   particularly	   influenced	   by	   Greek	   Neoplatonic	   epistemology	   -­‐	   Evagrius	   Ponticus,	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	   the	   Areopagite	   and	   Stephen	   bar	   Ṣūdhailē	   -­‐	   the	   question	   was	   how	   the	  mind	   could	  possess	  unmediated	  awareness	  of	  God,	   so	   that	   ‘God’	   could	  be	   freed	   from	   the	  idolatrous	  images	  of	  sense	  perception.	  This	  consideration	  of	  ‘God’	  as	  an	  object	  of	  the	  mind	  is	  a	  type	  of	  thinking	  which	  connects	  metaphysics	  to	  epistemology;	   if	   ‘God’	  can	  be	  thought	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only	  according	  to	  the	  subject-­‐object	  epistemological	  distinction,	  then	  ‘God’	  may	  be	  thought	  through	   the	   metaphysical	   speculation	   about	   the	   being	   (ousia)	   of	   beings	   (ta	   onta).	   The	  Syrian	  mystics	  objected	  to	  this	  entire	  line	  of	  reasoning	  that	  God	  was	  not	  to	  be	  reasoned	  by	  the	  mind	  from	  speculation	  on	  being,	  and	  that	  metaphysics	  should	  not	  be	  brought	  into	  the	  discourse	   about	   God.	   Indeed	   the	   academic	   study	   of	   mysticism	   has	   tended	   to	   assume	   a	  metaphysical	   content	   to	  mystical	   experience,	   either	   positive	   or	   negative,	   that	   is	   being	   or	  not-­‐being.	   However,	   this	   assumes	   implicitly	   that	   mystic	   discourse	   makes	   metaphysical	  claims	  about	  the	  experience	  of	  God,	  when	  rather	  it	  seeks	  precisely	  to	  critique	  metaphysical	  thinking	  about	  God	  in	  terms	  of	  Being	  or	  ousia.	  	  	  Michael	   A.	   Sells,	   a	   comparative	   scholar	   of	  mysticism,	   whose	   book	  Mystical	   Languages	   of	  
Unsaying	   focuses	   on	   the	   epistemological	   significance	   of	   negative	   language	   in	   mysticism,	  also	   includes	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   critique	   of	   Greek	   metaphysical	   thinking	   in	   Christian	  mysticism.905	  Sells	   has	   asserted	   ‘the	   interrelation	   of	   ontology	   and	   epistemology’	   that	   is	  inherited	   by	   the	   Western	   mystical	   tradition	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   Christian	   Neo-­‐Platonists,	   Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	   and	   Gregory	   of	   Nyssa. 906 	  In	   Sells’	   opinion,	   it	   may	   be	  understood	  from	  the	  Greek	  writings	  of	  these	  early	  mystics	  of	  the	  Christian	  East.	  The	  phrase	  ‘beyond-­‐being’	   is	  central	   to	  Dionysian	  negative	   theology,	  but	  rather	   than	  originating	  with	  him,	   it	   already	   appears	   in	   the	   Platonic	   dialogues	   and	   then	   in	   Plotinus’	   Enneads,	   as	   that	  which	  does	  not	  ‘speak	  its	  name’	  and	  cannot	  be	  circumscribed.907	  For	  the	  Christian	  mystical	  tradition	  in	  the	  Latin	  West,	  the	  Neoplatonic	  intuition	  that	  God	  is	  somehow	  ‘beyond-­‐being’	  (epekeina	   ousias)	   similarly	   becomes	   a	   crucial	   one,	   with	   the	   understanding	   that	   being	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  905	  Sells	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  Plotinus	  in	  the	  apophatic	  element	  within	  Christian	  mysticism.	  See	  Sells,	  ‘Though	  elements	  of	  apophasis	  existed	  earlier,	  it	  was	  Plotinus	  who	  wove	  these	  elements	  and	  his	  own	  original	  and	   mystical	   insights	   into	   a	   discourse	   of	   sustained	   apophatic	   intensity’.	   Michael	   Anthony	   Sells,	   Mystical	  
Languages	  of	  Unsaying	  (Chicago	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1994),	  5.	  906	  Ibid.,	   36.	   ‘Within	   the	  Periphyseon,	   Eriugena	   integrated	   into	  his	  own	  apophatic	  discourse	  both	  Dionysius’	  affirmation	  that	  the	  deity	  was	  “beyond-­‐being”	  and	  Gregory’s	  suggestion	  that	  the	  “nothing”	  in	  the	  doctrine	  of	  “creation	  from	  nothing”	  (creatio	  ex	  nihilo)	  was	  the	  divine	  nothingness	  out	  of	  which	  all	  being	  proceeds.’	  907	  Plotinus,	  Enneads,	  5.5.6.11-­‐17.	  	  ‘“The	  beyond-­‐being”	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  some-­‐thing	  since	  it	  does	  not	  posit	  any-­‐thing,	   nor	   does	   it	   “speak	   its	   name”	   [Plat.	   Parm.	   132	   a	   3].	   It	   merely	   indicates	   that	   it	   is	   “not	   that”.	   No	  attempt	  is	  made	  to	  circumscribe	  it.	  It	  would	  be	  absurd	  to	  circumscribe	  that	  immense	  nature.	  To	  wish	  to	  do	  so	  is	  to	  cut	  oneself	  off	  from	  its	  slightest	  trace.’	  ibid.,	  15.	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what	  is	  perceived	  by	  the	  mind,	  and	  thus	  what	  transcends	  being	  cannot	  be	  thought	  through	  the	  same	  methods	  of	  reasoning.908	  	  	  This	   integration	   of	   thinking	   and	   being	   was	   inherited	   from	   Greek	   metaphysics.	   For	   the	  scholastics	  what	  can	  be	  thought	  about	  God	  is	  what	  can	  be	  speculated	  about	  the	  divine	  being,	  and	   thus	   God	   becomes	   reduced	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   being.	   For	   the	   Greeks	   thinking	   and	  speaking	   are	   parallel	   activities,	   in	   that	   logos	   refers	   to	   both	   speech	   and	   reason,	   a	   dual	  meaning	   reflected	   in	   the	   Syriac	   word	   meltā.909	  The	   Syrians	   inherited	   the	   Neoplatonic	  development	  of	  Aristotelian	  philosophy.	  With	  Aristotle,	  thinking	  becomes	  formulated	  in	  the	  discourse	   of	   logos,	   and	   the	   logos	   what	   can	   be	   said	   about	   something.910	  Heidegger	   in	   his	  work,	   the	   Introduction	   to	   Metaphysics	   discusses	   in	   some	   depth	   the	   relation	   of	   being	   to	  thinking	  in	  Greek	  philosophy:	  	   One	   understands	   noein	   as	   thinking,	   and	   thinking	   as	   an	   activity	   of	   the	   subject.	   The	   subject’s	   thinking	  determines	  what	  Being	  is.	  Being	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  what	  is	  thought	  by	  thinking.911	  	  In	   the	   relation	   of	   being	   to	   thinking	   in	   the	   thinking	   of	   God	   within	   scholasticism,	   God	   is	  thought	   through	  the	  being	  of	  beings	  and	  thus	  God	  becomes	  the	  highest	  being	  that	  can	  be	  conceived	  by	  the	  thinking	  subject.	  The	  critique	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  thinking	  about	  God	  in	  the	  Christian	  mystic	  tradition	  is	  directed	  against	  this	  development	  in	  scholasticism	  of	  both	  the	  Latin	  West	  and	  Syrian	  East.	  Christian	  scholasticism	   inherits	   the	  kind	  of	  philosophical	  thinking	  which	   is	   controlled	   by	   the	   science	   of	   logos,	   the	   epistēmē	   logikē	   of	   the	   Platonic-­‐Aristotelian	   schools,	   the	   Greek	   ‘scholastic’	   thinking	   in	   which	   logic	   forms	   the	   rules	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  908	  Ibid.,	  36.	  Sells	  states	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘beyond-­‐being’	  appears	  also	  in	  the	  Periphyseon	  of	  John	  the	  Scot	  Eriugena	  (810-­‐877CE)	  and	  was	  inspired	  by	  his	  translation	  of	  the	  Dionysian	  corpus	  into	  Medieval	  Latin.	  Sells	  comments	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  notion	  for	  the	  Periphyseon,	  that,	  ‘To	  be	  is	  to	  be	  able	  to	  be	  grasped	  by	  the	  mind.	  That	  which	  transcends	  the	  mind	  must	  necessarily	  transcend	  being.’	  909 	  Becker	   emphasises	   the	   influence	   on	   the	   East	   Syrians	   by	   the	   Neoplatonic	   focus	   on	   semantics,	   for	  investigation	   into	   something	  begins	  with	   the	   correct	  way	  of	   speaking	   about	   it.	   Becker,	  Fear	  of	  God	  and	  the	  
Beginning	  of	  Wisdom	  :	  The	  School	  of	  Nisibis	  and	  Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia,	  134-­‐35.	  910	  Heidegger,	  Introduction	  to	  Metaphysics,	  132.	  Heidegger	  argues	  that	  the	  word	  logos	  comes	  to	  mean	  ‘saying’	  and	  ‘discourse’,	  though	  the	  originary	  meaning	  is	  that	  of	  ‘gathering’.	  911	  Ibid.,	  145.	  For	  Heidegger	  in	  fact,	  there	  is	  a	  ‘disjunction’	  of	  thinking	  from	  Being	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Socratics,	  and	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Parmenides	  and	  Heraclitus	  have	  been	  misrepresented	  as	  anticipating	  Kant	  and	  German	  idealism.	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scientific	   knowledge,	   or	   epistēmē.912	  In	   onto-­‐theological	   discourse,	   which	   is	   informed	   by	  scholastic	   metaphysics,	   the	   subject	   of	   its	   discourse,	   God,	   is	   reasoned	   through	   epistēmē	  
logikē	  and	  thus	  the	  Christian	  God	  enters	  into	  the	  Aristotelian	  categories	  of	  being.913	  In	  the	  Syrian	  tradition,	  a	  sustained	  critique	  was	  made	  of	  such	  developments,	  but	  the	  opposition	  of	  the	   Syrian	   mystics	   to	   onto-­‐theology	   derives	   from	   the	   fourth-­‐century	   monk,	   Evagrius	  Ponticus,	   whose	   Greek	   writings	   were	   inspirational	   to	   the	   flourishing	   of	   the	   East	   Syrian	  mystics	  in	  later	  centuries.	  When	  Evagrius	  made	  his	  assertion	  about	  the	  ineffability	  of	  God,	  this	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  God	  cannot	  be	  described	  according	  to	  the	  categories	  of	  form	  or	  species	  of	  Greek	  metaphysics,	  for	  these	  belong	  to	  a	  thinking	  determined	  by	  being.914	  	  The	   connection	   between	  metaphysics	   and	  mystic	   discourse	   is	   implicit	   in	   the	   latter’s	   aim	  which	   critiques	   the	   metaphysical	   conception	   of	   God	   as	   a	   divine	   being;	   a	   theological	  approach	  termed	  by	  Heidegger	  as	  ‘onto-­‐theo-­‐logy’.	  However,	  this	  critique	  of	  ontotheology	  implicit	  within	  mystic	  discourse	  must	  in	  turn	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  which	  has	  tended	  to	  presuppose	  this	  very	  ontotheology	  in	  its	  interpretation	  of	  the	  mystics.	  Mystic	  discourse,	  in	  the	  Certeaun	  sense	  as	  the	  early	  modern	  writings	  of	  mystics,	  critiques	  metaphysical	   conceptions	   of	   God	  within	   scholasticism.	   The	   academic	   study	   of	  mysticism	  that	  studies	  mystic	  discourse,	  presupposes	  both	  positively	  and	  negatively,	  a	  metaphysical	  conception	  of	  God.	  However,	  this	  was	  a	  conception	  critiqued	  by	  mystic	  discourse	  about	  God.	  For	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  its	  reading	  of	  mystic	  discourse,	  it	  must	  reflexively	  rethink	  its	  metaphysical	  assumptions,	  in	  order	  to	  find	  an	  appropriate	  language	  that	  resonates	  with	  mystic	  discourse’s	  intent	  to	  critique	  metaphysics.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  912	  Ibid.,	   127-­‐8.	  Heidegger	   states	   that,	   ‘“Logic”	   and	   “the	   logical”	   are	   simply	   not	   the	  ways	   to	   define	   thinking	  without	  further	  ado,	  as	  if	  nothing	  else	  were	  possible.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  was	  no	  accident	  that	  the	  doctrine	  of	  thinking	  became	  “logic”.’	  913	  Marion	  traces	  this	  decisive	  move	  to	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  and	  Descartes	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  philosophy.	  Marion,	  God	  without	  Being	  :	  Hors-­‐Texte,	  82.	  914	  Columba	  Stewart	  shows	  how	  Evagrius	  makes	  theological	  claims	  about	  God	  with	  metaphysical	  implications,	  when	  he	  claims	  that	  God	  is	  above	  all	  perception	  and	  thought,	  is	  immaterial	  and	  without	  form,	  and	  thus	  cannot	  be	   recognised	   by	   sensory	   perceptions.	   Stewart,	   "Imageless	   Prayer	   and	   the	   Theological	   Vision	   of	   Evagrius	  Ponticus,"	  191-­‐92.	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Ineffability	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Language	  In	   the	   academic	   study	   of	  mysticism,	   the	   assertion	   of	   ineffability	   in	  mystic	   discourse	   has	  been	  treated	  as	  a	  metaphysical	  or	  rather	  anti-­‐metaphysical	  claim.	  Ineffability	  was	  initially	  identified	  by	  William	   James	  as	  one	  of	   the	  most	   important	  marks	  of	  mysticism	   (alongside	  the	   noetic	   quality)	   in	   The	   Varieties	   of	   Religious	   Experience	   and	   thereafter	   was	   much	  discussed.915	  	   Scholars	   have	   interpreted	   ineffability	   to	   be	   descriptive	   of	   the	   experiential	  state	   of	   the	  mystic,	  which	   demands	   knowledge	   by	   direct	   acquaintance.	   Katz	   does	   accept	  James’s	   definition	   of	   ineffability	   as	   defying	   expression,	   but	   rejects	   the	   assumption	   that	  ineffability	  claims	   in	  mystical	  accounts	  can	  be	  used	   to	   infer	  a	  common	  ontic	   reality	   to	  all	  mystical	  experience.916	  Instead	  he	  affirms	  that	  the	  common	  identification	  of	  ineffability	  and	  paradoxicality	  cannot	  provide	  a	  sufficient	  foundation	  for	  a	  phenomenology	  or	  typology	  of	  mystical	   experience.	   The	  mystic	   assertion	   of	   ineffability	   does	   not	   render	   the	   experience	  intelligible,	  but	  rather	  removes	  the	  experience	  from	  description.	  As	  a	  logical	  consequence,	  there	   is	   an	   absence	   of	   data	  with	  which	   to	   construct	   a	   phenomenology	   out	   of	   the	  mystic	  claims	  of	  ineffability.917	  	  Sells	   has	   interpreted	   ineffability	   as	   an	   epistemological	   claim	   about	   the	   inadequacy	   of	  language,	  a	  claim	  which	  is	  logically	  inconsistent,	  since	  the	  mystic	  both	  asserts	  an	  object	  X,	  but	  then	  insists	  on	  the	  impossibility	  of	  describing	  this	  object	  which	  the	  mystic	  has	  reified	  in	  language	   through	   the	   assertion	   of	   X.918	  For	   Sells,	   this	  aporia	   generates	  what	   he	   calls	   the	  mystic’s	   ‘language	   of	   unsaying’,	   which	   is	   a	   ‘mode	   of	   discourse’,	   rather	   than	   simply	   a	  strategy	  of	  negation.919	  Sells	  considers	  apophasis	  or	  ‘un-­‐saying’	  as	  functioning	  according	  to	  the	  aporia,	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  affirmation	  of	  the	  transcendence	  of	  God	  through	  the	  negation	  of	  assertions	  which	  assume	  quiddity,	  or	  thing-­‐ness	  to	  God.920	  However,	  in	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  this	  language	  of	  unsaying,	  mystics	  would	  themselves	  seem	  to	  be	  caught	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  915	  James,	   The	   Varieties	   of	   Religious	   Experience	   :	   A	   Study	   in	   Human	   Nature,	   380-­‐81.	   ‘The	   subject	   of	   it	  immediately	  says	  that	   it	  defies	  expression,	   that	  no	  adequate	  report	  of	   its	  contents	  can	  be	  given	  in	  words.	   It	  follows	  from	  this	  that	  its	  quality	  must	  be	  directly	  experienced;	  it	  cannot	  be	  imparted	  or	  transferred	  to	  others.’	  916	  Katz,	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  48.	  917	  Ibid.,	  55-­‐56.	  918	  Sells,	  Mystical	  Languages	  of	  Unsaying,	  2.	  ‘Any	  statement	  of	  ineffability,	  “X	  is	  beyond	  names,”	  generates	  the	  
aporia	  that	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  statement	  must	  be	  named	  (as	  X)	  in	  order	  for	  us	  to	  affirm	  that	  it	  is	  beyond	  names.’	  919	  Ibid.	  920	  Ibid.,	  1-­‐4.	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in	  the	  aporia	  of	  ineffability;921	  even	  the	  strategy	  of	  the	  apophatic	  mystics	  being	  constrained	  by	   the	   continual	   linguistic	   enactment	   of	   the	   tension	   between	   the	   positive	   and	   negative	  affirmations.	  Sells	  does	  admit,	  because	  classical	  apophasis	  does	  in	  fact	  ‘posit,	  despite	  itself,	  substantialist	  deities’,	   that	   this	  means	  that	   it	  must	  be	  engaged	   ‘in	  a	  self-­‐critical	  stance,	  an	  acknowledgment	   of	   its	   own	   reifications,	   and	   a	   relentless	   turning-­‐back	   to	   unsay	   them’.922	  The	  apophasis	  of	  Western	  mystics,	  such	  as	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  and	  Eckhart,	  has	  been	  subject	  to	   the	   accusation	   made	   by	   Derrida,	   that	   the	   ineffable	   beyond-­‐being	   does	   not	   escape	  metaphysics,	  but	  is	  as	  Sells	  puts	  it,	  ‘just	  another	  form	  of	  entity,	  a	  God	  beyond	  God,	  a	  hidden	  God’.923	  	  For	  this	  criticism	  to	  be	  countered,	  it	  would	  need	  to	  be	  shown	  that	  mystic	  discourse	  does	   more	   than	   exist	   within	   the	   tension	   of	   the	   kataphatic	   and	   apophatic	   modes,	   as	  proposed	  by	  Sells.924	  	  The	  very	  notion	  of	  ‘beyond-­‐being’	  remains	  dependent	  on	  and	  unable	  to	  escape	  the	  thinking	  of	  being	  when	  it	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  objectifying	  nature	  of	  propositional	  discourse.	  In	  the	  formal	   logic	   of	   Aristotle,	   the	   linguistic	   statement	   is	   ‘a	   determination	   of	   something	   about	  something’	  and	  thus	  is	  either	  an	  affirmation	  (kata-­‐phasis)	  or	  a	  denial	  (apo-­‐phasis),	  that	  is	  to	  say	   something	   (phasis)	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   belonging	   or	   not	   belonging	   to	   something.925	  Apophatic	   speech	   thus	   depends	   on	   the	   kataphatic,	   affirmation	   and	   negation	   forming	   the	  twin	  poles	  of	   the	  discourse	  formalised	  in	  propositional	   logic.	   In	  Sells’	   theory	  of	  apophatic	  discourse,	   the	   apophatic	  mode	   of	   ‘unsaying’	   depends	   on	   the	   assertion	   of	   something,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  921	  Michael	  Sells	  refers	  to	  the	  classic	  formulation	  of	  this	  aporia	  by	  Augustine,	  in	  which	  the	  dilemma	  of	  making	  ineffability	  claims	  about	  God	  is	  resolved	  by	  silence.	  Ibid.,	  2.	  	  922	  Ibid.,	  225,	  n.	  31.	  923	  Ibid.,	  12.	  924	  Ibid.,	  224,	  n.	  27.	  References	  to	  the	  critique	  by	  Derrida	  and	  the	  counter-­‐argument	  of	  John	  Caputo	  are	  given	  by	   Sells.	   Jacques	   Derrida,	   "How	   to	   Avoid	   Speaking:	   Denials"	   in	   Languages	   of	   the	   Unsayable	   :	   The	   Play	   of	  
Negativity	   in	   Literature	   and	   Literary	   Theory	   ed.	   Sanford	   Budick	   and	   Wolfgang	   Iser,	   Irvine	   Studies	   in	   the	  Humanities	   (New	   York:	   Columbia	   University	   Press,	   1989).	   See	   John	   Caputo’s	   response	   as	   a	   critique	   of	  Derridean	  deconstruction,	  ‘In	  classical	  terms,	  the	  being	  of	  deconstruction	  always	  exists	  in	  alio,	  by	  inhabiting	  the	   discourse	   of	   others’.	   John	   D.	   Caputo,	   "Mysticism	   and	   Transgression:	   Derrida	   and	   Meister	   Eckhart,"	   in	  
Derrida	  and	  Deconstruction,	   ed.	  Hugh	   J.	   Silverman,	   Continental	   Philosophy	   (New	  York	   ;	   London:	  Routledge,	  1989),	  30.	  925	  Martin	   Heidegger,	   The	   Metaphysical	   Foundations	   of	   Logic	   [Metaphysische	   Anfangsgründe	   der	   Logik	   im	  Ausgang	   von	   Leibniz.],	   trans.	   Michael	   Heim,	   Studies	   in	   Phenomenology	   and	   Existential	   Philosophy	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1984),	  22-­‐23.	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thus	   these	   logical	   distinctions	   are	   maintained.926	  However,	   instead	   of	   affirmation	   and	  negation	  being	  the	  opposition	  of	  two	  propositions	  in	  the	  classical	  rule	  of	  non-­‐contradiction,	  i.e.	  P	   is	   not	  Q,	   apophatic	   discourse	  would	   operate	   through	   the	   tension	   of	   the	   opposition	  between	   P	   and	   Q.927 	  Sells	   has	   proposed	   that	   the	   paradoxes	   or	   aporias	   of	   apophatic	  discourse	  are	  neither	  illogical	  nor	  irrational,	  but	  supersede	  the	  logic	  of	   ‘object	  entities’.928	  However,	  the	  logic	  of	  an	  object	  entity	  is	   located	  not	  in	  the	  thing	  itself	  but	  within	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  propositional	  language	  which	  makes	  statements	  about	  the	  ontological	  relation	  of	  things.	  This	  logic	  cannot	  be	  superseded	  by	  simply	  changing	  the	  ‘subject	  of	  discourse’,	  as	  Sells	  suggests,	  since	  the	  metaphysical	  structure	  of	  logical	  discourse	  requires	  object	  entities,	  i.e.	   things	  which	   are;	   therefore	   a	   discourse	  which	   is	   not	   ruled	  by	   the	   categories	   of	   being	  must	  overcome	  the	  rules	  of	  logic.	  	  	  In	   the	   Syrian	   tradition,	   Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	   adopts	   an	   alternative	  mode	   of	   discourse	  altogether,	   in	  order	   to	  overcome	  the	  operation	  of	  classical	   logic	  within	  Syrian	   theological	  discourse.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  Syrian	  mystics	  who	  followed	  the	  Evagrian	  tradition,	  the	  Aristotelian	  categories	  and	   laws	  of	   logic	   that	  had	  come	  to	  predominate	   the	  scholastic	  tradition	   of	   onto-­‐theology,	   had	   reduced	   God	   to	   a	   concept.	   When	   mystics	   like	   Evagrius	  asserted	   the	   ineffability	   of	   the	   transcendent	   object	   of	   their	   experience,	   this	  was	   to	   claim	  that	   ‘God’	   is	   not	   subject	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   proposition	   that	  would	   impose	   categories	   on	  ‘God’	   according	   to	   the	  metaphysical	   structure	   of	   language.	   The	  mystic	   tradition	   sought	   a	  kind	   of	   thinking	   that	   could	   do	   justice	   to	   the	   transcendence	   of	   God;	   one	   that	   was	   not	  articulated	   according	   to	   Aristotelian	   logic	   and	   categories	   of	   being.	   How	   to	   express	   the	  notion	  of	  the	   ‘beyond’	  (Gr.	  epekeina),	   thus	  became	  a	  crucial	  concern	  for	  mystic	  discourse,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  finding	  a	  linguistic	  mode	  which	  could	  operate	  outside	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  926	  Sells	  provides	   the	  meaning	  of	   these	   terms	   in	   the	  Greek	   language,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  point	  out	   their	   logical	  etymology	  in	  the	  propositional	  statement.	  Sells,	  Mystical	  Languages	  of	  Unsaying,	  2-­‐3.	  927	  In	  Barhebraeus’	  summary	  of	  Peri	  Hermeneias,	  his	  chapter	  on	  propositions	  states	  that	  [8a]	  ‘A	  proposition	  is	  a	   declaratory	  utterance’	   (i.e.	   logos	  apophatikos),	   and	  his	   chapter	   on	   contradiction	   that	   [10a]	   ‘Contradiction	  consists	   in	   the	   opposition	   of	   two	   propositions	   in	   affirmation	   and	   negation,	   so	   that	   one	   of	   them	   is	   true,	  whereas	  the	  other	  is	  false.’	  Herman	  F.	  Janssens,	  "Bar	  Hebraeus;	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye,"	  The	  American	  
Journal	  of	  Semitic	  Languages	  and	  Literatures	  52,	  no.	  1	  (1935):	  16,	  20.	  928	  Sells,	  Mystical	  Languages	  of	  Unsaying,	  3-­‐4.	  ‘Real	  contradictions	  occur	  when	  language	  engages	  the	  ineffable	  transcendent,	   but	   these	   contradictions	   are	   not	   illogical.	   For	   the	   apophatic	   writer,	   the	   logical	   rule	   of	   non-­‐contradiction	  functions	  for	  object	  entities.	  When	  the	  subject	  of	  discourse	  is	  a	  non-­‐object	  and	  no-­‐thing,	  it	  is	  not	  irrational	  that	  such	  a	  logic	  be	  superseded.’	  
	   206	  
being.	  When	   ‘beyond	  being’	   is	   understood	   as	   a	   ‘thing’,	   rather	   than	   a	   strategy	   of	   thinking	  which	  moves	   beyond,	   then	   the	   ‘beyond	   being’	   as	   a	   definite	   noun,	   becomes	   just	   another	  metaphysical	  idol	  that	  mystic	  discourse	  sought	  to	  circumvent.	  Barhebraeus	  and	  the	  world	  of	  Syrian	  mysticism	  enable	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  thinking	  God	  through	  being,	  since	  his	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  was	  not	  dependent	  on	  the	  discourse	  of	  metaphysics,	  but	  on	  a	  ‘post-­‐metaphysical’	  language,	  that	  of	  love.	  	  
The Contribution of Syrian Hermeneutics 	  The	  problem	  confronting	  Barhebraeus	  was	  that	  of	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  Scholastics	  and	  the	  Evagrian	  mystics	   concerning	   the	   knowledge	   of	   God	   and	   specifically	   how	   the	   concept	  could	  govern	  the	  truly	  divine	  God.	  The	  Evagrian	  mystical	  tradition	  posited	  an	  unmediated	  awareness	   of	   God	   that	  was	   not	   controlled	   by	   the	  metaphysics	   of	   being.	   However,	   in	   the	  intellectualist	   approach	   to	   God	   of	   Neoplatonic	   Evagrianism,	   God	   was	   placed	   outside	   of	  being	  and	  without	  relation	   to	  being.	  God	  as	  pure	   intellect	  acted	  as	  another	   idol,	   in	  which	  God	  was	  reduced	  to	  the	  concept.	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  metaphysical	  conception	  of	  God	  as	  pure	  being,	  ‘God’	  became	  reified	  as	  an	  object	  of	  perception.	  In	  the	  Evagrian	  conception	  of	  God	  as	  pure	   intellect,	   ‘God’	   retreated	   into	   the	   abstraction	   of	   the	   ideas.929	  These	   two	   positions	  represented	  the	  two	  dominant	  philosophical	  traditions	  that	  the	  Syrians	  received	  from	  the	  Greeks	  in	  Late	  Antiquity	  -­‐	  Platonic	  idealism	  and	  Aristotelian	  realism.930	  For	  the	  scholastics,	  Aristotelian	  metaphysics	   and	   the	   categories	   rendered	   an	   understanding	   of	   God	   that	  was	  reasoned	  through	  created	  being,	  while	  for	  the	  Evagrian	  mystics,	  only	  Platonic	  intuition	  of	  the	   divine	   forms	   through	   the	   practice	   of	   theōria	   or	   contemplation,	   could	   reach	   the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  divine	  things.	  These	  rival	  epistemologies	  for	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  were	  based	   on	   two	   different	   strands	   in	   Greek	   metaphysics.	   For	   the	   Evagrian	   mystics,	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  929	  Andrew	  Louth	  compares	  the	  concept	  of	  God	  in	  Patristic	  and	  Platonic	  mysticism,	  to	  question	  whether	  the	  ‘supra-­‐personal’	  and	  ‘most	  ultimate’	  being	  in	  Plato’s	  Idea	  of	  the	  Good	  can	  really	  be	  considered	  theos,	  or	  ‘God’.	  Andrew	  Louth,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Christian	  Mystical	  Tradition	  :	  From	  Plato	  to	  Denys,	  2nd	  ed.	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  188-­‐90.	  930 	  Heidegger	   demonstrates	   how	   Western	   philosophy	   has	   similarly	   inherited	   these	   contrasting	  epistemologies.	  Heidegger,	  Introduction	  to	  Metaphysics,	  145-­‐6.	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Platonic	  dualism	  meant	  that	  divine	  truth	  lay	  in	  the	  good	  beyond	  being,	  while	  the	  scholastic	  tradition	   placed	   God	   as	   the	   highest	   being	   and	   thus	   reasoned	   through	   the	   metaphysical	  categories	  of	  being.	  The	  epistemological	  conflict	  was	  thus	  grounded	  in	  the	  ontological.	  	  
A	  Similar	  Epistemological	  Impasse	  Barhebraeus’	   writings	   offer	   a	   substantive	   solution	   to	   the	   subject-­‐object	   problem	   in	   the	  knowledge	  of	  God,	  i.e.	  the	  epistemological	  problem	  that	  has	  occupied	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	   in	   the	   debate	   about	   the	   intentionality	   of	   consciousness	   in	   the	   mystical	  experience.	  The	  epistemological	  problem	  that	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  of	  how	  the	   subject	   knows	   the	   object	   of	   his	   consciousness,	   corresponds	   to	   Barhebraeus’	   own	  problem	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  in	  the	  Syrian	  tradition.	  The	  modern	  impasse	  may	  thus	  be	  aligned	  with	   the	   conflict	   between	   scholastics	   and	  mystics	   in	   the	   Syrian	   tradition,	   in	   that	  these	  debates	  stem	  from	  epistemological	  positions	  that	  are	  grounded	  in	  Greek	  philosophy.	  	  The	   understanding	   of	   reality	   in	   the	   Syrian	   scholastic	   tradition	   is	   achieved	   through	  rationality	  with	  logic	  as	  its	  tool.	  This	  reasoning	  is	  applied	  to	  super-­‐sensory	  reality	  through	  a	  metaphysics	  which	   becomes	   theology,	  with	   the	   appropriation	   of	   Aristotle	   in	   scholastic	  theology.	   However,	   for	   the	   Neoplatonic	   mystics,	   true	   knowledge	   of	   reality	   is	   through	  spiritual	   insight,	   achieved	   by	   contemplation	   of	   the	   world	   of	   appearances	   towards	   the	  intuition	   of	   spiritual	   realities.	   These	   two	   distinctive	   approaches	   emerge	   in	   the	   two	  main	  traditions	  in	  the	  modern	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism.	  The	  former	  approach	  is	  upheld	  by	  the	   neo-­‐Kantian	   constructivists	   for	  whom	   all	   of	   human	   experience	   is	   constructed	   by	   the	  categories	  of	  perception,	  consequently	  even	  mystical	  experience	  of	  another	  order	  of	  reality	  is	   a	   product	   of	   social	   conditioning.	   The	   latter,	   Neoplatonic	   approach,	   is	   most	   clearly	  represented	  by	  the	  classical	  scholars	  of	  mysticism	  following	  the	  tradition	  of	  Schleiermacher,	  for	  whom	  the	  sense	  of	   the	   infinite	   is	   common	   to	  man	  and	   the	  source	  of	   religious	   feeling,	  with	   the	   power	   of	   intuition	   giving	   this	   sense	   of	   something	   beyond,	   through	   a	   priori	  knowledge.	  In	  this	  tradition	  of	  thinking,	  the	  existence	  of	  types	  of	  consciousness	  other	  than	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ordinary	  consciousness	  becomes	  crucial	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  mystics	  that	  they	  experience	  another	  kind	  of	  reality	  different	  from	  the	  world	  of	  appearances.931	  	  These	   epistemological	   positions	   in	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism	   have	   their	   background	   in	  Enlightenment	  and	  post-­‐Enlightenment	  thinking,	  particularly	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  Schleiermacher’s	   formulation	   of	   a	   theory	   of	   religion	   on	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism.	   With	  Schleiermacher,	   there	   was	   a	   deliberate	   move	   to	   formulate	   a	   rival	   tradition	   of	   thinking	  about	  God	   that	  was	   incommensurable	  with	   the	  Enlightenment	   rationalisation	  of	   religion.	  According	   to	   Schleiermacher,	   the	   intuition	   of	   religious	   feeling	   could	   not	   be	   judged	  according	   to	   these	  standards	  of	   rationality.	   James	   followed	  Schleiermacher	   in	  contending	  that	  religious	  experience	  can	  only	  be	  known	  by	  direct	  acquaintance	  and	  is	  unmediated	  by	  concepts,	   thus	   religious	   feeling	   comes	   prior	   to	   the	   concept	   and	   is	   ‘the	   deeper	   source	   of	  religion’.932	  Proudfoot	  has	  contended	  that	  Schleiermacher’s	  theory	  of	  religion	  as	   ‘a	  matter	  of	   feeling	  and	   intuition’,	   removes	   religion	   from	   the	   realm	  of	   rational	   scientific	   and	  moral	  inquiry.933	  	   Consequently,	   it	   remains	   unscathed	   by	   Kant’s	   contention	   that	   our	   experience	   is	   structured	   by	   the	  categories	   and	   thoughts	  we	   bring	   to	   it	   and	   thus	   that	  we	   produce	   rather	   than	   reproduce	   the	  world	  we	  think	  we	   know.	   As	   a	   sense	   that	   precedes	   and	   is	   independent	   of	   all	   thought,	   and	   that	   ought	   not	   to	   be	  confused	  with	   doctrine	   or	   practice,	   religion	   can	   never	   come	   into	   conflict	   with	   the	   findings	   of	  modern	  science	  or	  with	  the	  advance	  of	  knowledge	  in	  any	  realm.934	  	  	  In	   Schleiermacher’s	   reaction	   to	   Kant,	   lie	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   epistemological	   debate	   in	   the	  modern	  study	  of	  mysticism.	  Both	  sides	  in	  this	  debate	  appealed	  to	  Kant;	  his	  notion	  of	  the	  a	  
priori	   was	   used	   by	   Otto	   to	   justify	   his	   own	   theory	   of	   the	   numinous	   sense,935	  and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  931	  Staal	   highlights	   the	   distinction	   of	   appearance	   from	   reality	   as	   a	   characteristic	   doctrine	   of	   the	   mystics,	  adding	   that	   the	   physical	   sciences	   such	   as	   physics	   and	   astronomy	   make	   similar	   claims.	   Staal,	   Exploring	  
Mysticism	  :	  A	  Methodological	  Essay,	  54-­‐56.	  932	  Proudfoot,	  Religious	  Experience,	  7.	  See	  also	  James,	  The	  Varieties	  of	  Religious	  Experience	  :	  A	  Study	  in	  Human	  
Nature,	  431.	  933	  Proudfoot,	  Religious	  Experience,	  2.	  934	  Ibid.	  935	  Otto,	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Non-­‐Rational	  Factor	  in	  the	  Idea	  of	  the	  Divine	  and	  Its	  Relation	  
to	  the	  Rational,	  113.	  Otto	  states,	  ‘The	  proof	  that	  in	  the	  numinous	  we	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  purely	  a	  priori	  cognitive	  elements	  is	  to	  be	  reached	  by	  introspection	  and	  a	  critical	  examination	  of	  reason	  such	  as	  Kant	  instituted.’	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structuring	  of	  all	  consciousness	  by	  the	  Kantian	  forms	  and	  categories,	  is	  foundational	  for	  the	  constructivists’	   insistence	   on	   ‘the	   imposition	   of	   the	  mediating	   conditions	   of	   the	   knower’	  even	  in	  the	  mystical	  experience.936	  In	  his	  criticism	  of	  the	  emphasis	  on	  religious	  feeling	  by	  Schleiermacher,	  Otto	  and	  James	  in	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism,	  Proudfoot’s	  sympathies	  lie	  with	  Katz’s	  epistemological	  approach.	  Proudfoot	  argues	  that	  religious	  consciousness	  cannot	  be	  both	   independent	  of	   thought	  and	  yet	  contain	   ‘an	   intuitive	  component	  whose	  object	   is	   the	  infinite’,	  since	  the	  latter	  assumes	  a	  cognitive	  element.937	  For	  Proudfoot,	  the	  intentionality	  of	  the	   feeling	  of	  absolute	  dependence	   includes	  a	  referential	  aspect	   for	   its	  object	  and	  thus	   ‘it	  cannot	   be	   independent	   of	   thought’.938 	  Otto	   comments	   on	   Schleiermacher’s	   notion	   of	  religious	  feeling	  that	  despite	  his	  avoidance	  of	  a	  cognitive	  aspect,	  this	  is	  a	  mode	  of	  knowing	  that	   comes	   through	   ‘the	   intuitive	  outcome	  of	   feeling’,	  which	   transcends	  and	  goes	  beyond	  the	   empirical.939 	  Schleiermacher’s	   formulation	   of	   a	   religious	   consciousness	   is	   thus	   a	  response	   to	   a	   certain	   type	   of	   thinking,	   the	   Enlightenment	   emphasis	   on	   the	   rationality	   of	  empirical	  inquiry	  and	  scientific	  analysis.	  	  There	   was	   a	   corresponding	   concern	   in	   the	   Syrian	   tradition	   about	   the	   application	   of	   the	  Greek	  epistēmē	  of	  logic	  to	  religious	  discourse,	  and	  the	  rationalisation	  of	  God,	  the	  subject	  of	  its	  discourse,	  through	  metaphysics.	  The	  Syrian	  mystics’	  concern	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  God	  as	   independent	   of	   the	   thinking	   which	   rationalises	   theological	   discourse,	   thus	   forms	   a	  parallel	  to	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  classical	  scholars.	  The	  relativist	  critique	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  assumptions	  by	  the	  classical	  scholars	  of	  a	  unified	  object	  or	  common	  reality	  of	  all	  mystical	  experience	   has	   overlooked	   this	   insight.	   Constructivism	   has	   interpreted	   the	   mystical	  experience	  according	  to	  the	  material	  factors	  open	  to	  empirical	  analysis,	  thus	  rationalising	  the	   mystics’	   discourse	   about	   God.	   Smart	   has	   pointed	   out	   in	   his	   article	   “Understanding	  Religious	  Experience”	  that	  ‘the	  ‘object’	  of	  religious	  experience	  is	  itself	  transcendent	  and	  so	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  936	  Katz,	  "Language,	  Epistemology,	  and	  Mysticism,"	  59.	  937	  Proudfoot,	  Religious	  Experience,	  11.	  938	  Ibid.	  939	  Otto,	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Non-­‐Rational	  Factor	  in	  the	  Idea	  of	  the	  Divine	  and	  Its	  Relation	  
to	  the	  Rational,	  146-­‐7.	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a	   discussion	  which	   assimilates	   it	   to	   ‘worldly’	   objects	   of	   experience	   is	  misleading.’940	  This	  comment	   is	   highly	   pertinent	   to	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   epistemological	   approach	  represented	  by	  Katz.941	  For	  Katz,	  the	  only	  reality	  of	  the	  mystical	  experience	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	   social	   construction	   of	   the	   human	   subject	   and	   the	   data	   supplied	   by	   ordinary	  consciousness.	   In	   the	  modern	   debate	   over	  mysticism,	   the	   constructivists	   have	   adopted	   a	  reductionist	  metaphysic,	  whereby	   the	   experience	   of	   God	   is	   rationalised	   according	   to	   the	  explanation	  of	  cultural	  factors.	  	  	  The	  constructivists’	  neo-­‐Kantian	  epistemology	  imposes	  the	  mediation	  of	  all	  experience	  by	  the	   categories,	  without	   allowing	   for	  Kant’s	  a	  priori	   knowledge,	  which	   is	   foundational	   for	  Otto’s	   sense	   of	   the	   numinous.942	  Through	   Schleiermacher	   and	   Otto,	   religion	   is	   removed	  from	  Kant’s	  location	  of	  God	  in	  morality,	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  a	  priori,	  i.e.	  the	  innate	  sense	  of	  the	  religious,	  that	  has	  been	  termed	  the	  numinous,	  the	  infinite	  or	  the	  absolute,	  in	  order	  to	  give	  a	  universal	  aspect	  to	  the	  Christian	  notion	  of	  God.	  The	  opposition	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  mysticism	  according	   to	   intuition	  and	   the	   sense	  of	   the	   religious,	  with	   the	  denial	   of	   any	  ‘given’	   or	  a	  priori	   by	   the	   constructivists,	   in	   their	   relativizing	   of	   all	   knowledge	   claimed	   in	  mystical	   experience,	   corresponds	   to	   the	   problem	   confronting	   Barhebraeus.	   He	   was	  similarly	  presented	  with	  an	  either/or	  conundrum.	  Thus,	  either	  the	  sense	  of	  God	  is	  intuited	  by	   the	   intellect	   as	   a	   spiritual	   seeing	   of	   divine	   reality,	   or	   the	   being	   of	   God	   is	   reasoned	  through	   the	  categories	  of	  metaphysics	  as	   the	  being	  of	  all	  beings.	  The	  debate	  remained	  at	  the	  epistemological	  level,	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  was	  appropriate	  to	  the	  divine	  science	   of	   theology.	   In	   the	  modern	   study	   of	  mysticism	   the	   debate	   similarly	   concerns	   the	  discourse	  about	  transcendence.	  Either	  there	  are	  special	  states	  of	  consciousness,	  a	  sense	  of	  the	   wholly	   other	   through	   which	   transcendence	   is	   experienced	   and	   can	   be	   described	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  940	  Smart,	   "Understanding	  Religious	  Experience,"	  19-­‐20.	  Smart	  also	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  briefly	  his	  notion	  of	  divine	   transcendence,	   concluding	   that	   ‘God	   lies,	   as	   it	  were,	   along	   the	   spectrum	  of	   our	   experiences,	   and	  his	  transcendence	  cannot	  absolutely	  hide	  him	  away.’	  	  941	  The	  context	  of	  Smart’s	  comment	  on	  the	  transcendence	  of	  the	  mystical	  object	  is	  made,	  interestingly	  enough,	  in	  his	  contribution	  to	  the	  first	  of	  Katz’s	  volumes,	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophical	  Analysis.	  942	  Otto,	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Non-­‐Rational	  Factor	  in	  the	  Idea	  of	  the	  Divine	  and	  Its	  Relation	  
to	   the	  Rational,	   112-­‐3.	  Otto	   quotes	   from	   the	   opening	  words	   of	  Kant’s	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason:	   ‘That	   all	   our	  knowledge	  begins	  with	  experience	  there	  can	  be	  no	  doubt.	  For	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  that	  the	  faculty	  of	  cognition	  should	  be	  awakened	  into	  exercise	  otherwise	  than	  by	  means	  of	  objects	  which	  affect	  our	  senses?...	  But	  though	  all	  our	  knowledge	  begins	  with	  experience,	  it	  by	  no	  means	  follows	  that	  all	  arises	  out	  of	  experience.’	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phenomenologically,	  or,	  methods	  of	  rationality	  may	  be	  appropriated	  from	  other	  disciplines,	  especially	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  the	  theorisation	  of	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  reality,	  in	  the	  study	  of	  the	  mystical	  discourse.	  However,	  since	  mystic	  discourse	  is	  essentially	  a	  discourse	  about	  transcendence	  it	  requires	  a	  method	  of	  interpretation	  which	  does	  not	  conflict	  with	  the	  very	   subject	   of	   its	   discourse.	   Similarly	   Barhebraeus	   argued	   that	   the	   language	   of	  metaphysics	  could	  not	  be	  employed	  in	  a	  discourse	  that	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  transcendent	  God,	  for	  transcendence	  understood	  as	  the	  giving	  of	  being,	  could	  not	  to	  be	  reduced	  to	  being.	  	  
Barhebraeus’	  Epistemological	  Conflict	  The	  mystics	   in	   the	  Syrian	   tradition	  questioned	  how	  the	  experience	  of	  God	  could	  be	   freed	  from	  the	  sensory	  perception	  of	  the	  material	  world;	  for	  if	  God	  is	  constrained	  as	  the	  object	  of	  perception,	  then	  how	  could	  this	  render	  the	  infinite.	  They	  have	  offered	  an	  alternative	  mode	  of	   thinking	   about	   God	   that	   frees	   ‘God’	   from	   the	   idolatry	   of	   the	   concept.	   This	   alternative	  mode	  of	   thinking	  was	   to	   some	  degree	  appreciated	  by	   the	   classical	   scholars	  of	  mysticism,	  but	   they	   tended	   to	   impose	   a	  metaphysical	  model	   on	  mystic	   discourse.	   In	   order	   to	   avoid	  such	   essentialism,	   the	   positive	   contribution	   of	   the	  mystics	   to	   this	   problem	  of	   conceptual	  idolatry	   will	   be	   drawn	   from	   a	   particular	   instance	   in	   the	   Syrian	   mystical	   tradition,	   the	  epistemological	  crisis	  identified	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  fourth	  part	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  has	  already	  been	  discussed	   in	   some	   detail,	   where	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   this	   informative	   brief	  autobiography	  does	  not	  actually	  present	   in	  clear	   terms	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	   the	   impasse	  which	   caused	   Barhebraeus	   to	  waver	   between	   two	   positions.943	  The	   complexity	   of	   Syrian	  intellectual	   tradition	   reflected	   a	   rich	   theological	   and	   philosophical	   tradition	   amongst	   the	  East	  and	  West	  Syrians.	  Syrian	  theology	  had	  integrated	  elements	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Greeks	  at	   various	   stages	  of	   its	  development,	   indirectly	   from	   the	  Christian	  Platonism	  of	   the	  early	  Greek	  Fathers,	   and	   also	   through	   the	  direct	   translation	  of	  Greek	  philosophical	  works	   into	  Syriac	   from	   the	   sixth	   century	   onwards.	   Barhebraeus’	   two	   positions	   were	   rival	  epistemologies	  that	  Syrian	  theology	  inherited	  from	  Greek	  philosophy.	  The	  two	  trends	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  943	  See	  the	  relevant	  section	  in	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  
His	  Ethikon,	  61,	  579*.	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be	  broadly	  categorised	  as	  the	  scholastic	  and	  the	  mystic,	  one	  based	  on	  the	  naturalism	  and	  logic	   of	   Aristotle,	   the	   other	   on	   the	   idealism	   of	   Plato.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   these	   rival	  epistemologies	  both	  had	  a	  common	  background	  in	  the	  Alexandrian	  commentary	  tradition	  of	  the	  Neoplatonic	  Aristotle.	  	  When	  Barhebraeus	  spoke	  of	  his	  state	  of	  despair,	   this	  personal	   intellectual	  crisis	  reflected	  the	   larger	   epistemological	   impasse.	   Barhebraeus’	   own	   existential	   crisis	   concerned	   the	  wider	  intellectual	  problem	  of	  how	  the	  mind	  could	  achieve	  knowledge	  of	  God	  which	  was	  a	  transcendent	  knowledge.	   In	  other	  words,	  how	  the	  mind’s	  apprehension	  of	   things	   in	   their	  being	   could	   accommodate	   an	   object	   transcendent	   to	   itself,	   without	   making	   God	   into	  another	   ‘thing’.	   In	   order	   to	   overcome	   the	   subject-­‐object	   problem	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   God,	  Barhebaeus	   borrowed	   from	   the	   Islamic	   tradition	   where	   comparative	   debates	   had	   been	  played	  out	  between	  rival	  traditions	  of	  thought.	  In	  his	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  objects	  to	  the	  predominance	  of	  logic	  in	  theological	  discourse,	  suggesting	  that	  logical	  reasoning	  has	  been	   the	   cause	  of	   conflict	   between	   the	  Christian	  denominations.	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	   had	   similarly	  objected	  to	  the	  use	  of	  logic	  and	  metaphysics	  in	  determining	  matters	  of	  religion	  and	  belief,	  and	   in	   his	   autobiographical	   work	   al-­‐Munqidh	   min	   al-­‐ḍalāl,	   his	   description	   of	   his	   own	  personal	  crisis	  is	  so	  similar	  to	  Barhebraeus’,	  that	  scholars	  have	  suggested	  that	  rather	  than	  a	  true	   state	   of	   crisis,	   the	   brief	   account	   in	   fourth	   part	   of	   the	   Dove	   is	   little	   more	   than	   a	  referential	   literary	   motif.944	  Irrespective	   of	   his	   actual	   engagement	   with	   al-­‐Ghazālī,	   the	  epistemological	   nature	   of	   Barhebraeus’	   crisis,	   which	   reflected	   the	   impasse	   within	   the	  Syrian	   tradition,	   culminated	   in	   his	   response,	   which	   was	   to	   reconcile	   the	   two	   opposing	  positions	  through	  his	  mysticism	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  	  
Resolving	  the	  Impasse	  between	  Rival	  Epistemologies	  As	   Barhebraeus	   approached	   the	   conflict	   within	   the	   Syrian	   tradition,	   by	   returning	   to	   its	  epistemological	  foundations	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  its	  causes,	  his	  approach	  can	  be	  paralleled	  in	  overcoming	  the	   impasse	   in	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism.	   In	  the	  contemporary	  debate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  944	  This	  view	  taken	  by	  Takahashi	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  a	  previous	  chapter.	  However,	  Teule	  considers	  this	  to	  have	  been	  a	  genuine	   ‘existential’	   crisis,	  which	  befell	  him	  at	   the	  end	  of	  his	   life,	  and	   that	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  account	  was	  an	  example	  which	  Barhebraeus	   imitates	   in	   the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove.	   Teule,	   "Gregory	  Barhebraeus	  and	  His	  Time:	  The	  Syrian	  Renaissance,"	  30.	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over	  mystical	  consciousness,	  Forman’s	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  by	  identity	  attempts	  to	  convey	  a	  non-­‐intentional	  aspect	  to	  mystical	  experience,	  whereby	  the	  subject	  only	  has	  awareness	  of	  its	   state	   of	   awareness. 945 	  This	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   Schleiermacher’s	   ‘immediate	   self-­‐consciousness’,	   but	  with	   the	   omission	   of	   his	   ‘whence’.946	  However,	   rather	   than	   resolving	  the	  subject-­‐object	  problem	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  mystical	  experience,	  Forman’s	  approach	  merely	   sidesteps	   the	   issue	  at	  hand,	  by	   removing	  any	  objective	   reference	   for	   the	  mystical	  experience	  altogether.	  Such	  a	  move	  disengages	   from	  the	  discussion	  of	   transcendence	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  God	  in	  the	  mystical	  experience.	  Forman	  states	  that	  there	  are	  three	  elements	  in	  intentional	  knowledge	  which	  are	  distinct	  from	  each	  other:	   ‘the	  knower,	  the	  object	  known,	  and	  the	  epistemological	  process(es)	   involved	   in	   that	  knowing’.	  He	   then	  distinguishes	   this	  from	   ‘the	   knowledge	   I	   have	   of	   my	   own	   consciousness’,	   which	   he	   calls	   a	   ‘knowledge	   by	  identity’.947	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  collapses	  such	  distinctions	  identified	  as	  characteristic	  of	   intentional	  knowledge,	  and	  which	  maintain	  God	  as	   the	  object	  of	  knowledge.	  The	   three	  elements	  of	  knower,	  known	  object	  and	  the	  mediating	  epistemological	  process	  are	  conflated	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  epistemology	  to	  ontology,	  from	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God	  to	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  This	  ontological	  understanding	  of	   the	   love	  of	  God	  occurs	  through	  the	  Spirit,	   for	  the	  Spirit	  unifies	  subject	  and	  object	  through	  its	  giving	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  The	  Spirit	  is	  not	  an	  object	  of	  knowledge	  external	  to	  man,	  but	  works	  within	  him	  and	  animates	  his	  spiritual	  nature.	  In	  this	  way,	   Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  may	   extend	   Forman’s	  model	   of	   ‘knowledge	   by	   identity’	   for	  the	  mystical	  experience	  without	  restricting	  this	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  consciousness	  that	  is	  empty	  of	  content.	  	  For	  Barhebraeus,	  man	  transcends	  his	  mental	  and	  physical	  capacities,	  through	  realising	  his	  more	  hidden	  and	  essential	  spiritual	  nature,	   through	  which	  he	  perceives	  his	  own	  spiritual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  945	  Forman,	  "Mystical	  Knowledge:	  Knowledge	  by	  Identity,"	  726.	  	  946	  These	  well-­‐known	  expressions	  of	  Schleiermacher’s	  appear	  in	  his	  later	  work	  The	  Christian	  Faith,	  as	  quoted	  by	  Proudfoot,	  Religious	  Experience,	  33.	  947	  Forman,	  "Mystical	  Knowledge:	  Knowledge	  by	  Identity,"	  726.	  ‘I	  would	  call	  the	  knowledge	  I	  have	  of	  my	  own	  consciousness	   a	   “knowledge	   by	   identity”	   and	   distinguish	   it	   from	   intentional	   knowledge.	   In	   intentional	  knowledge	  three	  distinct	  elements	  must	  be	  involved:	  the	  knower,	  the	  object	  known,	  and	  the	  epistemological	  process(es)	  involved	  in	  that	  knowing.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  my	  knowledge	  of	  an	  external	  object,	  the	  object	  is	  clearly	  distinct	   from	   the	   subject.	   Here	   the	   sorts	   of	   complex	   mediating	   or	   constructing	   epistemological	   processes	  referred	   to	   by	   the	   constructivists	   are	   clearly	   involved.	   Even	   in	   the	   case	   of	   so-­‐called	   self-­‐knowledge,	   some	  aspect	  of	  the	  personality	  or	  ego,	  a	  disposition,	  or	  a	  concept	  of	  the	  self	  serves	  as	  the	  intentional	  object,	  and	  all	  the	  constructive	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  come	  into	  play.	  ’	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likeness	  as	  the	   image	  of	  God.	  When	  the	  soul	  sees	   its	  own	  beauty	  as	  given	  by	  the	  Spirit	   in	  likeness	  of	  the	  Spirit,	  then	  the	  giving	  of	  the	  beautiful	  and	  the	  good	  is	  loved	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  its	  giving.	   Therefore,	   Barhebraeus	   states	   that	   truth	   is	   revealed	   in	   the	   beautiful,	   that	   he	  may	  come	  to	  know	  the	  unknown	  figure	  of	  God	  in	  spirit	  and	  truth.948	  Thus,	  the	  true	  knowledge	  of	  God	  is	  through	  the	  Spirit,	  rather	  than	  knowledge	  of	  an	  object	  of	  consciousness	  or	  from	  any	  state	   of	   consciousness.	   This	   is	   a	   ‘knowledge	   of’	   what	   is	   given	   through	   revelation,	   which	  speaks	  of	  the	  gift	  of	  love	  and	  leaves	  the	  nature	  of	  God	  as	  the	  unknown.	  Such	  understanding	  of	  divine	  revelation	  is	  guided	  by	  the	  Spirit,	  whose	  truth	  convicts	  by	  the	  effective	  power	  of	  love	  that	  it	  imparts,	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  a	  non-­‐objectifying	  language	  -­‐	  a	  language	  which	  does	  not	  reason	  about	  the	  properties	  of	  things.	  	  	  The	  five	  causes	  of	  love	  show	  how	  ‘God’	  is	  not	  truly	  known	  except	  in	  the	  ‘love	  of	  God’.	  The	  phenomenon	   of	   love	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   the	   perception	   of	   a	   beautiful	   object,	   but	   is	  integral	  to	  man’s	  way	  of	  being.	  If	  man	  is	  predisposed	  to	  seek	  after	  the	  causes	  of	  things,	  then	  his	   love	   for	   the	  benefaction	  of	  his	  own	  self	   tends	   towards	   the	   source	  of	   this	  benefaction,	  which	  is	  found	  in	  the	  love	  of	  God	  that	  gives	  itself	  through	  the	  Spirit.	  Barhebraeus	  shows	  in	  his	  development	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  that	  even	  in	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  divine	  beauty,	  God	  is	  not	  an	  object	  of	  man’s	  perception,	  but	  the	  notion	  of	  God	  is	  understood	  in	  man’s	  love	  for	  what	  transcends	  his	  immediate	  possession	  of	  the	  beautiful	  and	  the	  good.	  Therefore,	  the	  love	   of	   God	   goes	   beyond	  man’s	   own	   existential	   being,	   but	   not	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   ‘God’	   is	  another	  higher	  being	  or	  somehow	  divorced	  from	  being,	  rather	  the	   love	  of	  God	  allows	  the	  mind	   to	   reach	   beyond	   metaphysical	   thinking	   towards	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   self	   that	  transcends	  the	  self.	  	  If	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  is	  considered	  from	  this	  reading	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism,	  then	  it	  is	  incumbent	  to	  revise	  the	  framework	  of	  its	  debates.	  Transcendence	  is	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  object	  of	  experience,	  and	   the	  debate	  over	   the	  perennialist	  or	   constructivist	  view	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  948	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	   Sentence	  79,	  75,	  593*.	  	  ‘My	  sun	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  me	  still	  in	  the	  sign	  of	  Caper	  only,	  even	  more	  to	  the	  South	  of	  Caper,	  and	  its	  ascension	  has	  not	  yet	  reached	  my	  horizon.	  And	  I	  desire	  and	  beseech	  that	  somewhat	  of	   the	   true	   light	  of	   the	  Beautiful	  One	  may	  dawn	   for	  me;	   in	  order	   that	   I	  may	  no	   longer	  adore	  Him	   that	   I	   know	  not,	   but	  Him,	   that	   I	  know	  in	  spirit	  and	  truth.’	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how	  that	  experience	  is	  determined,	  is	  an	  arbitrary	  one	  in	  view	  of	  its	  main	  presupposition,	  that	  mystics	  have	  a	  particular	  experience	  of	  something.	  This	  is	  much	  too	  limited	  a	  view	  of	  mysticism,	  especially	  when	  a	  mystic	  like	  Barhebraeus	  makes	  philosophical	  claims	  about	  the	  originary	   structuring	   of	   reality.	   The	   methodological	   contribution	   of	   Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  will	  be	  considered	  according	  to	  his	  view	  of	  how	  the	  language	  which	  constructs	  ontic	  reality,	  is	  a	  language	  itself	  constructed	  by	  a	  metaphysical	  view	  of	  reality.	  In	  order	  to	  bypass	  this	  circular	  reasoning,	  Barhebraeus	  shows	  through	  his	  own	  quest	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  revelation,	   the	   necessity	   of	   seeking	   after	   a	   thinking	   grounded	   in	   a	   different	   kind	   of	  discourse,	  one	  which	  is	  not	  based	  on	  the	  epistēmē	  of	  logic.	  	  
Methodological Contributions to the Study of Mysticism  	  Concentrating	   on	   questions	   of	   an	   epistemological	   nature,	   i.e.	   how	   the	  mystic	   knows	   the	  objects	  of	  his	  consciousness,	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  has	  understood	  the	  claims	  of	  mystics	  according	  to	  the	  Western	  emphasis	  on	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  all	  knowledge.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	   nature	   of	   the	   material	   for	   the	   phenomenon	   called	   ‘mysticism’	   has	   been	   overlooked.	  Rather	  than	  the	  mystical	  consciousness,	  the	  academic	  has	  access	  to	  the	  textual	  account	  of	  the	  mystic,	  through	  which	  any	  conclusions	  about	  mysticism	  must	  be	  reached.	  Peter	  Moore	  states	  this	  point	  thus:	  	   It	  often	  seems	  to	  be	  forgotten	  that	  the	  immediate	  data	  of	  the	  philosophical	  analysis	  of	  mysticism	  are	  not	  mystical	   experiences	   themselves,	   but	   the	   mystics’	   accounts	   of	   these	   experiences.	   It	   follows	   that	   the	  fruitfulness	   of	   philosophical	   analysis	   primarily	   depends	   on	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   these	   accounts	   render	  accessible	  to	  non-­‐mystical	  investigation	  the	  experiences	  to	  which	  they	  refer.949	  	  However,	  Moore	  does	  not	   take	  this	  point	   to	   its	  more	  radical	  conclusion,	   that	   the	  primary	  data	   of	   mysticism	   is	   the	   text	   itself.	   Since	   even	   philosophical	   analysis	   has	   no	   immediate	  access	   to	   the	   psychological	   experience	   of	   the	   mystic,	   it	   is	   the	   text	   which	   forms	   the	  phenomena	  of	  mysticism,	  and	  not	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘mystical	  experience’.	  Historical	  studies	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  949	  Moore,	  "Mystical	  Experience,	  Mystical	  Doctrine,	  Mystical	  Technique,"	  101.	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mysticism	   in	  particular,	  cannot	  begin	  with	   the	  mystical	  experience	  but	  with	   the	   text	  as	   it	  narrates	  the	  world	  of	  this	  experience.	  Since	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  has	  tended	  to	  concern	  itself	  with	  the	  study	  of	  the	  historical	  texts	  of	  mystics,	  hermeneutics	  would	  seem	  to	  offer	   an	   appropriate	   philosophical	  method	   for	   understanding	   these	   texts.	   The	   science	   of	  hermeneutics	  has	  traditionally	  been	  concerned	  with	  interpreting	  the	  meaning	  of	  texts.	  For	  Ricoeur,	   hermeneutics	   in	   its	   primary	   sense	   ‘concerns	   the	   rules	   required	   for	   the	  interpretation	   of	   the	   written	   documents	   of	   our	   culture’.950	  Further,	   he	   argues	   that	   ‘the	  human	  sciences	  may	  be	   said	   to	  be	  hermeneutical’	   in	   that	   their	  methodology	   is	   similar	   to	  text-­‐interpretation,	  and	  their	  object	  conforms	  to	  those	  features	  constitutive	  of	  text.951	  The	  study	  of	  religious	  texts,	  which	  is	  the	  primary	  concern	  in	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  since	   its	   discussions	   concern	   issues	   which	   ultimately	   arise	   from	   the	   text,	   can	   thus	  appropriate	  philosophical	  hermeneutics	  to	  explore	  further	  the	  theoretical	  problems	  posed	  by	  text-­‐interpretation.	  	  Over	   and	   above	   the	   intentionality	   of	   mystical	   consciousness,	   the	   academic	   study	   of	  mysticism	   should	   concern	   itself	   with	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   mystics’	   discourse.	   The	  written	  text	  of	  the	  mystic	  always	  requires	  a	  reader	  to	  interpret	   its	  meaning,	  but	  similarly	  implicates	   a	   further	   transcendental	   referent,	   ‘the	   world’	   about	   which	   the	   text	   speaks.952	  Ricoeur	   stated	   in	  his	   essay	  The	  Task	  of	  Hermeneutics,	  that	   ‘the	   text	  must	  be	  unfolded,	  no	  longer	  towards	  its	  author	  but	  towards	  its	  immanent	  sense	  and	  towards	  the	  world	  which	  it	  opens	   up	   and	   discloses’.953	  In	   the	   modern	   academic	   study	   of	   mysticism,	   the	   immanent	  sense	   of	   the	   mystical	   text	   is	   identified	   with	   the	   mystical	   consciousness,	   in	   which	   the	  discourse	   of	   the	  mystics	  would	   seem	   to	   retreat	   into	   personal	   subjectivity.	   However,	   this	  approach	  neglects	  the	  invitation	  towards	  otherness	  made	  by	  the	  mystic	  text,	  by	  which	  even	  mystic	   subjectivity,	   as	   it	   is	   represented	   within	   the	   mystic	   narrative,	   seeks	   to	   refer	   to	   a	  world	  beyond	  the	  self.	  It	  is	  the	  ‘discourse’	  of	  the	  mystics	  in	  the	  sense	  outlined	  by	  Certeau,954	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  950	  Paul	  Ricoeur,	  "The	  Model	  of	  the	  Text:	  Meaningful	  Action	  Considered	  as	  Text,"	  in	  Hermeneutics	  &	  the	  Human	  
Sciences,	  ed.	  John	  B.	  Thompson	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1981),	  197.	  951	  Ibid.	  952	  Ibid.,	  201-­‐2.	  Riceour	  states	  that	  ‘the	  world	  is	  the	  ensemble	  of	  references	  opened	  up	  by	  the	  texts’.	  953	  "The	  Task	  of	  Hermeneutics,"	  53.	  954	  Certeau,	  The	  Mystic	  Fable,	  16.	  Certeau	  also	  adds	   in	  a	   footnote	   (20)	   that	  by	   the	  mid-­‐seventeenth	  century,	  ‘“mystic”	  referred	  essentially	  to	  a	  use	  of	  language	  while	  “spirituality”	  referred	  to	  the	  experience’.	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rather	   than	   the	   phenomenology	   of	   mystical	   experience,	   that	   should	   form	   the	   primary	  object	   of	   study	   for	   the	   academic	   study	   of	   mysticism.	   From	   this	   discourse	   arises	   an	  epistemology	   of	   mystic	   subjectivity	   that	   is	   secondary	   to	   the	   ontological	   focus	   of	   mystic	  discourse.	  When	  the	  modern	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism	  brackets	  out	  the	  truth	  claims	  of	  mystic	  discourse	  in	  the	  name	  of	  academic	  objectivity,955	  it	  subsumes	  the	  ontological	  claims	  to	  the	  epistemological.	  Such	  a	  move	  provides	  a	  paradoxical	  but	  unintended	  reversal	  of	  the	  intentionality	  of	  mystic	  discourse.	  	  Mysticism	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  operating	  on	  three	  levels	  of	  discourse:	  primarily	  as	  that	  of	  mystical	   texts	   and	  practices,	   and	   secondly	   alongside	   that	   of	   the	   tradition	  by	  which	   these	  mystical	   texts	   continue	   to	  be	   interpreted	   and	   transmitted	  by	  practitioners.	   Finally	   at	   the	  third	  level,	  the	  academic	  tradition	  of	  studying	  mysticism	  may	  reflect	  on	  all	  three	  levels	  of	  discourse.956	  Rather	   than	  mysticism	   constituting	   a	   corpus	   of	   primary	   data	   subject	   to	   the	  scientific	  explanations	  of	  objective	   inquiry	   in	  the	  academy,	  both	  mystic	  discourse	  and	  the	  theology	  of	  mystic	  discourse	   internal	  to	  the	  tradition	  of	   the	  mystic	  can	  be	  used	  to	   inform	  this	   third	   level	   of	   academic	   inquiry.	   In	   his	   analysis	   of	   these	   three	   levels	   of	   discourse	   in	  academic	   inquiry,	   Flood	   has	   provided	   a	   model	   for	   the	   dialogue	   between	   these	   different	  levels,	   and	   for	   research	   in	   the	   academy	   to	   enter	   into	   a	   constructive	   and	   critical	   dialogue	  with	  its	  research	  subject.957	  His	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  religion,	  which	  draws	  implicitly	  on	  the	  post-­‐Heideggerian	  tradition	  of	  ontological	  hermeneutics,	  can	  thus	  be	  applied	  to	  find	  a	  way	  forward	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  interpretation	  of	  mystical	  experience	  in	  the	  academic	  study	   of	   mysticism.	   This	   debate,	   which	   has	   reached	   an	   impasse	   between	   a	  phenomenological	   objectivism	   and	   constructivism,	   reflects	   the	   wider	   epistemological	  impasse	  between	  essentialism	  and	   relativism	   in	   the	  Western	   academy.	  Bernstein’s	  work,	  on	   the	  epistemological	  gap	   that	  has	  developed	  between	  objectivism	  and	  relativism	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  955	  Flood	  argues	  that	  the	  phenomenologists	  of	  religion	  adopted	  Husserl’s	  method	  of	  ‘bracketing	  out’	  (epoché)	  for	   questions	   of	   religious	   truth,	   in	   order	   to	   proclaim	   the	   objectivity	   of	   their	   inquiry.	   Flood,	   Beyond	  
Phenomenology	  :	  Rethinking	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion,	  95-­‐99.	  956	  Flood’s	  outline	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  three	  levels	  of	  discourse	  in	  Religious	  Studies,	  is	  adapted	  here	  for	  the	   Academic	   Study	   of	  Mysticism.	   ‘A	   third-­‐order	   discourse	   is	   a	   form	   of	   reasoning	   about	   first-­‐	   and	   second-­‐order	  discourses	  and	  is	   implicitly	  if	  not	  explicitly	  comparative.’	  "Reflections	  on	  Tradition	  and	  Inquiry	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Religions,"	  55.	  957	  Flood,	   ‘Religious	  Studies	  needs	  to	  be	  hospitable	  in	  allowing	  a	  plurality	  of	  discourses	  to	  function	  within	  it	  and	  providing	  an	  arena	  for	  encounter	  between	  traditions	  that	  would	  not	  otherwise	  happen’.	  Ibid.,	  56.	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academy,	  shows	  how	  the	  dialogical	  nature	  of	  the	  ontological	  tradition	  of	  hermeneutics	  can	  serve	  to	  reoncile	  these	  rival	  epistemological	  positions.958	  	  	  Following	  Heidegger,	   ontological	   hermeneutics	   concerns	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   situated-­‐ness	  of	  man	  in	  his	  historical	  consciousness,	  as	  the	  receiver	  of	  traditions	  that	  constitute	  his	  understanding	   and	   yet	   also	   extend	   themselves	   to	   him	   for	   the	   continuing	   task	   of	  reinterpretation	   for	   the	   present.959	  In	   this	   way,	   the	   tradition	   of	   the	   mystics	   is	   another	  hermeneutical	   tradition	  of	   interpretation,	  which	  may	  be	   allowed	   to	   contribute	   further	   to	  the	   ontological	   inquiry	   of	   Western	   hermeneutics	   into	   the	   anticipatory	   structures	   of	  understanding	   that	   define	   the	   derived	   epistemology	   of	   the	   human	   sciences.960	  	   With	  Ricoeur,	   hermeneutics	   moves	   from	   the	   Heideggerian	   concern	   with	   the	   foundations	   of	  understanding,	   that	   is,	   the	   subordination	   of	   epistemology	   to	   ontology,	   to	   return	   towards	  the	   epistemological	   question	   of	   the	   derivative	   status	   of	   the	   human	   sciences. 961 	  The	  academic	   inquirer	  of	   the	  Western	   institution	   is	  shaped	  by	  the	  development	  of	  conceptual	  categories	  and	  debates	  that	  have	  determined	  historical	  consciousness.	  Therefore,	  research	  must	   take	   into	   account	   the	   situated	   nature	   of	   the	   inquirer,	   necessitating	   a	   dialogical	  encounter	  between	  the	  interpreter	  and	  the	  historical	  text	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  interpretation,	  in	   order	   to	   allow	   the	   ‘matter	   of	   the	   text’	   to	   speak.962	  Research	   into	   mysticism	   should	  theorise	   about	   mysticism	   as	   a	   critical	   reflection	   on	   themes	   which	   are	   reasoned	   and	  conditioned	  by	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  mystical	  texts	  themselves.	  This	  would	  allow	  mystic	  discourse	  to	  inform	  and	  even	  revise	  the	  preconceptions	  of	  the	  Western	  study	  of	  mysticism	  about	   the	   nature	   of	   its	   object	   of	   study	   and	   further	   shape	   the	   method	   of	   interpretation	  adopted	  within	  that	  academic	  discipline.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  958	  See	   ‘Part	   One	   –	   Beyond	   Objectivism	   and	   Relativism:	   An	   Overview’.	   Bernstein,	   Beyond	   Objectivism	   and	  
Relativism	  :	  Science,	  Hermeneutics,	  and	  Praxis,	  1-­‐49.	  959	  Hans	   Georg	   Gadamer,	   Joel	   Weinsheimer,	   and	   Donald	   G.	   Marshall,	   Truth	   and	   Method,	   2nd	   rev.	   ed.,	  Continuum	   Impacts	   (London:	   Continuum,	   2004),	   282-­‐83.	   See	   (i)	   ‘The	   Rehabilitation	   of	   Authority	   and	  Tradition’.	  960	  Ricoeur,	  "Hermeneutics	  and	  the	  Critique	  of	  Ideology,"	  88-­‐89.	  961	  "The	  Task	  of	  Hermeneutics,"	  59.	  962	  "Hermeneutics	  and	  the	  Critique	  of	  Ideology,"	  90.	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The	  Path	  to	  Thinking	  In	   his	  monograph,	  The	  Mystical	  Element	   in	  Heidegger’s	  Thought,	   John	  D.	   Caputo	   suggests	  that	   for	  Heidegger,	   the	   thinking	   that	   lies	  beyond	  philosophy	   is	  akin	   to	   that	  of	  poetry	  and	  mysticism.963	  Indeed	   when	   Heidegger	   categorises	   the	   history	   of	   Western	   philosophy	   as	  metaphysics	  in	  his	  Letter	  on	  Humanism,	  he	  is	  then	  moved	  to	  insist	  on	  the	  need	  for	  ‘thought’	  aside	  from	  this	  kind	  of	  philosophising.964	  In	  his	  essay	  What	  is	  Philosophy?	  Heidegger	  argues	  that	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  philosophy	  amounts	  to	  Western	  rationality,	  what	  Caputo	  calls,	  ‘a	   matter	   of	   supplying	   reasons	   and	   argumentation,	   of	   entering	   the	   forum	   of	   rational	  debate’.965	  This	  is	  the	  sphere	  of	  ‘the	  Principle	  of	  Sufficient	  Reason’,	  by	  which	  ‘it	  is	  necessary	  to	   provide	   “reasons”	   for	   every	   “proposition”’.966	  Caputo	   has	   maintained	   that	   instead	   of	  posing	  a	  new	  definitive	  rationale	  of	  things	  in	  line	  with	  all	  the	  other	  major	  philosophers	  of	  the	  Western	  tradition,	  Heidegger	  departs	  from	  this	  sphere	  to	  reasoning	  ‘in	  order	  to	  take	  up	  a	   non-­‐conceptual,	   non-­‐discursive,	   non-­‐representational	   kind	   of	   “thinking”’,	   a	   thinking	  which	  is	  detached	  from	  traditional	  philosophy.967	  	  	  In	  the	  ‘Postscript’	  to	  What	  is	  Metaphysics?,	  Heidegger	  considers	  ‘representational	  thinking’	  (vorstellendes	  Denken)	  	  as	  the	  ‘attempt	  to	  calculate	  and	  count	  up	  beings,	  to	  reckon	  upon	  the	  possible	  uses	  to	  which	  they	  can	  be	  put’.968	  However,	  Caputo	  suggests	  that	  what	  he	  proposes	  here	  as	  ‘essential	  thinking’	  (wesentliches	  Denken),	  depends	  for	  its	  object	  ‘not	  on	  beings	  but	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  Being	   itself’.969	  Caputo	  envisages	  the	  task	  of	  Heidegger’s	   thinking	  as	  going	  beyond	   the	   ‘manipulation	   of	   beings’	   and	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   ‘will-­‐fulness’	   of	   beings	   by	  which	   Nietzsche	   characterised	   Western	   metaphysics,	   towards	   a	   meditation	   on	   Being.970	  Heidegger’s	   emphasis	   on	   the	   detachment	   of	   reflective	   thinking	   constitutes	   an	   attempt	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  963	  John	   D.	   Caputo,	   The	   Mystical	   Element	   in	   Heidegger's	   Thought,	   Rev.	   reprint.	   ed.	   (New	   York:	   Fordham	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  6.	  964	  This	  reference	  follows	  Caputo’s	  quotation	  of	  Heidegger’s	  Letter	  on	  Humanism.	  Ibid.,	  4.	  	  965	  Ibid.,	  3.	  966	  Ibid.	  Of	  the	  metaphysical	  foundations	  of	  philosophy	  for	  Heidegger,	  Caputo	  states	  with	  reference	  to	  What	  is	  
Philosophy?:	  ‘Philosophy	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  man’s	  attempt	  to	  think	  beings	  in	  their	  common	  properties,	  to	  isolate	  the	   “Beingness”	   (Seiendheit)	   of	   beings,	   their	   most	   general	   features,	   such	   as	   idea	   (Plato)	   and	   energeia	  (Aristotle).	  Now	  “thought”	  has	  become	  “philosophy”.’	  967	  Ibid.,	  4.	  968	  Ibid.,	  25.	  969	  Ibid.	  970	  Ibid.,	  24.	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retrieve	   an	   aspect	   of	   being	   that	   has	   been	   lost	   in	   representational	   thinking.	   Indeed	  Heidegger’s	  call	  to	  ‘thinking’	  in	  The	  End	  of	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Task	  of	  Thinking	  is	  also	  a	  call	  for	   the	   contemplative	   thinking	   of	  meditation.971	  In	   the	  Discourse	  on	  Thinking	  he	  makes	   a	  plea	   for	  man	   to	   reverse	  his	   state	  of	  being	   in	   ‘flight	  from	  thinking’,972	  claiming	   that	  man	   is	  essentially	   ‘a	  thinking,	   that	  is,	  a	  meditating	  being’.973	  Heidegger	  insists	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  ‘the	  path	  of	  meditative	  thinking’,	  especially	  in	  the	  modern	  technological	  age,	  a	  path	  which	  anyone	  can	  follow	  ‘in	  his	  own	  manner	  and	  within	  his	  own	  limits’,	  to	  think	  on	  what	  concerns	  him.974	  The	   meditative	   thinking	   of	   spirit	   and	   reason	   is	   ‘at	   the	   core’	   of	   man’s	   being	   and	  through	  which	  he	  contemplates	  the	  meaning	  of	  everything	  that	  is.975	  	  	  Caputo	   suggests	   that	   for	   Heidegger,	   philosophy	   and	  mysticism	   ‘belong	   together’,	   just	   as	  they	   did	   in	   the	   medieval	   world-­‐view,	   and	   that	   rather	   than	   oppose	   a	   philosophical	  rationalism	  to	  a	  mystical	  irrationalism,	  Heidegger	  saw	  a	  kind	  of	  thinking	  that	  was	  detached	  from	   the	   extremes	   of	   rationalism	   and	   irrationalism. 976 	  Further,	   Caputo	   argues	   that	  Eckhart’s	  effecting	  of	  ‘a	  breakthrough	  beyond	  the	  scholastic	  metaphysics	  of	  his	  day’,	  forms	  both	  a	  structural	  and	  historical	  connection	  to	  Heidegger’s	  critique	  of	  metaphysics	  from	  its	  emergence	   in	  medieval	   scholasticism	   to	   its	   shaping	   of	  modern	   ontology.977	  In	   evaluating	  the	  role	  of	  Western	  mysticism	  in	  the	  later	  Heidegger’s	  thought,	  it	  may	  be	  considered	  what	  further	   contribution	   can	   be	   made	   by	   mystic	   traditions	   to	   the	   path	   of	   thinking	   beyond	  metaphysics	   outlined	   in	   Heidegger’s	   ontological	   hermeneutics.	   Indeed,	   Heidegger’s	   1964	  essay,	  The	  End	  of	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Task	  of	  Thinking,	   ends	  ambiguously	  on	   the	  nature	  of	  this	   path	   to	   post-­‐metaphysical	   thinking.	   He	   states	   only	   that	   there	   is	   perhaps	   ‘a	   thinking	  outside	  of	   the	  distinction	  of	   rational	  and	   irrational’,	  but	   that	   ‘an	  education	   in	   thinking’	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  971	  Martin	  Heidegger,	   "The	  End	  of	   Philosophy	   and	   the	  Task	  of	  Thinking,"	   in	  Basic	  Writings	   from	  "Being	  and	  
Time"	  (1927)	  to	  "the	  Task	  of	  Thinking"	  (1964),	  ed.	  David	  Farrell	  Krell	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1993),	  449.	  972	  Discourse	  on	  Thinking	  :	  A	  Translation	  of	  'Gelassenheit'	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1966),	  45.	  973	  Ibid.,	  47.	  974	  Ibid.	  975	  Ibid.,	  45-­‐46.	  ‘Calculative	  thinking	  is	  not	  meditative	  thinking,	  not	  thinking	  which	  contemplates	  the	  meaning	  of	  which	  reigns	  in	  everything	  that	  is.	  976	  Caputo,	  The	  Mystical	  Element	  in	  Heidegger's	  Thought,	  7.	  	  977	  Ibid.,	  7-­‐8.	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determine	  how	  not	   to	   think	  according	   to	  a	  ground	  of	   rationality	   is	   still	   required.978	  Here,	  the	  mysticism	  of	  Barhebraeus	  offers	  a	  meditation	  on	  a	  similar	  problem	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  to	  think	  and	  form	  a	  discourse	  about	  God	  without	  the	  reasoning	  of	  Greek	  philosophy.	  	  	  In	  the	  Syrian	  tradition,	  there	  was	  a	  similar	  relation	  of	  scholasticism	  to	  mysticism,	  in	  which	  the	  thinking	  of	  mysticism	  and	  scholasticism	  both	  belonged	  to	  the	  Neoplatonic	  Aristotelian	  tradition.	   Each	   took	   their	   position	   according	   to	   these	   epistemological	   foundations.	  However,	  rather	  than	  accept	  the	  antipathy	  of	  these	  positions,	  Barhebraeus	  effected	  his	  own	  ‘breakthrough’	  in	  critiquing	  the	  onto-­‐theology	  of	  scholastic	  metaphysics.	  In	  examining	  the	  shared	  foundations	  of	  these	  rival	  epistemologies,	  he	  found	  a	  resolution	  to	  their	  divergent	  approaches	   to	   the	   knowledge	   of	   God.	   His	   resolution	   of	   this	   impasse	   also	   offers	   a	  contribution	  to	  the	  ontological	  tradition	  of	  Western	  hermeneutics	  following	  Heidegger	  and	  Gadamer.	  Indeed	  rather	  than	  distinguishing	  mysticism	  as	  irrational,	  mystical	  thought	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  type	  of	  post-­‐metaphysical	  thinking	  which	  can	  contribute	  to	  philosophy.	  Such	  an	  understanding	  of	  mysticism	  would	  allow	  mystic	  discourse	  to	  emerge	  as	  a	  ‘mode	  of	  thinking’,	   and	   as	   such	   can	   contribute	   to	   overcoming	   the	   dominance	   of	   metaphysical	  thinking	  that	  Heidegger	  identified	  in	  the	  modern	  scientific	  age	  of	  technology.979	  	  Mystical	   thought	  has	   two	   clear	   instances	  where	   it	   can	  be	  brought	   into	  dialogue	  with	   the	  path	  to	  Heidegger’s	  reflection	  on	  being.	  The	  first	  relates	  to	  Heidegger’s	  call	  for	  a	  meditative	  or	  essential	  thinking,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  representational	  thinking	  of	  the	  modern	  ontology	  of	  the	  sciences.	  The	  second	  instance	  concerns	  the	  development	  of	  Heidegger’s	  overcoming	  of	  philosophy	   as	   metaphysics;	   his	   suggestion	   that	   with	   this	   end,	   there	   must	   be	   a	   thinking	  which	  moves	  beyond	  the	  distinction	  of	  the	  rational	  and	  the	  irrational.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  post-­‐metaphysical	  discourse	  which	  requires	  a	  different	  kind	  of	   language	   to	  a	   reasoning	  which	  seeks	   to	   ground	   things	   in	   the	   principle	   of	   sufficient	   reason.	   Heidegger	   pointed	   to	   poetic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  978 	  Heidegger,	   "The	   End	   of	   Philosophy	   and	   the	   Task	   of	   Thinking,"	   449.	   With	   reference	   to	   Aristotle’s	  
Metaphysics,	  Heidegger	  states:	   ‘For	   it	   is	  not	  yet	  decided	   in	  what	  way	  that	  which	  needs	  no	  proof	   in	  order	   to	  become	  accessible	  to	  thinking	  is	  to	  be	  experienced.’	  979	  Marion,	   "The	   "End	  of	  Metaphysics"	   as	   a	  Possiblity,"	  174.	   In	   response	   to	  Heidegger,	  Marion	  asks,	   ‘Would	  overcoming	  metaphysics	  then	  mean	  overcoming	  the	  mode	  of	  thinking	   that	  has	  predominated	  to	  the	  point	  of	  imperialism	   –	   the	   imperialism	   of	   representation,	   armed	   with	   the	   power	   of	   ordering	   and	   mathematical	  calculation?’	  [Italics	  mine].	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language,	  but	   the	  mystics	  of	   the	  Western	  tradition	  offer	  another	  kind	  of	  discourse,	  which	  often	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  poetic,	  but	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  it.	  In	  the	  language	  of	  the	  mystics	  there	  is	  thus	  a	  seeking	  after	  things	  in	  their	  essential	  meaning,	  to	  use	  the	  metaphysical	  reasoning	  on	  being	  to	  go	  ‘beyond	  being’.	  Mystic	  discourse	  in	  its	  concern	  with	  ‘the	  beyond’	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  apprehension	  of	   transcendence	  which	  requires	  going	  beyond	  the	  perception	  of	  being.	  Barhebraeus	  makes	  the	  attempt	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  standard	  metaphysical	  distinctions,	  in	  his	  understanding	  of	  how	  there	  is	  participation	  of	  man	  in	  the	  divine,	  which	  reaches	  beyond	  the	  concept	  of	  divine	  being,	  and	  towards	  the	  realisation	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.980	  	  
Meditational	  Thinking	  and	  Knowledge	  by	  Revelations	  Barhebraeus	  shows	  through	  his	  mystical	  writings,	  how	  thought	  which	  is	  meditative,	  leads	  to	   a	   language	  which	   resists	   the	   objectifying	  nature	   of	   representational	   thought	   that	   uses	  logic	   as	   its	   tool.	   His	   was	   a	   concerted,	   critical	   study	   that	   synthesised	   all	   of	   the	   mystical	  writings	  at	  his	  disposal,	  from	  the	  East	  Syrians	  to	  the	  Greeks,	  rejecting	  certain	  aspects	  and	  incorporating	  others	   for	   the	  sake	  of	   refining	  a	  non-­‐objectifying	  model	  of	   language.	   In	   the	  Syrian	   monastic	   tradition,	   the	   reflective	   thinking	   of	   meditation	   and	   meditative	   prayer	  forms	  a	  preparatory	  stage	  to	  the	  receiving	  of	  revelations	  of	  the	  Spirit.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  the	  fourth	  part	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  when	  Barhebraeus	  describes	  the	  sentences	  as	  part	  of	   what	   was	   revealed	   to	   him	   in	   a	   ‘flash	   of	   lightning’.981	  The	   receiving	   of	   revelations	   is	  understood	  as	  the	  illumination	  of	  the	  mind	  by	  the	  Spirit.	  This	  stage	  of	  illumination	  cannot	  be	   equated	   with	   theōria,	   understood	   alternatively	   as	   the	   Platonic	   intuition	   of	   the	   Greek	  philosophers	  and	  the	  monastic	  contemplation	  of	  the	  Syrian	  solitaries,	  but	  is	  a	  stage	  which	  comes	   subsequently	   to	   this.	   Barhebraeus	   also	   refers	   to	   the	   ‘prophetic’	   knowledge	   of	   the	  perfect,	  like	  the	  wisdom	  of	  the	  prophets,	  which	  is	  received	  from	  the	  Spirit	  in	  the	  solitude	  of	  the	  cell	  rather	  than	  learnt	  in	  the	  formal	  study	  of	  books.982	  In	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  he	  makes	  a	   distinction	   between	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	   solitaries	   and	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	   perfect,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  980	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  Sentences	  73-­‐75,	  74-­‐75,	  592-­‐93*.	  981	  Ibid.,	  62,	  579*.	  982	  Ibid.,	  Sentences	  50-­‐51,	  70,	  589*.	  ‘50.	  The	  knowledge	  of	  the	  perfect	  is	  founded	  on	  revelations.	  All	  revealed	  knowledge	  is	  of	  a	  prophetic	  nature.	  51.	  The	  knowledge	  of	  the	  perfect	  is	  of	  a	  prophetic	  nature.	  And	  no	  part	  of	  prophetic	  knowledge	  can	  be	  learned	  and	  acquired	  by	  reading	  the	  Scriptures.’	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indicating	   that	   there	   are	   clearly	   two	  distinct	   stages,	   first	   of	   contemplation	  and	   second	  of	  illumination.983	  	  Meditational	   thinking	   leads	   to	   longing	   after	   the	   Beloved	   and	   reaching	   towards	   the	  unknown,	  the	  darkness	  of	  the	  cloud	  which	  veils	  the	  sight	  of	  the	  Beautiful	  one	  from	  human	  grasp,	   and	   thus	   ultimately	   not	   to	   the	   acquirement	   of	   knowledge	   for	   its	   own	   sake.	   The	  opening	  sentence	  of	  the	  centuria	  on	  the	  inquiry	  into	  knowledge	  by	  the	  pure	  soul,	  describes	  the	  divine	  cloud	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  unknowing	  in	  the	  hiddenness	  of	  God.	  	   1. The	  pure	  soul	  inquires	  into	  knowledge,	  not	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  glory	  by	  which	  the	  knowing	  acquire	  in	  the	  world,	  but	   that	   its	   longing	  after	   the	   face	  of	   the	  Lord	  of	   the	  universe	  may	  be	  augmented,	  and	   that	   it	  may	  be	  able	  to	  enter	  and	  to	  be	  hidden	  within	  the	  divine	  cloud.984	  	  	  Therefore	   the	   longing	  of	   the	  pure	  soul	   leads	   towards	   the	  divine	  cloud,	   in	  which	  knowing	  and	  seeing	  do	  not	  occur	  in	  the	  representative	  sense.	  Thus	  the	  vision	  and	  knowledge	  of	  God	  that	   is	   attained	   in	   the	   cloud	   is	   described	   as	   ‘without	   visible	   vision	   and	   knowable	  knowledge’.985	  The	  cloud	  is	  the	  place	  where	  God’s	  wisdom	  can	  be	  attained	  directly	  and	  fully,	  ‘without	   the	   intermediary	   of	   complicated	   deliberations’. 986 	  Meditational	   thought	   thus	  precedes	  the	  knowledge	  by	  revelations,	  understood	  as	  the	  non-­‐representational	  knowledge	  received	   in	   the	  divine	  cloud.	   It	   requires	  preparation	  of	   the	  body	  and	  soul	   ready	   for	   their	  animation	  by	  the	  spirit	  of	   love,	  by	  which	  this	  knowledge	   is	  received.	   Indeed,	   towards	  the	  end	   of	   the	   sentences,	   Barhebraeus	   recognises	   that	   the	   reader	  may	   not	   have	   reached	   the	  state	  to	  which	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Dove	  has	  been	  guiding	  him,	  the	  state	  of	  longing	  to	  see	  through	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  983	  Ibid.,	   Sentence	   98,	   80,	   598*.	   ‘Now	   these	   sentences	   are	   only	   profitable	   for	   him	   who	   is	   trained	   in	   the	  knowledge	  of	  divine	  and	  human	  practice,	  longing	  to	  see	  in	  revelations	  those	  things	  which	  his	  speculation	  has	  reached…’	  	  984	  Ibid.,	  Sentence	  1,	  62,	  579-­‐580*.	  985	  Ibid.,	  103,	  491-­‐92*.	  Section	  11:	  On	  Consolation	  in	  God	  and	  Freedom	  of	  Speech	  with	  Him:	  ‘The	  joy	  and	  the	  gladness	  which	  happen	  to	  the	  Initiated	  on	  account	  of	  the	  multitude	  of	  divine	  revelations	  and	  the	  frequency	  of	  spiritual	  visions,	  is	  called	  consolation	  in	  God.	  When	  this	  consolation	  has	  taken	  hold	  of	  the	  enviable,	  the	  friend	  of	  God,	  he	   is	  only	  content	  with	  quiet	  solitude	  and	  he	  cannot	  bear	  even	   the	  sound	  of	  a	   leaf.	  Such	  solitude	   is	  called	  by	  the	  teachers	  a	  solitude	  which	  makes	  gods;	  for	  through	  it	  the	  mind	  acquires	  complete	  unification	  and	  perfect	  mingling	  with	  God,	  and	  vision	  and	  knowledge	  of	  Him,	  whose	  glory	  is	  exalted	  over	  the	  world,	  without	  visible	  vision	  and	  without	  knowable	  knowledge.’	  986	  Ibid.,	  Sentence	  12,	  64,	  581*.	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revelations.987	  For	  this,	  the	  reader	  is	  advised	  to	  return	  to	  his	  meditation	  on	  the	  text	  of	  the	  
Book	  of	  the	  Dove,	  in	  order	  that	  its	  words	  might	  ‘warm’	  his	  heart,	  that	  is,	  to	  enflame	  it	  with	  the	  love	  of	  the	  Beautiful	  Good.988	  	  	  It	   remains	   to	   be	   considered	   to	  what	   extent	   ‘knowledge	   by	   revelations’	   can	   be	   used	   as	   a	  category	   of	   thought	   for	   the	   Heideggerian	   tradition	   of	   ontological	   hermeneutics.	   The	  interpretation	   of	   the	   texts	   of	   the	   mystics	   represents	   the	   possibility	   for	   a	   retrieval	   of	   a	  tradition	   of	   thinking	   about	   God	   beyond	   the	   dominant	  metaphysical	   tradition	   of	   thinking	  through	   being.	   The	   Syrian	   mystical	   tradition	   can	   be	   aligned	   with	   the	   overcoming	   of	  metaphysics	   in	   the	   West;	   for	   the	   latter	   tradition,	   metaphysics	   has	   exhausted	   all	   of	   its	  possibilities	  according	  to	  Heidegger,989	  while	  for	  the	  former,	  metaphysics	  as	  such	  was	  very	  much	   an	   imported	   discipline,	   especially	   in	   its	   decisive	   development	   in	   the	   Arabic-­‐Avicennan	  tradition.	  Heidegger’s	  point	  that	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  philosophy	  is	  the	  history	  of	  metaphysics	   holds	   as	   true	   for	   the	   Syrian	   reception	   of	   Greek	   philosophy,	   especially	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  metaphysical	   implications	  that	  Greek	  philosophy	  had	  for	  the	  Syrians	  in	  their	  dependence	   on	   logic.	   In	   Barhebraeus’	   inspired	   sentences,	   mathematical	   logic	   is	   by	  implication	   ‘elementary	   knowledge’,	   that	   is	   without	   necessity	   once	   the	   mind	   has	  penetrated	   the	  divine	   cloud.990	  For	   the	  divine	   cloud	  demarcates	   ‘the	  place	  without	   place,	  the	   world	   without	   denomination,	   the	   nature	   without	   beginning’,991	  and	   thus	   the	   kind	   of	  reasoning	  which	  depends	  on	  the	  categories,	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  proposition,	  causes	  and	  first	  principles,	  becomes	  irrelevant	  here.	  The	  cloud	  marks	  an	  internal	  point	  of	  departure,	  from	  the	  syllogistic	  form	  of	  reasoning	  that	  enslaves	  man	  within	  the	  categories	  of	  time	  and	  place,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  987	  Ibid.,	  Sentence	  98,	  80,	  598*.	  ‘But	  who	  is	  devoid	  of	  this	  longing,	  shall	  reiterate	  his	  meditation	  upon	  this	  book;	  with	   attentive	   intelligence	   however,	   not	   by	   brutish	   recitation;	   perhaps	   in	   this	   way	   it	   will	   make	  warm	   his	  heart.’	  988	  Wensinck	  translates	  the	  Syriac	  for	  the	  Beautiful	  Good	  as	  ‘the	  Beautiful	  One’.	  Ibid.,	  Sentence	  99,	  80-­‐81,	  598*.	  ‘99.	  The	  causes	  which	  abate	  the	  love	  unto	  the	  Beautiful	  one	  are	  many.	  To	  enumerate	  all	  of	  them	  is	  above	  my	  power	  and	  too	  lengthy	  for	  my	  time.’	  989	  Marion	  discusses	  this	  repeated	  assertion	  of	  Heidegger’s,	  in	  his	  article.	  Marion,	  "The	  "End	  of	  Metaphysics"	  as	  a	  Possiblity,"	  167-­‐68.	  990	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  64,	  582*.	  991	  Ibid.,	  116,	  505*.	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to	   the	   recognition	   of	   his	   own	  beauty	   through	   seeing	   in	   himself	   the	   divine	   image,	   and	  by	  which	  he	  recognises	  the	  Beautiful.992	  	  	  
Language	  and	  Metaphysical	  Thought	  The	  mysticism	  of	  Barhebraeus	  makes	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  Western	  tradition	  of	  ontological	  hermeneutics,	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  meditation	  on	  the	  relation	  of	  language	  and	  thought.	  In	  Truth	  
and	  Method,	  Gadamer	  refers	  to	  language	  as	  the	  ‘horizon’	  of	  ontological	  hermeneutics,	  as	  the	  ‘medium’	  of	   the	  hermeneutic	  experience	  of	   the	  world.993	  Hence,	  he	  postulates	   that	   ‘man’s	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   is	  primordially	   linguistic’.	  994	  Despite	  what	  he	   calls	   ‘the	  universality	  of	  our	   linguistically	   mediated	   experience	   of	   the	   world’,	   he	   recognises	   the	   challenge	   of	  American	   relativism	   that	   ‘none	   can	   escape	   that	   particular	   image	   and	   that	   particular	  schematization	  with	  which	  he	  is	  imprisoned’.995	  However,	  Gadamer	  insists	  that:	  	   the	   possibility	   of	   going	   beyond	   our	   conventions	   and	   beyond	   all	   experiences	   that	   are	   schematized	   in	  advance	  opens	  up	  before	  us	  once	  we	  find	  ourselves,	  in	  our	  conversation	  with	  others,	  faced	  with	  opposed	  thinkers,	  with	  new	  critical	  tests,	  with	  new	  experiences.996	  	  Therefore	  his	  insistence	  on	  the	  universality	  of	  language	  despite	  the	  critique	  from	  relativism	  and	  ideology	  is	  based	  on	  the	  hermeneutic	  experience	  of	  the	  world,	  which	  is	  dialogical	  in	  the	  sense	   of	   being	   always	   in	   conversation	   with	   the	   other,	   a	   dialogism	   which	   allows	   for	   its	  preconceived	  notions	  to	  be	  open	  to	  correction	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  other.	  The	  question	  then	   turns	   to	  how	  the	  dialogical	  nature	  of	  hermeneutics	  might	  allow	   for	  other	  notions	  of	  thinking	   about	   man’s	   relation	   to	   the	   world	   through	   language,	   and	   might	   contribute	   to	  widening	  its	  understanding	  of	  these	  relations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  992	  Ibid.,	   Sentence	   95,	   79,	   597*.	   ‘95.	   When	   you	   wish	   to	   give	   rest	   to	   your	   mind	   from	   attaining	   profound	  questions	   by	   syllogistic	   intricacies,	   and	   you	  will	   acquire	   solitude	   and	   silence	  with	   steady	   labours,	   then	   be	  patient,	  and	  be	  not	  dejected	  on	  your	  way.	  Ere	  long	  your	  sun	  will	  rise	  and	  illuminate	  your	  evening	  and	  show	  you	  your	  beauty	  and	  liberate	  you	  from	  the	  slavery	  of	  time	  and	  place.’	  993	  See	  Part	  III	  ‘The	  Ontological	  Shift	  of	  Hermeneutics	  Guided	  by	  Language’,	  Hans-­‐Georg	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  
Method	  –	  for	  example	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  the	  first	  section	  ‘Language	  as	  the	  medium	  of	  the	  hermeneutic	  experience’.	  994	  Gadamer,	  Weinsheimer,	  and	  Marshall,	  Truth	  and	  Method,	  440.	  995	  Ibid.,	  548-­‐9.	  996	  Ibid.,	  550-­‐51.	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Heidegger	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  metaphysical	  foundations	  of	   language,	  or	  the	  thinking	  of	  
logos,	   in	   Western	   philosophy.	   The	   mystic	   tradition	   is	   another	   tradition	   besides	   that	   of	  ontological	   hermeneutics	   that	   forms	   a	   critique	   of	   these	   metaphysical	   foundations	   in	  language	  and	  thought,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  two	  are	  mutually	  implicated.	  Caputo	  has	  pointed	   out	   that	   Heidegger	   draws	   precisely	   on	   the	   language	   of	   the	   ‘poets,	   mystics,	   and	  mystic-­‐poets’,	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  language	  which	  overcomes	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  philosophical,	  through	   a	   ‘post-­‐metaphysical	   language’.997	  To	   what	   extent	   then	   can	   this	   attempt	   by	   the	  later-­‐Heidegger	  be	  taken	  forward,	  in	  continuing	  this	  dialogue	  with	  the	  mystics,	  to	  bring	  the	  insights	  of	  mystic	  discourse	  into	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  possibilities	  for	  a	  post-­‐metaphysical	  language	   that	  would	  allow	   for	   reflective	   thinking?	   In	  other	  words,	   if	  Western	  philosophy	  has	   imposed	   certain	   constraints	   on	   the	   thinking	   that	   occurs	   through	   language,	   then	   the	  tradition	  of	   the	  Western	  mystics	  may	  be	   seen	  as	  a	   reaction	   to	   the	  philosophical	   limits	  of	  this	   language.	   In	   the	   prior	   discussion	   of	   ineffability	   and	   mysticism,	   it	   has	   often	   been	  asserted	  that	  ineffability	  is	  characteristic	  of	  the	  mystical	  experience.	  Wittgenstein	  is	  often	  quoted	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  mystical	  lies	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  philosophical	  language,	  and	  to	   which	   the	   appropriate	   response	   is	   silence.998	  However,	   the	   mystic	   tradition	   does	   not	  simply	  retreat	  into	  silent	  protest	  about	  such	  limits	  as	  might	  be	  expected	  from	  the	  claim	  of	  ineffability.	   Instead,	   mystics	   transcribe	   into	   written	   texts	   a	   spoken	   discourse	   that	   is	  adequate	   to	  what	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  by	   the	  metaphysical	  and	  which	   is	   ineffable	  within	  such	  points	  of	  reference.	  	  The	   Syrian	   mystic	   tradition	   offers	   a	   further	   understanding	   of	   man’s	   hermeneutical	  experience	   of	   the	   world	   through	   the	   medium	   of	   language.	   This	   tradition	   distinguishes	  between	   the	   rational	  word	  which	   concerns	   the	   relation	  of	  man	   to	   the	   corporeal	  world,	   a	  world	   interpreted	   in	   language,	   and	   the	   intuition	  of	   the	   essence	   of	   spiritual	   things	  by	   the	  mystics,	  a	  realm	  which	  comes	  prior	  to	  language.	  In	  this	  vein,	  Barhebraeus	  writes	  of	  words	  and	   names	   as	   necessary	   for	   reference	   to	   corporeal	   things	   (gšīme),	   but	   not	   for	   the	   non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  997	  Caputo,	  The	  Mystical	  Element	  in	  Heidegger's	  Thought,	  260.	  998	  Ibid.	  Caputo	  refers	  here	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus,	  No.	  4.114-­‐5.	  Caputo	  contrasts	  the	  conclusions	   of	   Kant	   and	  Wittgenstein	   with	   Heidegger’s	   attempts	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   limits	   of	   philosophical	  discourse.	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corporeal	  (lā	  gšīme);	  thus	  language	  is	  a	  secondary	  thing.999	  If	  language	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  being	  of	   things	   in	   the	  Neoplatonic	   tradition	   of	   Aristotle,	   then	   the	   rational	  word	   coincides	  with	  metaphysical	  thinking.	  However,	  prior	  to	  thinking	  of	  the	  rational	  through	  meltā	  (Gr.	  logos),	  comes	   the	   Spirit	   or	   rūḥā	  which	   gives	   both	  word	   and	   life	   to	   rational	   sentient	   beings.	   For	  Syrian	  monks	  to	  seek	   life	   in	  the	  spirit	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  rational,	   the	  discipline	  of	  silence	  and	  the	  solitude	  of	  the	  cell	  becomes	  a	  necessity.	  Yet,	  Barhebraeus	  does	  not	  insist	  that	  the	  highest	  stage	  of	   the	  mystic	   is	  an	   ineffable	  one	  receding	   into	  silence,	  but	  rather	  advocates	  that	   the	   seeking	   and	   finding	   of	   the	   spirit	   institutes	   another	   kind	   of	   discourse.	   In	   the	  sentences,	   he	   declares	   that	   ‘[e]ssential	   seeking	   is	   turning	   the	   gaze	   wholly	   towards	   the	  sought’,	  1000	  	  for	  the	  Spirit	  is	  not	  metaphysically	  present	  in	  language	  but	  inspires	  language	  in	  its	  aspiration	  towards	  ‘the	  beloved’.	  This	  mysterious	  discourse	  relies	  on	  speaking	  through	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Spirit,	  a	  discourse	  which	  speaks	  the	  language	  of	  love	  by	  which	  the	  spirit	  gives,	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  a	  propositional	  language.	  Barhebraeus	  ends	  the	  book	  of	  love	  in	  the	  
Ethicon	  by	  quoting	  an	  anonymous	  saying	  on	  writing	   the	  mysteries	  of	   the	  Spirit,	  whereby	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Spirit	  ‘mix’	  into	  the	  words	  of	  the	  writer;	  a	  claim	  that	  he	  equally	  makes	  for	  his	  own	  writing.1001	  	  It	   is	   this	   spiritual	   power,	   designated	   by	   the	   ‘sweetness’	   of	   the	   words	   of	   the	   Spirit	   that	  inspires	   those	   who	   hear	   its	   words	   with	   its	   authority;	   for	   this	   is	   an	   authority	   that	   is	  recognised	  by	  the	  Initiated	  through	  their	  having	  already	   ‘tasted’	  (personally	  experienced)	  the	  ‘sweetness’	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  in	  the	  Spirit.1002	  The	  words	  ‘designated’	  by	  the	  Spirit	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  999	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  Sentence	  76,	  75,	  593*.	  1000	  Ibid.,	  Sentence	  23,	  65-­‐66,	  583-­‐84*.	   ‘23.	  Love	  is	  the	  lover’s	  seeking	  after	  the	  beloved.	  Essential	  seeking	  is	  turning	  the	  gaze	  wholly	  towards	  the	  sought.	  And	  then	  seeking	  and	  finding	  will	  become	  twins,	  viz.	  finding	  will	  follow	  seeking	  immediately.	  He	  who	  seeks	  thus,	  finds;	  who	  asks	  thus,	  receives.’	  1001	  Ibid.,	   116-­‐17,	   506*.	   ‘It	   has	   further	   been	   said:	   If	   anyone	  writes	   the	  mysteries	   of	   the	   spirit,	   without	   the	  spirit's	  dictating	  them	  to	  him,	  it	  will	  not	  mix	  its	  sweetness	  into	  his	  words	  and	  therefore	  they	  will	  not	  be	  loved	  by	  those	  who	  read	  them	  nor	  give	  delight	  to	  those	  who	  hear	  them.	  But	  if	  anyone	  learns	  the	  mysteries	  of	  the	  spirit	  from	  the	  spirit,	  writing	  what	  it	  dictates	  to	  him,	  then	  the	  spirit	  will	  mix	  itself	   into	  all	  his	  words	  and	  all	  those	  who	  hear	  him	  will	   smell	   its	   odours	   and	   their	   hearts	  will	   be	   filled	  by	   these	  words	  with	   life	   and	   their	  sound	  will	  eradicate	  the	  passions	  from	  them.	  And	  this	  is	  the	  pen	  of	  the	  ready	  writer	  with	  which	  he	  writes	  his	  holy	  book.’	  1002	  Ibid.,	  Sentence	  53,	  71,	  589*.	  ‘Who	  has	  not	  tasted	  the	  sweetness	  of	  the	  love	  of	  his	  Lord,	  cannot	  discern	  the	  power	  of	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Beloved,	  because	  they	  are	  of	  a	  designating	  nature.	  And	  spiritual	  words	  cannot	  be	  uttered	  but	  in	  mysterious	  designations.’	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thus	   a	   form	   of	   speech	   or	   discourse	   (mamllā),1003	  which	   is	   then	   transferred	   into	   written	  discourse	   to	  be	   read	  or	  heard	  by	  an	  audience	  who	  can	  appreciate	   its	   spiritual	  power.1004	  The	   written	   discourse	   of	   the	   mystic	   thus	   occurs	   through	   the	   dictation	   of	   the	   Spirit;	   a	  process	   of	   dictation	   which	   is	   also	   one	   of	   composition,1005	  with	   the	   word	   of	   the	   spirit	  brought	  to	  life	  in	  the	  writing	  of	  the	  text.	  The	  mystic	  author	  is	  inspired	  within	  the	  process	  of	  writing,	  rather	  than	  his	  inspiration	  being	  an	  event	  prior	  to	  his	  writing.	  The	  relation	  is	  thus	  not	   between	   the	   primary	   ineffable	   experience	   and	   the	   secondary	   textual	   account	   of	   the	  mystic,	  but	  the	  very	  act	  of	  writing	  is	  a	  spiritual	  activity,	  through	  which	  the	  spirit	  dictates	  its	  word	  to	  the	  writer.	  Barhebraeus	  states	  that	  in	  writing	  the	  ‘mysteries	  of	  the	  spirit’,	  the	  Spirit	  dictates	  the	  mystic’s	  words,	  for	  this	  is	  what	  sanctifies	  his	  writing.1006	  The	  mysteries	  of	  the	  Spirit	  once	   transferred	   into	   the	   text,	  work	  a	   second	   inspiration	   in	   inspiring	   love	   in	   those	  who	  read	  them,	  and	  thus	  the	  mysterious	  nature	  of	  the	  Spirit,	  the	  secret	  which	  lies	  hidden,	  is	  that	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  which	  is	  the	  ‘mystery’	  (Syr.	  rāzā)	  revealed	  to	  those	  who	  are	  ready	  to	  listen.	  	  	  
Thinking	  Language	  through	  Grammar	  In	   Barhebraeus’	   thinking	   about	   language,	   there	   is	   a	   progression	   from	   the	   thinking	   of	  language	   that	   is	   tied	   to	   the	   grammatical	   understanding	   of	   the	   Greeks,	   towards	   an	  awareness	  of	  the	  problematic	  of	  reducing	  language	  to	  the	  logical	  analysis	  of	   its	  structural	  components	   in	   grammar.	   This	   development	   in	   Barhebraeus’	   understanding	   is	   implied	   in	  his	   mystical	   understanding	   of	   the	   language	   that	   is	   given	   or	   ‘dictated’	   by	   the	   Spirit.	   An	  understanding	   of	   language	   that	   is	   based	   entirely	   on	   Greek	   grammar	   carries	   over	   the	  problem	   of	   thinking	   God	   through	  metaphysics	   into	   the	   structuring	   of	   the	   discourse	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1003	  Payne-­‐Smith	  gives	  two	  primary	  meanings	  for	  mamllā:	  i)	  speech,	  diction,	  ii)	  talk,	  discourse.	  Payne	  Smith	  and	  Payne	  Smith,	  A	  Compendious	  Syriac	  Dictionary	  :	  Founded	  Upon	  the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  Payne	  Smith,	  279.	  1004	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  Sentence	  55,	  71,	  589*.	   ‘55.	  Who	  learns	  the	  mysteries	  of	  the	  spirit	   from	  the	  spirit,	  his	  audience	  will	  gather	  all	  enjoyments	  from	  his	  words;	  and	  his	  utterances	  will	  eradicate	  all	  passions	  from	  their	  hearts.’	  1005	  Certeau,	   The	   Mystic	   Fable,	   121.	   Certeau	   points	   out	   that	   dictation	   was	   a	   medieval	   scholastic	   art	   (ars	  
dictandi),	  an	  art	  of	  composition	  which	  became	  associated	  with	  rhetoric,	   involving	  transference	  from	  ‘oral	  to	  written	  expression’,	  and	  was	  a	  manner,	  a	  modus,	  of	  speaking,	  that	  became	  significant	  for	  mystic	  discourse.	  1006	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  Sentence	  54,	  71,	  589*.	  ‘54.	  Who	  writes	  the	  mysteries	  of	  the	  spirit,	  without	  the	  spirit's	  dictating	  them	  to	  him,	  is	  a	  sounding	  brass	  or	  a	  tinkling	  cymbal,	  because	  the	  spirit	  does	  not	  mix	  its	  sweetness	  into	  his	  words.’	  
	   229	  
speaks	  about	  God.	  In	  order	  to	  free	   ‘God’	   from	  the	  concept	  of	  being,	  Barhebraeus	  sought	  a	  language	   that	   was	   appropriate	   to	   this	   task,	   a	   non-­‐metaphysical	   language	   which	   would	  allow	   theological	   discourse	   to	   speak	   about	   transcendence	   without	   resorting	   to	   logical	  propositions	  about	  the	  divine	  nature.	  These	  insights	  correspond	  to	  those	  of	  Heidegger,	  who	  formed	  a	  critique	  of	  ‘onto-­‐theological’	  discourse	  stemming	  from	  the	  medieval	  scholasticism	  of	  the	  Latin	  West,	  in	  which	  the	  divine	  became	  the	  highest	  being	  of	  Aristotelian	  metaphysics.	  Heidegger	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  thinking	  of	   the	  Greeks	  has	  regulated	   language	  through	  the	  ‘technical	  instruments’	  of	  logic	  and	  grammar.1007	  	  The	  more	  specific	  intention	  of	  the	  mystics,	  in	  discerning	  man’s	  relation	  to	  God,	  can	  make	  a	  further	   contribution	   to	   ontological	   hermeneutics	   in	   the	   development	   of	   a	   post-­‐metaphysical	   thinking	   about	   transcendence.	   Barhebraeus’	   aim	   was	   to	   adopt	   a	   mode	   of	  discourse	   that	  would	   allow	   the	   divine	  word	   to	   continue	   speaking,	   rather	   than	   to	   reason	  about	   divine	   being	   in	   the	   abstract.	   In	   the	   Syrian	   mystic	   tradition,	   Barhebraeus	   found	   a	  mode	   of	   discourse	   that	   was	   conducted	   through	   the	   understanding	   of	   God	   as	   Spirit;	   this	  ‘spiritual’	   understanding	   was	   itself	   mediated	   by	   the	   Spirit	   in	   the	   very	   manner	   of	   its	  knowing,	   giving	   an	   authority	   to	   its	   language	   that	   did	   not	   depend	   on	   classical	   logic.	   The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  given-­‐ness	  of	  language	  by	  the	  Spirit	   in	  the	  monastic	  spiritual	  tradition	  is	  thus	  quite	  detached	   from	  the	  scholastic	  mode	  of	  reading	  and	  discussion	   in	   the	  schools	  of	  Greek	  learning	  that	  interpreted	  language	  through	  the	  logical	  categorisation	  of	  the	  utterance.	  For	   students	   of	   scholastic	   learning	   at	   a	  West	   Syrian	  monastery	   like	  Qennešre,	   the	   Syriac	  language	  came	  to	  be	  analysed	  through	  Greek	  logic	  (mlīlūtā)	  with	  some	  adaptations.	  Since	  the	  Organon	  had	  received	  most	  attention	  by	  the	  Syrian	  translators,	  the	  reception	  of	  Greek	  philosophy	   was	   predominantly	   that	   of	   its	   logic.1008	  Indeed	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   analysis	   of	  grammar,	  Aristotelian	  logic	  had	  to	  be	  modified	  in	  various	  ways	  to	  be	  accommodated	  within	  the	  Semitic	   language	  system	  to	  which	  Syriac	  belonged;	   thus	   the	  copula	   functioned	  rather	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1007	  Heidegger,	  Introduction	  to	  Metaphysics,	  56.	  Heidegger	  states	  ‘that	  these	  grammatical	  forms	  have	  not	  dissected	  and	  regulated	  language	  as	  such	  since	  eternity	  like	  an	  absolute,	  that	  instead,	  they	  grew	  out	  of	  a	  very	  definite	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Greek	  and	  Latin	  language’.	  1008	  Daniel	  King	  notes	  that	  in	  the	  Peripatetic	  tradition	  of	  the	  Neoplatonic	  commentators	  on	  Aristotle,	  following	  Porphyry	  the	  Organon	  came	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  about	  grammar.	  Daniel	  King,	  "Grammar	  and	  Logic	  in	  Syriac	  (and	  Arabic),"	  Journal	  of	  Semitic	  Studies	  58,	  no.	  1	  (2013):	  106-­‐7.	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differently	  to	  Greek	  and	  was	  often	  omitted	  altogether	  in	  Syriac.1009	  These	  modifications	  of	  Greek	   logic,	   as	   it	   was	   adapted	   in	   the	   translation	   process	   into	   Syriac,	   are	   evident	   in	  Barhebraeus’	   own	   works	   devoted	   to	   logic.	   Barhebraeus’	   summary	   treatise	   on	   logic,	   the	  
Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye,	  incorporates	  the	  Alexandrian	  tradition	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Organon,	   and	   thus	   includes	   the	   Syriac	   version	   of	   Porphyry’s	   commentary,	   the	  
Isagoge,	   alongside	   the	   books	   of	   the	   Organon,	   notably	   the	   Categories	   and	   Peri	  
Hermeneias.1010	  The	   intrinsic	   connection	  of	   logic	   and	  grammar	   for	   the	  Greeks	   is	   similarly	  reflected	  in	  Barhebraeus’	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye,	  that	  is	  also	  concerned	  with	  the	  terms	  of	   the	   proposition	   treated	   in	   grammar.	   These	   relations	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   the	  immediate	  goal	  of	  logic	  in	  the	  Aristotelian	  tradition	  is	  demonstration,	  which	  occurs	  through	  its	  technical	  usage	  of	  language.	  In	  Janssens’	  explication	  of	  Aristotelian	  logic,	  demonstration	  is	  based	  on	  the	  syllogism,	  the	  syllogism	  is	   formed	  by	  propositions,	  and	  the	  proposition	   is	  composed	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  language.1011	  	  The	  Greek	  connection	  of	   logic	  and	  grammar	  was	  deeply	  entrenched	  amongst	   the	  Syrians,	  evidenced	   in	   the	  plans	  of	   the	  East	  Syrian	  Patriarch	  Timothy	   I,	   to	  write	  a	  Syriac	  Grammar	  based	  on	  the	  models	  of	  Greek	  logic.	  Commenting	  on	  this,	  King	  thus	  states:	  	   He	  freely	  used	  logical	  terminology	  for	  grammar	  and	  tried	  to	  turn	  the	  latter	  into	  a	  science	  of	  divisions	  such	  as	  we	  see	  in	  many	  logical	  texts	  of	  the	  same	  period.	  Timothy	  thus	  exemplifies	  an	  approach	  to	  grammar	  in	  which	  the	  elements	  of	  language	  are	  tied	  to	  reality	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  terms	  applicable	  to	  physics	  and	  logic	  are	  not	  only	  usable	  in	  grammar	  but	  become	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  the	  elaboration	  of	  an	  effective	  description	  of	  a	  specific	  language.1012	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1009	  Janssens	  comments	  in	  a	  footnote	  to	  section	  8b	  in	  the	  Chapter	  ‘About	  Propositions’	  in	  Peri	  Hermeneias,	  on	  the	   distinction	   between	   the	   bipartite	   proposition	   and	   the	   proposition	   with	   an	   additional	   predicate.	   ‘The	  significance	  of	  that	  distinction	  was	  lost	  when	  the	  Greek	  examples	  were	  transposed	  into	  Syriac,	  where	  the	  use	  of	  the	  copula	  in	  a	  nominal	  sentence	  is	  not	  the	  rule.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  the	  Semitic	  viewpoint,	  no	  copula	  is	  implied	  in	  a	  proposition	  composed	  of	  subject	  and	  nominal	  predicate…	  Consequently	  the	  bipartite	  proposition	  as	  defined	  by	  Bar	  Hebraeus	  conforms	  to	  the	  usual	   type	  of	   the	  Semitic	  nominal	  proposition	  without	  copula’.	  Janssens,	  "Bar	  Hebraeus;	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye,"	  17	  n.	  104.	  1010	  Ibid.	   Janssens	   published	   four	   articles	   with	   the	   American	   Journal	   of	   Semitic	   Languages	   and	   Literatures	  concerning	  Barhebraeus’	  summary	  treatise	  on	  logic;	  these	  consist	  of	  an	  introductory	  article	  (1930),	  the	  Syriac	  text	   itself	   in	   two	  parts	   (1931	  &	  1932)	  and	   the	  English	   translation	  of	   the	   first	  part	   (1935).	  The	  second	  part	  appears	  not	  to	  have	  been	  translated	  by	  Janssens	   into	  English.	  My	  comments	  are	  thereby	  limited	  to	  the	  first	  part	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  treatise	  on	  logic,	  which	  summarises	  the	  Isagoge,	  the	  Categories,	  and	  the	  Peri	  Hermeneias.	  1011	  L'Entretien	  de	  la	  Sagesse	  :	  Introduction	  aux	  Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	  20.	  1012	  King,	  "Grammar	  and	  Logic	  in	  Syriac	  (and	  Arabic),"	  116-­‐17.	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  He	   concludes	   that,	   although	   it	   is	   not	   known	   whether	   Timothy	   ever	   undertook	   such	   a	  grammar,	   the	   importance	   he	   ascribed	   to	   the	   Greek	   and	   Arabic	   grammatical	   traditions	  confirms	   ‘the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   Syrian	   educational	   system	   conceived	   of	   the	   relationship	  between	   grammar	   and	   logic,	   or	   between	   language	   and	   thought.’	  1013	  That	   logic	  was	   not	   a	  universal,	  but	  a	  tool	  inherited	  from	  a	  particular	  tradition	  of	  thinking,	  is	  a	  perspective	  that	  was	   perhaps	   reinforced	   for	   the	   Syrians	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   their	   main	   traditions	   of	   logic,	  Aristotelian	   and	   Stoic,	   came	   to	   them	   from	   a	   differently	   structured	   grammatical	   and	  syntactical	  context	  to	  the	  Semitic.1014	  Despite	  the	  predominance	  of	  Greek	  thought	  amongst	  the	  Syrians,	  there	  was	  also	  amongst	  the	  monastics	  a	  deeply	  held	  antipathy	  to	  this	  learning,	  and	  it	  was	  thus	  between	  these	  positions	  that	  Barhebraeus	  mediated.1015	  	  	  However,	   Barhebraeus	   appreciated	   the	   relative	   value	   of	   logic	   in	   that	   he	   continued	   to	  compose	  summaries	  of	  logic	  as	  part	  of	  larger	  compendiums	  of	  philosophy	  to	  the	  end	  of	  his	  life,	  even	  if	  it	  he	  could	  no	  longer	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  logic	  as	  a	  universal	  rule.	  In	  the	  preface	  to	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye,	  he	  affirms	  that	  the	  cause	  of	  disagreements	  between	  men	  in	   thinking	   and	   doctrine	   is	   that	   reasoning	   does	   not	   always	   reach	   truth,	   and	   thus	   logic	  provides	  the	  authoritative	  instrument	  for	  directing	  this	  reasoning.	  	   Therefore	   the	   need	   arises	   for	   some	   rule	   capable	   of	   directing	   the	   mind	   toward	   correct	   reasoning,	  perfecting	   man	   in	   theory	   and	   practice,	   and	   wherewith	   the	   mind	   might	   discriminate	   between	   what	   is	  correct	  and	  what	  is	  not,	  and	  be	  kept	  from	  stumbling.	  Such	  a	  rule	  is	  supplied	  by	  logic	  or	  dialectic,	  which	  may	  be	  called	  the	  “science	  of	  wisdom.”1016	  	  Here,	   Barhebraeus	   follows	   the	   tradition	   of	   understanding	   logic	   as	   the	   instrument	   of	  philosophy,	  and	  not	  another	  branch	  of	   the	  philosophical	  sciences.	   In	  his	  compendiums	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1013	  Ibid.,	  117.	  1014	  For	   example,	   Paul	   the	   Persian	   incorporates	   both	   Stoic	   and	   Aristotelian	  models	   into	   his	   ten	   species	   of	  discourse,	  in	  the	  sixth	  century	  commentary	  entitled	  the	  Introduction	  to	  Logic.	  Ibid.,	  112-­‐13.	  1015	  Wensinck,	   Bar	   Hebraeus's	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove	   :	   Together	  with	   Some	   Chapters	   from	  His	   Ethikon,	   45,	   563*.	  There	   is	   anecdotal	   evidence	   of	   this	   attitude	   in	   a	   section	   concerning	   the	   ‘Purity	   of	   deliberations’,	   in	   which	  Barhebraeus	  quotes	  the	  following	  passage:	  ‘To	  Aba	  Arsenius	  a	  certain	  brother	  said:	  why	  do	  you,	  who	  are	  wise,	  ask	  this	  villager,	  namely	  Aba	  Macarius,	  concerning	  deliberations?	  He	  answered:	  I	  know	  the	  lore	  of	  the	  Greeks	  and	  Romans,	  but	  the	  alphabet	  of	  this	  villager	  I	  have	  not	  yet	  learnt.’	  1016	  Preface,	  2a.	  Janssens,	  "Bar	  Hebraeus;	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye,"	  2-­‐3.	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Avicennan	   philosophy,	   the	   Conversation	   of	   Wisdom	   and	   the	   Cream	   of	   Wisdom,	   he	   again	  follows	  Avicenna’s	  lead	  in	  placing	  the	  Organon	  at	  the	  beginning,	  as	  the	  prolegomena	  to	  the	  other	   books.1017 	  The	   instrument	   of	   logic	   can	   thus	   be	   used	   to	   analyse	   propositional	  discourse,	   and	   correct	   reasoning	  may	  be	   reached	   through	   logic	   or	  dialectic,	   implying	   the	  discursive	  basis	  of	  such	  reasoning.	  It	  is	  with	  Aristotle	  that	  ‘logos	  as	  assertion	  becomes	  the	  locus	  of	  truth	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  correctness’,	  and	  thus	  the	  assertion	  of	  what	  is	  either	  true	  or	  false,	  in	  Aristotle’s	  De	  Interpretatione.1018	  Heidegger	  emphasises	  the	  understanding	  of	  logos	  as	  discourse	   that	  occurs	  with	  Aristotle,	   in	  which	   the	   logos	   becomes	   contained	  within	   the	  assertion,	   and	   thus	   to	   say	   something	   is	   to	   assert	   something	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  categories	   of	   being. 1019 	  Aristotle’s	   metaphysics	   uses	   logical	   reasoning	   in	   order	   to	  investigate	   the	   underlying	   order	   of	   being,	   so	   that	   the	   function	   of	   logos	   as	   assertion	   is	  controlled	  by	  the	  categories	  of	  metaphysics,	  and	  logic	  becomes	  its	  organon	  or	  instrument.	  	  However,	  Barhebraeus	  comes	  to	  understand	  truth	  of	  logos	  not	  in	  this	  sense	  of	  the	  assertion	  of	  correct	  reasoning,	  but	  in	  the	  disclosure	  of	  what	  has	  been	  concealed	  from	  view,	  through	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  Spirit	  into	  discourse.	  His	  re-­‐interpretation	  of	  how	  truth	  is	  revealed	  in	  the	   logos	   of	  discourse,	   offers	   a	   further	  dimension	   to	   the	   concern	  with	   the	   foundations	  of	  understanding	   that	   has	   occupied	   ontological	   hermeneutics.	   Heidegger	   asserts	   that	   with	  Aristotle,	   logic	   becomes	   the	   tool	   (organon)	   for	   grasping	   truth,	   only	   to	   suspend	   ‘the	  
originary	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  Being	  of	  beings’.	  Heidegger	  argues	  for	  the	  truth	  (alētheia)	  that	  was	  ‘originary’	  to	  the	  logos,	  prior	  to	  the	  assertion	  of	  logos	  that	  allowed	  analysis	  in	  language	  and	   the	   assignment	   of	   rules	   of	   ‘logic’	   to	   govern	   its	   disclosure	   in	   language. 1020 	  In	  Barhebraeus’	  mystic	  discourse,	  the	  giving	  of	  logos	  or	  word	  (Syr.	  meltā)	  to	  man	  is	  originary	  to	   the	   action	   of	   the	   Spirit	   and	   this	   giving	   is	   one	   that	   inspires	   his	   approach	   to	   language,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1017	  For	   the	   structure	   of	   these	   works	   by	   Barhebraeus,	   see	   Janssens’	   Introduction	   to	   the	   four	   parts	   of	   the	  
Conversation	  of	  Wisdom	   and	  Takahashi’s	   list	   of	   the	  books	   in	   the	   six	   sections	  of	   the	  Cream.	  L'Entretien	  de	  la	  
Sagesse	   :	   Introduction	  aux	  Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	   20-­‐22.	   Takahashi,	   "Edition	   of	   the	   Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	  on	  the	  Edition	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Heaven	  and	  the	  World	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  Generation	  and	  Corruption	  of	  the	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom,"	  114-­‐15.	  1018	  Heidegger,	  Introduction	  to	  Metaphysics,	  199.	  Heidegger	  refers	  to	  Aristotle	  De	  Interpretatione,	  Chapter	  4.	  1019	  Ibid.	  Heidegger	  argues	  that	  from	  Aristotle’s	  De	  Interpretatione	  (chapters	  5-­‐6),	  ‘Logos	  is	  now	  legein	  ti	  kata	  
tinos,	  saying	  something	  about	  something.	  That	  about	  which	  something	  is	  said	  is	  in	  each	  case	  what	  lies	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  assertion,	  what	  lies	  in	  front	  of	  it,	  hupokeimenon	  (subjectum).’	  1020	  Ibid.,	  201.	  Heidegger	  continues,	  ‘It	  was	  not	  without	  justification	  that	  the	  ancient	  philosophy	  of	  the	  schools	  collected	  the	  treatises	  of	  Aristotle	  that	  relate	  to	  logos	  under	  the	  title	  “Organon.”’	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whereby	   the	   rational	   word	   is	   liberated	   from	   the	   control	   of	   logical	   analysis	   through	  grammar.	  Instead	  of	  logic	  being	  the	  instrument	  of	  knowledge,	  it	  is	  the	  spirit	  which	  guides	  the	  intellect	  towards	  all	  truth.	  Theological	  truth	  is	  not	  to	  be	  asserted	  through	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  proposition	  or	  the	  deductive	   logic	  of	  the	  syllogism,	  but	   it	   is	   the	  Spirit	   that	  gives	  truth	  and	   convinces	   by	   its	   own	   evidential	   proof,	   the	   response	   of	   love	   in	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  receiver.1021	  The	  Spirit	  is	  thus	  the	  giver	  of	  truth	  which	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  gift	  of	  love	  and	  it	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  which	  is	  then	  transcribed	  into	  language,	  the	  mediation	  of	   being	   from	   the	   spirit	   to	   the	  word.	  While	  Heidegger’s	   understanding	   of	   logos	   from	   the	  pre-­‐Socratic	  philosophers,	  returns	  to	  the	  originary	  thinking	  of	  being,	   for	  Barhebraeus	  the	  meditation	  on	  being	   leads	   to	   the	  Word	  which	   is	   given	   through	   the	  Spirit,	   and	   this	   giving	  finds	  its	  primary	  expression	  in	  the	  discourse	  based	  on	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  	  	  
The	  Spirit	  Speaks	  in	  the	  Gift	  Heidegger	  questions	   at	   the	   conclusion	  of	   his	   essay	  The	  End	  of	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Task	  of	  
Thinking:	  ‘What	  speaks	  in	  the	  “There	  is/It	  gives”?’1022	  This	  question	  is	  very	  much	  the	  point	  of	   departure	   for	   Marion,	   who	   suggests	   that	   in	   searching	   out	   the	   ‘it	   gives’	   (es	   gibt)	   of	  Heidegger’s	  assertion	  of	  being,	  there	  comes	  ‘the	  possibility	  of	  accessing,	  on	  this	  side	  of	  (or	  beyond)	  beings,	  what	  precedes	  it’.	  In	  the	  ‘it	  gives’	  there	  is	  ‘a	  donation	  that	  arrives’,	  but	  the	  arriving	   of	   the	   donation	   of	   being	   involves	   the	   question	   ‘of	   what	   lets	   itself	   be	   given’.1023	  Marion	  argues	  against	  Heidegger,	   to	  say	  that	  the	  overcoming	  of	  metaphysics	   leads	  to	   ‘the	  horizon	   of	   donation’,	   for	   Being	   arises	   in	   donation	   through	   the	   giving	   which	   ‘can	   never	  appear	   as	   something	   given	   since	   it	   exhausts	   and	   accomplishes	   itself	   in	   allowing	   to	  appear’.1024	  It	   is	   in	  the	  dimension	  of	  giving	  and	  the	  gift	  that	  representational	  thinking	  can	  be	   surpassed	   and	   philosophy	   can	   free	   itself	   from	   metaphysics.1025	  Marion	   extends	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1021	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  Sentence	  90,	  78,	  596*.	  ‘90.	  Accustom	  your	  soul	  to	  believe	  what	  you	  hear	  from	  the	  true	  one.	  And	  if	  you	  recognize	  not	  His	  true	  essence,	  do	  not	  search	  after	  His	  cause	  with	  syllogisms…’	  1022	  Heidegger,	  "The	  End	  of	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Task	  of	  Thinking,"	  449.	  	  Heidegger	  then	  concludes	  the	  essay	  by	  stating,	  ‘The	  task	  of	  thinking	  would	  then	  be	  the	  surrender	  of	  previous	  thinking	  to	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  matter	  for	  thinking.’	  1023	  Marion,	  "The	  "End	  of	  Metaphysics"	  as	  a	  Possiblity,"	  177.	  1024	  Ibid.,	  181-­‐82.	  1025	  Ibid.,	  182-­‐83.	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Heideggerian	   tradition	   of	   ontological	   hermeneutics,	   in	   seeking	   a	   way	   forward	   in	   ‘the	  question	   of	   a	   non-­‐metaphysical	   thinking’,	   which	   he	   suggests	   requires	   a	   philosophical	  thinking	   that	   reaches	   ‘perhaps	   even	   beyond	   the	   question	   of	   being’.1026	  In	   his	   theological	  work,	   God	   Without	   Being,	   Marion	   develops	   his	   thinking	   about	   donation	   through	   the	  understanding	  of	  the	  God	  of	  Christian	  revelation,	  advocating	  that	  through	  liberating	  the	  gift,	  Charity	  ‘delivers’	  the	  ontological	  difference	  of	  Being/being.1027	  Marion	  argues	  that	  Charity,	  the	  Christian	  love	  of	  agapē,	  in	  fact	  forms	  the	  appropriate	  and	  most	  essential	  name	  of	  God	  in	  
1John	   4:8,	   precisely	   because	   love	   allows	   God	   to	   be	   thought	   under	   ‘the	   figure	   of	   the	  unthinkable’.	  1028	  Further	  Marion	  explains	  that	   ‘Love	  does	  not	  suffer	  from	  the	  unthinkable	  or	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  conditions,	  but	  is	  reinforced	  by	  them’.	  Thus	  for	  God	  to	  love	  and	  to	  be	  understood	   as	   agapē,	   places	   no	   restriction	   or	   limit	   on	   ‘his	   initiative,	   amplitude,	   and	  ecstasy’.1029	  	  Barhebraeus	  presents	  the	  primacy	  of	   love	   in	  a	  different	  manner	  to	  the	  post-­‐metaphysical	  tradition	  of	  Marion,	  for	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  presentation	  of	  love	  is	  not	  the	  assertion	  of	  1John	  4:8,	  that	   ‘God	   is	   Love’,	   that	   is	   fundamental	   to	   Marion’s	   theological	   discourse	   of	   Charity.1030	  Rather,	  Barhebraeus’	  discourse	  rests	  on	  the	  verse	  of	  John	  4:24,	  that	  ‘God	  is	  spirit’	  and	  must	  be	  worshipped	  in	  spirit	  and	  in	  truth.1031	  This	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  monastic	  spiritual	  tradition,	  for	   in	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  gives	  this	  teaching	   in	  the	  words	  of	  an	  anonymous	  master	  to	  his	  disciple.1032	  He	  presents	  the	  essential	  revelation	  of	  God	  as	  the	  giving	  of	  the	  Spirit	  in	  love,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1026	  Ibid.,	  183-­‐4.	  1027	  God	  without	  Being	  :	  Hors-­‐Texte,	  102.	  ‘The	  gift,	  in	  liberating	  Being/being,	  in	  liberating	  being	  from	  Being,	  is	  itself	   finally	   liberated	   from	   ontological	   difference	   –	   not	   only	   the	   sending,	   not	   only	   the	   distortion,	   but	   the	  freeing	  of	  the	  first	  instance,	  charity.	  For	  the	  gift	  itself	  is	  liberated	  only	  in	  its	  exertion	  starting	  from	  and	  in	  the	  name	  of	  that	  which,	  greater	  than	  it,	  comes	  behind	  it,	  that	  which	  gives	  and	  expresses	  itself	  as	  gift,	  charity	  itself.	  Charity	  delivers	  Being/being.’	  1028	  Ibid.,	  46-­‐7.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Heidegger	  who	  maintains	  love	  only	  ‘in	  a	  derived	  and	  secondary	  state’,	  according	  to	  Marion.	  1029	  Ibid.,	  47.	  1030	  See	  Marion’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  primacy	  given	  to	  love	  by	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius,	  which	  was	  reversed	  in	  Thomas	  Aquinas’	  onto-­‐theological	  focus	  on	  Exodus	  3:14.	  Ibid.,	  73-­‐83.	  1031	  For	  example,	  on	  prayer	  in	  Spirit	  and	  in	  truth	  see	  Section	  7	  on	  Pure	  Prayer.	  Teule,	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I,	  17.	  	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  119,	  60*.	  Book	  1,	  Chapter	  5:	  On	  Music:	   ‘it	   is	  becoming	   for	  us	   to	  worship	  God	   in	  spirit	  and	   truth	  and	   in	  holy	  silence,	  of	  which	  sanctifications	  are	  stronger	  than	  all	  voices’.	  	  1032	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  32,	  550*.	  ‘For	  God	  is	  spirit;	  and	  they	  that	  worship	  him	  must	  worship	  him	  in	  spirit	  and	  in	  truth.’	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and	  thus	  it	   is	  the	  love	  of	  God	  that	  constitutes	  this	  worshipping	  and	  knowing	  God	  in	  spirit	  and	  truth.	  From	  this	  understanding,	  Barhebraeus	  develops	  two	  derivative	  notions.	  Firstly,	  God	  as	  Spirit	  gives	  in	  love,	  a	  giving	  which	  begins	  outside	  of	  space	  and	  time,	  and	  thus	  the	  gift	  cannot	   be	   understood	   through	   the	   incarnation	   of	   the	   Word	   that	   is	   only	   thought	  metaphysically	   in	  the	  Christologies	  of	  substance,	  nature	  and	  person.1033	  Secondly,	   for	  God	  to	  be	  worshipped	  as	  ‘Spirit’	  rather	  than	  as	  ‘Word’,	  language	  becomes	  problematized	  in	  the	  worship	  of	  God	  in	  prayer.	  Thus,	  for	  human	  language	  to	  be	  adequate	  to	  the	  worship	  which	  is	  true	  in	  spirit,	  it	  must	  be	  directly	  inspired	  by	  the	  Spirit.	  	  
The	  Giving	  of	  the	  Spirit	  In	  his	  own	  emphasis	  on	  the	  spirit,	  Barhebraeus	  retrieves	  a	  particularly	  Syrian	  tradition	  of	  reverence	   for	   the	  Holy	  Spirit,	  and	   this	  can	  be	  seen	   in	   the	  Syrian	  poetic	  homilies	   (memrē)	  and	  hymns	  of	  St	  Ephrem.1034	  In	   these	  works,	   the	   spirit	   is	  understood	  as	   the	  most	  hidden	  part	  of	  man;	  when	  the	  soul	  ascends	  to	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  spirit,	  man	  becomes	  the	  ‘likeness’	  of	  God’s	  majesty.1035	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  of	  the	  giving	  of	  the	  spirit	  in	  love	  draws	  on	  this	  early	   theological	   tradition	  of	  St	  Ephrem.1036	  Furthermore,	  he	  attempted	   to	  bring	   together	  the	   opposed	   trends	   of	   scholastic	   intellectualism	   and	  Evagrian	  mysticism	   -­‐	   both	   of	  which	  relied	   on	   a	   Neoplatonic	   Aristotelian	   tradition	   of	   epistemology	   through	   metaphysics	   -­‐	   in	  returning	  to	  another,	  shared	  tradition	  of	   theological	  understanding,	  centred	  on	  the	  spirit.	  Barhebraeus	   not	   only	   revives	   and	   retrieves	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	   spirit	   in	   the	   Syrian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1033	  In	  Part	   IV	  of	   the	  Dove,	   Barhebraeus	  prefers	   the	   ascription	   ‘bilateral	   likeness’	   for	  Christ’s	  humanity	   and	  divinity,	   and	   relativizes	   the	   formulations	   of	   different	   denominations	   according	   to	   this	   common	   confession.	  Ibid.,	  60,	  578*.	  1034	  See	   for	   example	   the	   numerous	   publications	   of	   Sebastian	   Brock	   on	   St	   Ephrem.	   Sebastian	   P.	   Brock,	  The	  
Harp	  of	  the	  Spirit	  :	  Twelve	  Poems	  of	  Saint	  Ephrem,	  Studies	  Supplementary	  to	  Sobornost	  (London:	  Fellowship	  of	  St.	   Alban	   and	   St.	   Sergius,	   1975).	  The	  Luminous	  Eye	   :	   The	   Spiritual	  World	  Vision	  of	   Saint	  Ephrem,	   Cistercian	  Studies	  Series	  (Kalamazoo,	  Mich.:	  Cistercian	  Publications,	  1992).	  1035	  See	  for	  example	  Brock’s	  translation	  of	  Hymn	  IX.20,	  in	  Ephraem,	  Hymns	  on	  Paradise,	  143.	  ‘Far	  more	  glorious	  than	  the	  body/	  is	  the	  soul,	  And	  more	  glorious	  still	  than	  the	  soul/	  is	  the	  spirit,	  but	  more	  hidden	  than	  the	  spirit/	  is	  the	  Godhead.	  At	  the	  end/	  the	  body	  will	  put	  on/	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  soul,	  The	  soul	  will	  put	  on	  that	  of	  the	  spirit,	  While	  the	  spirit	  shall	  put	  on/	  the	  very	  likeness	  of	  God’s	  majesty.’	  1036	  Barhebraeus	   refers	   to	   the	   early	   Syrian	   poetic	   tradition	   in	   his	   chapter	   on	  music	   (Book	   1,	   Chapter	   V.4),	  which	  begins	  with	  recognising	  Mar	  Ephraim	  for	  his	  composition	  of	  holy	  songs	  and	  homilies.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  
Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  124,	  65*.	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tradition,	   but	   also	   extends	   this	   central	   role	   of	   the	   spirit	   as	   an	   animating	   element	   to	   the	  mind	  and	  body.	  	  The	   spiritual	   (rūḥānāyā)	   dimension	   of	   man	   is	   understood	   as	   derivative	   from	   the	   Spirit	  (rūḥā)	   of	  God.1037	  Thus	   rather	   than	   the	  distinction	  of	  man’s	  being	   from	   the	  First	   (divine)	  Being	  of	  metaphysics,	  Syrian	  mystic	  discourse	  emphasises	  the	  spirit	  of	  man	  derived	  from	  the	   Holy	   Spirit.	   However,	   this	   latter	   relation	   is	   not	  merely	   one	   of	   causation,	   though	   the	  Spirit	  is	  called	  the	  ‘cause	  of	  all	  causes’;	  the	  Spirit	  has	  a	  life-­‐giving	  force	  which	  maintains	  and	  animates	  the	  life	  of	  all	  living	  things.1038	  The	  language	  of	  the	  Spirit	  does	  not	  employ	  logos	  as	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  assertion,	  but	  has	  an	  affective	  power	  that	  may	  be	  heard	  by	  those	  who	  come	  to	   hear	   its	   speech	   through	  meditative	   thinking.1039	  In	   the	  Dove,	   Barhebraeus	   talks	   of	   the	  meditative	   aspect	   of	   the	  monk’s	   solitary	   asceticism	   in	   the	   cell.	  Here,	  meditation	   contains	  three	  elements,	  the	  first	  concerns	  the	  recognition	  of	  sin,	  the	  second	  the	  meditation	  on	  God’s	  justice	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  the	  fear	  of	  God	  in	  the	  heart,	  and	  the	  third	  on	  the	  abundance	  of	  God’s	  goodness	  and	  mercy.	  This	  third	  element	  is	  quoted	  here	  in	  full:	  	   The	  third,	  that	  one	  meditates	  upon	  the	  effusions	  of	  God’s	  mercy	  and	  the	  goods	  promised	  to	  the	  good;	  then	  thanksgivings	  will	  be	  multiplied	  in	  his	  mouth	  and	  his	  thoughts	  will	  be	  made	  to	  abide	  in	  the	  spiritual	  world	  and	  he	  will	  have	  spiritual	  intercourse	  with	  the	  Angels	  of	  light	  and	  the	  souls	  of	  the	  just.1040	  	  When	   meditative	   thought	   is	   given	   towards	   the	   effusions	   of	   God’s	   ‘mercy’	   (rāḥmā)	   a	  merciful	   love	   that	   overflows	   with	   goodness,	   this	   produces	   words	   of	   thanksgiving.	  Meditative	  thinking	  is	  thus	  a	  spiritual	  thinking	  that	  occurs	  through	  the	  spiritual	  (rūḥānāyā)	  element	   in	   man,	   and	   leads	   to	   the	   ‘spiritual	   intercourse’	   (rūḥānāyata	   mātaʿnā)	   in	   the	  spiritual	  world.1041	  Meditative	  thinking	  is	  thus	  a	  filling	  of	  the	  mind	  with	  the	  abundance	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1037	  This	   presupposition	   draws	   on	   the	   Syrian	   poetic	   tradition	   of	   St	   Ephrem.	   In	   the	   Hymns	   on	   Paradise,	  Sebastian	  Brock	  notes	   in	   regards	   to	  Hymn	   IX	   (which	   is	  quoted	   from,	  below)	   that	   ‘one	   should	   recall	   that	   in	  Syriac	  the	  term	  rúḥā	  means	  both	  “wind”	  and	  “spirit”/“Spirit”’.	  Ephraem,	  Hymns	  on	  Paradise,	  135.	  1038	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  4,	  523*.	  1039	  Ibid.	  ‘Her	  speech	  touches	  every	  ear,	  but	  few	  hear	  her	  voice.	  She	  calls	  every	  man	  by	  his	  name,	  but	  one	  of	  a	  thousand	  answers	  her.’	  1040	  Ibid.,	  23,	  541*.	  1041	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  ‘spiritual	  intercourse’	  is	  also	  intimated	  by	  Barhebraeus	  when	  he	  outlines	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  psychic	  duties	  of	  the	  cell,	  which	  consists	   ‘in	  expecting	  from	  the	  Lord	  the	  gift	  of	  the	  illumination	  of	  the	  mind	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‘effusions’	   of	   God’s	   merciful	   love,	   the	   giving	   for	   its	   own	   sake,	   which	   is	   described	   by	  Barhebraeus	  using	  the	  verb	  ‘to	  pour	  out’	  (špaʿ),	   like	  a	  river	  which	  overflows	  its	  banks.1042	  Meditation	  on	  the	  gift	  of	  love	  leads	  to	  the	  thinking	  of	  the	  origination	  of	  this	  giving,	  through	  the	  Spirit	  that	  gives	  life.	  Barhebraeus	  calls	  the	  Spirit	  itself	   ‘Life’	  and	  further	  says	  that	  ‘Life	  however	  reveals	  itself	  in	  the	  living	  as	  long	  as	  it	  lives’;1043	  the	  Spirit	  therefore	  reveals	  itself	  in	  the	  living	  as	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  This	  association	  of	  the	  Spirit	  with	  the	  life	  of	  the	  living	  can	  also	  be	  identified	  as	  the	  spirit	  in	  man,	  from	  which	  derives	  his	  innate	  spiritual	  affinity	  with	  God	  as	  Spirit	  and	  the	  fifth	  cause	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.1044	  	  
The	  Discourse	  of	  the	  Spirit	  For	  Barhebraeus,	  the	  truth	  that	  was	  ‘originary’1045	  to	  the	  logos	  is	  that	  of	  the	  word	  as	  the	  gift	  of	   the	   Spirit.	   By	   the	   Spirit	   reason	   is	   given	   to	   the	   rational,	   but	   this	   primary	   giving	   is	  neglected	  in	  the	  emphasis	  on	  Aristotle’s	  definition	  of	  man	  as	  the	  rational	  animal.	  Reason	  is	  but	  one	  of	  the	  gifts	  of	  the	  spirit,	  but	  has	  become	  dominant	  over	  man’s	  being	  and	  his	  relation	  to	   the	   world,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   ‘God’	   has	   become	   an	   extension	   of	   man’s	   reason.	   This	  reasoning	  was	  dominated	  by	   the	   classical	   logic	  of	  Aristotle	   and	  became	  enshrined	   in	   the	  Christology	  of	  the	  Church	  Fathers.	  In	  order	  to	  recover	  the	  Word	  from	  its	  confinement	  in	  the	  assertion	  of	  being,	  Barhebraeus	  developed	  his	  discourse	  of	   the	  Spirit.	  This	  discourse	  was	  represented	   in	   the	   Apophthegmata,	   the	   ‘sayings’	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   Fathers,1046	  and	   was	  maintained	   in	   the	   utterances	   of	   the	   Syrian	   mystics	   following	   the	   transmission	   of	   this	  tradition	   in	   Evagrian	   monasticism.	   By	   reason	   of	   this	   historic	   background,	   much	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  and	  the	  aptitude	  to	  behold	  the	  spiritual	  things	  in	  their	  nature	  and	  to	  have	  communion	  with	  them’.	  Ibid.,	  19,	  537*.	  1042	  See	  Payne-­‐Smith’s	  dictionary	  entry	  for	  the	  Syriac	  word	  špaʿ:	   ‘to	  pour	  forth,	  overflow,	  run	  over,	  rise	  (as	  a	  river	  in	  a	  flood);	  to	  abound’.	  Payne	  Smith	  and	  Payne	  Smith,	  A	  Compendious	  Syriac	  Dictionary	  :	  Founded	  Upon	  
the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  Payne	  Smith,	  591-­‐92.	  1043	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  Sentences	  30-­‐31,	  67,	  585*.	  1044	  Ibid.,	   91,	   480*.	   ‘The	   fifth	   cause	   that	   of	   a	   hidden	   consanguinity	   and	   a	   secret	   likeness	   between	   God	   and	  mankind,	  is	  found	  to	  be	  a	  more	  intrinsic	  one,	  as	  is	  justified	  by	  the	  divine	  word,	  which	  shows	  man	  to	  have	  been	  created	  in	  the	  image	  of	  God.’	  1045	  This	   is	  Heidegger’s	   term;	  Heidegger,	   Introduction	  to	  Metaphysics,	   155.	   ‘The	  originary	   remains	   originary	  only	  if	  it	  has	  the	  constant	  possibility	  of	  being	  what	  it	  is:	  origin	  as	  springing	  forth	  (Ursprung	  als	  Entspringen)	  [from	  the	  concealment	  of	  the	  essence].’	  1046	  Budge,	   The	   Paradise	   or	   Garden	   of	   the	   Holy	   Fathers	   :	   Being	   Histories	   of	   the	   Anchorites,	   Recluses,	   Monks,	  
Coenobites,	   and	   Ascetic	   Fathers	   of	   the	   Deserts	   of	   Egypt	   between	   A.D.	   CCL	   and	   A.D.	   CCCC	   circiter.	   Volume	   II	  contains	  the	  Syriac	  version	  of	  the	  Apophthegmata.	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material	  in	  the	  Dove	  and	  the	  Ethicon	  resembles	  a	  collection	  of	  quotations.	  This,	  rather	  than	  an	   encyclopaedic	   endeavour,	   is	   a	   deliberate	   strategy	   on	   the	   part	   of	   Barhebraeus	   in	   an	  attempt	   to	   retain	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   utterance	   in	   the	   primary	   giving	   of	   the	   Spirit	   into	  language.	  What	  is	  said	  about	  the	  Spirit	  must	  retain	  the	  primary	  nature	  of	  its	  being	  given	  by	  the	  Spirit,	  in	  order	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  its	  devolution	  into	  the	  logos	  of	  the	  assertion,	  the	  saying	  of	  something	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  propositional	  thought	  of	  being.	  Certeau	  has	  pronounced	  that	   there	   is	   an	   attempt	   by	   Western	   mystics	   to	   return	   the	   ‘said’	   into	   the	   voice	   of	   the	  ‘saying’.1047	  Mystic	   discourse	   for	   Certeau,	   allows	   the	   Spirit	   to	   speak	   again	   in	   the	  mystics’	  texts,	   ‘in	   the	   very	   place	   at	   which	   the	   Speaker	   speaks’.1048	  If	   the	   mystics’	   deployment	   of	  language	   sought	   to	   retain	   the	   saying	   even	   in	   the	   said,	   then	   the	   mystical	   text	   had	   to	  recapitulate	   and	   make	   manifest	   the	   ‘divine	   utterance’.1049 	  In	   Syrian	   mystic	   discourse,	  mystics	  seek	  to	  speak	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Spirit,	  to	  let	  the	  speech	  of	  the	  Spirit	  be	  heard	  over	  scholastic	  reasoning	  and	  its	  association	  with	  the	  studious	  reading	  of	  the	  written	  word.	  	  In	  the	  Dove,	  Barhebraeus	  enjoins	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  on	  the	  reader	  which	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  parts.	  The	  first	  two	  concern	  the	  labours	  of	  the	  body	  in	  the	  monastery	  and	  of	  the	  soul	  in	  the	  cell,	  but	  the	  third	  is	  described	  as	  ‘the	  spiritual	  rest	  of	  the	  perfect’,	  in	  the	  culmination	  of	  this	  bodily	  and	  psychic	  discipline.	  At	  this	  third	  level,	  the	  reader	  enters	  the	  realm	  of	  a	  mode	  of	  speaking,	   of	   spiritual	   intercourse;	   the	   ascetic	   disciplines	   appear	   as	   preparation	   for	   this	  ‘intercourse	   with	   the	   dove’.1050	  In	   his	   structuring	   of	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Dove,	   Barhebraeus’	  instruction	  concerning	  the	  disciplining	  of	  the	  body	  prepares	  the	  self	  for	  the	  disciplining	  of	  the	  soul	  or	  the	  mind.	  These	  disciplines	  open	  the	  path	  towards	  speaking	  with	  the	  spirit,	  for	  the	  instructions	  of	  the	  two	  previous	  parts	  have	  brought	  the	  Initiated	  to	  the	  level	  of	  freedom	  of	   speech	   with	   the	   spiritual	   dove.1051	  Herman	   Teule	   has	   suggested	   that	   the	   state	   of	   the	  ‘freedom	   of	   speech’	   (Syr.	   parrhisiā)	   with	   the	   dove	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   ‘fundamental’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1047	  Certeau,	  The	  Mystic	  Fable,	  163.	  1048	  "Mystic	  Speech,"	  in	  Heterologies	  :	  Discourse	  on	  the	  Other,	  Theory	  and	  History	  of	  Literature	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  92.	  	  1049	  Ibid.	  1050	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  47,	  565*.	  1051	  Ibid.,	  48,	  566*.	  ‘When,	  by	  the	  things	  mentioned,	  the	  soul	  has	  become	  cultivated	  and	  accustomed,	  the	  mind	  acquires	  perfect	  freedom	  of	  speech	  with	  the	  dove	  and	  placidly	  gazes	  at	  her	  and	  has	  intercourse	  with	  her.’	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characteristics	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  1052	  In	  the	  chapter	  of	  love	  in	  the	  Ethicon,	  parrhisiā	  is	  part	  of	  the	  twelfth	  and	  final	  state	  of	  the	  Initiated	  in	  the	  working	  of	  grace	  towards	  perfection	  in	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  In	  this	  chapter	  of	  the	  Ethicon,	  Barhebraeus	  also	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  free	   outbursts	   of	   speech	   and	   what	   can	   be	   explained	   of	   the	   hidden	   things.	   Revelation	  authorizes	  explanation	  by	  the	  very	  manner	  of	  its	  revealing	  the	  truth	  of	  what	  is	  hidden.1053	  For,	   as	   Barhebraeus	   promises	   to	   the	   Initiated	   in	   the	   centuria,	   it	   is	   the	   revelation	   of	   the	  Paraclete	   as	   ‘the	   spirit	   of	   truth’	   (Syr.	   rūḥā	  d-­‐šrārā),	   that	   ‘will	   come	   to	  you	  and	  guide	  you	  into	  all	   truth’	   (Syr.	  b-­‐klēh	  šrārā).1054	  The	  revelations	  of	   the	  spirit	  not	  only	   lead	  the	  reader	  into	   truth	   (šrārā),	   but	   it	   reveals	   into	   speech	   what	   can	   be	   spoken	   of	   its	   truth	   for	   the	  instruction	  of	  others.	  Revelation	  is	  a	  bringing	  into	  the	  open,	  into	  discourse,	  the	  hiddenness	  or	   the	   mystery	   of	   truth.	   This	   is	   not	   a	   truth	   which	   can	   be	   ascertained	   by	   the	   syllogistic	  reasoning	  of	  logic,	  but	  is	  given	  to	  rational	  discourse	  by	  the	  spirit.	  	  The	   one	   hundred	   aphoristic	   sentences	   in	   the	   fourth	   part	   of	   the	   Dove	   proceed	   from	   the	  revelations	  of	  the	  spirit,	  rather	  than	  the	  freedom	  of	  speech	  that	  is	  not	  to	  be	  spoken	  within	  the	   objectifying	   constraints	   of	   ordinary	   language.	   The	   purpose	   of	   the	   Dove	   is	   the	  transcribing	  of	   the	  mysteries	  of	   the	  spirit	   into	  written	  discourse	   to	  guide	  others	   into	   this	  way	  of	  proceeding,	  through	  the	  Spirit	  in	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  This	  task	  requires	  care,	  since	  what	  is	   said	   in	   the	   freedom	   of	   speech	   with	   the	   Spirit	   can	   be	   easily	   misunderstood	   once	   it	   is	  detached	   from	   the	   circumstance	   of	   the	   utterance. 1055 	  For	   this	   reason,	   Barhebraeus	  deliberately	   refrains	   from	   repeating	  what	   is	   uttered	   in	   the	   ‘boldness’	   or	   the	   ‘freedom’	   of	  this	  utterance.1056	  Instead,	  what	  he	  is	  prepared	  ‘to	  embody	  in	  paper’	  is	  not	  what	  is	  said	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1052	  Teule,	   "Gregory	  Barhebraeus	  and	  His	  Time:	  The	  Syrian	  Renaissance,"	  30.	  Teule	  describes	  Barhebraeus’	  insights	  about	   the	   love	  of	  God	  and	   the	   freedom	  of	   speech	  as	   ‘a	   combination	  of	   inspiring	   theories,	  which	  he	  found	   in	   the	   work	   of	   Ghazali	   and	   in	   the	   writings	   of	   Christian	   authors,	   such	   as	   Joseph	   Ḥazzāyā,	   John	   of	  Dalyatha	  and	  Stephen	  b.	  Ṣudaylī’.	  	  1053	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove	   :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	   from	  His	  Ethikon,	   113,	   502*.	  ‘The	  twelfth	  is	  that	  of	  outbursts	  of	  speech	  and	  prominence	  of	  the	  scrutinizing	  of	  things	  to	  come	  and	  explaining	  of	  things	  hidden,	  those	  which	  are	  written	  in	  the	  archbook,	  which	  is	  the	  book	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God.	  And	  to	  the	  mind,	  when	  reading	  them,	  they	  are	  here	  revealed.’	  1054	  Ibid.,	  Sentence	  90,	  78,	  596*.	  1055	  Ibid.,	  110,	  499*.	  ‘But	  concerning	  these	  things	  the	  Holy	  Ghost	  says	  :	  There	  is	  mystery	  between	  me	  and	  my	  housemates,	  and	  it	  warns	  them	  to	  hide	  such	  things	  and	  not	  to	  divulge	  them,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  permit	  them	  to	  scrutinize	  them,	  except	  in	  personal	  intercourse	  with	  the	  housemates.’	  1056	  Ibid.,	  104,	  493*.	  ‘And	  while	  he	  neither	  knows	  himself	  nor	  any	  thing,	  he	  cries	  many	  times:	  Aba,	  my	  father,	  and	  other	  bold	  utterances,	  which	  it	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  write	  down	  and	  to	  embody	  in	  paper.’	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this	  free	  utterance,	  but	  what	  the	  spirit	  legitimates	  through	  the	  dictation	  of	  its	  mysteries	  to	  the	  author	  of	  the	  mystic	  text.	  The	  freedom	  of	  speech	  in	  the	  Spirit	  is	  thus	  a	  different	  mode	  from	  the	  dictation	  of	  writing	  by	  the	  Spirit	  that	  inspires	  the	  centuria.	  These	  different	  levels	  of	   spiritual	   speech	   are	   reminiscent	   of	   Certeau’s	   proposal	   that	   the	   texts	   of	   the	   Western	  mystics	   ‘institute	   a	   “style”	   that	   articulates	   itself	   into	   practices	   defining	   a	  modus	   loquendi	  and/or	   a	   modus	   agendi’,	   that	   is	   a	   new	   or	   present	   way	   of	   speaking	   and	   manner	   of	  proceeding.1057	  But	   this	  mystic	  way	   of	   speaking	   is	   not	   only	   demarcated	   by	   its	   distinctive	  linguistic	  style,	  but	  by	  its	  referent	  that	  is	  transcendent	  to	  the	  text	  and	  yet	  speaks	  through	  the	   text,	   the	   speech	   of	   the	   Spirit.	   The	   revelation	   of	   the	   Spirit	   brings	   with	   it	   a	   spiritual	  epistemology,	   the	   illumination	   of	   the	  mind	   through	   the	   Spirit,	   founded	   on	   an	   alternative	  ontology,	  the	  ‘living	  word’	  of	  the	  Spirit.1058	  This	  subsistence	  through	  the	  living	  word	  of	  the	  Spirit	   sees	   the	   immanent	   revelation	   of	   the	   transcendent	   God	   in	  man’s	   experience	   of	   the	  world	  through	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1057	  Certeau,	  The	  Mystic	  Fable,	  14.	  1058	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove	   :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	   from	  His	  Ethikon,	   110,	   499*.	  Wensinck	  notes	  that	  his	  translation	  ‘in	  personal	  intercourse	  (with	  the	  housemates)’	  is	  more	  literally	  ‘a	  living	  word’	  (footnote	  6).	  Indeed	  the	  phrase	  b-­‐melʿa	  hāyʿā	   l-­‐bayytāyē	  could	  alternatively	  be	  translated	  as	  ‘in	  living	  word	  to	  the	  housemates’.	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  cognate	  baytāyūtā	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5;	  for	  Teule	  this	  denotes	  the	  intimacy	  or	  familiarity	  with	  God,	  deriving	  from	  the	  Syriac	  baytā	  as	  in	  ‘house’	  or	  ‘family’.	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Chapter	  7:	  Conclusion	  	  Barhebraeus’	   meditational	   thinking	   on	   the	   Spirit	   provides	   insights	   for	   the	   Western	  discipline	  of	  the	  study	  of	  mysticism	  which	  can	  be	  categorised	  according	  to	  the	  three	  main	  aims	   of	   the	   thesis.	   The	   first	   one,	   Barhebraeus’	   understanding	   of	   the	   ontology	   of	   God	  through	   the	   love	   of	   God,	   has	   been	   developed	   to	   show	   his	   originality	   across	   the	   Syrian	  scientific	   and	   theological	   disciplines.	   This	   provides	   a	   revision	   of	   the	   traditional	   view	   in	  Syriac	   studies	  of	  Barhebraeus	  as	  a	   scholastic	   compiler.	   Secondly,	   the	  mystical	  experience	  and	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   intentionality	   have	   been	   shown	   to	   form	   the	   main	   categories	   of	  debate	   for	   the	   Western	   academic	   study	   of	   mysticism,	   categories	   which	   may	   be	   revised	  according	   to	   the	   Syrian	   tradition	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God.	   Finally,	   the	   role	   of	   dialogue	   in	   the	  hermeneutical	   study	   of	   mysticism	   set	   up	   in	   Chapter	   2	   as	   a	   way	   forward	   for	   the	  epistemological	   impasse	   in	   the	  Western	   academy,	   has	   been	  brought	   to	   full	   conclusion	   in	  Chapter	  6	  through	  the	  dialogue	  with	  Syrian	  hermeneutics	  concerning	  the	  concept	  of	  God,	  and	  the	  reading	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  mystical	  thought	  as	  a	  resolution	  of	  the	  impasse.	  	  Chapter	   2	   showed	   that	   religious	   experience	   continues	   to	   be	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   modern	  debates	   in	   the	  Western	   study	   of	  mysticism.	   These	   debates	   have	   been	   defined	  within	   the	  academy	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  the	  potential	  contribution	  that	  mystic	  traditions	  can	  provide.	  In	  an	   attempt	   to	   recover	   the	   traditions	   of	   the	  mystics,	   the	  work	   of	   Certeau	   and	   others	  was	  reprised	   in	   order	   to	   develop	   a	   hermeneutical	   approach	   for	   the	   study	   of	   mysticism.	   In	  particular	  Flood’s	  notion	  of	  levels	  of	  discourse	  becomes	  paradigmatic	  for	  this	  approach,	  in	  recognising	   that	   the	  Western	  discipline	  of	   the	   study	  of	  mysticism	  represents	  a	  particular	  discourse	  of	  reasoning	  which	  may	  be	  informed	  by	  the	  traditions	  of	  mystic	  writing	  and	  the	  mystic	  science	  of	   interpretation	  of	   these	  texts.	  This	  understanding	   is	   implicit	   through	  the	  development	   of	   the	   subsequent	   chapters	  until	   Chapter	  6	   explicates	  how	  precisely	   Syrian	  hermeneutics	  may	   inform	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  mysticism.	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  thus	  represents	  both	   the	   level	   of	   interpretive	  discourse	  of	   the	  Syrian	   tradition	  of	  mystic	   texts	  and	   the	   level	   of	   of	   mystic	   discourse	   in	   the	   primary	   sense	   of	   making	   claims	   about	   the	  ontological	  experience	  of	  God,	  through	  the	  love	  of	  God.	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  Chapter	  3	  examined	   the	  background	   to	  Barhebraeus’	   contribution	   to	   the	  Syrian	   tradition	  with	   his	   engagement	   in	   the	   central	   epistemological	   debates	   of	   his	   tradition.	  His	  writings	  alternatively	   present	   and	   reformulate	   the	   intellectual	   issues	   that	   had	   preoccupied	   his	  predecessors.	   He	   assembled	   the	   full	   range	   of	   intellectual	   resources	   at	   his	   disposal,	  including	   the	   Graeco-­‐Syriac	   and	   the	   Arabic	   Avicennan	   traditions,	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  clarifying	  and	  resolving	   the	  problems	  posed	   for	   the	  Syriac	  Christians,	  by	   the	  reception	  of	  the	   Greek	   sciences.	   For	   Barhebraeus,	   the	   central	   theme	   of	   the	   love	   of	   God	   in	   Syrian	  mysticism	  became	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  problematic	  of	  conceiving	  God	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  dominant	  traditions	  of	  thought	  inherited	  by	  the	  Syrians.	  Barhebraeus	  overcame	  the	  impasse	  between	  the	   Syrian	  mystic	   and	   scholastic	   traditions,	   by	   exposing	   the	   philosophical	   foundations	   of	  both	   sides,	   and	   proposing	   an	   integrated	   schema	   that	   could	   accommodate	   both.	  Barhebraeus	   indicated	   the	   way	   forward	   through	   the	   epistemological	   impasse	   in	   Syrian	  monasticism,	  to	  resolve	  the	  problem	  of	  conceiving	  of	  God	  either	  as	  the	  highest	  intellect	  or	  the	  highest	  being.	  	  	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  was	  explored	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  background	  to	  his	  main	  theme	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  in	  Syrian	  mysticism	  and	  his	  unique	  development	  of	  this	  theme	  for	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  epistemological	  problem	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God.	  Barhebraeus	  offers	  insights	  into	  how	  the	  mind	  (hawnā)	  is	  conditioned	  by	  its	  finitude	  in	  its	  comprehension	  of	  God;	  this	  recognition	  is	  an	  aid	  to	  the	  mind	  in	  the	  ascent	  to	  thinking	  about	  God,	  which	  may	  aspire	   to	   grow	   in	   likeness	   to	   the	   Father.	   The	   final	   part	   of	   the	   ascent	   occurs	   through	   the	  giving	  of	   the	  Father	   in	   love,	  by	  which	  the	  Spirit	  of	   the	  Son	  comes	  to	  dwell	   in	   the	  purified	  hearts	  of	  the	  sanctified.	  Only	  then	  is	  the	  mind	  able	  to	  pass	  beyond	  the	  relational	  notions	  of	  Father	   and	  adoptive	   sons,	   to	   achieve	  unification	  with	  God	  without	   such	  distinctions.	  The	  love	  of	  God	  marks	   the	   transition	  between	   the	   thinking	  of	  God	   through	   the	   concept,	   even	  that	   of	   personhood	   in	   the	   scriptural	   language	   of	   the	   Father	   and	   the	   Son,	   and	   the	  abandoning	  of	  such	  thinking	  altogether.	  	  	  Therefore,	   there	  are	   two	  strands	   in	   the	  mysticism	  of	  Barhebraeus	  concerning	   the	   love	  of	  God,	  one	  emphasising	  the	  interpersonal	  aspect	  of	  loving	  relationship	  between	  the	  creature	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who	  is	  created	  in	  the	  likeness	  of	  His	  Creator,	  while	  the	  other	  evokes	  love	  in	  a	  more	  dynamic	  sense	  whereby	  the	  soul	  is	   lifted	  beyond	  its	  created-­‐ness,	  towards	  a	  state	  where	  there	  is	  a	  loss	  of	  the	  subject	  and	  thus	  also	  a	  surpassing	  of	  the	  object-­‐hood	  of	  God,	  beyond	  the	  notion	  of	  substance	  to	  Barhebraeus’	  understanding	  of	  the	  biblical	  God	  as	  essentially	  the	  spirit	  of	  love.	  Barhebraeus’	  particular	  contribution	  to	  the	  Syrian	  tradition	  is	  in	  his	  understanding	  of	  spiritual	   likeness	   which	   overcame	   the	   metaphysical	   problem	   of	   the	   relation	   of	   God	   to	  creation	  through	  the	  ontic	  structures	  of	  form	  and	  substance.	  	  	  Chapter	  5	  considered	   the	  ontological	   implications	  of	   the	   rival	  epistemologies	  held	  by	   the	  mystics	  and	  the	  scholastics	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  alternative	  approaches	  developed	  in	  the	  Syrian	  theological	  discourse	  about	  God.	  Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  and	  Stephen	  bar	  Ṣūdhailē,	  both	  of	  whose	  writings	   came	   to	   inform	   the	   West	   Syrian	   tradition,	   demonstrate	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  epistemological	   conflict	   that	   Barhebraeus	   inherited	   and	   further,	   the	   onto-­‐theological	  implications	  of	  understanding	  God	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  God.	  Barhebraeus	  rather	  sought	  to	   reimagine	   the	   relation	   of	   epistemology	   to	   ontology	   in	   Syrian	   theological	   discourse,	  whereby	  the	  epistemological	  had	  come	  to	  define	  the	  ontological.	  Through	  the	  love	  of	  God	  Barhebraeus	  reconciles	  the	  epistemological	  conflict	  by	  surpassing	  metaphysics.	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  has	  explicated	  the	  five	  causes	  of	   love	  to	  show	  how	  the	  love	  for	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  self	   and	   the	   good	   of	   its	   well-­‐being	   is	   an	   immanent	   desire	   of	   the	   soul,	   a	   desire	   that	   is	  ultimately	  realised	  and	  perfected	  in	  a	  transcendent	  Good.	  	  That	  Barhebraeus	  turned	  to	  al-­‐Ghazālī’s	  exposition	  of	  the	  five	  causes	  of	  human	  love	  for	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  in	  order	  to	  reconcile	  the	  epistemology	  of	  the	  Evagrian	  mystics	  with	  that	  of	  the	  scholastics,	  suggests	  that	  his	  own	  tradition	  lacked	  the	  resources	  within	  itself	  to	  resolve	  this	  impasse.	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  Syrian	  tradition	  to	  resolve	  the	  epistemological	  impasse	  according	  to	  its	  internal	  resources	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  Organon	  in	  the	  curriculum	  of	  the	  West	  Syrian	  monastic	  schools	  and	  the	  East	  Syrian	  schools	  of	  learning	  which	   led	   to	   the	   neglect	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  Aristotelian	   sciences.	   Barhebraeus’	   systematic	  approach	   to	   learning	   led	  him	  to	  study	  all	   the	  branches	  of	   the	  Greek	  sciences	  and	  even	  to	  immerse	  himself	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  mystics	  for	  an	  extended	  period.	  He	  was	  thus	  placed	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in	  the	  privileged	  position	  of	  being	  able	  to	  represent	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  one	  to	  the	  other,	   in	  a	  manner	  that	  reconciled	  both.1059	  	  Chapter	  6	  concluded	  that	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  is	  the	  overcoming	   of	   the	   transcendent-­‐immanent	   binary.	   For	   Barhebraeus,	   God	   is	   neither	   the	  highest	   being	   of	   all	   beings	   as	   categorised	   by	   the	   philosophers	   who	   were	   dependent	   on	  Greek	  metaphysics,	  nor	  the	  apophatic	  denial	  of	  this	  speculation	  in	  the	  assertion	  of	  God	  as	  non-­‐being	  or	  even	  the	  ‘nothing’.1060	  In	  his	  mysticism	  of	  the	  Spirit,	  he	  follows	  the	  apophatic	  Dionysian	   tradition	   of	   affirming	   the	   necessity	   of	   going	   beyond	   the	   divine	   names,	   for	   the	  Spirit	  is	  not	  another	  name	  for	  God.	  Rather,	  the	  Spirit	  is	  more	  essential	  in	  form	  than	  even	  the	  Godhead,	  transcending	  the	  binary	  of	  Creator-­‐created	  that	  is	  implicit	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  God	  as	  first	  cause	  in	  onto-­‐theological	  discourse,	  to	  show	  the	  essential	  given-­‐ness	  of	  God	  as	  Spirit.	  	  	  Richard	   Kearney	   in	   his	   book	   Anatheism	   Returning	   to	   God	   After	   God,	   makes	   reference	   to	  ‘transcendent-­‐immanence’	   in	   the	   understanding	   of	   Christian	   mystics	   of	   the	   Western	  tradition.1061	  Barhebraeus’	  mysticism	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  contributes	  to	  this	  understanding	  of	  God,	  through	  the	  realisation	  of	  man’s	  spiritual	  capacity	  to	  reach	  beyond	  himself	  in	  love	  for	  what	   is	   beautiful	   and	  good.	  This	   is	   a	   love	  which	  begins	  with	  his	   concern	   for	  his	   own	  being,	  extends	  towards	  love	  of	  the	  beautiful	  good,	  which	  is	  a	  love	  of	  something	  other	  for	  the	  sake	   of	   its	   giving,	   and	   returns	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   oneself,	   by	   which	   man	   finds	   an	  affinity	  with	   the	   gift	   of	   love	   through	   the	   Spirit	   that	   is	   revealed	  within	   his	   own	   being.	   In	  Barhebraeus’	   mystic	   discourse,	   the	   God	   beyond	   metaphysics	   can	   only	   be	   thought	   in	  language	  that	  is	  free	  of	  propositional	  thinking,	  one	  that	  allows	  the	  giving	  of	  the	  gift	  of	  love	  and	  its	  return	  without	  reasoning	  as	  to	  its	  cause.	  In	  love	  the	  gift	  can	  be	  given,	  received	  and	  returned	  without	   asking	   the	   question	   of	   the	  why,	   because	   this	   presupposes	   a	   cause	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1059	  For	  the	  comparison	  with	  Aquinas’	  reconciliation	  of	  the	  Western	  epistemological	  impasse	  between	  Augustinianism	  and	  Aristotelianism:	  MacIntyre,	  Three	  Rival	  Versions	  of	  Moral	  Enquiry	  :	  Encyclopaedia,	  
Genealogy,	  and	  Tradition,	  115.	  1060	  For	   example	   the	   Christian	  mystic	   Gregory	   of	   Nyssa	   suggests	   that	   all	   being	   proceeds	   out	   of	   the	   divine	  nothingness,	  in	  his	  interpretation	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  creatio	  ex	  nihilio.	  Sells,	  Mystical	  Languages	  of	  Unsaying,	  36.	  	  1061 	  Kearney	   refers	   to	   the	   ‘transcendent	   immanence’	   that	   he	   says	   characterises	   modern	   sacramental	  aesthetics,	  but	  which	  he	  also	  identifies	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Christian	  mystics	  from	  John	  of	  the	  Cross	  to	  Meister	  Eckhart,	   as	   well	   as	   Sufi	   mystics	   like	   Rumi.	   Richard	   Kearney,	   Anatheism	   :	   Returning	   to	   God	   after	   God,	  Insurrections	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  99.	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insists	  on	  a	  ground	  that	  restrains	  the	  mystic	  discourse	  of	  the	  infinite,	  the	  giving	  of	  the	  love	  of	  God	  by	  which	  the	  Spirit	  speaks.	  	  Kearney	  states	  that	  it	  is	  the	  ‘radical	  and	  recurring	  sense	  of	  something	  more	  –	  something	  ulterior,	  extra	  and	  unexpected	  –	  that	  various	  religions	  call	  God’.1062	  In	   the	  Syrian	  mystic	   tradition,	   the	   truth	  of	   this	  sense	  of	   ‘something	  more’	   that	   is	  called	  ‘God’,	  is	  explored	  by	  Barhebraeus	  through	  his	  meditation	  on	  the	  love	  of	  God	  which	  he	  unfolds	   in	   the	   post-­‐metaphysical	   language	   of	   the	   Spirit.	   Barhebraeus’	   mystic	   discourse	  offers	  a	  critique	  of	  thinking	  God	  though	  the	  concept,	  to	  surpass	  the	  propositional	  thinking	  about	  God	  through	  the	  meditative	  thought	  on	  the	  love	  of	  God.	  	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1062	  Ibid.,	  183.	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Appendix	  1:	  Chronology	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  works	  	  Takahashi	   provides	   a	   chronological	   order	   for	   Barhebraeus’	   works,	   arranged	   primarily	  according	  to	  those	  works	  for	  which	  there	  is	  a	  known	  date	  of	  composition.	  He	  then	  inserts	  others	   into	   this	   list	  where	   there	   is	  an	   indication	  that	   they	  were	  written	  either	  some	  time	  before	  or	  after	  those	  works	  which	  are	  more	  definitely	  dated.	  This	  classification	  does	  not	  of	  course	   allow	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   Barhebraeus	   revising	   his	   works	   after	   their	   initial	  composition,	   as	   Takahashi	   has	   admitted.1063	  The	   chronology	   provided	   below,	   follows	   in	  outline	  Takahashi’s	  list,	  provided	  in	  Section	  I.2.3,	  1064	  using	  both	  the	  Latin	  and	  Syriac	  titles	  of	   Barhebraeus’	   works	   where	   appropriate, 1065 	  supplemented	   with	   information	   from	  Takahashi’s	  more	  detailed	  overview	  in	  later	  sections.1066	  	  
• Ktābā	  d-­‐pushshāq	  ḥelmē	  1067	  
• Mêmrā	  shennāyā:	  before	  12611068	  
• Ktābā	  d-­‐têgrat	  têgrātā:	  before	  May	  1276	  and	  Swād	  sōpiya	  	  
• Candelabrium	  sanctuarii	  =	  Ktābā	  da-­‐mnārat	  qudshē,	  2nd	  Base:	  1266/7	  
• ‘Lecture’	  on	  Euclid’s	  Elements:	  1268,	  in	  Marāgha	  
• Mnārat	  qudshē,	  4th	  Base/Foundation:	  1271/72	  
• ‘Lecture’	  on	  Ptolemy’s	  Almagest:	  1272,	  in	  Marāgha1069	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1063	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  90-­‐91.	  1064	  Ibid.,	  91-­‐94.	  	  	  1065	  In	  the	  main	  body	  of	  the	  thesis,	  the	  Syriac	  titles	  and	  English	  translation	  have	  been	  preferred,	  but	  the	  Latin	  titles	  are	  included	  here	  when	  they	  have	  been	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  secondary	  literature.	  The	  Syriac	  titles	  follow	  Takahashi	  in	  using	  those	  given	  in	  J.	  B.	  Abbeloos	  and	  Thomas	  Lamy’s	  edition	  of	  the	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum,	  while	   the	   Latin	   titles	   reflect	   the	   conventions	   established	   by	   Giuseppe	   Simone	   Assemani’s	   Bibliotheca	  
Orientalis.	  Abbeloos	  and	  Lamy,	  Gregorii	  Barhebraei	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum,	  Quod	  e	  Codice	  Musei	  Britannici	  
Descriptum	   Conjuncta	   Opera	   ed,	   II:475-­‐82.	   Giuseppe	   Simone	   Assemani	   and	   Biblioteca	   apostolica	   vaticana.,	  
Bibliotheca	  Orientalis	  Clementino-­‐Vaticana	  :	  In	  Qua	  Manuscriptos	  Codices	  Syriacos,	  Arabicos,	  Persicos,	  Turcicos,	  
Hebraicos,	   Samaritanos,	   Armenicos,	   Æthiopicos,	   Græcos,	   Ægyptiacos,	   Ibericos,	   &	   Malabaricos,	   Jussu	   et	  
Munificentia	   Clementis	   XI.	   Pontificis	   Maximi,	   Ex	   Oriente	   Conquisitos,	   Comparatos,	   Avectos,	   &	   Bibliothecæ	  
Vaticanæ	  Addictos,	  3	  vols.	  (Romæ:	  Typis	  Sacræ	  Congregationis	  de	  Propaganda	  Fide,	  1719-­‐1728),	  268-­‐72.	  1066	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  63-­‐90.	  See	  Section	  I.2.2.	  1067	  Ibid.,	  85.	  Takahashi	  states	  that	  this	  was	  composed	  during	  Barhebraeus’	  youth,	  according	  to	  the	  list	  of	  his	  works	  provided	  by	  his	  brother	  in	  the	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum.	  1068	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  only	  dating	  from	  the	  Common	  Era	  (CE)	  is	  used	  in	  this	  list.	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• K.	  d-­‐zalgē:	  coming	  after	  Swād	  sōpiya	  and	  Awṣar	  Rāzē	  1070	  
• K.	  d-­‐Awṣar	  Rāzē:	  1272	  or	  12781071	  
• Nomocanon	  =	  K.	  d-­‐Huddāyē:	  coming	  after	  Mnārat	  qudshē	  and	  K.	  d-­‐zalgē	  
• K.	  d-­‐bābātā:	  (probably)	  before	  Swād	  sōpiya1072	  	  
• K.	  d-­‐swād	  sōpiya:	  before	  12751073	  
• Chronicon	  Syriacum/Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum	  =	  K.	  d-­‐maktbānūt	  zabnē:	  1276	  
• K.	  d-­‐pushshāqā	  d-­‐Īrōte’ōs:	  1276/7,	  in	  Mosul1074	  	  
• K.	  da-­‐grammaṭīqī	  ba-­‐mshuḥtā	  d-­‐mār	  Aprēm:	  summer	  1277,	  Baghdad1075	  
• Mêmrā	  zawgānāyā:	  1277,	  Baghdad	  
• K.	  d-­‐remzē	  wa-­‐m‘īrānwātā	  d-­‐Abū	  ‘Alī	  bar	  Sīnā1076	  
• Ascensus	  mentis	  =	  K.	  d-­‐sullāqā	  hawnānāyā:	  1278/91077	  
• Ethicon	  =	  K.	  d-­‐ītīqōn:	  completed	  on	  15th	  July	  1279,	  in	  Marāgha	  1078	  
• K.	  d-­‐yawnā:	  after	  the	  Ethicon1079	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  1069 	  Takahashi,	   Barhebraeus	   :	   A	   Bio-­‐Bibliography,	   84.	   In	   the	   Chronicon	   Ecclesiasticum	   that	   he	  ‘solved/commented	   on’	   (šrā)	   Euclid	   and	   Ptolemy	   in	  Marāgha	   in	   1267/8	   and	   1272	   respectively.	   Takahashi	  comments	  that:	  ‘In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  known	  written	  works	  by	  Barhebraeus	  on	  Euclid	  and	  the	  Almagest,	  the	  word	   “shrā”	   here	   has	   usually	   been	   understood	   to	  mean	   that	   Barhebraeus	   “explained”	   these	  works	   orally.’	  Thus	   Takahashi	   interprets	   these	   oral	   commentaries	   as	   ‘lectures’.	   Abbeloos	   and	   Lamy,	   Gregorii	   Barhebraei	  
Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum,	  Quod	  e	  Codice	  Musei	  Britannici	  Descriptum	  Conjuncta	  Opera	  ed,	  II.443-­‐44.	  1070	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  90-­‐91.	  Since	  this	  work	  is	  mentioned	  in	  both	  Swād	  Sōpiya	  and	  
Awṣar	  Rāzē,	   this	  would	  place	   it	  prior	   to	   these	  works.	  Takahashi	  discusses	   further	   issues	  of	  dating	  Ktābā	  d-­‐
zalgē	  according	  to	  the	  contents.	  1071	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  dating	  the	  composition	  of	  this	  work,	  ibid.,	  92-­‐93.	  1072	  Janssens,	  L'Entretien	  de	  la	  Sagesse	  :	  Introduction	  aux	  Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	  17.	  1073	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  93.	  Following	  Janssens,	  1275	  is	  the	  terminus	  ante	  quem	   for	  its	  composition,	  but	  Takahashi	  comments	  that	  the	  grounds	  given	  for	  this	  dating	  by	  Janssens	  are	  not	  certain.	  Janssens,	  L'Entretien	  de	  la	  Sagesse	  :	  Introduction	  aux	  Œuvres	  Philosophiques	  de	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	  16-­‐17.	  1074	  Both	  the	  date	  and	  the	  place	  of	  composition	  are	  provided	  in	  a	  note	  in	  the	  original	  manuscript;	  this	  note	  is	  reproduced	  by	  Marsh.	  Marsh,	  The	  Book	  Which	  Is	  Called	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos,	  with	  Extracts	  from	  the	  
Prolegomena	  and	  Commentary	  of	  Theodosios	  of	  Antioch	  and	   from	  the	   "Book	  of	  Excerpts"	  and	  Other	  Works	  of	  
Gregory	  Bar-­‐Hebræus,	  186,	  76*.	  1075	  A	  short	  treatise	  on	  grammar	  in	  the	  ‘heptasyllabic	  metre’	  of	  Mar	  Ephrem.	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐
Bibliography,	  81.	  	  1076	  Ibid.,	  70.	  Translation	  of	  Ibn	  Sīnā’s	  Kitāb	  al-­‐ishārāt	  wa-­‐l-­‐tanbīhāt.	  The	  oldest	  manuscript,	  a	  parallel	  Arabic-­‐Syriac	  text,	  was	  copied	  during	  Barhebraeus’	  lifetime	  and	  precisely	  dated	  (Laur.	  Or.	  6;	  December	  1278).	  1077	  Ibid.,	  83.	  This	  book	   is	   in	   two	  parts,	   the	   first	  dealing	  with	  astronomy	   in	  8	  chapters,	  and	  the	  second	  with	  mathematical	  geography	  in	  7	  chapters.	  The	  dating	  of	  Ascensus	  mentis	   follows	  Nau’s	  edition:	  Nau,	  Le	  Livre	  de	  
L'ascension	  de	  L'esprit	   sur	   la	  Forme	  du	  Ciel	   et	  de	   la	  Terre	   :	   Cours	  D'astronomie	  Rédigé	   en	  1279	  par	  Grégoire	  
Aboulfarag,	  dit	  Bar	  Hebræus,	  26.4f.,	  196.10f.	  1078	  Following	  the	  subscription	  in	  Brit.	  Lib.	  Add.	  7194.	  	  1079	  Wensinck	  states	  that	  the	  Ethicon	  was	  written	  in	  1278	  (following	  a	  note	  in	  the	  Codex	  Rich	  n°	  1794,	  British	  Museum)	   and	   that	   the	  Dove	  was	   subsequent	   to	   this.	  Wensinck,	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	   the	  Dove	   :	  Together	  
with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  Ethikon,	  xiv.	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• Shorter	  Anaphora	  of	  St.	  James:	  1281/21080	  
• K.	  d-­‐ṣemḥē:	  completed	  before	  December	  12841081	  	  
• Butyrum	  Sapientae	  =	  K.	  d-­‐hêwat	  ḥekmtā:	  Part	   II	   completed	  on	  22nd	  August	  1285	   in	  Mosul,	  Part	  III	  at	  end	  of	  December	  1285,	  and	  Part	  IV	  on	  8th	  Feb.	  1286.1082	  	  
• K.	  d-­‐Ṭalyūt	  Hawnā:	  left	  unfinished	  on	  his	  departure	  to	  Marāgha,	  in	  1286.1083	  
• Historia	   dynastiarum	   =	   K.	   d-­‐maktbānūt	   zabnē	   arabāyā;	   Mukhtaṣar	   tā’rīkh	   al-­‐
duwal1084	  
• K.	  d-­‐qānōnā	  rabbā	  d-­‐Abū	  ‘Alī;1085	  K.	  d-­‐belṣūṣītā;1086	  both	  left	  unfinished,	  now	  lost.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1080	  Ibid.,	  88,	  94.	  This	  is	  a	  shortened	  version	  of	  the	  Anaphora	  of	  St.	  James;	  in	  the	  headings	  of	  this	  anaphora	  it	  is	  frequently	   stated	   that	   the	   revision	   was	   undertaken	   by	   Barhebraeus,	   and	   composed	   ‘in	   the	   mountains	   of	  Armenia’.	  1081	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  82.	  This	  is	  a	  detailed	  prose	  treatise	  on	  grammar	  in	  four	  parts:	  I.	  Nouns.	  II.	  Verbs.	  III.	  Particles.	  IV.	  General	  (phonetics/orthography).	  1082	  See	  Mingana	  Syr.	  310,	  fol.	  216r.	  1083	  Takahashi,	   Barhebraeus	   :	   A	   Bio-­‐Bibliography,	   66,	   225.	   The	   unfinished	   mystical	   work,	   the	   Book	   of	   the	  
Youthul	  Mind	   (K.	  d-­‐Ṭalyūt	  Hawnā)	   is	   not	   considered	   in	   the	   thesis,	   since	   there	   are	   only	   Arabic	   and	   Turkish	  translations	  available.	  Samir’s	  article	  reproduces	  the	  Arabic	  version	  of	  this	  text	  in	  Appendix,	  II:	  ‘Version	  arabe	  rimée	  de	  l’«enfance	  de	  l’esprit»’.	  Samir,	  "Un	  Récit	  Autobiographique	  d'Ibn	  al-­‐'Ibri,"	  44-­‐51.	  	  1084	  The	  work	  had	  been	  virtually	  completed	  before	  Barhebraeus’	  death,	  the	  details	  are	  given	  by	  Barṣawmā	  (in	  
Chron.	  Eccl.	  II:	  469).	  See	  also	  the	  quotation	  given	  at	  Chapter	  3,	  p52,	  n.181.	  	  	  1085	  Although	   this	   ‘translation/abridgement’	   of	   Ibn	  Sīnā’s	  Qānūn	  fī	  al-­‐ṭibb	   is	   lost,	   the	   ‘first	   four	  quires’	  were	  completed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Barhebraeus’	  death.	  Takahashi,	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography,	  87.	  	  1086	  Ibid.,	  82.	  Takahashi	  describes	  this	  work	  as	  an	  ‘epitome	  of	  grammar’.	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Appendix	  2:	  Works	  cited	  of	  Barhebraeus	  	  
• Ascent	  of	  the	  Mind:	  Syr.	  Ktābā	  d-­‐sullāqā	  hawnānāyā	  -­‐	  Lat.	  Ascensus	  Mentis	  
• Dove	  =	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove:	  Syr.	  Ktābā	  d-­‐Yawnā	  -­‐	  Lat.	  Liber	  Columbae	  
• Book	  of	  Directions:	  Syr.	  Ktābā	  d-­‐Huddāyē	  -­‐	  Lat.	  Nomocanon	  	  
• Book	  of	  the	  Essence	  of	  Secrets:	  Syr.	  Ktābā	  d-­‐zubdat	  al-­‐asrār	  
• Book	  of	  Excerpts	  on	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  Holy	  Hierotheos:	  Ktābā	  d-­‐pushshāqā	  d-­‐Īrōte’ōs	  
• Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye:	  Ktābā	  d-­‐bābātā	  
• Book	  of	  Remarks	  and	  Admonitions:	  Ktābā	  d-­‐remzē	  wa-­‐m‘īrānwātā	  d-­‐Abū	  ‘Alī	  bar	  Sīnā	  
• Book	  of	  the	  Youthful	  Mind:	  Ktābā	  d-­‐Ṭalyūt	  Hawnā	  
• Candelabrum	  =	  Candelabrum	  of	  the	  Sanctuary:	  Syr.	  Mnārat	  qudshē	  -­‐	  Lat.	  
Candelabrium	  Sanctuarii.	  	  
• Chronography:	  Syr.	  Maktbānūt	  Zabnē	  –	  in	  2	  volumes,	  with	  Latin	  titles	  by	  convention,	  
Chronicon	  Syriacum	  and	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum	  (Chron.	  Eccl.)	  
• Concise	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Human	  Soul:	  Maqāla	  mukhtaṣara	  fī	  al-­‐nafs	  al-­‐basharīya	  
• Conversation	  of	  Wisdom:	  Ktābā	  d-­‐swād	  sōpiya	  (Swād	  Sōpiya)	  
• Cream	  =	  Cream	  of	  Wisdom:	  Syr.	  Ktābā	  d-­‐ḥêwat	  ḥekmtā	  (Ḥêwat	  Ḥekmtā)	  -­‐	  Lat.	  
Butyrum	  Sapientae	  
• Ethicon	  =	  Book	  of	  the	  Ethicon:	  Ktābā	  d-­‐ītīqōn	  
• History	  of	  the	  Dynasties:	  Arabic.	  Mukhtaṣar	  tā’rīkh	  al-­‐duwal	  –	  Syr.	  Ktābā	  d-­‐maktbānūt	  
zabnē	  arabāyā	  -­‐	  Lat.	  Historia	  compendiosa	  dynastiarum	  
• Letter	  to	  Catholicus	  Denḥā	  I	  
• Poems:	  Syr.	  Mushḥātā	  -­‐	  Lat.	  Carmina	  
• Treatise	  of	  Treatises:	  Ktābā	  d-­‐têgrat	  têgrātā	  (Têgrat	  têgrātā)	  
• Treatise	  on	  the	  Science	  of	  the	  Human	  Soul:	  Mukhtaṣar	  fī	  ʿilm	  al-­‐nafs	  al-­‐insānīya	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Appendix	  3:	  Glossary	  of	  Key	  Terms	  
Syriac	  Terms	  
ʿarpelā	  	   	   	   cloud,	  thick	  darkness	  (Gr.	  gnophos)1087	  ʾaynā	  	   	   	   	   eye	  	  
barqā	  	  	   	   	   lightning	  
bātar	  kyānāyātā	  	   	   after	  the	  physics,	  i.e.	  metaphysics	  
baytāyūtā	  	   	   	   communion	  or	  familiarity	  
dāmyūtā	  	   	   	   likeness	  -­‐	  dāmyūtā	  ksītā:	  hidden	  likeness	  
durrāšā	  	   	   	   disputation	  ʿeltā	  	   	   	   	   cause	  (Gr.	  aitia)	  
eskōlāyē	  	   	   	   the	  school-­‐men,	  i.e.	  scholastics	  
gmīrē	  	   	   	   	   the	  perfect	  
gšīme	  	   	   	   	   corporeal	  things	  cf.	  lā	  gšīme:	  non-­‐corporeal	  
gulyānē	  	   	   	   revelations	  
ḥadāyūtā	  	   	   	   unification	  	  
hawnā	  	   	   	   the	  mind,	  intellect	  or	  heart	  -­‐	  Evagrian	  nous	  	  
haymānūtā	  	   	   	   faith	  
ḥbīkūtā	   	   	   conmingling	  
ḥezwā	   	  	   	   	   vision	  
hnīy	  	   	   	   	   sweet,	  fragrant,	  pleasant,	  grateful,	  agreeable	  
ḥubbā	   	  	   	   	   love	  
īdaʿtā	  	   	   	   	   knowledge	  (Gr.	  	  gnosis)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1087	  For	   this	  Glossary,	   foreign	   terms	  which	   belong	   to	   direct	   quotations	   have	  not	   been	   included,	   in	   order	   to	  avoid	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   different	   transliteration	   systems	   used	   by	   scholars.	   Reference	   has	   been	   made	   to	  Sokoloff’s	  dictionary	  for	  the	  correct	  representation	  of	  the	  East	  Syriac	  vowels,	  as	  displayed	  in	  Bedjan’s	  edition.	  Michael	   Sokoloff,	   A	   Syriac	   Lexicon	   :	   A	   Translation	   from	   the	   Latin	   :	   Correction,	   Expansion,	   and	   Update	   of	   C.	  
Brockelmann's	  Lexicon	  Syriacum	  (Winona	  Lake,	  Ind.:	  Eisenbrauns	  ;	  Piscataway).	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ʾītūtā	  	   	   	   	   essence,	  substance	  
kūnnāyē	  	   	   	   terminology,	  names,	  denominations	  
kyānā	  (pl.	  kyānē)	  	   	   nature	  
malpānā	   	   	   teacher	  
mamllā	  	   	   	   speech,	  diction;	  talk,	  discourse	  
melīle	   	   	   	   endowed	  with	  speech	  and	  reason,	  articulate,	  rational	  	  	  
mellē	   	   	   	   words	  
meltā	  	   	   	   	   word	  precept,	  the	  Logos;	  the	  faculty	  of	  speech,	  thought,	  reason	  
mēmrā	  (pl.	  mēmrē)	  	   	   a	  discourse,	  homily;	  treatise	  or	  division	  of	  a	  book1088	  	  
miškan	  	   	   	   dwelling	  place	  or	  tabernacle	  
mlīlūtā	  	   	   	   logic,	  reason	  
mušḥātā	  	   	   	   degrees	  (of	  perfection)	  
napšā	  	  	   	   	   soul	  
ndīq	  	   	   	   	   to	  peer	  
nūhrā	   	  	   	   	   light	  
parrhisiā	  	   	   	   freedom	  of	  speech	  
petgāmē	  	   	   	   sentences	  
pīlāsāwpūtā	  	   	   	   philosophy	  (of	  the	  Greeks)	  
qadīšē	  	  	   	   	   the	  holy	  ones	  or	  saints	  	  
qnomā	  (pl.	  qnomē)	  	   	   essence,	  substance,	  actual	  existence	  	  (Gr.	  hypostasis)	  
rāḥmā:	  	   	   	   mercy,	  compassion,	  favour	  	  	  
rāzā	  (pl.	  rāzē)	  	   	   mystery	  
regšā	  	   	   	   	   sense	  perception	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1088	  The	  range	  of	  meanings	  for	  mēmrā	  listed	  here	  are	  limited	  to	  its	  usage	  (as	  with	  the	  other	  entries)	  within	  the	  body	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Payne	  Smith	  and	  Payne	  Smith,	  A	  Compendious	  Syriac	  Dictionary	  :	  Founded	  Upon	  the	  
Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  Payne	  Smith,	  247.	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reḥmtā	  	   	   	   love,	  dilection	  -­‐	  reḥmat	  ʾallāhā:	  love	  of	  God	  	  
rūḥā:	  	   	   	   	   spirit	  	  
rūḥānāyā	  (pl.	  rūḥānāyata)	  	   spiritual	  
šapyā	   	   	   	   pure,	  luminous	  
šelyā	   	   	   	   solitude	  
šetqā	   	   	   	   silence	  
špaʿ	  	   	   	   	   to	  pour	  out	  
šrā	   	   	   	   to	  solve,	  to	  comment	  on;	  a	  lecture	  
šrārā	   	   	   	   truth	  	  -­‐	  rūḥā	  d-­‐šrārā:	  the	  spirit	  of	  truth	  
šūbḥā	   	   	   	   glory	  
šūḥlāpā	   	   	   states	  of	  mind	  
šūprā	   	   	   	   	  beauty	  -­‐	  šūprā	  barrāyā:	  outer	  beauty	  (cf.	  inner:	  gawwāyā)	  
tawdyātā	   	   	   confessions	  
tēoriya	  	   	   	   contemplation,	  meditation,	  speculation	  (Gr.	  theōria)	  	  
ṭābā	   	   	   	   the	  good/Good	  -­‐	  ṭābtā:	  that	  which	  is	  good	  	  
Greek	  Terms	  	  
agape	   	   	   	   love	  (1John	  4:8)	  cf.	  eros	  1089	  	  
agathos	   	   	   good	  -­‐	  ho	  kalos	  agathon:	  the	  beautiful	  good	  
alētheia	   	   	   truth,	  unconcealment	  
apatheia	   	   	   impassibility,	  the	  passionless	  state	  -­‐	  pathē:	  the	  passions	  
aporia	  	   	   	   paradox,	  uncertainty	  
dynameis	   	   	   revelatory	  energies	  cf.	  hyperousios:	  (divine)	  super-­‐essence	  
eidos	   	   	   	   image,	  archetype	  –	  eidōlon	  theou:	  the	  idol	  of	  God	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1089	  Greek	  accents	  have	  not	  been	   included	   in	   the	  body	  of	   the	   thesis,	   except	  when	  quoting	  directly	   from	   the	  secondary	  sources,	  and	  thus	  do	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  Glossary	  (thus	  agapē	  not	  agápē).	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eikasīa	  	   	   	   imagination	  
epekeina	  	   	   	   beyond	  -­‐	  epekeina	  ousias:	  beyond-­‐being	  	  
epistēmē	  logikē	   	   the	  Greek	  ‘scholastic’	  science	  of	  logos	  
epithumia	   	   	   desire	  cf.	  thumos:	  repulsion	  
eudaimonia	  	   	   	   the	  human	  good	  
haploos	   	   	   simple	  cf.	  suntheton:	  composite	  (entity)	  
idea	   	   	   	   form,	  idea	  -­‐	  idea	  tou	  agathou:	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  good	  	  
logismoi	   	   	   evil	  thoughts	  
logos	  	   	   	   	   speech,	  word	  etc.	  -­‐	  logos	  apophatikos:	  a	  declaratory	  utterance	  	  
mystērion	   	   	   mystery	  	  
noēma	  	   	   	   concept	  –	  pl.	  noēmata:	  conceptual	  depictions	  (Evagrius)	  
noēsis	   	   	   	   intuition	  
nous	   	   	   	   the	  intellect	  or	  mind	  –	  pneumatikos	  nous:	  the	  spiritual	  mind	  
ousia	  	   	   	   	   essence,	  being	  -­‐	  to	  on:	  being	  cf.	  ta	  onta:	  beings	  
phasis	   to	  say	  something	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  belonging)	  –	  kataphasis:	  a	  denial	  cf.	  apophasis:	  an	  affirmation	  
philautia	  	   	   	   love	  of	  self	  
phusis	   	   	   	   nature	  
theion	  	  	   	   	   divine	  –	  theos:	  God	  	  
theologia	  	   	   	   the	  vision	  of	  the	  Holy	  Trinity	  –	  in	  the	  Evagrian	  schema:	  	  i)	  praktikē:	  the	  active	  life	  ii)	  theōria	  physikē:	  contemplative	  knowledge	  of	  created	  things	  iii)	  theologikē	  of	  the	  Trinity	  	  
theosis	  	   	   	   deification	  
	   254	  
Bibliography	  	  
Primary	  Sources	  Abbeloos,	  J.	  B.,	  and	  Thomas	  Joseph	  Lamy.	  Gregorii	  Barhebraei	  Chronicon	  Ecclesiasticum,	  
Quod	   e	   Codice	   Musei	   Britannici	   Descriptum	   Conjuncta	   Opera	   ed	   [in	   Syriac	   and	  Latin].	  2	  vols	  Lovanii	  (Belgium):	  C.	  Peeters,	  1872.	  Al-­‐Ghazālī.	  Al-­‐Ghazālī	  on	  Love,	  Longing,	  Intimacy	  &	  Contentment	  [in	  English].	  Translated	  by	  Eric	  L.	  Ormsby.	   Islamic	  Texts	   Society	  Al-­‐Ghazali	   Series.	   	   Cambridge:	   Islamic	  Texts	  Society,	  2011.	  ———.	   Al-­‐Ghazālī's	   Path	   to	   Sufism	   and	   His	   Deliverance	   from	   Error	   :	   An	   Annotated	  
Translation	  of	  Al-­‐Munqidh	  Min	  Al-­‐Dalal.	  Translated	  by	  Richard	  Joseph	  McCarthy.	  	  Louisville,	  KY:	  Fons	  Vitae,	  2000.	  ———.	   The	   Incoherence	   of	   the	   Philosophers	   =	   Tahāfut	   Al-­‐Falāsifah:	   A	   Parallel	   English-­‐
Arabic	   Text.	   Translated	   by	   Michael	   E.	   Marmura.	   Islamic	   Translation	   Series.	  	  Provo,	  Utah:	  Brigham	  Young	  University	  Press,	  1997.	  Aristotle.	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Aristotle	  :	  Literally	  Translated	  from	  the	  Greek.	  Translated	  by	  John	  H.	  McMahon.	  Bohn's	  Classical	  Library.	  	  London:	  George	  Bell,	  1896.	  Assemani,	   Giuseppe	   Simone,	   and	   Biblioteca	   apostolica	   vaticana.	   Bibliotheca	   Orientalis	  
Clementino-­‐Vaticana	   :	   In	   Qua	  Manuscriptos	   Codices	   Syriacos,	   Arabicos,	   Persicos,	  
Turcicos,	   Hebraicos,	   Samaritanos,	   Armenicos,	   Æthiopicos,	   Græcos,	   Ægyptiacos,	  
Ibericos,	  &	  Malabaricos,	   Jussu	   et	  Munificentia	   Clementis	   XI.	   Pontificis	  Maximi,	   Ex	  
Oriente	  Conquisitos,	  Comparatos,	  Avectos,	  &	  Bibliothecæ	  Vaticanæ	  Addictos.	  3	  vols	  Romæ:	  Typis	  Sacræ	  Congregationis	  de	  Propaganda	  Fide,	  1719-­‐1728.	  Bakoš,	   J.	   "Le	  Candélabre	  des	  Sanctuaires	  de	  Grégoire	  Aboulfaradj	  dit	  Barhebraeus."	   [in	  Syriac	  and	  French].	  Patrologia	  Orientalis	  XXII	  (1933):	  489-­‐628.	  Bar	  Hebraeus,	  Gregory	  John.	  Ethicon	  :	  Christian	  Ethics	  (Morals).	  	  [Glane/Losser]	  Holland:	  St.	  Ephrem	  the	  Syrian	  Monastery,	  1985.	  ———.	   Historia	   Compendiosa	   Dynastiarum,	   Arab.	   ed.	   &	   Lat.	   Versa	   ab	   E.	   Pocockio.	  	  Oxon.1663.	  Bedjan,	  Paul.	  Ethicon	  :	  Seu,	  Moralia	  Gregorii	  Barhebræi	  [in	  Syriac].	  	  Parisiis	  ;	  Lipsiae:	  Otto	  Harrassowitz,	  1898.	  ———.	   Gregorii	   Barhebraei	   Chronicon	   Syriacum	   [in	   French	   ;	   Syriac].	   	   Parisiis:	  Maisonneuve,	  1890.	  ———.	  Nomocanon	  Gregorii	  Barhebraei.	  	  Parisiis	  ;	  Lipsiae:	  Harrassowitz,	  1898.	  Brock,	   Sebastian	   P.	   The	   Harp	   of	   the	   Spirit	   :	   Twelve	   Poems	   of	   Saint	   Ephrem.	   Studies	  Supplementary	   to	   Sobornost.	   	   London:	   Fellowship	   of	   St.	   Alban	   and	   St.	   Sergius,	  1975.	  ———.	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh	  :	  (Isaac	  the	  Syrian)	  :	  'The	  Second	  Part',	  Chapters	  IV-­‐XLI	  [in	  Syriac	  text	   (Vol.	   554)	   with	   English	   translation	   (Vol.	   555).].	   Corpus	   Scriptorum	  Christianorum	  Orientalium.	  2	  vols	  Lovanii	  Louvain:	  Peeters,	  1995.	  ———.	  The	  Luminous	  Eye	  :	  The	  Spiritual	  World	  Vision	  of	  Saint	  Ephrem.	  Cistercian	  Studies	  Series.	  	  Kalamazoo,	  Mich.:	  Cistercian	  Publications,	  1992.	  ———.	   The	   Syriac	   Fathers	   on	   Prayer	   and	   the	   Spiritual	   Life.	   Cistercian	   Studies	   Series.	  	  Kalamazoo,	  Mich.:	  Cistercian	  Publications,	  1987.	  ———.	   "Two	   Letters	   of	   the	   Patriarch	   Timothy	   from	   the	   Late	   Eighth	   Century	   on	  Translations	   from	  Greek."	  Arabic	  Sciences	  and	  Philosophy	  9,	   no.	   2	   (1999):	   233-­‐46.	  Budge,	  E.	  A.	  Wallis.	  The	  Chronography.	  2	  vols	  Amsterdam:	  Philo	  Press,	  1976.	  
	   255	  
———.	   The	   Paradise	   or	   Garden	   of	   the	  Holy	   Fathers	   :	   Being	  Histories	   of	   the	   Anchorites,	  
Recluses,	  Monks,	  Coenobites,	  and	  Ascetic	  Fathers	  of	   the	  Deserts	  of	  Egypt	  between	  
A.D.	  CCL	  and	  A.D.	  CCCC	  circiter.	  2	  vols	  London:	  Chatto	  &	  Windus,	  1907.	  Chabot,	   Jean	   Baptiste.	   Chronique	   de	   Michel	   le	   Syrien,	   Patriarche	   Jacobite	   d'Antioche	  
(1166-­‐1199)	   [in	   Syriac	   and	   French].	   4	   vols	   Bruxelles:	   Culture	   et	   Civilisation,	  1963.	  Dolabani,	  Yuhanna.	  Mus̆ḥātā	  [in	  Syriac].	  	  Glane/Losser	  Holand:	  Monastery	  of	  St.	  Ephrem	  the	  Syrian,	  1983.	  Draguet,	  Rene.	  Commentaire	  du	  Livre	  d'Abba	  Isaie	  (Logoi	  I-­‐XV).	  CSCO.	  Vol.	  326,	  Louvain:	  Peeters,	  1972.	  Drossaart	  Lulofs,	  H.	   J.	  On	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Aristotle.	   Philosophia	  Antiqua.	   	   Leiden:	  E.	   J.	  Brill,	  1965.	  Ephraem,	  Syrus.	  Hymns	  on	  Paradise.	  Translated	  by	  Sebastian	  P.	  Brock.	  	  Crestwood,	  N.Y.:	  St	  Vladimir's	  Seminary,	  1990.	  Frankenberg,	   Wilhelm.	   Euagrius	   Ponticus	   [in	   Syriac	   and	   Greek	   on	   opposite	   pages].	  	  Berlin:	  Weidmannsche	  Buchhandlung,	  1912.	  Frothingham,	   Arthur	   Lincoln.	   Stephen	  Bar	   Sudaili	   :	   The	   Syrian	  Mystic,	   and	   the	   Book	   of	  
Hierotheos.	  	  Leyden:	  E.J.	  Brill,	  1886.	  Gottheil,	  Richard	   J.	  H.	  "A	  Synopsis	  of	  Greek	  Philosophy	  by	  Bar	  Hebraeus."	  Hebraica	  3.4	  (1887):	  249-­‐54.	  Guillaumont,	   Antoine.	   Les	   Six	   Centuries	   des	   "Képhalaia	   Gnostica"	   d'Évagre	   le	   Pontique.	  
Édition	  Critique	  de	  la	  Version	  Syriaque	  Commune	  et	  Édition	  d'une	  Nouvelle	  Version	  
Syriaque	   Intégrale	   avec	   une	   Double	   Traduction	   Française.	   T.28.	   Patrologia	  Orientalis.	  	  Paris:	  Firmin-­‐Didot,	  1958.	  Guillaumont,	   Antoine,	   and	   Claire	   Guillaumont.	   Évagre	   le	   Pontique.	   Le	   Gnostique,	   ou,	   a	  
Celui	  Qui	  est	  Devenu	  Digne	  de	  la	  Science.	  Sources	  Chrétiennes.	  	  Paris:	  Cerf,	  1989.	  Hansbury,	   Mary.	   The	   Letters	   of	   John	   of	   Dalyatha.	   Texts	   from	   Christian	   Late	   Antiquity.	  	  Piscataway,	  N.J.:	  Gorgias	  Press,	  2006.	  Harmless,	  William,	   and	   Raymond	   R.	   Fitzgerald.	   "The	   Sapphire	   Light	   of	   the	  Mind:	   The	  Skemmata	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus."	  Theological	  Studies	  62,	  no.	  3	  (2001):	  498.	  Janssens,	  Herman	  F.	  "Bar	  Hebraeus;	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye."	  The	  American	  Journal	  
of	  Semitic	  Languages	  and	  Literatures	  52,	  no.	  1	  (1935):	  1-­‐21.	  ———.	  "Bar	  Hebraeus;	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye	  (Concluded)."	  The	  American	  Journal	  
of	  Semitic	  Languages	  and	  Literatures	  47,	  no.	  2	  (1931):	  94-­‐134.	  ———.	  "Bar	  Hebraeus;	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye	  (Continued)."	  The	  American	  Journal	  
of	  Semitic	  Languages	  and	  Literatures	  48,	  no.	  4	  (1932):	  209-­‐63.	  ———.	   L'Entretien	   de	   la	   Sagesse	   :	   Introduction	   aux	   Œuvres	   Philosophiques	   de	   Bar	  
Hebraeus.	  	  Paris:	  Les	  Belles	  Lettres,	  1937.	  Joosse,	  N.	  Peter.	  A	  Syriac	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Aristolelian	  Philosophy	  :	  Barhebraeus	  (13th	  c.),	  
Butyrum	   Sapientiae,	   Books	   of	   Ethics,	   Economy,	   and	   Politics	   :	   A	   Critical	   Edition,	  
with	  Introduction,	  Translation,	  Commentary,	  and	  Glossaries	   [in	  Syriac	  Estrangelo	  text	  with	   facing	  English	   translation;	   introduction	  and	   commentary	   in	  English.].	  Aristoteles	  Semitico-­‐Latinus.	  	  Leiden	  ;	  Boston:	  Brill,	  2004.	  King,	   Daniel.	  The	  Earliest	  Syriac	  Translation	  of	  Aristotle's	  Categories	   :	  Text,	  Translation,	  
and	  Commentary.	  Aristoteles	  Semitico-­‐Latinus.	  	  Leiden:	  Brill,	  2010.	  Marsh,	   Fred	   Shipley.	   The	   Book	   Which	   Is	   Called	   the	   Book	   of	   the	   Holy	   Hierotheos,	   with	  
Extracts	   from	   the	   Prolegomena	   and	   Commentary	   of	   Theodosios	   of	   Antioch	   and	  
from	  the	  "Book	  of	  Excerpts"	  and	  Other	  Works	  of	  Gregory	  Bar-­‐Hebræus	  [in	  English	  ;	  Syriac].	   	   London:	   Williams	   and	   Norgate	   for	   the	   Text	   and	   Translation	   Society,	  1927.	  Nau,	   François.	  Documents	  Pour	  Servir	  a	  L'histoire	  de	   l'Église	  Nestorienne	   [in	   Syriac	   and	  French].	  Patrologia	  Orientalis.	  	  Paris:	  Firmin-­‐Didot,	  1919.	  ———.	   Le	   Livre	   de	   L'ascension	   de	   L'esprit	   sur	   la	   Forme	   du	   Ciel	   et	   de	   la	   Terre	   :	   Cours	  
D'astronomie	  Rédigé	  en	  1279	  par	  Grégoire	  Aboulfarag,	  dit	  Bar	  Hebræus	  [in	  Syriac	  
	   256	  
and	  French].	  Bibliothèque	  de	  L'école	  des	  Hautes	  Études	  Sciences	  Philologiques	  et	  Historiques.	  2	  vols	  Paris:	  É.	  Bouillon,	  1899.	  Plato,	   and	   H.	   D.	   P.	   Lee.	   The	   Republic.	   Penguin	   Classics.	   2nd	   (revised)	   ed.	  	  Harmondsworth:	  Penguin,	  1987.	  Poortman,	   E.	   L.	   J.,	   and	   H.	   J.	   Drossaart	   Lulofs.	   Nicolaus	   Damascenus	   De	   Plantis	   :	   Five	  
Translations	   [in	   Syriac,	   Arabic,	   Hebrew,	   Latin,	   and	   Greek,	   with	   English	  translations.].	   Verhandelingen	   Der	   Koninklijke	   Nederlandse	   Akademie	   Van	  Wetenschappen	   Afd	   Letterkunde	   Nieuwe	   Reeks.	   	   Amsterdam:	   North-­‐Holland	  Pub.	  Co.,	  1989.	  Rolt,	   C.	   E.	   Dionysius	   the	   Areopagite	   :	   On	   the	   Divine	   Names	   and	   the	   Mystical	   Theology.	  	  [Kila],	  Mont.:	  Kessinger,	  1992.	  Rorem,	   Paul,	   and	   John	   C.	   Lamoreaux.	   John	   of	   Scythopolis	   and	   the	   Dionysian	   Corpus	   :	  
Annotating	  the	  Areopagite.	   Oxford	  Early	  Christian	   Studies.	   	  Oxford	   ;	  New	  York:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1998.	  Russell,	  Norman.	  The	  Lives	  of	  the	  Desert	  Fathers	  :	  The	  Historia	  Monachorum	  in	  Aegypto.	  Cistercian	   Studies	   Series.	   	   London	   ;	   Kalamazoo,	   Mich.:	   Mowbray;	   Cistercian,	  1981.	  Scebabi,	  Augustinus.	  Gregorii	  Bar-­‐Hebraei	  Carmina	   [in	  Syriac].	   	  Romae:	  ex	  Typographia	  Polyglotta	  S.	  C.	  De	  Propaganda	  Fide,	  1877.	  Sherwood,	  P.	  "Mimro	  de	  Serge	  de	  Rešayna	  sur	  la	  Vie	  Spirituelle."	  [in	  Syriac	  and	  French].	  
L'Orient	  syrien	  5,	  6.	  Teule,	  Herman	  G.	  B.	  Ethicon	  :	  Mēmrā	  I	  [in	  English	  ;	  Syriac].	  	  Louvain:	  E.	  Peeters,	  1993.	  Watt,	   John	  W.	  Aristotelian	  Rhetoric	   in	  Syriac	   :	  Butyrum	  Sapientiae,	  Book	  of	  Rhetoric	   [in	  Parallel	   Syriac	   text	   and	   English	   translation].	   Aristoteles	   Semitico-­‐Latinus.	  	  Leiden:	  Brill,	  2005.	  Wensinck,	  A.	   J.	  Bar	  Hebraeus's	  Book	  of	  the	  Dove	  :	  Together	  with	  Some	  Chapters	  from	  His	  
Ethikon.	  	  Leyden:	  E.	  J.	  Brill,	  1919.	  	  
Secondary	  Sources	  Abrahamov,	  Binyamin.	  Divine	  Love	  in	  Islamic	  Mysticism	  :	  The	  Teachings	  of	  Al-­‐Ghazâlî	  and	  
Al-­‐Dabbâgh.	  	  London:	  Routledge	  Curzon,	  2003.	  Ahearne,	   Jeremy.	  Michel	   de	   Certeau	   :	   Interpretation	   and	   Its	   Other.	   Key	   Contemporary	  Thinkers.	  	  Cambridge:	  Polity,	  1995.	  Andruzac,	   Christophe.	   René	   Guénon:	   La	   Contemplation	   Métaphysique	   et	   L’expérience	  
Mystique	  	  Paris:	  Dervy-­‐Livres,	  1980.	  Arthur,	   Rosemary	   A.	   "A	   Sixth-­‐Century	   Origenist:	   Stephen	   Bar	   Sudaile	   and	   His	  Relationship	  with	   Ps-­‐Dionysius."	   Paper	   presented	   at	   the	   Twelfth	   International	  Conference	  on	  Patristic	  Studies,	  Oxford,	  1991.	  Badiou,	  Alain,	  and	  Nicolas	  Truong.	   In	  Praise	  of	  Love	   	   [Éloge	  de	   l'amour.].	  Translated	  by	  Peter	  Bush.	  	  London:	  Serpent's	  Tail,	  2012.	  Barnes,	   Barry,	   and	   David	   Bloor.	   "Relativism,	   Rationalism	   and	   the	   Sociology	   of	  Knowledge."	   In	  Rationality	   and	  Relativism,	   edited	   by	  Martin	   Hollis	   and	   Steven	  Lukes,	  21-­‐47.	  Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  1982.	  Barsoum,	   Ignatius	  Aphram,	   and	  Matti	  Moosa.	  The	  Scattered	  Pearls	   :	  A	  History	  of	  Syriac	  
Literature	  and	  Sciences.	  2nd	  rev.	  ed.	  	  Piscataway,	  N.J.:	  Gorgias	  Press,	  2003.	  Becker,	   Adam	   H.	   Fear	   of	   God	   and	   the	   Beginning	   of	  Wisdom	   :	   The	   School	   of	  Nisibis	   and	  
Christian	  Scholastic	  Culture	  in	  Late	  Antique	  Mesopotamia.	  Divinations	  :	  Rereading	  Late	  Ancient	  Religion.	  	  Philadelphia,	  Pa.:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  2006.	  Beggiani,	   Seely	   J.	   Introduction	   to	   Eastern	   Christian	   Spirituality	   :	   The	   Syriac	   Tradition.	  	  Cranbury,	  NJ:	  Associated	  University	  Presses,	  1991.	  Bernstein,	   Richard	   J.	   Beyond	   Objectivism	   and	   Relativism	   :	   Science,	   Hermeneutics,	   and	  
Praxis.	  	  Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  1983.	  
	   257	  
Beulay,	  Robert.	  "Des	  Centuries	  de	  Joseph	  Ḥazzaya	  Retrouvées?".	  Parole	  de	  l’Orient	  3,	  no.	  1	  (1972):	  5-­‐44.	  ———.	   "Formes	  de	  Lumiére	  et	  Lumiére	  Sans	  Forme:	  Le	  Théme	  de	   la	  Lumiére	  dans	   la	  Mystique	  de	   Jean	  de	  Dalyatha."	   In	  Mélanges	  Antoine	  Guillaumont	  :	  Contributions	  
À	   L'étude	   des	   Christianismes	   Orientaux,	   avec	   une	   Bibliographie	   du	   Dédicataire,	  edited	  by	  Antoine	  Guillaumont.	  Cahiers	  D'orientalisme,	  131-­‐41.	  Genève:	  Cramer,	  1988.	  Binns,	  John.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Christian	  Orthodox	  Churches.	   	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002.	  Bitton-­‐Ashkelony,	   Brouria.	   "The	   Limit	   of	   the	   Mind	   (NOYΣ):	   Pure	   Prayer	   According	   to	  Evagrius	   Ponticus	   and	   Isaac	   of	   Nineveh."	   Zeitschrift	   Fur	   Antikes	   Christentum-­‐
Journal	  of	  Ancient	  Christianity	  15,	  no.	  2	  (2011):	  291-­‐321.	  Brock,	  Sebastian	  P.	  From	  Antagonism	  to	  Assimilation	  :	  Syriac	  Attitudes	  to	  Greek	  Learning.	  	  Washington,	  D.	  C.:	  Dumbarton	  Oaks,	  1980.	  ———.	   "From	  Qatar	   to	  Tokyo,	  by	  Way	  of	  Mar	  Saba:	  The	  Translations	  of	   Isaac	  of	  Beth	  Qaṭraye	  (Isaac	  the	  Syrian)."	  ARAM	  Periodical	  12	  (2000):	  475-­‐84.	  ———.	   "Monasticism	   in	   Iraq	   :	  The	  Cultural	  Contribution."	   In	  The	  Christian	  Heritage	  of	  
Iraq	   :	  Collected	  Papers	   from	  the	  Christianity	  of	   Iraq	   I-­‐V	  Seminar	  Days,	   edited	   by	  Erica	   C.	   D.	   Hunter.	   Gorgias	   Eastern	   Christian	   Studies,	   64-­‐80.	   Piscataway,	   NJ:	  Gorgias	  Press,	  2009.	  ———.	  "Some	  Uses	  of	  the	  Term	  Theoria	  in	  the	  Writings	  of	  Isaac	  of	  Nineveh."	  Parole	  de	  
l'Orient	  20	  (1995):	  407-­‐19.	  ———.	   Spirituality	   in	   the	  Syriac	  Tradition.	   2nd	   ed.	   	   Kottayam:	   St.	   Ephrem	  Ecumenical	  Research	  Institute,	  2005.	  ———.	   "Syriac	   Commentary	   Tradition."	   In	   From	   Ephrem	   to	   Romanos	   :	   Interactions	  
between	  Syriac	  and	  Greek	  in	  Late	  Antiquity.	  Variorum	  Collected	  Studies	  Series,	  3-­‐18.	  Aldershot	  ;	  Brookfield,	  USA:	  Ashgate,	  1999.	  ———.	   "A	   Syriac	   Intermediary	   for	   the	   Arabic	   Theology	   of	   Aristotle?	   In	   Search	   of	   a	  Chimera?".	   In	   The	  Libraries	  of	  the	  Neoplatonists,	   edited	   by	   Cristina	   D'Ancona	  Costa,	  293-­‐306.	  Leiden:	  Brill,	  2007.	  ———.	   "Syriac	   Sources	   for	   Seventh-­‐Century	   History."	   Byzantine	   and	   Modern	   Greek	  
Studies	  2	  (1976):	  17-­‐36.	  Burnett,	  Charles.	  "Antioch	  as	  a	  Link	  between	  Arabic	  and	  Latin	  Culture	  in	  the	  Twelfth	  and	  Thirteenth	  Century."	  In	  Arabic	  into	  Latin	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  :	  The	  Translators	  and	  
Their	  Intellectual	  and	  Social	  Context,	  edited	  by	  Charles	  Burnett.	  Collected	  Studies,	  1-­‐78.	  Farnham:	  Ashgate,	  2010.	  Caputo,	  John	  D.	  The	  Mystical	  Element	  in	  Heidegger's	  Thought.	  Rev.	  reprint.	  ed.	  	  New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press,	  1986.	  ———.	   "Mysticism	   and	   Transgression:	   Derrida	   and	   Meister	   Eckhart."	   In	   Derrida	   and	  
Deconstruction,	  edited	  by	  Hugh	  J.	  Silverman.	  Continental	  Philosophy,	  24-­‐39.	  New	  York	  ;	  London:	  Routledge,	  1989.	  Certeau,	   Michel	   de.	   The	   Mystic	   Fable	   [La	   fable	   mystique.].	   Translated	   by	   Michael	   B.	  Smith.	   Religion	   and	   Postmodernism.	   Vol.	   1,	   Chicago	   ;	   London:	   University	   of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1992.	  ———.	  "Mystic	  Speech."	  In	  Heterologies	  :	  Discourse	  on	  the	  Other.	  Theory	  and	  History	  of	  Literature,	  80-­‐100.	  Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1986.	  Chialà,	   Sabino	   "Les	   Mystiques	   Syro-­‐Orientaux,	   une	   École	   ou	   une	   Époque?".	   In	   Les	  
Mystiques	   Syriaques,	   edited	   by	   Alain	   Desreumaux.	   Études	   Syriaques,	   63-­‐78.	  Paris:	  Geuthner,	  2011.	  Clayton,	   John,	  Anne	  M.	  Blackburn,	  and	  Thomas	  D.	  Carroll.	  Religions,	  Reasons	  and	  Gods	  :	  
Essays	  in	  Cross-­‐Cultural	  Philosophy	  of	  Religion.	  	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006.	  Colless,	  Brian	  E.	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  Bar	  Hebraeus."	  Orientalia	  Christiana	  Periodica	  54,	  no.	  1	  (1988):	  153-­‐73.	  
	   258	  
———.	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	  John	  Saba."	  PhD,	  University	  of	  Melbourne,	  1969.	  ———.	  "The	  Mysticism	  of	   John	  Saba."	  Orientalia	  Christiana	  Periodica	  39,	  no.	  1	   (1973):	  83-­‐102.	  ———.	   The	   Wisdom	   of	   the	   Pearlers	   :	   An	   Anthology	   of	   Syriac	   Christian	   Mysticism.	  	  Kalamazoo,	  Mich.:	  Cistercian	  Publications,	  2008.	  Coomaraswamy,	   Ananda	   Kentish,	   Roger	   Lipsey,	   and	   Bollingen	   Foundation	   Collection	  (Library	   of	   Congress).	   Coomaraswamy.	   Bollingen	   Series.	   3	   vols	   Princeton,	   N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1977.	  Cupitt,	  Don.	  Mysticism	  after	  Modernity.	  	  Oxford,	  UK	  ;	  Malden,	  Mass:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  1997.	  Cutsinger,	   James	   S.	   Paths	   to	   the	   Heart	   :	   Sufism	   and	   the	   Christian	   East.	   The	   Perennial	  Philosophy	  Series.	  	  Bloomington,	  Ind.:	  World	  Wisdom,	  2002.	  Derrida,	   Jacques.	   "How	   to	   Avoid	   Speaking:	   Denials	   "	   Translated	   by	   Ken	   Freiden.	   In	  
Languages	   of	   the	   Unsayable	   :	   The	   Play	   of	   Negativity	   in	   Literature	   and	   Literary	  
Theory	   edited	   by	   Sanford	   Budick	   and	   Wolfgang	   Iser.	   Irvine	   Studies	   in	   the	  Humanities,	  3-­‐70.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1989.	  Dupuy,	   Michel.	   "Spiritualité."	   In	   Dictionnaire	   de	   Spiritualité	   Ascétique	   et	   Mystique	   :	  
Doctrine	   et	   Histoire,	   edited	   by	   Marcel	   Viller,	   Charles	   Baumgartner	   and	   André	  Rayez.	  Paris:	  G.	  Beauchesne	  et	  ses	  fils,	  1937.	  El-­‐Bizri,	   N.	   "Avicenna	   and	   Essentialism."	   Review	   of	  Metaphysics	  54,	   no.	   4	   (Jun	   2001):	  753-­‐78.	  Eliaeson,	  Sven.	  "Max	  Weber's	  Methodology:	  An	  Ideal‐Type."	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  the	  
Behavioral	  Sciences	  36,	  no.	  3	  (2000):	  241-­‐63.	  Fitzgerald,	   Timothy.	   The	   Ideology	   of	   Religious	   Studies.	   	   New	   York	   ;	   Oxford:	   Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000.	  Flood,	   Gavin	   D.	   The	   Ascetic	   Self	   :	   Subjectivity,	   Memory,	   and	   Tradition.	   	   Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004.	  ———.	  Beyond	  Phenomenology	  :	  Rethinking	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion.	   	   London	   ;	  New	  York:	  Cassell,	  1999.	  ———.	   The	   Importance	   of	   Religion	   :	   Meaning	   and	   Action	   in	   Our	   Strange	   World.	  	  Chichester,	  West	  Sussex,	  UK	  ;	  Malden,	  MA:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2012.	  ———.	  "Reflections	  on	  Tradition	  and	   Inquiry	   in	   the	  Study	  of	  Religions."	   Journal	  of	  the	  
American	  Academy	  of	  Religion	  74,	  no.	  1	  (2006):	  47-­‐58.	  Forman,	  Robert	  K.	  C.	   "Introduction:	  Mysticism,	  Constructivism,	  and	  Forgetting."	   In	  The	  
Problem	  of	  Pure	  Consciousness	  :	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	  edited	  by	  Robert	  K.	  C.	  Forman,	  3-­‐49.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990.	  ———.	  "Mystical	  Knowledge:	  Knowledge	  by	  Identity."	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Academy	  
of	  Religion	  61,	  no.	  4	  (1993):	  705-­‐38.	  ———.	  Mysticism,	  Mind,	  Consciousness.	  	  Albany,	  NY:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1999.	  Frank,	  Richard	  M.	  Creation	  and	  the	  Cosmic	  System	  :	  Al-­‐Ghazâlî	  &	  Avicenna.	  Abhandlungen	  Der	   Heidelberger	   Akademie	   Der	   Wissenschaften	   Philosophisch-­‐Historische	  Klasse.	  	  Heidelberg:	  Carl	  Winter,	  Universitätsverlag,	  1992.	  Furlani,	   Giuseppe.	   "Di	   Tre	   Scritti	   in	   Lingua	   Siriaca	   Di	   Barhebreo	   Sull'	   Anima."	  Rivista	  
degli	  Studi	  Orientali	  14	  (1934):	  284-­‐308.	  Gadamer,	  Hans	  Georg,	  Joel	  Weinsheimer,	  and	  Donald	  G.	  Marshall.	  Truth	  and	  Method	  [in	  Translation	   of	   Wahrheit	   und	   Methode.].	   Continuum	   Impacts.	   2nd	   rev.	   ed.	  	  London:	  Continuum,	  2004.	  Gale,	   Richard	   M.	   "Mysticism	   and	   Philosophy."	   The	   Journal	   of	   Philosophy	   57,	   no.	   14	  (1960):	  471-­‐81.	  Gellman,	  Jerome.	  "Mysticism."	  	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (2014).	  Gilson,	   Etienne.	  History	  of	  Christian	  Philosophy	   in	   the	  Middle	  Ages.	   	   London:	   Sheed	   and	  Ward,	  1955.	  Griffith,	   S.	   H.	   The	   Beginnings	   of	   Christian	   Theology	   in	   Arabic	   :	   Muslim-­‐Christian	  
	   259	  
Encounters	   in	   the	   Early	   Islamic	   Period	   [in	   English	   with	   some	   Arabic	   text.].	  Variorum	  Collected	  Studies	  Series.	  	  Aldershot	  ;	  Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate,	  2002.	  Guillaumont,	   Antoine.	   Les	   'Képhalaia	   Gnostica'	   d'Évagre	   le	   Pontique	   et	   L'histoire	   de	  
L'origénisme	  chez	  les	  Grecs	  et	  chez	  les	  Syriens.	  Patristica	  Sorbonensia.	  	  Paris:	  Eds.	  du	  Seuil,	  1962.	  Gutas,	   Dimtri.	   "Paul	   the	   Persian	   on	   the	   Classification	   of	   the	   Parts	   of	   Aristotle's	  Philosophy:	   A	  Milestone	   between	  Alexandria	   and	   Baġdâd."	  Der	   Islam	  60,	   no.	   2	  (1983).	  ———.	   Greek	   Thought,	   Arab	   Culture	   :	   The	   Graeco-­‐Arabic	   Translation	   Movement	   in	  
Baghdad	  and	  Early	  Abbasid	  Society	  (2nd-­‐4th/8th-­‐10th	  c.).	   	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1998.	  Hage,	  Wolfgang.	  "Ecumenical	  Aspects	  of	  Barhebraeus'	  Christology."	  The	  Harp	  :	  A	  Review	  
of	  Syriac	  and	  Oriental	  Studies	  IV,	  no.	  1,	  2,	  3	  (1991):	  103-­‐09.	  Hagman,	   Patrik.	   The	   Asceticism	   of	   Isaac	   of	   Nineveh.	   Oxford	   Early	   Christian	   Studies.	  	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  Hausherr,	   Irénée.	   "De	   Doctrina	   Spirituali	   Christianorum	   Orientalium,	   Quaestiones	   et	  Scripta,	  I	  ".	  Orientalia	  Christiana	  30,	  no.	  3	  (1933):	  147-­‐211.	  Healey,	   John	   F.	   First	   Studies	   in	   Syriac.	   University	   Semitics	   Study	   Aids.	   	   Birmingham:	  University	  of	  Birmingham,	  1980.	  Heidegger,	   Martin.	  Discourse	   on	   Thinking	   :	   A	   Translation	   of	   'Gelassenheit'.	   	   New	   York:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1966.	  ———.	  "The	  End	  of	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Task	  of	  Thinking."	  In	  Basic	  Writings	  from	  "Being	  
and	  Time"	  (1927)	  to	  "the	  Task	  of	  Thinking"	  (1964),	  edited	  by	  David	  Farrell	  Krell,	  431-­‐49.	  London:	  Routledge,	  1993.	  ———.	  The	  Fundamental	  Concepts	  of	  Metaphysics	   :	  World,	  Finitude,	  Solitude.	   Studies	   in	  Continental	  Thought.	  	  Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  ———.	  Introduction	  to	  Metaphysics.	  	  New	  Haven	  ;	  London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2000.	  ———.	   The	   Metaphysical	   Foundations	   of	   Logic	   	   [Metaphysische	   Anfangsgründe	   der	  Logik	   im	   Ausgang	   von	   Leibniz.].	   Translated	   by	   Michael	   Heim.	   Studies	   in	  Phenomenology	   and	   Existential	   Philosophy.	   	   Bloomington:	   Indiana	   University	  Press,	  1984.	  ———.	  The	  Phenomenology	  of	  Religious	  Life.	  Translated	  by	  Matthias	  Fritsch	  and	  Jennifer	  Anna	   Gosetti-­‐Ferencei.	   Studies	   in	   Continental	   Thought.	   1st	   pbk.	   ed.	  	  Bloomington,	  IN:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  Hollis,	   Martin,	   and	   Steven	   Lukes.	   Rationality	   and	   Relativism.	   	   Oxford:	   Basil	   Blackwell,	  1982.	  Hugonnard-­‐Roche,	   Henri.	   "Jacob	   of	   Edessa	   and	   the	   Reception	   of	   Aristotle."	   In	  
Jacob	  of	  Edessa	  and	  the	  Syriac	  Culture	  of	  his	  Day,	  edited	  by	  R.	  B.	  ter	  Haar	  Romeny.	  Monographs	  of	  the	   Peshitta	   Institute,	   Leiden,	   205-­‐22.	   Leiden	   ;	   Boston:	   Brill,	  2008.	  ———.	   "Le	   Corpus	   Philosophique	   Syriaque	   aux	   VIe-­‐VIIIe	   Siècles."	   Paper	   presented	   at	  the	  "Late	  antiquity	  and	  Arabic	  thought	  :	  patterns	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  European	  culture"	  Strasbourg,	  March	  12-­‐14	  2004.	  ———.	  "L'oeuvre	  Logique	  de	  Barhebraeus."	  Parole	  de	  l'Orient	  33	  (2008):	  129-­‐43.	  ———.	  "Sur	   les	  Versions	  Syriaques	  des	  "Catégories"	  d'Aristote."	   Journal	  Asiatique	  275,	  no.	  3-­‐4	  (1987):	  205-­‐22.	  Hunter,	  Erica	  C.	  D.	   "Interfaith	  Dialogues:	  The	  Church	  of	   the	  East	  and	   the	  Abbasids."	   In	  
Der	  Christliche	  Orient	  Und	  Seines	  Umwelt.	   	  Gesammelte	  Studien	  Zu	  Ehren	   Jurgen	  
Tubach,	   edited	   by	   Sophia	   G.	   Vashalomidze	   and	   Lutz	   Greisiger,	   289-­‐302.	  Wiesbaden	  Harrassowitz,	  2007.	  Huxley,	  Aldous.	  The	  Doors	  of	  Perception.	  	  London:	  Chatto	  &	  Windus,	  1954.	  ———.	  The	  Perennial	  Philosophy.	  	  London:	  Triad	  Grafton,	  1985.	  Ishida,	  Huyo.	   "Otto's	  Theory	  of	  Religious	  Experience	   as	  Encounter	  with	   the	  Numinous	  and	  Its	  Application	  to	  Buddhism."	  Japanese	  Religions	  XVI,	  no.	  4	  (1989):	  17-­‐25.	  
	   260	  
Jacobi,	  R.	   "Nasīb."	   In	  The	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Islam,	  Second	  Edition,	  edited	  by	  P.	  Bearman,	  Th.	  Bianquis,	  C.E.	  Bosworth,	  E.	  van	  Donzel	  and	  W.P.	  W.P.	  Heinrichs	  Leiden:	  Brill	  Online,	  2013.	  James,	  William.	  The	  Varieties	  of	  Religious	  Experience	  :	  A	  Study	  in	  Human	  Nature.	  Penguin	  Classics.	  	  New	  York	  ;	  London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1985.	  Janssens,	  Herman	  F.	  "Bar	  Hebraeus;	  Book	  of	  the	  Pupils	  of	  the	  Eye."	  The	  American	  Journal	  
of	  Semitic	  Languages	  and	  Literatures	  47,	  no.	  1	  (1930):	  26-­‐49.	  Jantzen,	   Grace.	  Power,	  Gender,	   and	  Christian	  Mysticism.	   Cambridge	   Studies	   in	   Ideology	  and	  Religion.	  	  Cambridge	  ;	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  Joosse,	   N.	   Peter.	   "Bar	   Hebraeus’	   Ktaba	  Da-­‐Hewath	  Hekhmtha	   (Butyrum	   Sapientiae):	   A	  Description	  of	  the	  Extant	  Manuscripts."	  Le	  Muséon	  112,	  no.	  3-­‐4	  (1999):	  417-­‐58.	  ———.	  "Expounding	  on	  a	  Theme:	  Structure	  and	  Sources	  of	  Barhebraeus."	  In	  The	  Syriac	  
Renaissance,	   edited	   by	   Herman	   G.	   B.	   Teule.	   Eastern	   Christian	   Studies,	   136-­‐50.	  Leuven:	  Peeters,	  2010.	  Jullien,	   Florence.	   "Une	   Question	   de	   Controverse	   Religieuse:	   la	   Lettre	   au	   Catholicos	  Nestorien	  Mār	  Denḥā	  I."	  Parole	  de	  l'Orient	  33	  (2008):	  95-­‐113.	  Katz,	  Steven	  T.	  "The	  'Conservative'	  Character	  of	  Mystical	  Experience."	  In	  Mysticism	  and	  
Religious	  Traditions,	   edited	  by	  Steven	  T.	  Katz,	  3-­‐60.	  Oxford	   ;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1983.	  ———.	   "Language,	   Epistemology,	   and	   Mysticism."	   In	   Mysticism	   and	   Philosophical	  
Analysis,	   edited	   by	   Steven	   T.	   Katz.	   Studies	   in	   Philosophy	   and	   Religion,	   22-­‐74.	  London:	  Sheldon	  Press,	  1978.	  ———.	  Mysticism	  and	  Language.	  	  New	  York,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  1992.	  ———.	  Mysticism	  and	  Sacred	  Scripture.	   	  Oxford	  England	  ;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000.	  Kearney,	   Richard.	   Anatheism	   :	   Returning	   to	   God	   after	   God.	   Insurrections.	   	   New	   York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  Kessel,	   Grigory,	   and	   Karl	   Pinggéra.	   A	   Bibliography	   of	   Syriac	   Ascetic	   and	   Mystical	  
Literature.	  Eastern	  Christian	  Studies.	  	  Leuven	  ;	  Walpole,	  MA:	  Peeters,	  2011.	  Kessler,	   Michael,	   and	   Christian	   Sheppard.	  Mystics	   :	   Presence	   and	   Aporia.	   Religion	   and	  Postmodernism.	  	  Chicago	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2003.	  King,	   Daniel.	   "Alexander	   of	   Aphrodisias'	   On	   the	   Principles	   of	   the	   Universe	   in	   a	   Syriac	  Adaptation."	  Le	  Muséon	  123,	  no.	  1	  (2010):	  159-­‐91.	  ———.	  "Grammar	  and	  Logic	  in	  Syriac	  (and	  Arabic)."	  Journal	  of	  Semitic	  Studies	  58,	  no.	  1	  (2013):	  101-­‐20.	  ———.	  "Why	  Were	  the	  Syrians	  Interested	  in	  Greek	  Philosophy?".	  In	  History	  and	  Identity	  
in	   the	   Late	   Antique	   near	   East,	   edited	   by	   Philip	   Wood.	   Oxford	   Studies	   in	   Late	  Antiquity,	  61-­‐81.	  Oxford	  ;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013.	  King,	  Richard.	  Orientalism	  and	  Religion	  :	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Theory,	  India	  and	  the	  Mystic	  East.	  	  London:	  Routledge,	  1999.	  Laird,	   M.	   "Gregory	   of	   Nyssa	   and	   the	   Mysticism	   of	   Darkness:	   A	   Reconsideration	   (an	  Epistemological-­‐Ethical	   Structuring	   of	   the	   Experience	   of	   Divine	   Union	   in	  Christian	  Literature	  of	  Late	  Antiquity)."	  Journal	  of	  Religion	  79,	  no.	  4	  (Oct	  1999):	  592-­‐616.	  Lane,	  George.	  "An	  Account	  of	  Gregory	  Bar	  Hebraeus	  Abu	  Al-­‐Faraj	  and	  His	  Relations	  with	  the	  Mongols	  of	  Persia."	  Hugoye:	  Journal	  of	  Syriac	  Studies	  2,	  no.	  2	  (1999	  [2010]):	  209-­‐33.	  Lazarus-­‐Yafeh,	   Hava.	   Studies	   in	   Al-­‐Ghazzali.	   	   Jerusalem:	   Magnes	   Press,	   Hebrew	  University,	  1975.	  Liddell,	   Henry	   George.	   A	   Greek-­‐English	   Lexicon.	   edited	   by	   Robert	   Scott,	   Henry	   Stuart	  Jones	   and	  Roderick	  McKenzie.	   9th	   ed.	   2	   vols.	   Vol.	   II,	   Oxford:	   Clarendon,	   1925-­‐1940.	  Lindbeck,	  George	  A.	  The	  Nature	  of	  Doctrine	  :	  Religion	  and	  Theology	  in	  a	  Postliberal	  Age.	  1st	  ed.	  	  Philadelphia:	  Westminster	  Press,	  1984.	  
	   261	  
Lossky,	   Vladimir.	   The	   Vision	   of	   God.	   Library	   of	   Orthodox	   Theology	   and	   Spirituality.	  	  London:	  Faith	  Press,	  1963.	  Louth,	  Andrew.	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Christian	  Mystical	  Tradition	  :	  From	  Plato	  to	  Denys.	  2nd	  ed.	  	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  MacIntyre,	  Alasdair.	  After	  Virtue	  :	  A	  Study	  in	  Moral	  Theory.	  2nd	  ed.	  	  London:	  Duckworth,	  1985.	  ———.	  Three	  Rival	  Versions	  of	  Moral	  Enquiry	  :	  Encyclopaedia,	  Genealogy,	  and	  Tradition.	  New	  ed.	  	  Notre	  Dame:	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  1992.	  ———.	  Whose	  Justice?	  Which	  Rationality?	  	  London:	  Duckworth,	  1988.	  Marion,	   Jean-­‐Luc.	   "The	   "End	   of	   Metaphysics"	   as	   a	   Possiblity."	   In	   Religion	   after	  
Metaphysics,	   edited	   by	   Mark	   A.	   Wrathall,	   166-­‐89.	   Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003.	  ———.	  God	  without	  Being	  :	  Hors-­‐Texte	  	  [Dieu	  sans	  l'être.].	  Religion	  and	  Postmodernism.	  	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1991.	  McCutcheon,	   Russell	   T.	  Manufacturing	   Religion	   :	   The	  Discourse	   on	   Sui	   Generis	   Religion	  
and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Nostalgia.	  	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1997.	  McGinn,	   Bernard.	  The	  Presence	  of	  God	   :	  A	  History	  of	  Western	  Christian	  Mysticism.	   	   New	  York:	  Crossroad,	  1991.	  McMahon,	   John	   M.	   "Severus	   Sebokht	   [Sebokt,	   Sebukht,	   Seboht]."	   In	   The	   Biographical	  
Encyclopedia	   of	   Astronomers,	   edited	   by	   Thomas	   Hockey,	   Virginia	   Trimble,	  Thomas	  R	  Williams,	  Katherine	  Bracher,	  Richard	  A	  Jarrell,	  Jordan	  D	  Marché,	  II,	  F.	  Jamil	  Ragep,	  Jo	  Ann	  Palmeri	  and	  Marvin	  Bolt,	  1044-­‐45:	  Springer	  New	  York,	  2007.	  Moore,	  Peter.	  "Mystical	  Experience,	  Mystical	  Doctrine,	  Mystical	  Technique."	  In	  Mysticism	  
and	  Philosophical	  Analysis,	   edited	  by	  Steven	  T.	  Katz,	   101-­‐31.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1978.	  ———.	  "Recent	  Studies	  of	  Mysticism:	  A	  Critical	  Survey."	  Religion	  :	  a	  Journal	  of	  Religion	  
and	  Religions	  3	  (1973):	  146-­‐56.	  Nelstrop,	   Louise,	   Kevin	   J.	   Magill,	   and	   Bradley	   B.	   Onishi.	   Christian	   Mysticism	   :	   An	  
Introduction	  to	  Contemporary	  Theoretical	  Approaches.	  	  Farnham:	  Ashgate,	  2009.	  Nöldeke,	   Theodor,	   and	   John	   Sutherland	  Black.	  Sketches	   from	  Eastern	  History.	   	   London:	  Adam	  and	  Charles	  Black,	  1892.	  Otto,	  Rudolf.	  The	  Idea	  of	  the	  Holy	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Non-­‐Rational	  Factor	  in	  the	  Idea	  of	  
the	  Divine	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  the	  Rational.	  2nd	  ed.:	  Oxford	  U.P,	  1950.	  ———.	  Mysticism	   East	   and	  West	   :	   A	   Comparative	   Analysis	   of	   the	   Nature	   of	   Mysticism.	  Translated	  by	  Bertha	  L.	  Bracey	  and	  Richenda	  C.	  Payne.	  Macmillan,	  1932.	  Payne	   Smith,	   R.,	   and	   Jessie	   Payne	   Smith.	   A	   Compendious	   Syriac	   Dictionary	   :	   Founded	  
Upon	  the	  Thesaurus	  Syriacus	  of	  R.	  Payne	  Smith.	  	  Oxford:	  Clarendon,	  1903.	  Penner,	  Hans	  H.	  "The	  Mystical	  Illusion."	  In	  Mysticism	  and	  Religious	  Traditions,	  edited	  by	  Steven	  T.	  Katz,	  89-­‐116.	  Oxford	  ;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1983.	  Peters,	   F.E.	   "The	   Origins	   of	   Islamic	   Platonism:	   The	   School	   Tradition."	   In	   Islamic	  
Philosophical	   Theology,	   edited	   by	   Parviz	   Morewedge.	   Studies	   in	   Islamic	  Philosophy	   and	   Science,	   14-­‐45.	   Albany:	   State	   University	   of	   New	   York	   Press,	  1979.	  Prince,	  Brainerd.	  "Aurobindo's	  Integralism	  :	  Study	  of	  Religion	  and	  the	  Hermeneutics	  of	  Tradition."	  Thesis	  (Ph.D.),	  Middlesex	  University,	  2012.	  Proudfoot,	   Wayne.	   Religious	   Experience.	   	   Berkeley	   ;	   London:	   University	   of	   California	  Press,	  1985.	  Reinink,	   G.	   J.	   "'Origenism'	   in	   Thirteenth-­‐Century	   Northern	   Iraq."	   In	   After	   Bardaisan	   :	  
Studies	   on	   Continuity	   and	   Change	   in	   Syriac	   Christianity	   edited	   by	   Han	   J.	   W.	  Drijvers,	   Alexander	   Cornelis	   Klugkist	   and	   G.	   J.	   Reinink.	   Orientalia	   Lovaniensia	  Analecta,	  236-­‐52.	  Leuven:	  Peeters,	  1999.	  Ricoeur,	  Paul.	  Hermeneutics	  :	  Writings	  and	  Lectures,	  Volume	  2	   	   [Écrits	  et	  conferences.	  2.	  Herméneutique.].	  Translated	  by	  David	  Pellauer.	  	  Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2013.	  
	   262	  
———.	   "Hermeneutics	   and	   the	   Critique	   of	   Ideology."	   In	   Hermeneutics	   &	   the	   Human	  
Sciences,	  edited	  by	  John	  B.	  Thompson,	  63-­‐100.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1981.	  ———.	  "The	  Model	  of	  the	  Text:	  Meaningful	  Action	  Considered	  as	  Text."	  In	  Hermeneutics	  
&	   the	   Human	   Sciences,	   edited	   by	   John	   B.	   Thompson,	   197-­‐221.	   New	   York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1981.	  ———.	   "The	  Task	  of	  Hermeneutics."	   In	  Hermeneutics	  &	  the	  Human	  Sciences,	   edited	  by	  John	  B.	  Thompson,	  43-­‐62.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1981.	  	  ———.	  Time	  and	  Narrative	   	   [Temps	  et	  récit.].	  Translated	  by	  Kathleen	  McLaughlin	  and	  David	  Pellauer.	  3	  vols	  Chicago	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1984.	  Rothberg,	   Donald.	   "Contemporary	   Epistemology	   and	   the	   Study	   of	   Mysticism."	   In	   The	  
Problem	  of	  Pure	  Consciousness	  :	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy,	  edited	  by	  Robert	  K.	  C.	  Forman,	  163-­‐210.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990.	  Samir,	   Samir	   Khalil,	   S.J.	   "Cheminement	   Mystique	   d'Ibn	   al-­‐'Ibri	   (1226-­‐1286)."	   Proche-­‐
Orient	  Chretien	  37	  (1987):	  71-­‐89.	  ———.	  "Un	  Récit	  Autobiographique	  d'Ibn	  al-­‐'Ibri."	  Dirāsāt	  15	  (1988):	  15-­‐51.	  Sandford,	  Stella.	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Love	  :	  Gender	  and	  Transcendence	  in	  Levinas.	  	  London:	  The	  Athlone	  Press,	  2000.	  Schleiermacher,	  Friedrich.	  The	  Christian	  Faith	  [in	  English	  translation	  of	  the	  2nd	  German	  edition.].	  	  Edinburgh:	  T	  &	  T	  Clark,	  1928.	  ———.	  On	  Religion	  :	  Speeches	  to	  Its	  Cultured	  Despisers	   	   [Über	  die	  Religion.].	  Translated	  by	   Richard	   Crouter.	   Texts	   in	   German	   Philosophy.	   	   Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1988.	  Schmidt,	   Leigh	   Eric.	   "The	   Making	   of	   Modern	   Mysticism."	   Journal	   of	   the	   American	  
Academy	  of	  Religion	  71,	  no.	  2	  (2003):	  273-­‐302.	  Schuon,	   Frithjof.	   Islam	  and	   the	  Perennial	  Philosophy.	   	   London:	  World	   of	   Islam	   Festival	  Publishing,	  1976.	  ———.	  The	  Transcendent	  Unity	  of	  Religions.	  	  London:	  Faber	  and	  Faber,	  1953.	  Schüssler	   Fiorenza,	   Francis,	   and	   Gordon	   D.	   Kaufman.	   "God."	   In	   Critical	   Terms	   for	  
Religious	  Studies,	  edited	  by	  Mark	  C.	  Taylor,	  136-­‐59.	  Chicago	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1998.	  Sells,	  Michael	  Anthony.	  Mystical	  Languages	  of	  Unsaying.	  	  Chicago	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1994.	  Sharf,	  Robert	  H.	   "Experience."	   In	  Critical	  Terms	  for	  Religious	  Studies,	   edited	  by	  Mark	  C.	  Taylor,	  94-­‐116.	  Chicago	  ;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1998.	  Shear,	   Jonathan.	   "On	   Mystical	   Experiences	   as	   Support	   for	   the	   Perennial	   Philosophy."	  
Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Religion	  62,	  no.	  2	  (1994):	  319-­‐42.	  Smart,	  Ninian.	  "Interpretation	  and	  Mystical	  Experience."	  Rel.	  Stud.	  1,	  no.	  1	  (1965):	  75-­‐87.	  ———.	   "Understanding	  Religious	  Experience."	   In	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophical	  Analysis,	  edited	  by	  Steven	  T.	  Katz,	  10-­‐21.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1978.	  Smith,	  Huston.	   "Is	  There	  a	  Perennial	  Philosophy?".	   Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  
Religion	  55,	  no.	  3	  (1987):	  553-­‐66.	  Smith,	  Margaret.	  Studies	  in	  Early	  Mysticism	  in	  the	  near	  and	  Middle	  East	  :	  Being	  an	  Account	  
of	   the	  Rise	  and	  Development	  of	  Early	  Christian	  Mysticism	   in	   the	  near	  and	  Middle	  
East	  up	  to	  the	  Seventh	  Century,	  and	  of	  the	  Subsequent	  Development	  of	  Mysticism	  in	  
Islam	  Known	  as	  Sufism,	  Together	  with	  Some	  Account	  of	  the	  Relationship	  between	  
Early	   Christian	  Mysticism	   and	   the	   Earliest	   Form	   of	   Islamic	  Mysticism.	   	   London:	  Sheldon	  Press,	  1931.	  Sokoloff,	  Michael.	  A	  Syriac	  Lexicon	  :	  A	  Translation	  from	  the	  Latin	  :	  Correction,	  Expansion,	  
and	   Update	   of	   C.	   Brockelmann's	   Lexicon	   Syriacum.	   	   Winona	   Lake,	   Ind.:	  Eisenbrauns	  ;	  Piscataway,	  2009.	  Staal,	   Frits.	   Exploring	   Mysticism	   :	   A	   Methodological	   Essay.	   	   Berkeley	   Calif.	   ;	   London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1975.	  Stace,	  W.	  T.	  Mysticism	  and	  Philosophy.	  	  London:	  Macmillan,	  1960.	  
	   263	  
Stewart,	   Columba.	   "Evagrius	   Ponticus	   and	   the	   Eastern	   Monastic	   Tradition	   on	   the	  Intellect	  and	  the	  Passions."	  Modern	  Theology	  27,	  no.	  2	  (2011):	  263-­‐75.	  ———.	   "Imageless	  Prayer	   and	   the	  Theological	  Vision	  of	  Evagrius	  Ponticus."	   Journal	  of	  
Early	  Christian	  Studies	  9,	  no.	  2	  (2001):	  173-­‐204.	  Takahashi,	  Hidemi.	  Barhebraeus	  :	  A	  Bio-­‐Bibliography.	  1st	  Gorgias	  Press	  ed.	   	  Piscataway,	  N.J.:	  Gorgias	  Press,	  2005.	  ———.	   "Between	   Greek	   and	   Arabic:	   The	   Sciences	   in	   Syriac	   from	   Severus	   Sebokht	   to	  Barhebraeus."	  In	  Transmission	  of	  Sciences	  :	  Greek,	  Syriac,	  Arabic	  and	  Latin,	  edited	  by	  Haruo	  Kobayashi	  and	  Mizue	  Kato,	  16-­‐39.	  Tokyo:	  Joint	  Usage/Research	  Center	  for	   Islamic	   Area	   Studies,	   Organization	   for	   Islamic	   Area	   Studies,	   Waseda	  University	  (WIAS),	  2010.	  ———.	  "Edition	  of	   the	  Syriac	  Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus.	  With	  a	  Preliminary	  Report	   on	   the	   Edition	   of	   the	   Book	   of	   Heaven	   and	   the	  World	   and	   the	   Book	   of	  Generation	   and	   Corruption	   of	   the	   Cream	   of	  Wisdom."	   In	  The	  Letter	   before	   the	  
Spirit	  :	  The	  Importance	  of	  Text	  Editions	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Reception	  of	  Aristotle,	  edited	   by	   Aafke	   M.	   I.	   van	   Oppenraaij	   and	   Resianne	   Fontaine.	   Aristoteles	  Semitico-­‐Latinus,	  0927-­‐4103,	  109-­‐30.	  Leiden:	  Brill,	  2012.	  ———.	   "The	   Influence	   of	   Al-­‐Ghazālī	   on	   the	   Juridical,	   Theological	   and	   Philosophical	  Works	  of	  Barhebraeus."	   In	   Islam	  and	  Rationality:	  The	  Impact	  of	  al-­‐Ghazālī.	  Ohio	  State	  University,	  2011.	  ———.	  "The	  Mathematical	  Sciences	   in	  Syriac:	  From	  Sergius	  of	  Resh-­‐‘Aina	  and	  Severus	  Sebokht	   to	  Barhebraeus	   and	  Patriarch	  Ni‘matallah."	  Annals	  of	  Science	  68,	   no.	   4	  (2011):	  477-­‐91.	  ———.	   "The	   Poems	   of	   Barhebraeus:	   A	   Preliminary	   Concordance."	   Христианский	  
Восток	  NS	  6	  [12]	  (2013):	  78-­‐139.	  ———.	   "The	  Reception	   of	   Ibn	   Sīnā	   in	   Syriac	  the	   Case	   of	   Gregory	  Barhebraeus."	   Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Before	  and	  after	  Avicenna	  :	  proceedings	  of	  the	  First	  Conference	  of	  the	  Avicenna	  Study	  Group,	  Yale	  University,	  2001.	  ———.	   "Simeon	   of	   Qal'a	   Rumaita,	   Patriarch	   Philoxenus	   Nemrod	   and	   Bar	   'Ebroyo."	  
Hugoye:	  Journal	  of	  Syriac	  Studies	  4,	  no.	  1	  (2001	  [2010]):	  45-­‐91.	  Tannous,	   Jack.	   "You	  Are	  What	  You	  Read:	  Qenneshre	  and	   the	  Miaphysite	  Church	   in	   the	  Seventh	  	  Century."	  In	  History	  and	  Identity	  in	  the	  Late	  Antique	  near	  East,	  edited	  by	  Philip	   Wood.	   Oxford	   Studies	   in	   Late	   Antiquity,	   83-­‐102.	   New	   York:	   Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013.	  Taylor,	   David	   G.	   K.	   "L'importance	   des	   Pères	   de	   L'eglise	   dans	   L'oeuvre	   Spéculative	   de	  Barhebraeus."	  Parole	  de	  l'Orient	  33	  (2008):	  63-­‐85.	  Teule,	  Herman.	  "Barhebraeus."	  In	  Christian-­‐Muslim	  Relations	  :	  A	  Bibliographical	  History.	  
Volume	   4,	   (1200-­‐1350),	   edited	   by	   David	   Thomas,	   Alexander	   Mallett	   and	   Juan	  Pedro	  Monferrer	  Sala.	  History	  of	  Christian-­‐Muslim	  Relations,	  588-­‐609.	  Leiden	   ;	  Boston:	  Brill,	  2012.	  ———.	  "Barhebraeus’	  Ethicon,	  Al-­‐Ghazâlî	  and	  Ibn	  Sînâ."	  Islamocristiana	  18	  (1992):	  73-­‐86.	  ———.	   "Christian	   Spiritual	   Sources	   in	   the	   Ethicon	   of	   Barhebraeus."	   The	   Journal	   of	  
Eastern	  Christian	  Studies	  60	  (2008):	  333-­‐54.	  ———.	   "Gregory	   Barhebraeus	   and	   His	   Time:	   The	   Syrian	   Renaissance."	   Journal	  of	   the	  
Canadian	  Society	  for	  Syriac	  Studies	  3	  (2003).	  ———.	  "The	   Idea	  of	  Perfection	   in	   the	  Spiritual	  Works	  of	  Gregory	  Barhebraeus."	  Paper	  presented	   at	   the	   The	   Image	   of	   the	   Perfect	   Christian	   in	   Patristic	   Thought	   Lviv,	  Ukraine,	  2009.	  ———.	  "An	  Important	  Concept	   in	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  Mysticism:	  The	  Remembrance	  of	   God,	   dhikr	   Allah	   –	   'uhdōnō	   d-­‐Alōhō."	   In	   Gotteserlebnis	   Und	   Gotteslehre:	  
Christliche	  Und	  Islamische	  Mystik	  Im	  Orient,	  edited	  by	  Martin	  Tamcke.	  Göttinger	  Orientforschungen,	  Syriaca	  Reihe	  1,	  11-­‐23.	  Wiesbaden:	  Harrassowitz,	  2010.	  
	   264	  
———.	   "It	   Is	  Not	  Right	   to	  Call	  Ourselves	  Orthodox	  and	   the	  Others	  Heretics:	   Ecumenical	  Attitudes	  in	  the	  Jacobite	  Church	  in	  the	  Time	  of	  the	  Crusades."	  Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  East	  and	  West	  in	  the	  Crusader	  States	  :	  Context	  -­‐	  Contacts	  -­‐	  Confrontations	  II,	  Hernen	  Castle,	  Netherlands,	  1997.	  ———.	  "L'amour	  de	  Dieu	  dans	  L'oeuvre	  de	  Bar	  Ebroyo."	  Paper	  presented	  at	   the	  Actes	  du	  Colloque	  VIII	  Patrimoine	  syriaque,	  Antélias-­‐Beyrouth,	  2002.	  Treiger,	   Alexander.	   "Al-­‐Ghazālī's	   “Mirror	   Christology”	   and	   Its	   Possible	   East-­‐Syriac	  Sources."	  Muslim	  World	  101,	  no.	  4	  (2011):	  698-­‐713.	  ———.	  Inspired	  Knowledge	  in	  Islamic	  Thought	  :	  Al-­‐Ghazali's	  Theory	  of	  Mystical	  Cognition	  
and	   Its	   Avicennian	   Foundation.	   Culture	   and	   Civilization	   in	   the	   Middle	   East.	  	  London	  ;	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2012.	  ———.	  "Monism	  and	  Monotheism	  in	  Al-­‐Ghazālī's	  Mishkāt	  Al-­‐Anwār."	  Journal	  of	  Quranic	  
Studies	  9,	  no.	  1	  (2007):	  1-­‐27.	  Turner,	   Denys.	  Eros	  and	  Allegory	   :	  Medieval	  Exegesis	  of	   the	  Song	  of	  Songs.	   	   Kalamazoo,	  Mich.:	  Cistercian,	  1995.	  Underhill,	  Evelyn.	  The	  Essentials	  of	  Mysticism	  :	  And	  Other	  Essays.	  	  London:	  Dent,	  1920.	  ———.	  The	  Mystic	  Way	  :	  A	  Psychological	  Study	  in	  Christian	  Origins.	  	  London:	  Dent,	  1913.	  ———.	   Mysticism	   :	   A	   Study	   in	   the	   Nature	   and	   Development	   of	   Man's	   Spiritual	  
Consciousness.	  2nd	  ed.	  	  London:	  Methuen,	  1911.	  ———.	  The	  Mystics	  of	  the	  Church.	  	  Cambridge:	  James	  Clarke,	  1975.	  ———.	  Practical	  Mysticism	  :	  A	  Little	  Book	  for	  Normal	  People.	  	  Guildford:	  Eagle,	  1991.	  ———.	  The	  Spiritual	  Life	  :	  Four	  Broadcast	  Talks	  by	  Evelyn	  Underhill.	   	  London:	  Hodder	  &	  Stoughton,	  1937.	  Van	  Den	  Bergh,	  Simon.	  "The	  "Love	  of	  God"	  in	  Ghazali's	  Vivification	  of	  Theology."	  Journal	  
of	  Semitic	  Studies	  1,	  no.	  4	  (1956):	  305-­‐21.	  Waardenburg,	  Jacques.	  Classical	  Approaches	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion	  :	  Aims,	  Methods,	  and	  
Theories	  of	  Research.	  	  New	  York:	  Walter	  de	  Gruyter,	  1999.	  Wainwright,	   William	   J.	   Mysticism	   :	   A	   Study	   of	   Its	   Nature,	   Cognitive	   Value	   and	   Moral	  
Implications.	  	  Brighton:	  Wayland,	  1981.	  Watt,	  John	  W.	  "Commentary	  and	  Translation	  in	  Syriac	  Aristotelian	  Scholarship:	  Sergius	  to	  Baghdad."	  Journal	  for	  Late	  Antique	  Religion	  and	  Culture	  4	  (2010):	  28-­‐42.	  ———.	  "From	  Sergius	  to	  Mattā:	  Aristotle	  and	  Pseudo-­‐Dionysius	  in	  Syriac	  Tradition	  ".	  In	  
Interpreting	   the	   Bible	   and	   Aristotle	   in	   Late	   Antiquity	   :	   The	   Alexandrian	  
Commentary	  Tradition	  between	  Rome	  and	  Baghdad,	   edited	  by	   Josef	   Lössl	   and	   J.	  W.	  Watt,	  239-­‐58.	  Farnham,	  Surrey,	  England	  ;	  Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate,	  2011.	  ———.	   "Greek	   Philosophy	   and	   Syriac	   Culture	   in	   ‘Abbasid	   Iraq."	   In	   The	   Christian	  
Heritage	  of	  Iraq	  :	  Collected	  Papers	  from	  the	  Christianity	  of	  Iraq	  I-­‐V	  Seminar	  Days,	  edited	   by	   Erica	   C.	   D.	   Hunter.	   Gorgias	   Eastern	   Christian	   Studies,	   10-­‐37.	  Piscataway,	  NJ:	  Gorgias	  Press,	  2009.	  Wear,	  Sarah	  Klitenic.	  "Another	  Link	  in	  the	  Golden	  Chain:	  Aeneas	  of	  Gaza	  and	  Zacharias	  Scholasticus	   on	   Plotinus	   Enn.	   4.3."	   Greek,	   Roman	   and	   Byzantine	   Studies	   53	  (2013):	  145-­‐65.	  Weber,	  Max.	  Economy	  and	  Society	  :	  An	  Outline	  of	  Interpretive	  Sociology	   	   [Wirtschaft	  und	  Gesellschaft.].	   Translated	   by	   Ephraim	   Fischoff.	   	   New	   York:	   Bedminster	   Press,	  1968.	  ———.	   The	   Methodology	   of	   the	   Social	   Sciences.	   Translated	   by	   Henry	   A.	   Finch	   and	  Edward	  A.	  Shils.	  	  New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1949.	  ———.	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Religion.	  	  Boston,	  Mass.:	  Beacon,	  1993.	  Weeraperuma,	   Claudia.	   Contemplative	   Prayer	   in	   Christianity	   and	   Islam.	   	   Delhi:	   ISPCK,	  2003.	  Weltecke,	  Dorothea.	   "On	   the	  Syriac	  Orthodox	   in	   the	  Principality	  of	  Antioch	  During	   the	  Crusader	  Period."	  Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  East	  and	  West	  in	  the	  Medieval	  Eastern	  Mediterranean	   I	   :	   Antioch	   from	   the	  Byzantine	  Reconquest	   until	   the	   end	   of	   the	  Crusader	  Principality,	  Leuven,	  2003.	  
	   265	  
———.	  "A	  Renaissance	  in	  Historiography?	  Patriarch	  Michael,	  the	  Anonymous	  Chronicle	  Ad	  A.	  1234,	  and	  Bar	  Ebroyo."	   In	  The	  Syriac	  Renaissance,	  edited	  by	  Herman	  G.	  B	  Teule,	  Tauwinkel	  C.	  Fortescu,	  ter	  Haar	  Romeney	  R.B.	  and	  J.J.	  van	  Ginkiel.	  Eastern	  Christian	  Studies,	  95-­‐112.	  Leuven:	  Peeters,	  2010.	  Widengren,	   G.	   "Researches	   in	   Syrian	   Mysticism:	   Mystical	   Experiences	   and	   Spiritual	  Exercises."	  Numen	  8,	  no.	  3	  (1961):	  161-­‐98.	  Wilks,	  Marina.	  "Jacob	  of	  Edessa's	  Use	  of	  Greek	  Philosophy	  in	  His	  Hexaemaron."	  In	  Jacob	  
of	   Edessa	   and	   the	   Syriac	   Culture	   of	   His	   Day,	   edited	   by	   R.	   B.	   ter	   Haar	   Romeny.	  Monographs	   of	   the	   Peshitta	   Institute,	   Leiden,	   223-­‐38.	   Leiden	   ;	   Boston:	   Brill,	  2008.	  Winch,	  Peter.	  The	  Idea	  of	  a	  Social	  Science,	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Philosophy.	  2nd	  ed.	  	  London:	  Routledge,	  1990.	  Zaehner,	   R.	   C.	  Hindu	  &	  Muslim	  Mysticism.	   	   Oxford:	  Oneworld	   by	   arrangement	  with	   the	  School	  of	  Oriental	  and	  African	  Studies,	  1994.	  ———.	  Mysticism,	  Sacred	  and	  Profane	  :	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  Some	  Varieties	  of	  Praeter-­‐Natural	  
Experience.	  	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1957.	  Zonta,	   Mauro.	   "Structure	   and	   Sources	   of	   Bar-­‐Hebraeus'	   "Practical	   Philosophy"	   in	   the	  
Cream	   of	   Science."	   Paper	   presented	   at	   the	   Symposium	   Syriacum	   VII,	   Uppsala,	  1996.	  ———.	   "Syriac,	   Hebrew	   and	   Latin	   Encyclopedia	   in	   the	   13th	   Century:	   A	   Comparative	  Approach	   to	   "Medieval	   Philosophies"."	   Paper	   presented	   at	   the	   Was	   ist	  Philosophie	  im	  Mittelalter?	  =	  Qu'est-­‐ce	  que	  la	  philosophie	  au	  Moyen	  Âge?	  =	  What	  is	  Philosophy	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages?,	  Erfurt,	  25-­‐30	  August	  1997.	  	  	  
